rft 


THE  DISCOURSES 


WITH   THE 


ENCHEIRIDION  AND  FRAGMENTS. 


TXAA'SLATED,    WITH  NOTES,   A   LIFE   OF   EPICTETUS, 
AND  A    VIEW  OF  HIS  PHILOSOPHY. 


BY  GEORGE  LONG,   M.A. 


DOXOHUE   BROTHERS 

CHICAGO — NEW  YORK 


EPICTETUS. 


VERY  little  is  known  of  the  life  of  Epictetus.  It  is  said 
that  he  was  a  native  of  Hierapolis,  in  Phrygia,  a  town  be- 
tween the  Maeander  and  a  branch  of  the  Ma^ander  named 
the  Lycus.  Hierapolis  is  mentioned  in  the  epistle  of  Paul 
to  the  people  of  Colossae  (Coloss.  iv.  13 ) ;  from  which  it 
has  been  concluded  that  there  was  a  Christian  church  in 
Hierapolis  at  the  time  of  the  apostle.  The  date  of  the  birth 
of  Kpictetus  is  unknown.  The  only  recorded  fact  of  his 
early  life  is  that  he  was  a  slave  in  Rome,  and  his  master  was 
Epaphroditus,  a  profligate  freedman  of  the  emperor  Xero. 
There  is  a  story  that  the  master  broke  his  slave's  leg  by  tor- 
turing him  :  but  it  is  better  to  trust  to  the  evidence  of  Sim- 
plicius,  the  commentator  on  the  Encheiridion  or  Manual,  who 
says  that  Epictetus  was  weak  in  body  and  lame  from  an  early 
age.  It  is  not  said  how  he  became  a  slave  ;  but  it  has  been 
asserted  in  modern  times  that  the  parents  sold  the  child.  I 
have  not,  however,  found  any  authority  for  this  statement. 

It  may  be  supposed  that  the  young  slave  showed  intel- 
ligence, for  his  master  sent  or  permitted  him  to  attend  the 
lectures  of  C.  Musonius  Rufus,  an  eminent  Stoic  philoso- 
pher. It  may  seem  strange  that  such  a  master  should  have 
wished  to  have  his  slave  made  into  a  philosopher  ;  but 
Garnier,  the  author  of  a  Memoire  sur  les  ouvrages  d'Epictete, 
explains  this  matter  very  well  in  a  communication  to  Schweig- 
haeuser.  Gamier  says :  "  Epictetus,  born  at  Hierapolis 
of  Phrygia  of  poor  parents,  was  indebted  apparently  for  the 

iii 

2040787 


iv  EPIC  TE  TUB. 

advantages  of  a  good  education  to  the  whim,  which  was  com- 
mon at  the  end  of  the  Republic  and  under  the  first  emp( 
among  the  great  of  Rome  to  reckon  among  their  numerous 
slaves  Grammarians,  Poets,  Rhetoricians,  and  Philosophers, 
in  the  same  way  as  rich  financiers  in  these  later  ages  have  been 
led  to  form  at  a  great  cost  rich  and  numerous  libraries.  This 
supposition  is  the  only  one  which  can  explain  to  us,  how  a 
wretched  child,  born  as  poor  as  Irus,  had  received  a  good 
education,  and  how  a  rigid  Stoic  was  the  slave  of  Epaphro- 
ditus,  one  of  the  officers  of  the  imperial  guard.  For  we 
cannot  suspect  that  it  was  through  predilection  for  the  Stoic 
doctrine  -and  for  his  own  use,  that  the  confidant  and  the 
minister  of  the  debaucheries  of  Nero  would  have  desired  to 
possess  such  a  slave." 

Some  writers  assume  that  Epictetus  was  manumitted  by 
his  master;  but  I  can  find  no  evidence  for  this  statement. 
Epaphroditus  accompanied  Nero  when  he  fled  from  Rome 
before  his  enemies,  and  he  aided  the  miserable  tyrant  in 
killing  himself.  Domitian  (Sueton.  Domit.  14)  afterward 
put  Epaphroditus  to  death  for  this  service  to  'Nero.  We  may 
conclude  that  Epictetus  in  some  way  obtained  his  freedom, 
and  that  he  began  to  teach  at  Rome  ;  but  after  the  expulsion 
of  the  philosophers  from  Rome  by  Domitian,  A.  D.  89,  he 
retired  to  Nicopolis  in  Epirus,  a  city  built  by  Augustus  to 
commemorate  the  victory  at  Actium.  Epictetus  opened  a 
school  or  lecture-room  at  Nicopolis,  where  he  taurjht  till  he 
was  an  old  man.  The  time  of  his  death  is  unknown.  Epic- 
tetus was  never  married,  as  we  learn  from  Lucian  (Demonax, 
c.  55,  Tom.  ii.  ed.  Hemsterh.  p.  393).*  When  Epictetus 
was  finding  fault  with  Demonax  and  advising  him  to  take  a 
wife  and  beget  children,  for  this  also,  as  Epictetus  said,  was 
a  philosopher's  duty,  to  leave  in  place  of  himself  another  in 
the  universe,  Demonax  refuted  the  doctrine  by  answering, 
Give  me  then,  Epictetus,  one  of  your  own  daughters.  Sim- 
*  Lucian 's  "  Life  of  the  Philosopher  Dement^.." 


EPICTE  TUS.  v 

plicius  says  (Comment,  c.  46,  p.  432,  ed.  Schweigh.)  that 
Epictetus  lived  alone  a  long  time.  At  last  he  took  a  woman 
into  his  house  as  a  nurse  for  a  child,  which  one  of  Epictetus' 
friends  was  going  to  expose  on  account  of  his  poverty,  bui 
Epictetus  took  the  child  and  brought  it  up. 

Epictetus  wrote  nothing  ;  and  all  that  we  have  under  his 
name  was  written  by  an  affectionate  pupil,  Arrian,  afterward 
the  historian  of  Alexander  the  Great,  who,  as  he  tells  us, 
took  down  in  writing  the  philosopher's  discourses  (the  Epistle 
of  Arrian  to  Lucius  Gellius,  p.  i ).  These  discourses  formed 
eight  books,  but  only  four  are  extant  under  the  title  of 
'ETTIKTJITOV  Siarpi^a.1.  Simplicius,  in  his  .  commentary  on  the 
'E-yxeipiSio*  or  Manual,  states  that  this  work  also  was  put  to- 
gether by  Arrian,  who  selected  from  the  discourses  of  Epic- 
tetus what  he  considered  to  be  most  useful,  and  most  neces- 
sary, and  most  adapted  to  move  men's  minds.  Simplicius 
also  says  that  the  contents  of  the  Encheiridion  are  found 
nearly  together  and  in  the  same  words  in  various  parts  of  the 
Discourses.  Arrian  also  wrote  a  work  on  the  life  and  death 
of  Epictetus.  The  events  of  the  philosopher's  studious  life 
were  probably  not  many  nor  remarkable  ;  but  we  should  have 
been  glad  if  this  work  had  been  preserved,  which  told,  as  Sim- 
plicius says,  what  kind  of  man  Epictetus  was. 

Photius  (Biblioth.  58)  mentions  among  Arrian's  works  Con- 
versations with  Epictetus,  <  Ofj.i\lai  'ET^TOV  in  twelve  books. 
Upton  thinks  that  this  work  is  only  another  name  for  the 
Discourses,  and  that  Photius  has  made  the  mistake  of  taking 
the  Conversations  to  be  a  different  work  from  the  Discourses. 
Yet  Photius  has  enumerated  eight  books  of  the  Discourses 
and  twelve  books  of  the  Conversations.  Schweighaeuser 
observes  that  Photius  had  not  seen  these  works  of  Arrian  on 
Epictetus,  for  so  he  concludes  from  the  brief  notice  of  these 
works  by  Photius.  The  fact  is  that  Photius  does  not  say 
that  he  had  read  these  books,  as  he  generally  does  when  he 
is  speaking  of  the  books,  which  he  enumerates  in  his  Biblio- 


v 

theca.  '1'he  conclusion  is  that  we  are  not  certain  that  there 
was  a  work  of  Arrian,  entitled  the  Conversations  of  Epic- 
tetus. 

The  Discourses  of  Epictetus  with  the  Encheiridion  and 
Fragments  were  translated  into  English  by  the  learned  lady 
Mrs.  Elizabeth  Carter;  who  is  said  to  have  lived  to  the  age 
of  eighty-nine.  The  fourth  edition  (1807)  contains  the  trans- 
lator's last  additions  and  alterations.  There  is  an  Intro- 
duction to  this  translation  which  contains  a  summary  view  of 
the  Stoic  philosophy  for  the  purpose  of  explaining  Epictetus  ; 
and  also  there  are  notes  to  the  translation.  The  editor  of 
this  fourth  edition  says  that  "  the  Introduction  and  notes  of 
the  Christian  translator  of  Epictetus  are,  in  the  estimation  of 
most  readers,  not  the  least  valuable  parts  of  the  work  :  "  and 
he  adds  "  this  was  also  the  opinion  of  the  late  Archbishop 
Seeker,  who  though  he  thought  very  highly  of  the  Philosophy 
of  Epictetus,  considered  the  Introduction  and  notes  as  ad- 
mirably calculated  to  prevent  any  mistake  concerning  it,  as 
well  as  to  amend  and  instruct  the  world."  The  Introduction 
is  certainly  useful,  though  it  is  not  free  from  errors.  I  do 
not  think  that  the  notes  are  valuable.  I  have  used  some  of 
them  without  any  remarks  ;  and  I  have  used  others  and  made 
some  remarks  on  them  where  I  thought  that  Mrs.  Carter  was 
mistaken  in  her  opinion  of  the  original  text,  or  on  other 
matters. 

The  translation  of  Mrs.  Carter  is  good  ;  and  perhaps  no 
Englishman  at  that  time  would  have  made  a  better  transla- 
tion. I  intended  at  first  to  revise  Mrs.  Carter's  translation, 
and  to  correct  any  errors  that  I  might  discover.  I  had  re- 
vised about  half  of  it,  when  I  found  that  I  was  not  satisfied 
with  my  work  ;  and  I  was  advised  by  a  learned  friend  to 
translate  the  whole  myself.  This  was  rather  a  great  under- 
taking for  an  old  man,  who  is  now  past  seventy-six.  I  have 
however  done  the  work  with  great  care,  and  as  well  as  I 
could.  I  have  always  compared  my  translation  with  the 


F.riCTKTUS.  vii 

Latin  version  and  with  Mrs.  Carter's  ;  and  I  thin*  that  this 
is  the  best  way  of  avoiding  errors  such  as  any  translator  may 
make.  A  man  who  has  not  attempted  to  translate  a  Greek 
or  Latin  author  does  not  know  the  difficulty  of  the  undertak- 
ing. That  which  may  appear  plain  when  he  reads  often 
becomes  very  difficult  when  he  tries  to  express  it  in  another 
language.  It  is  true  that  Epictetus  is  generally  intelligible  ; 
but  the  style  or  manner  of  the  author,  or  we  may  say  of 
Arrian,  who  attempted  to  produce  what  he  heard,  is  some- 
times made  obscure  by  the  continual  use  of  questions  and 
answers  to  them,  and  for  other  reasons. 

Upton  remarks  that  ''  there  are  many  passages  in  these 
dissertations  which  are  ambiguous  or  rather  confused  on 
account  of  the  small  questions,  and  because  the  matter  is  not 
expanded  by  oratorical  copiousness,  not  to  mention  other 
causes."  The  discourses  of  Epictetus,  it  is  supposed,  were 
spoken  extempore,  and  so  one  thing  after  another  would 
come  into  the  thoughts  of  the  speaker  (Wolf).  Schweig- 
haeuser  also  observes  in  a  note  (11.336  of  his  edition)  that  the 
connection  of  the  discourse  is  sometimes  obscure  through 
the  omission  of  some  words  which  are  necessary  to  indicate 
the  connection  of  the  thoughts.  The  reader  then  will  find 
that  he  cannot  always  understand  Epictetus,  if  he  does  not 
read  him  very  carefully,  and  some  passages  more  than  once. 
He  must  also  think  and  reflect,  or  he  will  miss  the  meaning. 
I  do  not  say  that  the  book  is  worth  all  this  trouble.  Every 
man  must  judge  for  himself.  But  1  should  not  have  trans- 
lated the  book,  if  I  had  not  thought  it  worth  study  ;  and  I 
think  that  all  books  of  this  kind  require  careful  reading,  if 
they  are  worth  reading  at  all. 

The  text  of  Epictetus  is  sometimes  corrupted,  and  this 
corruption  causes  a  few  difficulties.  However,  these  diffi- 
culties are  not  numerous  enough  to  cause  or  to  admit  much 
variety  or  diversity  in  the  translations  of  the  text.  This 
remark  will  explain  why  many  parts  of  my  translation  are 


yiii  KPICTETUS. 

the  same  or  nearly  the  same  as  Mrs.  Carter's.  When  this 
happened,  I  did  not  think  it  necessary  to  alter  my  transla- 
tion in  order  that  it  might  not  be  the  same  as  hers.  I 
made  my  translation  first,  and  then  compared  it  with  Mrs. 
Carter's  and  the  Latin  version.  I  hope  that  I  have  not 
made  many  blunders.  I  do  not  suppose  that  I  have  made 
none. 

The  last  and  best  edition  of  the  Discourses,  the  Enchei- 
ridion,  and  the  fragments  is  by  J.  Schweighaeuser  in  6  vols. 
8vo.  This  edition  contains  the  commentary  of  Simplicius 
on  the  Encheiridion,  and  two  volumes  of  useful  notes  on 
the  Discourses.  These  notes  are  selected  from  those  ot 
Wolf,  Upton,  and  a  few  from  other  commentators  ;  but  a 
large  part  are  by  Schweighaeuser  himself,  who  was  an  ex- 
cellent scholar  and  a  very  sensible  man.  I  have  read  all 
these  notes,  and  I  have  used  them.  Many  of  the  notes  to 
the  translation  are  my  own. 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  EPICTETUS. 


I  HAVE  made  a  large  Index  to  this  book ;  and  any  person, 
who  has  the  necessary  industry,  may  find  in  it  almost  every 
passage  in  the  Discourses  in  which  the  opinions  of  the  phi- 
losopher are  stated ;  and  thus  he  may  acquire  a  general 
notion  of  the  philosophical  system  of  Epictetus.  But  few 
readers  will  have  the  time  and  the  inclination  for  this  labor, 
and  therefore  I  shall  attempt  to  do  the  work  for  them. 

I  have  found  two  "expositions  of  the  system  of  Epictetus. 
One  is  by  Dr.  Heinrich  Ritter  in  his  Geschichte  der  Phi- 
losophic alter  Zeit,  Vierter  Theil,  1839.  The  other  is  by 
Professor  Christian  A.  Brandis.*  Both  of  these  expositions 
are  useful ;  and  I  have  used  them.  I  do  not  think  that 
either  of  them  is  complete,  nor  will  mine  be.  I  shall 
not  make  my  exposition  exactly  in  the  same  form  as  either 
of  them ;  nor  shall  I  begin  it  in  the  same  way. 

Ritter  has  prefixed  a  short  sketch  of  C.  Musonius  Rufus, 
a  Roman  Stoic,  to  his  exposition  of  the  system  of  Epictetus. 
Rufus  taught  at  Rome  under  the  emperor  'Nero,  who  drove 
him  from  Rome  ;  but  Rufus  returned  after  the  tyrant's 
death,  and  lived  to  the  times  of  Vespasian  and  his  son  Titus. 
He  acquired  great  reputation  as  a  teacher,  but  there  is  no 
evidence  that  he  wrote  anything,  and  all  that  we  know  of  his 
doctrines  is  from  a  work  of  Pollio  in  Greek,  which  was 

*  Article  EPICTETUS  in  the  "Dictionary  of  Greek  and  Roman  L'i« 
ography,"  etc.,  edited  by  Doctor  William  Smith. 

ix 


X  EPICTETUS. 

written  after  the  model  of.  Xenophon's    Memorabilia  of  Soc- 
rates.    Of  this  work  there  are  many  fragments.* 

Rufus  taught  a  practical  philosophy,  one  that  was  useful 
for  the  purposes  of  life,  and  for  the  life  of  a  philosopher  who 
was  not  hindered  by  following  the  common  occupations 
of  mankind  from  philosophizing  and  aiding  others  to  phil- 
osophize, t  He  urged  young  men  especially  to  the  study  of 
philosophy,  and  even  women,  because  without  philosophy 
no  person  can  be  virtuous  and  do  his  duty.  He  asks,  what 
hinders  the  scholar  from  working  with  his  teacher  and  at  the 
same  time  learning  from  him  something  about  moderation 
(<ru<ppoffvnj)  and  justice  and  endurance  ?  His  belief  in  the 
power  of  philosophy  over  men's  minds  was  strong,  and  he 
was  convinced  that  it  was  a  perfect  cure  for  the  corruption 
of  mankind.  He  showed  the  firmness  of  this  conviction  on 
an  occasion  which  is  recorded  by  Tacitus  (Hist.  iii.  81). 
He  endeavored  to  mediate  between  the  partisans  of  Yitellius 
who  were  in  Rome,  and  the  army  of  Vespasian,  which  was 
before  the  gates  :  but  he  failed  in  his  attempt.  His  be- 
havior was  like  that  of  a  modern  Christian,  who  should  attempt 
to  enforce  the  Christian  doctrines  of  peace  on  men  whc*  are 
arrayed  against  one  another  with  arms  in  their  hands.  Such 
a  Christian  would  be  called  a  fanatic  now  ;  and  Tacitus,  who 
was  himself  a  philosopher,  gives  to  the  behavior  of  Rufus 
the  mild  term  of  "  intempestivam  "  or  "  unseasonable." 
The  judgment  of  Tacitus  was  right :  the  behavior  of  Rufus 

*  See  the  "  Fragments  from  Stobsus,"  cited  by  Rkter  in  his  notes 
(Vierter  Theil,  p.  204).  The  notice  of  lliti\iwv,  as  he  is  named,  in 
Suidas,  is  not  satisfactory.  It  speaks  of  the  ' ' XiroiJLin^fMvtv^ara.  ot 
Musonius  by  Polio  or  Pollio  ;  and  yet  it  states  that  Pollio  taught  at 
Rome  in  the  time  of  Pompeius  Magnus.  See  Clinton,  Fasti,  iii. 
p.  550. 

1  "  It  would  be  a  strange  thing  indeed  if  the  cultivation  of  the  earth 
hindered  a  man  from  philosophizing  or  aiding  others  to  philosophise  " 
(Stobaeus) 


RPICTF.Trs.  Xt 

was  unseasonable,  as  the  result  proved  :  but  the  attempt  of 
Rufus  was  the  act  of  a  good  man. 

Rufus  did  not  value  Dialectic  or  Logic  so  highly  as  the 
old  Stoics ;  but  he  did  not  undervalue  it,  and  he  taught 
that  a  man  should  learn  how  to  deal  with  sophistical  argu- 
ments, as  we  learn  from  Epictetus  (I.  c.  7  at  the  end). 

In  his  teaching  about  the  Gods  he  follows  the  general 
Stoic  practice  of  maintaining  the  popular  religion.  He 
taught  that  nothing  was  unknown  to  the  Gods  :  as  Socrates 
(Xenophon,  Mem.  i.  c.  i)  taught  that  the  Gods  knew  every- 
thing, what  was  said,  what  was  done,  and  what  men  thought. 
He  considered  the  souls  of  men  to  be  akin  to  the  gods; 
but  as  they  were  mingled  with  the  body,  the  soul  must  par- 
take of  the  impurities  of  the  body.  The  intelligent  principle 
(Stdwio)  is  free  from  all  necessity  (compulsion)  and  self- 
sufficient  (ai/rt£owr«>j).  \Ve  can  only  conjecture  that  Rufus 
did  not  busy  himself  about  either  Dialectic  or  Physic  ;  for 
he  said  that  philosophizing  was  nothing  else  than  an  inquiry 
about  what  is  becoming  and  conformable  to  duty ;  an  in- 
quiry which  is  conducted  by  reason,  and  the  result  is  exhib- 
ited in  practice. 

The  old  Stoics  considered  virtue  to  be  the  property  only 
of  the  wise  man ;  and  they  even  doubted  whether  such  a 
man  could  be  found.  But  Rufus  said  that  it  was  not  impos- 
sible for  such  a  man  to  exist,  for  we  cannot  conceive  such 
virtues  as  a  wise  man  possesses  otherwise  than  from  the  ex- 
amples of  human  nature  itself  and  by  meeting  with  men 
such  as  those  who  are  named  divine  and  godlike.  The 
Stoical  doctrine  that  man  should  live  according  to  nature  is 
not  pressed  so  hard  by  Rufus  as  by  some  Stoics,  and  he 
looks  on  a  life  which  is  conformable  to  nature  as  not  very 
difficult ;  but  he  admits  that  those  who  attempt  philosophy 
have  been  trained  from  youth  in  great  corruption  and  rilled 
with  wickedness,  and  so  when  they  seek  after  virtue  they  re- 
quire more-  discipline  or  practice.  Accordingly  he  views 


philosophy  as  a  spiritual  medicine,  and  gives  more  weight  to 
the  practice  or  exercise  of  virtue  than  the  older  Stoics  dici. 
The  knowledge  and  the  teaching  of  what  is  good,  he  says, 
should  come  first  ;  but  Rufus  did  not  believe  that  the  knowl- 
edge of  the  Good  was  strong  enough  without  practice  (dis- 
cipline) to  lead  to  moral  conduct,  and  consequently  he  be- 
lieved that  practice  has  greater  efficacy  than  teaching.*  He 
makes  two  kinds  of  exercise  :  first,  the  exercise  of  the  soul  in 
thinking,  in  reflecting  and  in  stamping  on  the  mind  sound 
rules  of  life  ;  and  second,  in  the  enduring  of  bodily  labors  or 
pain,  in  which  act  of  endurance  the  soul  and  the  body  act 
together. 

"  The  sum  of  his  several  rules  of  life,"  says  Ritter,  "  may 
be  thus  briefly  expressed  :  in  his  opinion  a  life  according  to 
Nature  results  in  a  social,  philanthropic  and  contented  state 
of  mind,  joined  to  the  most  simple  satisfaction  of  our  neces- 
sary wants.  We  see  his  social  and  philanthropic  disposition 
in  this  that  he  opposes  all  selfishness  (selbstsucht),  that  he 

*  I  have  followed  the  exposition  of  Ritter  here.  Perhaps  a  literal 
translation  of  the  Greek  is  still  better  :  "  Reason  which  teaches  how  we 
should  act  co-operates  with  practice,  and  reason  (or  teaching)  comes  in 
order  before  custom  (habit)  or  practice  :  for  it  is  not  possible  to  become 
habituated  to  anything  good  if  a  person  is  not  habituated  by  reason  (by 
teaching) ;  in  power  indeed  the  habit  (practice)  has  the  advantage  over 
teaching,  for  habit  (practice)  is  more  efficacious  in  leading  a  man  to  act 
(properly)  than  reason  is."  I  have  given  the  meaning  of  the  Greek  as 
accurately  as  I  can.  In  our  modern  education  we  begin  with  teaching 
general  rules,  or  principles  or  beliefs  ;  and  there  we  stop.  The  result  is 
what  might  be  expected.  Practice  or  the  habit  of  doing  what  we  ought 
to  do  is  neglected.  The  teachers  are  teachers  of  words  and  no  more. 
They  are  the  men  whom  Epictetus  (iii.  21,  note)  describes  :  "  You  have 
committed  to  memory  the  words  only,  and  you  say,  Sacred  are  the 
words  by  themselves."  See  p.  269,  note.  It  is  one  of  the  greatest 
merits  of  Rufus  that  he  laid  down  the  principle  which  is  expended 
above ;  and  it  is  the  greatest  demerit  of  our  system  of  teaching  that  the 
principle  is  generally  neglected  :  and  most  particularly  by  those  teacherg 
who  proclaim  ostentatiously  that  they  give  a  religious  education. 


EPICTETUS.  xiii 

views  marriage  not  only  as  the  sole  right  and  natural  satis- 
faction of  the  sexual  feelings,  but  also  as  the  foundation  of. 
family,  of  a  state,  and  of  the  continuation  of  the  human 
race  ;  and  accordingly  he  declares  himself  against  the  ex- 
posure of  children  as  an  unnatural  practice  ;  and  he  often 
recommends  beneficence.'' 

Epictetus  was  a  pupil  of  this  noble  Roman  teacher,  whose 
name  occurs  several  times  in  the  Discourses.  Ritter  con- 
jectures that  Epictetus  also  heard  Euphrates,  whom  he  highly 
commends.  It  has  been  justly  said,  though  Epictetus  is 
named  a  Stoic,  and  that  his  principles  are  Stoical,  he  is  not 
purely  a  Stoic.  He  learned  from  other  teachers  as  well  as 
the  Stoic.  He  quotes  the  teaching  and  example  of  Socrates 
continually,  and  the  example  of  Diogenes  the  Cynic,  both  of 
whom  he  mentions  more  frequently  than  Zeno  the  founder 
of  the  Stoic  philosophy.  He  also  valued  Plato,  who  accepted 
from  Socrates  many  of  his  principles,  and  developed  and  ex- 
panded them.  So  Epictetus  learned  that  the  beginning  of 
philosophy  is  man's  knowledge  of  himself  (yi&Ot  09*0*9*^ 
and  the  acknowledgment  of  his  own  ignorance  and  weakness. 
He  teaches  (i.  c.  17  ;  ii.  c.  14;  ii.  c.  10)  that  the  examination 
of  names,  the  understanding  of  the  notion,  of  the  conception 
of  a  thing,  is  the  beginning  of  education  :  he  consistently 
teaches  that  we  ought  to  pity  those  who  do  wrong,  for  they 
•err  in  ignorance  (i.  c.  18  ;  ii.  c.  22,  p.  202);  and,  as  Plato 
says,  every  mind  is  deprived  of  truth  unwillingly.  Epictetus 
strongly  opposes  the  doctrines  of  Epicurus,  of  the  newer 
Academics,  and  of  Pyrrho,  the  great  leader  of  the  Skeptical 
school  (i.  c.  5,  c.  23  ;  ii.  c.  20).  He  has  no  taste  for  the  sub- 
tle discussions  of  these  men.  He  says  (p.  89),  "  Let  the  fol- 
lowers of  Pyrrho  and  the  Academics  come  and  make  their 
objections.  For  I,  as  to  my  part,  have  no  leisure  for  these 
disputes,  nor  am  I  able  to  undertake  the  defense  of  common 
consent  (opinion)."  "  How  indeed  perception  is  effected, 
whether  through  the  whole  body  or  any  part,  perhaps  I  can- 


xv 

not  explain  ;  for  both  opinions  perplex  me.  But  that  you 
and  I  are  not  the  same,  I  know  with  perfect  certainty.  How 
do  you  know  it  ?  When  I  intend  to  swallow  anything,  I 
never  carry  it  to  your  mouth,  but  to  my  own.  And  you 
yourselves  (the  Pyrrhonists),  who  take  away  the  evidence  of 
the  senses,  do  you  act  otherwise  ?  Who  among  you,  when 
he  intended  to  enter  a  bath,  ever  went  into  a  mill?''  He 
also  says  (ii.  c.  20)  that  "  the  propositions  which  are  true 
and  evident  are  of  necessity  used  even  by  those  who  contra- 
dict them;  and  a  man  might  perhaps  consider  it  to  be  the 
greatest  proof  of  a  thing  being  evident  that  it  is  found  to 
be  necessary  even  for  him  who  denies  it  to  make  use  of  it 
at  the  same  time.  For  instance,  if  a  man  should  deny  that 
anything  is  universally  true,  it  is  plain  that  he  must  make 
the  contradictory  negation,  that  nothing  is  universally  true." 
Kpictetus  did  not  undervalue  Dialectic  or  Logic,  and  the 
solution  of  what  are  called  Sophistical  and  Hypothetical 
arguments  (i.  c.  7) ;  but  he  considered  the  handling  of  all 
such  arguments  as  a  thing  relating  to  the  duties  of  life,  and 
as  a  means  toward  Ethic,  or  the  practice  of  morals.  Rufus 
said,  "  for  a  man  to  use  the  appearances  presented  to  him 
rashly  and  foolishly  and  carelessly,  and  not  to  understand 
argument  nor  demonstration  nor  sophism,  nor,  in  a  word,  to 
see  in  questioning  and  answering  what  is  consistent  with 
that  which  we  have  granted  or  is  not  consistent :  is  there  no 
error  in  this?''  Accordingly  Dialectic  is  not  the  object  of 
our  life,  but  it  is  a  means  for  distinguishing  between  true 
and  false  appearances,  and  for  ascertaining  the  validity  of 
evidence,  and  it  gives  us  security  in  our  judgments.  It  is 
the  application  of  these  things  to  the  purposes  of  life  which 
is  the  first  and  necessary  part  of  philosophy.  So  he  says 
in  the  Encheiridion  (LI.)  :  "  The  first  and  most  necessary 
place  in  philosophy  is  the  use  of  theorems  ("precepts),  for  in- 
stance, That  we  must  not  lie  :  the  second  is  that  of  demon- 
stration, for  instance,  How  is  it  proved  that  we  oujjht  not  to 


EPTCTETUS.  xv 

lie  :  the  third  is  that  which  is  confirmatory  of  these  two  and 
explanatory,  for  example,  How  is  this  a  demonstration  ?  " 
The  philosophy  of  Epictetus  is  in  fact  only  the  way  of  living 
as  a  man  ought  to  live,  according  to  his  nature. 

Epictetus  accordingly  views  that  part  of  the  Stoic  teach- 
ing, named  Physic  or  the  Nature  of  things,  also  as  subor- 
dinate to  his  philosophy,  which  is  purely  Ethical.  We  ought 
to  live  according  to  Nature,  and  therefore  we  must  inquire 
what  the  Law  of  Nature  is.  The  contemplation  of  the  order 
of  things  is  the  duty  of  man,  and  to  observe  this  wonderful 
system  of  which  man  is  a  part ;  but  the  purpose  of  the  con- 
templation and  the  observation  is  that  we  may  live  a  life 
such  as  we  ought  to  live.  He  says  (Frag.  CLXXV.),  "  What 
do  I  care  whether  all  things  are  composed  of  atoms  or  of 
similar  parts,  or  of  fire  and  earth  ?  for  is  it  not  enough  to 
know  the  nature  of  the  good  and  the  evil,  and  the  measures 
of  the  desires  and  aversions,  and  also  the  movements  toward 
things  and  from  them  ;  and  using  these  as  rules  to  administer 
the  affairs  of  life,  but  not  to  trouble  ourselves  about  the 
things  above  us  ?  For  these  things  are  perhaps  incom- 
prehensible to  the  human  mind  :  and  if  any  man  should  even 
suppose  them  to  be  in  the  highest  degree  comprehensible, 
what  then  is  the  profit  of  them,  if  they  are  comprehended  ? 
And  must  we  not  say  that  those  men  have  needless  trouble 
who  assign  these  things  as  necessary  to  a  philosopher's  dis- 
course ?  Epictetus  then  did  not  value  the  inquiries  of  the 
Physical  philosophers,  or  he  had  no  taste  for  tlu-m.  His 
Philosophy  was  Ethical,  and  his  inquiry  was.  What  is  the 
rule  of  life  ? 

'•  With  respect  to  gods,"  says  Epictetus  <i.  c.  12),  -'there 
are  some  who  say  that  a  divine  being  does  not  exist  :  others 
say  that  it  exists,  but  it  is  inactive  and  careless,  and  takes 
no  forethought  about  anything  ;  a  third  class  say  such  a 
exists  and  ex-n  is<-s  forethought,  but  only  about  gre.it 
things  and  heavenly  things,  and  about  nothing  on  the  earth  ; 


ivj  EPfCTETUS. 

a  fourth  class  say  that  a  divine  being  exercises  forethought 
both  about  things  on  the  earth  and  heavenly  things,  but  in  a 
general  way  only,  and  not  about  things  severally.  There  is 
a  fifth  class  to  whom  Ulysses  and  Socrates  belong,  who  say, 
'  I  move  not  without  thy  knowledge  '  "  (Iliad,  x.  278).  After 
a  few  remarks  Kpictetus  concludes:  "The  wise  and  good 
man  then,  after  considering  all  these  things,  submits  his  own 
rnind  to  him  who  administers  the  whole,  as  good  citizens  do 
to  the  law  of  the  state.1' 

The  foundation  of  the  Ethic  of  Epictetus  is  the  doctrine 
which  the  Stoic  Cleanthes  proclaimed  in  his  hymn  to  Zeus 
(God  i,  "  From  thee  our  race  comes."  Epictetus  speaks  of 
Gods,  whom  we  must  venerate  and  make  offerings  to  ;  and  of 
God,  from  whom  we  all  are  sprung  in  an  especial  manner. 
"God  is  the  father  both  of  men  and  of  gods."  This  great 
descent  ought  to  teach  us  to  have  no  ignoble  or  mean  thoughts 
about  ourselves.  Me  says,  "  Since  these  two  things  are  mingled 
in  the  generation  of  man,  body  in  common  with  the  animals, 
and  reason  and  intelligence  in  common  with  the  Gods,  many 
incline  to  this  kinship,  which  is  miserable  and  mortal ;  and 
some  few  to  that  which  is  divine  and  happy  "  (i.  c.  3).  In  a 
chapter  of  Providence  (1  c.  6)  he  attempts  to  prove  the  exist- 
ence of  God  and  his  government  of  the  world  by  everything 
which  is  or  happens  ;  but  in  order  to  understand  these  proofs, 
a  man,  he  says,  must  have  the  faculty  of  seeing  what  belongs 
and  happens  to  "  all  persons  and  things,  and  a  grateful  dis- 
position "  (also,  i.  c.  1 6 1.  He  argues  from  the  very  structure 
of  things  which  have  attained  their  completion,  that  we  are 
accustomed  to  show  that  a  work  is  certainly  the  act  of  some 
artificer,  and  that  it  has  not  been  constructed  without  a 
purpose.  "  Does  then  each  of  these  things  demonstrate  the 
work-man,  and  do  not  visible  things  and  the  faculty  of  seeing 
and  light  demonstrate  him  ?  "  He  then  considers  the  constitu- 
tion of  man's  understanding  and  its  operations  ;  and  he  asks, 
if  this  not  sufficient  to  convince  us,  let  people  "  explain  to  us 


EPICTETUS.  XVtt 

what  it  is  that  makes  each  several  thing,  or  how  it  is  pos- 
sible that  things  so  wonderful  and  like  the  contrivances  of 
art  should  exist  by  chance  and  from  their  o\vn  proper 
motion  ?  " 

It  is  enough  for  animals  to  do  what  their  nature  leads 
them  to  do  without  understanding  why  they  do  it.  But  it  is 
not  enough  for  us  to  whom  God  has  given  also  the  intellectual 
faculty;  for  unless  we  act  conformably  to  the  nature  and 
constitution  of  each  thing,  we  shall  never  attain  our  true  end. 
God  has  introduced  man  into  the  world  to  be  a  spectator  of 
God  and  his  works ;  and  not  only  a  spectator  of  them,  but 
an  interpreter.  For  this  reason,  he  says,  "  it  is  shameful 
for  man  to  begin  and  to  end  where  irrational  animals  do  ; 
but  rather  he  ought  to  begin  where  they  begin,  and  to  end 
where  nature  ends  in  us ;  and  nature  ends  in  contemplation 
and  understanding,  and  in  a  way  of  life  conformable  to 
nature  "  (p.  22}.  He  examines  in  another  chapter  (i.  c.  9), 
How  from  the  fact  that  we  are  akin  to  God,  a  man  may  pro- 
ceed to  the  consequences.  Here  he  shows  that  a  man  who 
has  observed  with  intelligence  the  administration  of  the  world, 
and  has  learned  that  the  greatest  community  is  that  which 
is  composed  of  men  and  God,  and  that  from  God  came  all 
beings  which  are  produced  on  the  earth,  and  particularly 
rational  beings  who  are  by  reason  conjoined  with  him, — 
"why  should  not  such  a  man  call  himself  a  citizen  of  the 
world,  why  not  a  son  of  God,  and  why  should  he  be  afraid 
of  anything  which  happens  among  men  ? — when  you  have 
God  for  your  maker,  and  father,  and  guardian,  shall  not  this 
release  us  from  sorrows  and  fears  ?  " 

In  this  chapter  also  is  a  supposed  address  of  Kpictetus 
to  those  people  who  on  account  of  the  bonds  of  the  body 
and  the  troubles  of  this  life  intend  to  throw  them  off,  "  and 
to  depart  to  their  kinsmen."  Kpictetus  says,  "  Friends,  wait 
for  God  :  when  He  shall  give  the  signal  and  releas< 
from  this  service,  then  go  to  Him  ;  but  for  the  present  en- 


RPICTETCS. 

dure  to  dwell  in  this  place  where  He  has  put  you — wait  then, 
do  not  depart  without  a  reason/'  He  gives  the  example  of 
Socrates,  who  said  that  if  God  has  put  us  in  any  place,  we 
ought  not  to  desert  it.  I  think  that  Epictetus  did  not  rec- 
ommend suicide  in  any  case,  though  he  admitted  that  there 
were  cases  in  which  he  would  not  condemn  it;  but  a  man 
ought  to  have  good  reasons  for  leaving  his  post. 

The  teaching  of  Epictetus,  briefly  expressed,  is,  that  man 
ought  to  be  thankful  to  God  for  all  things,  and  always  con- 
tent with  that  which  happens,  for  what  God  chooses  is  better 
than  what  men  can  choose  (iv.  c.  7).  This  is  what  Bishop 
Butler  says,  "  Our  resignation  to  the  will  of  God  may  be  said 
to  be  perfect  when  our  will  is  lost  and  resolved  up  into  His  ; 
when  we  rest  in  His  will  as  our  end,  as  being  itself  most  just 
and  right  and  good/'  (Sermon  on  the  Love  of  God.) 

I  have  not  discovered  any  passage  in  which  Epictetus 
gives  any  opinion  of  the  mode  of  God's  existence.  He  dis- 
tinguishes God  the  maker  and  governor  of  the  universe  itself. 
His  belief  in  the  existence  of  this  great  power  is  as  strong  as 
any  Christian's  could  be  :  and  very  much  stronger  than  the 
belief  of  maiiy  \vho  call  themselves  Christians,  and  who 
solemnly  and  publicly  declare  '•  I  believe  in  God  the  Father 
Almighty,  Maker  of  heaven  and  earth."  Epictetus  teaches 
us  what  our  duty  is  toward  God  ;  and  there  is  no  doubt  that 
he  practiced  what  he  taught,  as  a  sincere  and  honest  man 
should  do  or  at  least  try  to  do  with  all  his  might.  \Ye  must 
suppose  that  a  man  of  his  temper  of  mind,  and  his  great 
abilities  did  what  he  recommends  (Fragments,  cxviii.,  cxixj: 
"  Let  your  talk  of  God  be  renewed  every  day  rather  than 
your  food  ;  "  and  "Think  of  God  more  frequently  than  you 
breathe."  I  see  no  other  conclusion  that  such  a  man  could 
come  to  than  this,  that  God  exists  without  doubt,  and  that 
He  is  incomprehensible  to  such  feeble  creatures  as  man  who 
lives  in  so  feeble  a  body.  See  p.  21,  note. 

We  must  now  see  what   means  God   has  given  to  His  chil- 


/:7'/c'7Y:  7T.V.  xix 

dren  for  doing  their  duty.  Epictetus  begins  by  showing 
what  things  God  has  put  in  our  power,  and  what  things  he 
has  not  (i.  c.  i  :  Encheir.  i).  "That  which  is  best  of  all  and 
supreme  over  all  is  the  only  thing  which  the  gods  have  placed 
in  our  power,  the  right  use  of  appearances ;  but  all  other 
things  they  have  not  placed  in  our  power  ;  "  and  the  reason 
of  this  limitation  of  man's  power  is,  "  that  as  we  exist  on  the 
earth  and  are  bound  to  such  a  body  and  to  such  companions, 
how  was  it  possible  for  us  not  to  be  hindered  as  to  these 
things  by  externals  ?"  He  says  again  (Encheiricl.  i)  :  "  Of 
things  some  are  in  our  power,  and  others  are  not.  In  our 
power  are  opinion,  movement  toward  a  thing,  desire,  aver- 
sion i  turning  from  a  thing)  ;  and  in  a  word,  whatever  are  our 
own  acts  :  not  in  our  power  are  the  body,  property,  reputa- 
tion, offices  (magisterial  power),  and  in  a  word,  whatever  are 
not  our  own  acts.  And  the  things  in  our  power  are  by  nature 
free,  not  subject  to  restraint  nor  hindrance  :  but  the  things 
not  in  our  power  are  weak,  slavish,  subject  to  restraint,  in  the 
power  of  others."  This  is  his  notion  of  man's  freedom.  On 
this  notion  all  his  system  rests.  He  says  (i.  c.  17) :  "  if  God 
had  made  that  part  of  himself,  which  he  took  from  himsaf 
and  gave  to  us,  of  such  a  nature  as  to  be  hindered  or  com- 
pelled either  by  himself  or  by  another,  he  would  not  then  be 
God  nor  would  he  be  taking  care  of  us  as  he  ought." 

He  says  (i.  c.  i  :  iii.  c.  3  ;  and  elsewhere)  that  the  right  use  of 
appearances  is  the  only  thing  that  the  gods  have  placed  in  our 
power  ;  and  '•  that  it  is  the  business  of  the  wise  and  good 
man  to  use  appearances  conformably  to  nature."  For  this 
purpose  a  man  has  what  Epictetus  names  a  ruling  faculty,  of 
which  he  gives  a  definition  or  description  (iv.  c.  7).  It  is 
that  faculty  '•  which  uses  all  other  faculties  and  tries  them, 
and  selects  and  rejects  :  "  a  faculty  by  which  we  reflect  and 
judge  and  determine,  a  faculty  which  no  other  animal  has,  a 
faculty  which,  as  Bishop  Hutler  says,  "  plainly  bears  upon  it 
marks  of  authority  over  all  the  rest,  and  claims  the  absolute 


xx  EPICTETUS. 

direction  of  them  all,  to  allow  or  forbid  their  gratification  " 
(Preface  to  the  Sermons). 

These  appearances  are  named  <t>a.vTaaia.L  by  Epictetus ;  and 
the  word  is  translated  "  Visa  animi ''  by  Gellius  (Frag,  clxxx.). 
This  Phantasy  is  not  only  the  thing  which  is  perceived  by 
the  eyes,  but  the  impression  which  is  made  on  the  eyes,  and 
generally  it  means  any  impression  received  by  the  senses; 
and  also  it  is  the  power  of  the  mind  to  represent  things  as  if 
they  were  present,  though  they  are  only  present  in  the  mind 
and  are  really  absent.  This  power  of  Phantasy  exists  also 
in  animals  in  various  degrees  according  to  their  several  ca- 
pacities; animals  make  use  of  appearances,  but  man  only  un- 
derstands the  use  of  appearances  (i.  c.  6).*  If  a  man  cannot 
or  does  not  make  a  right  use  of  appearances,  he  approaches 
the  nature  of  an  irrational  animal ;  and  he  is  not  what  God 
made  him  capable  of  being. 

The  nature  of  the  Good  is  in  the  use  of  appearances,  and 
the  nature  of  evil  likewise  ;  and  things  independent  of  the 
will  do  not  admit  either  the  nature  of  evil  or  of  good  (ii.  c.  i). 
The  good  and  the  bad  are  in  man's  will,  and  in  nothing  ex- 
ternal. The  rational  power  therefore  leads  us  to  acknowl- 
edge as  good  only  that  which  is  conformable  to  reason,  and 
to  recognize  as  bad  that  which  is  not  conformable  to  reason. 
The  matter  on  which  the  good  man  labors  is  his  rational 
faculty  :  that  is  the  business  of  the  philosopher  (iii.  c.  3). 
A  man  who  wishes  to  be  what  he  is  by  nature,  by  his  consti- 
tution, adapted  for  becoming,  must  "  struggle  against  appear- 
ances "  (ii.  c.  18).  This  is  not  an  easy  thing,  but  it  is  the 
only  way  of  obtaining  true  freedom,  tranquillity  of  mind,  and 

*  I  suppose  that  this  will  be  generally  allowed  to  be  true.  Whatever  an 
animal  can  do,  we  shall  hardly  admit  that  he  understands  the  use  of  ap- 
pearances, and  uses  them  as  a  man  can.  However  the  powers  of  some 
animals,  such  as  ants  for  example,  are  very  wonderful ;  and  it  may  be 
contended  that  they  are  not  irrational  in  many  of  their  acts,  but  quite 
rational. 


i-:ricTi:'rrs.  xxi 

the  dominion  over  the  movements  of  the  soul,  in  a  word 
happiness,  which  is  the  true  end  and  purpose  of  man's  ex- 
istence on  earth.  Every  man  carries  in  him  his  own  enemy, 
whom  he  must  carefully  watch  (Ench.  xlviii).  There  is  dan- 
ger that  appearances,  which  powerfully  resist  reason,  will 
carry  you  away :  if  you  are  conquered  twice  or  even  once, 
there  is  danger  that  a  habit  of  yielding  to  them  will  be 
formed.  "Generally,  then,  if  you  would  make  anything  a 
habit,  do  it :  if  you  would  not  make  it  a  habit,  do  not  do  it ; 
but  accustom  yourself  to  do  something  else  in  place  of  it " 
(ii.  c.  18).  As  to  pleasure  Epictetus  says  (Ench.  xxxiv.)  : 
"  If  you  have  received  the  impression  (<j>avTa<?la.v)  of  any  pleas- 
ure, guard  yourself  against  being  carried  away  by  it ;  but  let 
the  thing  wait  for  you,  and  allow  yourself  a  certain  delay  on 
your  own  part.  Then  think  of  both  times,  of  the  time  when 
you  will  enjoy  the  pleasure,  and  of  the  time  after  the  enjoy- 
ment of  the  pleasure  when  you  will  repent  and  reproach  your- 
self. And  set  against  these  things  how  you  will  rejoice,  if 
you  have  abstained  from  the  pleasure,  and  how  you  will  com- 
mend yourself.  But  if  it  seem  to  you  seasonable  to  under- 
take (do)  the  thing,  take  care  that  the  charm  of  it,  and  the 
pleasure,  and  the  attraction  of  it  shall  not  conquer  you,  and 
set  on  the  other  side  the  consideration  how  much  better  it  is 
to  be  conscious  that  you  have  gained  this  victory." 

Hence  the  rule  that  a  man  must  be  careful  and  cautious 
in  everything  which  is  in  the  pouer  of  the  will;  but  on  the 
contrary,  with  respect  to  externals  which  arc  not  in  a  man's 
power,  he  must  be  bold.  "  Confidence  (courage)  then  ought 
to  be  employed  against  death,  and  caution  against  the  fear 
of  death  :  but  now  we  do  to  the  contrary,  and  employ  against 
death  the  attempt  to  escape  ;  and  to  our  opinion  about  it  we 
employ  carelessness,  rashness  and  indifference  "  (ii.  c.  i). 
For  the  purification  of  the  soul  and  enabling  it  to  employ  its 
-s  a  man  must  root  out  of  himself  two  things,  arrogance 
(pride)  and  distrust.  "Arrogance  is  the  opinion  that  you 


f.MCTRTUS. 

want  nothing  (are  deficient  in  nothing) ;  but  distrust  is  the 
opinion  that  you  cannot  be  happy  when  so  many  circum- 
stances surround  you."* 

The  notion  of  Good  and  Bad  should  be  firmly  fixed  in 
man's  mind.  There  is  in  the  opinion  of  Epictetus  no  differ- 
ence among  men  on  this  matter.  He  says  (ii.  c.  1 1)  on  the 
beginning  of  Philosophy:  As  to  good  and  evil,  and  what  we 
ought  to  do  and  what  we  ought  not  to  do,  and  the  like,  "  who- 
ever came  into  the  world  without  having  an  idea  of  them  ?  " 
These  general  notions  he  names  irpoXiJi/'ets,  preconceptions,  or 
praecognitions  (ii.  c.  2);  and  we  need  discipline  "  in  order  to 
learn  how  to  adapt  the  preconception  of  the  rational  and  the 
irrational  to  the  several  things  conformably  to  nature."  Why 
then  do  men  differ  in  their  opinions  about  particular  things  ? 
The  differences  arise  in  the  adaptation  of  the  prascognitions 
to  the  particular  cases.  He  says  (iv.  c.  i)  :  "This  is  the 
cause  to  men  of  all  their  evils,  the  not  being  able  to  adapt 
the  general  preconceptions  to  the  several  things."  It  is  so 
in  everything.  General  principles  are  often  very  simple  and 
intelligible  ;  but  when  we  come  to  the  application  of  the 
principles,  there  arises  difficulty  and  difference  of  opinions. 
"  Education  is  the  learning  how  to  adapt  the  natural  prascog- 
nitions to  the  particular  things  conformably  to  nature ;  and 
then  to  distinguish  that  of  things  some  are  in  our  power,  but 
others  are  not."  The  Great  Law  of  Life  (i.  c.  26)  is  that  we 
must  act  conformably  to  nature.  "  In  nature  there  is  nothing 
which  draws  us  away  from  following  what  is  taught ;  but  in 
the  matters  of  life,  many  are  the  things  which  distract  us." 
A  man  then  must  not  begin  with  the  matters  of  real  life,  for 
it  is  not  easy  to  begin  with  the  more  difficult  things.  "  This 
then  is  the  beginning  of  philosophy,  a  man's  perception  of 
the  state  of  his  ruling  faculty  ;  for  when  a  man  knows  that  it 
is  weak,  then  he  will  not  employ  it  on  things  of  the  greatest 

*  Ritter,  p.  227,  has  a  wrong  reading  in  his  quotation  of  this  passage, 
and  he  has  misunderstood  it. 


EPJCTETVS. 

difficulty  ;  "  and  again  ( ii.  i  i ),  "  the  beginning  of  philosophy 
is  .1  man's  consciousness  about  his  own  weakness  and  in- 
ability about  necessary  things  :  "  and  further,  "  this  is  the 
beginning  of  philosophy,  a  perception  of  the  disagreement  of 
men  with  one  another,  and  an  inquiry  into  the  cause  of 
the  disagreement,  and  a  condemnation  and  distrust  of  that 
which  only  'seems,'  and  a  certain  investigation  of  that  which 
'  seems,'  whether  it  'seems  '  rightly,  and  a  discovery  of  some 
rule,  as  we  have  discovered  a  balance  in  the  determination 
of  weights,  and  a  carpenter's  rule  (or  square)  in  the  case 
of  straight  and  crooked  things.  This  is  the  beginning  of 
philosophy." 

Epictetus  urges  the  fact  of  a  man  assenting  to  or  not  assent- 
ing to  a  thing  as  a  proof  that  man  possesses  something  which 
is  naturally  free.  He  says  (p.  282) :  "  Who  is  able  to  com- 
pel you  to  assent  to  that  which  appears  false  ?  No  man. 
And  who  can  compel  you  not  to  assent  to  that  which  appears 
true  ?  Xo  man.  By  this  then  you  see  that  there  is  some- 
thing in  you  naturally  free.  But  to  desire  or  to  be  averse  from( 
or  to  move  toward  an  object  or  to  move  from  it,  or  to  prepare 
it.  ^r  to  propose  to  do  anything,  \vhich  cf  you  can  do 
this,  unless  he  has  received  an  impression  of  the  appearance 
of  that  which  is  profitable  or  a  duty?  No  man.  You  have 
then  in  these  things  also  something  which  is  not  hindered 
and  is  free.  Wretched  men,  work  out  this,  take  care  of  this, 
seek  for  good  here."  (Compare  iv.  c.  r,  p.  338.) 

Here  the  philosopher  teaches  that  a  man's  opinion  or  his 
belief  cannot  be  compelled  by  another,  though  we  may  con- 
clude from  what  we  see  and  hear  and  is  done  in  the  world, 
that  a  larger  part  of  mankind  do  not  know  this  fact.  A 
man  cannot  even  think  or  believe  as  he  chooses  himself  :  it 
a  thing  is  capable  of  demonstration,  and  if  he  understands 
demonstration,  he  must  believe  what  is  demonstrated.  If 
the  thing  is  a  matter  of  probable  evidence,  he  will  follow 
that  which  seems  the  more  probable,  if  he  has  any  capacity 


rxiv  MFICTETUS. 

for  thinking.  I  say  "  any  capacily  "  for  thinking,  because 
the  intellectual  power  in  the  minds  of  a  great  number  of  per- 
sons is  very  weak ;  and  in  all  of  us  often  very  weak  com- 
pared with  the  power  of  the  necessities  of  our  nature,  of  our 
desires,  of  our  passions,  in  fact  of  all  that  is  in  this  won- 
derful creature  man,  which  is  not  pure  reason  or  pure 
understanding,  or  whatever  name  we  give  to  the  powers 
named  intellectual. 

The  second  part  of  this  last  quotation  from  Epictetus 
relates  to  the  Will,  by  which  I  mean,  and  I  suppose  that  he 
means,  the  wish  and  the  intention  and  the  attempt  to  do 
something  particular,  or  to  abstain  from  doing  some  particular 
thing.  Much  has  been  written  about  man's  Will.  Some  per- 
sons think  that  he  has  none  ;  that  he  moves  as  he  is  moved, 
and  cannot  help  himself.  Epictetus  has  no  essay  or  disser- 
tation on  this  matter;  and  it  would  have  been  contrary  to  his 
method  of  teaching  to  make  a  formal  discussion  of  the  Will, 
after  the  manner  of  modern  philosophers.  He  does  not 
touch  on  the  question  of  man's  will  as  dependent  on  the  will 
of  God,  or  as  acting  in  opposition  to  it.  God  has  made 
man  as  free  as  he  could  be  in  such  a  body,  in  which  he 
must  live  on  the  earth.  This  body  is  not  man's  own,  but 
it  is  clay  finely  tempered  ;  and  God  has  given  also  to  man 
a  small  portion  of  Himself,  in  a  word,  the  faculty  of  using  the 
appearances  of  things,  of  which  faculty  Epictetus  says,  "  If 
you  will  take  care  of  this  faculty  and  consider  it  your  only 
possession,  you  will  never  be  hindered,  never  meet  with 
impediments,  you  will  not  lament,  you  will  not  blame,  you 
will  not  flatter  any  person  "  (i.  c.  i).  He  says  (iv.  c.  12) 
that  God  "has  placed  me  with  myself,  and  has  put  my  will 
in  obedience  to  myself  alone,  and  has  given  me  rules  for  the 
right  use  of  it." 

The  word  of  Epictetus  which  I  have  always  translated  by 
Will  is  irpoalpfsis,  which  is  literally  a  "  preference,"  a  choice  of 
one  thing  before  another,  or  before  any  other  thing  ;  a  de- 


RPIGTJZTUS.  xxv 

scription  which  is  sufficiently  intelligible.  Though  Epicte- 
tus  contends  that  man  has  power  over  his  will,  he  well  knew 
how  weak  this  power  sometimes  is.  An  appearance,  he  says 
(p.  94),  is  presented,  and  straightway  I  act  according  to  it : 
and  what  is  the  name  of  those  who  follow  every  appearance  ? 
They  are  called  madmen.  Such  are  a  large  part  of  man- 
kind ;  and  it  is  true  that  many  persons  have  no  Will  at  all. 
They  are  deceived  by  appearances,  perplexed,  tossed  about 
like  a  ship  which  has  lost  the  helm  ;  they  have  no  steady, 
fixed,  and  rational  purpose.  Their  perseverance  or  obstinacy 
is  often  nothing  more  than  a  perseverance  in  an  irrational 
purpose.  It  is  often  so  strong  and  so  steady  that  the  man 
himself  and  others  too  may  view  it  as  a  strong  will ;  and  it 
is  a  strong  will,  if  you  choose,  but  it  is  a  will  in  a  wrong  di- 
rection. "  The  nature  of  the  Good  is  a  certain  Will :  the 
nature  of  the  Bad  is  a  certain  kind  of  Will  ''  (\.  c.  29). 

Those  who  have  been  fortunate  in  their  parents  and  in 
their  education,  who  have  acquired  good  habits,  and  are  not 
greatly  disturbed  by  the  affects  and  the  passions,  may  pass 
through  life  calmly  and  with  little  danger,  even  when  the 
powers  of  the  will  are  very  weak,  and  hardly  ever  exercised. 
Life  with  them  is  fortunately  a  series  of  habits  generally 
good,  or  at  least  not  bad.  This  is  the  condition  of  many 
men  and  women.  They  are  good  or  seem  to  be  good,  be- 
cause they  are  not  tried  above  their  power ;  but  if  a  tempta- 
tion should  suddenly  surprise  them  when  they  are  not  pre- 
pared for  it.  they  are  conquered  and  they  fall.  Even  a  man, 
who  has  trained  himself  to  the  exercise  of  his  rational  facul- 
ties and  has  for  a  long  time  passed  a  blameless  life,  may  in 
a  moment  when  his  vigilance  is  relaxed,  when  he  is  off  his 
guard,  be  defeated  by  the  enemy  whom  he  always  carries 
about  with  him. 

The  difference  between  a  man  who  has  within  him  the 
principles  of  reason  and  him  who  has  not,  appears  from  a 
story  told  by  Gellius  I'xix.  i  > :  We  were  sailing,  he  says,  from 


xx  v 


Cassiopa  to  Brundisium  when  a  violent  storm  came  on.  In 
the  ship  there  was  a  Stoic  philosopher,  a  man  of  good  repute. 
He  who  told  the  story  says  that  he  kept  his  eyes  on  the 
philosopher  to  see  how  he  behaved  under  the  circumstances. 
The  philosopher  did  not  weep  and  bewail  like  the  rest,  but 
his  complexion  and  apparent  perturbation  did  not  much 
differ  from  those  of  the  other  passengers.  When  the 
danger  was  over,  a  wealthy  Greek  from  Asia,  went  up 
to  the  Stoic,  and  in  an  insulting  manner  said,  How 
is  this,  philosopher?  when  we  are  in  danger,  you  were 
afraid  and  grew  pale;  but  I  was  neither  afraid  nor  was  I 
pale.  The  philosopher  after  a  little  hesitation  said,  If  I 
seemed  to  be  a  little  afraid  in  so  violent  a  tempest,  you  are 
not  worthy  to  hear  the  reason  of  it.  However  he  told  the 
man  a  story  about  Aristippus,*  who  on  a  like  occasion  was 
questioned  by  a  man  like  this  Greek  ;  and  so  the  philoso- 
pher got  rid  of  the  impertinent  fellow.  When  they  arrived 
at  Brundisium,  the  narrator  asked  the  philosopher  for  an  ex- 
planation of  his  fear,  which  the  philosopher  readily  gave. 
He  took  out  of  his  bag  a  work  of  Epictetus,  the  fifth  book  of 
his  discourses,  in  which  was  the  following  passage  (Frag. 
clxxx.):  The  affects  of  the  mind  (visa  animi),  which  philoso- 
phers name  <j>arraffta.t,  by  which  a  man's  mind  is  struck  by  the 
first  appearance  of  a  thing  which  approaches,  are  not  things 
which  belong  to  the  will  nor  in  our  power,  but  by  a  peculiar 
force  they  intrude  themselves  on  men.  But  the  assents, 
which  they  name  <rv~/KaraOf<rei*  (the  assents  of  the  judgment), 
by  whioh  the  same  affects  (visa  animi)  are  known  and  de- 
termined are  from  the  will  and  are  in  the  power  of  men  to  make. 
For  this  reason  when  some  frightful  sound  in  the  heavens  or 
from  a  fall,  or  some  sudden  news  of  danger  comes,  or  any- 
thing of  the  same  kind  happens,  it  is  unavoidable  that  even 
the  mind  of  the  wise  man  must  be  moved  somewhat  and 
confounded,  and  that  it  must  grow  pale,  not  through  ;in 

*  Or  a  follower  of  Aristippus.     The  text  is  not  certain, 


opinion  which  he  has  first  conceived  of  any  danger  (or  evil), 
but  by  certain  rapid  and  inconsiderate  emotions  which  antic- 
ipate (prevent)  the  exercise  of  the  mind  and  the  reason.  In 
a  short  time  however  the  wise  man  does  not  allow  these 
emotions  (visa  animi)  to  remain,  but  he  rejects  them,  and  he 
sees  nothing  terrible  in  them.  But  this  is  the  difference 
between  the  fool  and  the  wise  man  :  the  fool,  as  the  things 
at  the  first  impulse  appeared  to  be  dangerous,  such  he  thinks 
them  to  be ;  but  the  wise  man,  when  he  has  been  moved  for 
a  short  time,  recovers  the  former  state  and  vigor  of  his  mind, 
which  he  always  had  with  reference  to  such  appearances, 
that  they  are  not  objects  of  fear,  but  only  terrify  by  a  false 
show.* 

This  explanation  may  be  applied  to  all  the  events,  to  all 
the  thoughts,  and  to  all  the  emotions  which  disturb  the  mind 
and  the  reason,  whatever  be  their  cause  or  nature.  If  a 
man's  mind  has  been  long  under  proper  discipline,  after 
reflection  he  is  able  to  recover  from  this  disorder  and  to 
resume  his  former  state.  If  he  has  not  been  under  proper 
discipline  when  his  powers  of  reason  are  thus  assailed,  he 
may  do  anything  however  foolish  or  bad.  A  sound  ex- 
ercise of  the  faculty  of  the  Will  therefore  requires  dis- 
cipline, in  order  that  it  may  be  corrected  and  maintained. 
A  man  must  exercise  his  will  and  improve  it  by  labor  so 
as  to  make  it  conformable  to  nature  and  free.  This  exer- 
cise of  the  will  and  the  improvement  of  it  are  a  labor  that 
never  ends.  A  man  should  begin  it  as  soon  as  he  can.  If 
the  question  is  asked  how  a  man  must  begin,  who  has 
never  been  trained  by  a  parent  or  teacher  to  observe  care- 
fully his  own  conduct,  to  reflect,  to  determine,  and  then 
to  act,  I  cannot  tell.  Perhaps  a  mere  accident,  some 
trifle  which  many  persons  would  not  notice,  may  be  the 
beginning  of  a  total  change  in  a  man's  life,  as  in  the  case 

*  This  is  the  general  sense  of  the  passage.  The  translation  is  not 
easy. 


F.PICTKTCS. 

of  Polemon,  who  was  a  dissolute  youth,  and  as  he  was  by 
chance  passing  the  lecture-room  of  Xenocrates,  he  and  his 
drunken  companions  burst  into  the  room.  Polemon  was 
so  affected  by  the  words  of  the  excellent  teacher,  that  he 
came  out  a  different  man,  and  at  last  succeeded  Xenocrates 
in  the  school  of  the  Academy  (iii.  c.  i).  Folly  and  bad 
habits  then  may  by  reflection  be  altered  into  wisdom  and 
a  good  course  of  life.  If  such  a  thing  happens,  and  un- 
doubtedly it  has  happened,  it  may  be  said  that  the  origin 
or  the  change  is  not  in  a  man's  will,  but  in  something 
external.  Granted  :  a  thing  external  has  presented  an 
appearance  to  a  man,  but  the  effect  of  the  appearance  would 
not  be  the  same  in  all  men,  as  we  presume  that  it  was  not 
the  same,  as  the  story  is  told,  in  Polemon  and  his  com- 
panions. One  man  in  this  case  had  a  temper  or  disposition 
and  a  capacity  to  use  his  mental  power  and  to  profit  by  the 
words  of  Xenocrates.  It  may  be  said  that  this  temper  or 
disposition  and  capacity  are  not  in  the  power  of  a  man's 
\Vill ;  and  this  is  true.  But  that  matter  is  nothing  to  us. 
Men  have  various  capacities,  and,  as  Epictetus  would  say, 
they  are  the  gift  of  God,  who  distributes  them  as  he  pleases. 
One  man  has  the  power  of  using  an  appearance  in  a  way 
which  is  good  for  himself,  and  another  has  not.  We  can 
say  no  more.  In  whatever  way  then  a  man  has  been  led  to 
exercise  his  will  toward  a  good  end,  he  must  practice  the 
exercise  of  his  will  for  such  an  end  ;  he  must  make  a  habit 
of  it,  which  habit  will  acquire  strength  ;  and  he  may  then 
have  a  reasonable,  hope  that  he  will  not  often  fail  in  his  good 
purpose.  This  I  believe  to  be  the  meaning  of  Epictetus, 
as  we  may  collect  from  the  numerous  passages  in  which  he 
speaks  of  the  will.  I  hope  that  no  reader  will  think  that  I 
propose  what  1  have  said  as  a  sufficient  explanation  of  a 
difficult  matter.  I  have  only  said  what  I  think  to  be  suffi- 
cient to  explain  Epictetus ;  and  I  have  said  what  seems  to 
me  to  be  true. 


KPfCTETUS.  xxix 

Epicurus  taught  that  we  should  not  marry  nor  beget 
children  nor  engage  in  public  affairs,  because  these  things 
disturb  our  tranquillity.  Epictetus  and  the  Stoics  taught 
that  a  man  should  marry,  should  beget  children,  and  dis- 
charge all  the  duties  of  a  citizen.  In  one  of  his  best  dis- 
courses (iii.  c.  22  ;  About  Cynicism),  in  which  he  describes 
what  kind  of  person  a  Cynic  (his  ideal  philosopher)  should 
be.  he  says  that  he  is  a  messenger  from  God  (Zeus)  to  men 
about  good  and  bad  things,  to  show  them  that  they  have 
wandered  and  are  seeking  the  substance  of  good  and  evil 
where  it  is  not  ;  but  where  it  is,  they  never  think.  The 
Cynic  is  supposed  to  say,  How  is  it  possible  that  a  man 
like  himself,  who  is  houseless  and  has  nothing,  can  live 
happily?  The  answer  is,  See,  God  has  sent  you  a  man  to 
show  you  that  it  is  possible.  The  man  has  no  city,  nor 
house,  he  has  nothing  ;  he  has  no  wife,  nor  children  ;  and  yet 
he  wants  nothing.  In  reply  to  a  question  whether  a  Cynic 
should  marry  and  procreate  children,  Epictetus  answers  :  "If 
you  grant  me  a  community  of  wise  men,  perhaps  no  man  will 
readily  apply  himself  to  the  Cynic  practice."  However,  he 
says,  if  he  does,  nothing  will  prevent  him  from  marrying  and 
begetting  children,  for  his  wife  will  be  another  like  himself, 
"  But,"  he  adds,  "  in  the  present  state  of  things  which  is  like 
that  of  an  army  placed  in  battle  order,  is  it  not  fit  that  the 
Cynic  should  without  any  distraction  be  employed  only  on  the 
ministration  of  God,  able  to  go  about  among  men,  not  tied 
down  to  the  common  duties  of  mankind,  nor  entangled  in 
the  ordinary  relations  of  life,  which,  if  he  neglects,  he  will 
not  maintain  the  character  of  an  honorable  and  good  man  ? 
and  if  he  observes  them,  he  will  lose  the  character  of  the 
messenger,  and  spy  and  herald  of  God."  The  conclusion  is 
that  it  is  better  for  a  minister  of  God  not  to  marry.* 

*  Dr.  Farrar  snys  in  his  "Seekers  after  God "  (Epictefus,  p.  238), 
"  That  Epictetus  approves  of  celibacy  as  a  '  counsel  of  perfection,'  and 
indeed  his  views  have  a  close  and  remarkable  resemblance  to  those  of 


XXX  hl'ICTETVS. 

Epictetus  distinguishes  the  soul  from  the  body  in  the 
chapter  (iv.  c.  1 1)  about  purity  (cleanliness) ;  but  lie  wisely 
does  not  attempt  to  define  the  soul.  He  says,  "  We  sup- 
pose that  there  is  something  superior  in  man  and  that  we 
first  receive  it  from  the  Gods  :  for  since  the  Gods  by  their 
nature  are  pure  and  free  from  corruption,  so  far  as  men 
approach  them  by  reason,  so  far  do  they  cling  to  purity  and 
to  a  love  (habit)  of  purity."  It  is  however  impossible  for 
man's  nature  to  be  altogether  pure ;  but  reason  endeavors 
to  make  human  nature  love  purity.  "  The  first  then  and 
highest  purity  is  that  which  is  in  the  soul ;  and  we  say  the 
same  of  impurity.  But  you  could  not  discover  the  impurity 
of  the  soul  as  you  could  discover  that  of  the  body  :  but  as 
to  the  soul,  what  else  could  you  find  in  it  than  that  which 
makes  it  filthy  in  respect  to  the  acts  which  are  her  own  ? 
Now  the  acts  of  the  soul  are  movement  toward  an  object  or 
movement  from  it,  desire,  aversion,  preparation,  design 
(purpose),  assent.  What  then  is  it  which  in  these  acts  makes 
the  soul  filthy  and  impure  ?  Nothing  else  than  her  own  bad 
judgments.  Consequently  the  impurity  of  the  soul  is  the 
soul's  bad  opinions ;  and  the  purification  of  the  soul  is  the 
planting  in  it  of  proper  opinions  ;  and  the  soul  is  pure  which 
has  proper  opinions,  for  the  soul  alone  in  her  own  acts  is  free 
from  perturbation  and  pollution." 

Epictetus  says  (iv.  c.  7)  that  man  is  not  "  flesh  nor  bones 
nor  sinews,  but  he  is  that  which  makes  use  of  these  parts  of 
the  body  and  governs  them  and  follows  (understands)  the 
appearances  of  things."  This  opinion  seems  to  be  the  same 
or  nearly  the  same  as  Bp.  Butler's  (iv.  c.  7,  note).  If  then 
Epictetus  had  any  distinct  notion  of  the  soul,  and  he  is  a 
man  whose  notions  are  generally  distinct,  I  think  that  his 
opinion  of  man's  body  and  of  man's  soul  is,  that  a  man's 

St.  Paul."  I  do  not  understand  the  first  part  of  this  sentence ;  and  the 
reader  of  Epictetus  will  see  that  the  second  part  is  not  true.  There  is  a 
note  on  the  matter  (pp.  282,  349). 


KPICTF.Tl'S. 

body  is  not  the  man,  but  the  body  is  that  "  finely  tempered 
clay "  in  which  the  man  dwells,  and  without  the  body  he 
could  not  live  this  earthly  life  :  and  his  notion  of  the  soul  is 
that  which  is  stated  above  (iv.  c.  1 1  and  c.  7 ).  As  to  the 
mode  and  nature  of  this  connection  between  the  body  and 
the  soul,  I  can  only  suppose  that  he  would  have  disclaimed 
all  knowledge  of  it,  as  he  does  of  the  nature  of  perception 
(p.  86);  and  I  do  not  suppose  that  any  philosopher  or  theo- 
logian would  venture  to  say  what  this  connection  of  soul 
and  body  is.  In  the  life  then  which  man  lives  on  the  earth 
I  think  that  the  opinions  of  Epictetus  are  the  same  or 
nearly  the  same  as  those  of  Swedenborg ;  but  after  the  event, 
which  comes  to  all  men,  and  which  we  name  Death,  the 
opinions  are  very  different. 

And  what  is  Death?  (p.  251  in  the  chapter  on  Solitude). 
It  is  a  going  "  to  the  place  from  which  you  came,  to  your 
friends  and  kinsmen,  to  the  elements  :  what  there  was  in 
you  of  fire  goes  to  fire ;  of  earth  to  earth  ;  of  air  (spirit)  to 
air ;  of  water  to  water  :  no  Hades,  no  Acheron,  nor  Cocy- 
tus,  nor  Pyriphlegethon,  but  all  is  full  of  Gods  and  Damons." 
He  says  (p.  309) :  "  Death  is  a  greater  change,  not  from  the 
state  which  now  is  to  that  which  is  not,  but  to  that  which  is 
not  now.  Shall  I  then  no  longer  exist  ?  You  will  not  exist, 
but  you  will  be  something  else,  of  which  the  world  now  has 
need  :  for  you  also  came  into  existence  not  when  you  chose, 
but  when  the  world  had  need  of  you."  Death  is  the  resolu- 
tion of  the  matter  of  the  body  into  the  things  out  of  which  it 
is  composed  (p.  384).  This  is  distinct  and  intelligible.  <  )f 
the  soul,  which,  as  we  have  seen,  he  considers  to  be  in  some 
way  different  from  the  body  during  life,  he  does  not  speak 
so  distinctly.  I  think  that  he  means,  if  he  means  anything, 
something  like  what  I  have  said  in  p.  384,  note. 

The  philosopher,  who  appears  to  have  no  belief  in  a 
future  existence,  as  it  is  generally  understood,  teaches  that 
\vc  ousfht  to  live  such  a  life  in  all  our  thoughts  and  in  all 


EFICTETUS. 

our  acts  as  a  Christian  would  teach.  He  says  (p.  312), 
"  Then  in  the  place  of  all  other  delights  substitute  this, 
that  of  being  conscious  that  you  are  obeying  God,  that  not 
in  word  but  in  deed  you  are  performing  the  acts  of  a  wise 
and  good  man."  He  looks  for  no  reward  for  doing  what 
he  ought  to  do.  The  virtuous  man  has  his  reward  in  his 
own  acts.  If  he  lives  conformably  to  nature,  he  will  do 
what  is  best  in  this  short  life,  and  will  obtain  all  the  hap- 
piness which  he  can  obtain  in  no  other  way. 

He  says  (p.  341):  "  Who  are  you  and  for  what  purpose 
did  you  come  into  the  world  ?  Did  not  God  introduce  you 
here,  did  he  not  show  you  the  light,  did  he  not  give  you 
fellow- workers,  and  perception  and  reason  ?  and  as  whom 
did  he  introduce  you  here  ?  did  he  not  introduce  you  as 
subject  to  death,  and  as  one  to  live  on  the  earth  with  a 
little  flesh,  and  to  observe  his  administration  and  to  join 
with  him  in  the  spectacle  and  the  festival  for  a  short  time  ? 
Will  you  not  then,  as  long  as  you  have  been  permitted, 
after  seeing  the  spectacle  and  the  solemnity,  when  he  leads 
you  out,  go  with  adoration  of  him  and  thanks  for  what  you 
have  heard  and  seen  ?  " 

Perhaps  we  may  say  that  the  conclusion  of  Epictetus 
about  the  soul  after  the  separation  from  the  body  is  equiv- 
alent to  a  declaration  that  he  knew  nothing  about  it ;  as  he 
disclaims  sometimes  the  knowledge  of  other  things.  We 
cannot  assume  that  in  the  books  which  are  lost  he  ex- 
pressed any  opinions  which  are  inconsistent  with  those  con- 
tained in  the  books  which  exist.  He  must  have  known  the 
opinion  of  Socrates  about  the  immortality  of  the  soul,  or 
the  opinion  attributed  to  Socrates ;  but  he  has  not  said  that 
he  assents  to  it,  nor  does  he  express  dissent  from  it.  Bp. 
Butler  in  his  Analogy  of  Religion  Natural  and  Revealed 
(Part  I.  Of  Natural  Religion,  Chap.  I.  of  a  Future  Life) 
has  examined  the  question  of  a  Future  Life  with  his  usual 
modesty,  good  sense  and  sagacity.  The  inquiry  is  very 


/•Y'/f /•/•:  7T.9. 

difficult.  He  says  at  the  end  of  the  chapter:  "  The  credi- 
bility of  a  future  life,  which  has  been  here  insisted  on,  how 
little  soever  it  may  satisfy  our  curiosity,  seems  to  answer 
all  the  purposes  of  religion,  in  like  manner  as  a  demon- 
strative proof  would.  Indeed,  a  proof,  even  a  demonstrative 
one,  of  a  future  life,  would  not  be  a  proof  of  religion.  For, 
that  we  are  to  live  hereafter,  is  just  as  reconcilable  with  the 
scheme  of  atheism,  and  as  well  to  be  accounted  for  by  it,  as 
that  we  are  now  alive  is  ;  and  therefore  nothing  can  be  more 
absurd  than  to  argue  from  that  scheme  that  there  can  be  no 
future  state.  Hut  as  religion  implies  a  future  state,  any  pre- 
sumption against  such  a  state  is  a  presumption  against 
religion.  " 

I  conclude  that  Epictetus,  who  was  a  religious  man,  and 
who  believed  in  the  existence  of  God  and  his  administration 
of  all  tilings,  did  not  deny  a  future  life  ;  nor  does  he  say  that 
he  believes  it.  I  conclude  that  he  did  not  understand  it  ;  that 
it  w  is  beyond  his  conception,  as  the  nature  of  God  also  was. 
His  great  merit  as  a  teacher  is  that  he  "  attempted  to  show 
that  there  is  in  man's  nature  and  in  the  constitution  of  things 
sufficient  reason  for  living  a  virtuous  life.  "*  He  knew  well 
what  man's  nature  is,  and  he  endeavored  to  te,ach  us  how  we 
can  secure  happiness  in  this  life  as  far  as  we  are  capable  of 
attaining  it. 

More  might  be  said  ;  but  this  is  enough.  I  will  only  add 
that  the  Stoics  have  been  charged  with  arrogance  ;  and  the 

*  I  am  not  sure  that  I  rightly  understood  the  Apostle  Paul,  when  he 
•he  note  in  p.  182.  The  words,  "  Let  us  eat  and  drink,  for  to- 
morrow we  die,"  are  said  to  In:  a  ([notation  from  a  (ireek  writer.  The 
words  then  may  be  taken  not  as  Paul's,  but  as  the  conclusion  of  foolish 
persons.  A  friend  who,  as  1  understand  his  remarks,  is  of  this  opinion, 
also  adds  that  as  Paul  was  a  leann-d  man,  and  knew  something  about 
the  Greek  philosophers,  he  would  certainly  j/ive  them  credit  for  better 
and  more  rational  opinions.  This  may  be  the  true  meaning  of  the 
words.  Paul  is  not  alwavs  easy  to  understand,  even  by  those  who  make 
*  special  study  of  his  Kpistlrs. 


XXX  IV 


charge  is  just.  Kpictetus  himself  has  been  blamed  for  it 
even  by  modern  theologians,  who  are  not  always  free  from 
this  fault  themselves.  If  there  is  any  arrogance  or  apparent 
arrogance  in  Epictetus,  he  did  not  teach  it,  for  he  has  espe- 
cially warned  us  against  this  fault,  as  the  reader  will  see  in 
several  passages. 


ARRIAN'S 

DISCOURSES  OF  EPICTETUS. 


ARRIAN  to  Lucius  GELLIUS,  with  -wishes  for  his  happiness. 

I  NEITHER  wrote  these  Discourses*  of  Epictetus  in  the 
way  in  which  a  man  might  write  such  things  ;  nor  did  I 
make  them  public  myself,  inasmuch  as  I  declare  that  I  did 
not  even  write  them.  But  whatever  I  heard  him  say,  the 
same  I  attempted  to  write  down  in  his  own  words  as  nearly 
as  possible,  for  the  purpose  of  preserving  them  as  memorials 
to  myself  afterward  of  the  thoughts  and  the  freedom  of 

*  A.  Gellius  (i.  2  and  xvii.  19)  speaks  of  the  Discourses  of  Epictetus 
being  arranged  by  Arrian  ;  and  Gellius  (xix.  i)  speaks  of  a  fifth  book  of 
these  Discourses,  but  only  four  are  extant  and  .some  fragments.  The 
whole  number  of  books  was  eight,  as  Photius  (Cod.  58)  says.  There  is 
also  extant  an  Encheiridion  or  Manual,  consisting  of  short  pieces 
selected  from  the  Discourses  of  Epictetus ;  and  there  is  the  valuable 
commentary  on  the  Encheiridion  written  by  Simplicius  in  the  sixth  cen- 
tury A.  D.  and  in  the  reign  of  Justinian.  Arrian  explains  in  a  manner 
what  he  means  by  saying  that  he  did  not  write  these  Discourses  of 
Epictetus  ;  but  he  does  not  explain  his  meaning  when  he  says  that  he 
did  not  make  them  public.  He  tells  us  that  he  did  not  attempt  to  write 
down  in  the  words  of  Epictetus  what  the  philosopher  said  ;  but  how  it 
happened  that  they  were  first  published,  without  his  knowledge  or  con- 
sent, Arrian  does  not  say.  It  appears,  however,  that  he  did  see  the  Dis- 
courses when  they  were  published;  and  as  Schweighaeuser  remarks,  htr 
would  naturally  correct  any  errors  that  he  detected,  and  so  there  would 
be  an  edition  revised  by  himself.  Schweighaeuser  has  a  note  (i.  ch. 
26,  13)  on  the  difficulties  which  he  now  find  in  the  Discourses. 

I 


2  IPICTETUS. 

speech  of  Epictetus.  Accordingly  the  Discourses  are  natu- 
rally such  as  a  man  would  address  without  preparation  to 
another,  not  such  as  a  man  would  write  with  the  view  of 
others  reading  them.  Now,  being  such,  I  do  not  know  how 
they  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  public,  without  either  my  con- 
sent or  my  knowledge.  But  it  concerns  me  little  if  I  shall 
be  considered  incompetent  to  write  ;  and  it  concerns  Epictetus 
not  at  all  if  any  man  shall  despise  his  words  ;  for  at  the  time 
when  he  uttered  them,  it  was  plain  that  he  had  no  other  pur- 
pose than  to  move  the  minds  of  his  hearers  to  the  best  things. 
If,  indeed,  these  Discourses  should  produce  this  effect,  they 
will  have,  I  think,  the  result  which  the  words  of  philosophers 
ought  to  have.  But  if  they  shall  not,  let  those  who  read 
them  know  that,  when  Epictetus  delivered  them,  the  hearer 
could  not  avoid  being  affected  in  the  way  that  Epictetus 
wished  him  to  be.  But  if  the  Discourses  themselves,  as  they 
are  written,  do  not  effect  this  result,  it  may  be  that  the  fault 
is  mine,  or,  it  may  be,  that  the  thing  is  unavoidable. 
Farewell ! 


BOOK   I. 


CHAPTER   I. 

OF  THE  THINGS    WHICH    ARE  IN  OUR    POWER,     \\!>    NOT  IN  OUR 

POWER. 

OF  all  the  faculties  (except  that  which  I  shall  soon  men- 
tion), you  will  find  not  one  which  is  capable  of  contemplating 
itself ;  and,  consequently,  not  capable  either  of  approving  or 
disapproving.  How  far  does  the  grammatic  art  possess  the 
contemplating  power  ?  As  far  as  forming  a  judgment  about 
what  is  written  and  spoken.  And  how  far  music  ?  As  far 
as  judging  about  melody.  Does  either  of  them  then  con- 
template itself  ?  By  no  means.  But  when  you  must  write 
something  to  your  friend,  grammar  will  tell  you  what  words 
you  must  write  ;  but  whether  you  should  write  or  not,  gram- 
mar will  not  tell  you.  And  so  it  is  with  music  as  to  musical 
sounds  ;  but  whether  you  should  sing  at  the  present  time 
and  play  on  the  lute,  or  do  neither,  music  will  not  tell  you. 
What  faculty  then  will  tell  you  ?  That  which  contemplates 
both  itself  and  all  other  things.  And  what  is  this  faculty? 
The  rational  faculty ;  *  for  this  is  the  only  faculty  that  we 
have  received  which  examines  itself,  what  it  is,  and  what 
power  it  has,  and  what  is  the  value  of  this  gift,  and  examines 

I  rational  faculty  is  that  <>f  which  Antoninus  says  (xi.  i)  :  "These 
are  the  properties  of  the  rational  soul  :  it  sees  itself,  analy/es  itself,  and 
makes  itself  such  as  it  chooses  ;  the  fruit  which  it  bears,  itself  enjoys." 

3 


all  other  faculties  :  for  what  else  is  there  which  tells  us  that 
golden  things  are  beautiful,  for  they  do  not  say  so  themselves  ? 
Evidently  it  is  the  faculty  which  is  capable  of  judging  of 
appearances.*  What  else  judges  of  music,  grammar,  and 
the  other  faculties,  proves  their  uses  and  points  out  the  occa- 
sions for  using  them  ?  Nothing  else. 

As  then  it  was  fit  to  be  so,  that  which  is  best  of  all  and 
supreme  over  all  is  the  only  thing  which  the  gods  have  placed 
in  our  power,  the  right  use  of  appearances  ;  but  all  other 
things  they  have  not  placed  in  our  power.  Was  it  because 
they  did  not  choose  ?  I  indeed  think  that,  if  they  had  been 
able,  they  would  have  put  these  other  things  also  in  our 
power,  but  they  certainly  could  not.f  For  as  we  exist  on  the 
earth,  and  are  bound  to  such  a  body  and  to  such  companions, 
how  was  it  possible  for  us  not  to  be  hindered  as  to  these 
things  by  externals  ? 

But  what  says  Zeus  ?  Epictetus,  if  it  were  possible,  I 
would  have  made  both  your  little  body  and  your  little  prop- 
erty free  and  not  exposed  to  hindrance.  But  now  be  not 
ignorant  of  this  :  this  body  is  not  yours,  but  it  is  clay  finely 
tempered.  And  since  I  was  not  able  to  do  for  you  what  I 

*  This  is  what  he  has  just  named  the  rational  faculty.  The  Stoics 
gave  the  name  of  appearances  to  all  impressions  received  by  the  senses, 
and  to  all  emotions  caused  by  external  things. 

t  Compare  Antoninus,  ii.  3.  Kpictetus  does  not  intend  to  limit  the 
power  of  the  gods,  but  he  means  that  the  constitution  of  things  being 
what  it  is,  they  cannot  do  contradictories.  They  have  so  constituted 
things  that  man  is  hindered  by  externals.  How  then  could  they  give  to 
man  a  power  of  not  being  hindered  by  externals  ?  Seneca  (De  1'rov- 
identia,  c.  6)  says:  "But  it  may  be  said,  many  things  happen  which 
cause  sadness,  fear,  and  are  hard  to  bear.  Because  (God  says)  I  could 
not  save  you  from  them,  I  have  armed  your  minds  against  all."  This 
is  the  answer  to  those  who  imagine  that  they  have  disproved  the  com- 
mon assertion  of  the  omnipotence  of  God,  when  they  ask  whether  He 
can  combine  inherent  contradictions,  whether  He  can  cause  two  and  two 
to  make  five.  This  is  indeed  a  very  absurd  way  of  talking. 


KP/CTETl'S.  5 

have  mentioned,  I  have  given  you  a  small  portion  of  us,* 
this  faculty  of  pursuing  an  object  and  avoiding  it,  and  the 
faculty  of  desire  and  aversion,  and,  in  a  word,  the  faculty  of 
using  the  appearances  of  things  :  and  if  you  will  take  care 
of  this  faculty  and  consider  it  your  only  possession,  you  will 
never  be  hindered,  never  meet  with  impediments  ;  you  will 
not  lament,  you  will  not  blame,  you  will  not  flatter  any 
person. 

Well,  do  these  seem  to  you  small  matters  ?  I  hope  not. 
Be  content  with  them  then  and  pray  to  the  gods.  But  now 
when  it  is  in  our  power  to  look  after  one  thing,  and  to  attach 
ourselves  to  it,  we  prefer  to  look  after  many  things,  and  to  be 
bound  to  many  things,  to  the  body  and  to  property,  and  to 
brother  and  to  friend,  and  to  child  and  to  slave.  Since  then 
we  are  bound  to  many  things,  we  are  depressed  by  them  and 
dragged  down.  For  this  reason,  when  the  weather  is  not  fit 
for  sailing,  we  sit  clown  and  torment  ourselves,  and  continually 
look  out  to  see  what  wind  is  blowing.  It  is  north.  What  is 
that  to  us  ?  When  will  the  west  wind  blow?  When  it  shall 
choose,  my  good  man,  or  when  it  shall  please  .-Eolus ;  for 
God  has  not  made  you  the  manager  of  the  winds,  but  .-Kolus. 
What  then  ?  We  must  make  the  best  use  that  we  can  of  the 
things  which  are  in  our  power,  and  use  the  rest  according  to 
their  nature.  What  is  their  nature  then  ?  As  God  m?y 
please. 

Must  I  then  alone  have  my  head  cut  off  ?  What,  would 
you  have  all  men  lose  their  heads  that  you  maybe  consoled  ? 
Will  you  not  stretch  out  your  neck  as  Lateranust  did  at 

*  Schweighaeuser  observes  that  these  faculties  of  pursuit  and  avoid- 
ance, and  of  desire  and  aversion,  and  even  the  faculty  of  using  appear- 
ances, belong  to  animals  as  well  as  to  man  ;  but  animals  in  using  ap- 
pearances are  moved  by  passion  only,  and  do  not  understand  what  iln-y 
are  doing,  while  in  man  these  passions  are  under  his  control. 

t   I'lautins  l.ateranus.  consul-elect,  was  charged  with  being  engaged  in 

Hso's  conspiracy  against  Nero.    11^  was  burned  to  execution  without 


Rome  when  Nero  ordered  him  to  be  beheaded  ?  For  when 
he  had  stretched  out  his  neck,  and  received  a  feeble  blow, 
which  made  him  draw  it  in  for  a  moment,  he  stretched  it  out 
again.  And  a  little  before,  when  he  was  visited  by  Kpaph- 
roditus,*  Nero's  freedman,  who  asked  him  about  the  cause 
of  offense  which  he  had  given,  he  said,  '•  If  I  choose  to  tell 
anything,  I  will  tell  your  master/' 

What  then  should  a  man  have  in  readiness  in  such  cir- 
cumstances ?  What  else  than  this?  What  is  mine,  and 
what  is  not  mine  ;  and  what  is  permitted  to  me,  and  what 
is  not  permitted  to  me.  I  must  die.  Must  I  then  die  lament- 
ing ?  I  must  be  put  in  chains.  Must  I  then  also  lament  ?  I 
must  go  into  exile.  Does  any  man  then  hinder  me  from  go- 
ing with  smiles  and  cheerfulness  and  contentment  ?  Tell 
me  the  secret  which  you  possess.  1  will  not,  for  this  is  in 
my  power.  But  I  will  put  you  in  chains.f  Man,  what  are 
you  talking  about  ?  Me  in  chains  ?  You  may  fetter  my 
leg,  but  my  will  not  even  Zeus  himself  can  overpower.  I  will 
throw  you  into  prison.  My  poor  body,  you  mean.  I  will  cut 
your  head  off.  When  then  have  I  told  you  that  my  head 
alone  cannot  be  cut  off  ?  These  are  the  things  which  philos- 
ophers should  meditate  on,  which  they  should  write  daily, 
in  which  they  should  exercise  themselves. 

Thrasea  $  used  to  say,  f  would  rather  be  killed  to-day  than 

being  allowed  to  see  his  children :  and  though  the  tribune  who  executed 
him  was  privy  to  the  plot,  Lateranus  said  nothing  (Tacit.  Ann.  xv. 
49-  60)- 

*  Epaphroditus  was  a  freedman  of  Xero,  and  once  the  master  of 
Kpictetus.  He  was  Nero's  secretary.  One  good  act  is  recorded  of 
him  :  he  helped  Xero  to  kill  himself,  and  for  this  act  he  was  killed  by 
Domitian  (Suetonius,  Domitian,  c.  14). 

t  This  is  an  imitation  of  a  passage  in  the  Baccha*  .of  Kuripides 
(v.  492,  etc.),  which  is  also  imitated  1-y  Horace  (Kpp.  i.  if>). 

\  Thrasea  Pzetus,  a  Stoic  philosopher,  who  wa*  ordered  in  Nero's 
time  to  put  himself  to  death  (Tacit.  Ann.  xvi.  21-351.  "e  was  tne  nus" 


EPICTETUS.  7 

banished  to-morrow.  What  then  did  R.ufus*  say  to  him  ?  If 
you  choose  death  as  the  heavier  misfortune,  how  great  is  the 
folly  of  your  choice?  But  if,  as  the  lighter,  who  has  given 
you  the  choice  ?  Will  you  not  study  to  be  content  with  that 
which  has  been  given  to  you  ? 

What  then  did  Agrippinus  f  say  ?  He  said,  "  I  am  not  a 
hindrance  to  myself."  When  it  was  reported  to  him  that  his 
trial  was  going  on  in  the  Senate,  he  said,  "  I  hope  it  may  turn 
out  well ;  but  it  is  the  iifth  hour  of  the  day  " — this  was  the 
time  when  he  was  used  to  exercise  himself  and  then  take  the 
cold  bath — '•  let  us  go  and  take  our  exercise."  After  he  had 
taken  his  exercise,  one  comes  and  tells  him,  You  have  been 
condemned.  To  banishment,  he  replies,  or  to  death  ?  To 
banishment.  What  about  my  property?  It  is  not  taken 
from  you.  Let  us  go  to  Aricia  then,!  he  said,  and  dine. 

This  it  is  to  have  studied  what  a  man  ought  to  study  ;  to 
have  made  desire,  aversion,  free  from  hindrance,  and  free 
from  all  that  a  man  would  avoid.  I  must  die.  If  now,  I  am 


band  of  Arria,  whose  mother  Arria,  the  wife  of  Chechia  Psetus,  in  the 
time  of  the  Emperor  Claudius,  heroically  showed  her  husband  the  way 
to  die  (Plinius,  Letters,  iii.  if>).  Martial  has  immortalized  the  elder 
Arria  in  a  famous  epigram  (i.  14) : 

"  When  Arria  to  her  Paetus  gave  the  sword, 
Which  her  own  hand  from  her  chaste  bosom  drew, 

'  This  wound,'  she  said,  '  believe  me,  gives  no  pain, 
Hut  that  will  pain  me  which  thy  hand  will  do.'  " 

Munsonius    Kuhis.  a    Tuscan    by    birth,    uf    equestrian    rank,    a 
philosopher  and  Stoic  (Tacit.  Hist.  iii.  Si). 

t  Paconius  Agrippinus  was  condemned  in  Nero's  time.  The  charge 
against  him  was  that  he  inherited  his  father's  hatred  qf  the  head  of  the 
Roman  slate  (Tacit.  Ann.  xvi.  28).  The  father  of  Agrippinus  had  been 
put  to  death  under  Tiberius  (Suetonius,  Tib.  c.  61). 

{  Aricia,  about  twenty  Roman  miles  from  Kom  :>pia. 


8  EP1CTETUS. 

-~eady  to  die.  If,  after  a  short  time,  I  now  dine  because  it  is 
the  dinner-hour  ;  after  this  I  will  then  die.  How  ?  Like  a 
man  who  gives  up  *  what  belongs  to  another. 


CHAPTER   II. 

HOW    A    MAN    ON   KVK.KY  OCCASION    CAN    MAINTAIN    HIS   I'KOI'KK 
CHARACTER. 

To  the  rational  animal  only  is  the  irrational  intolerable; 
but  that  which  is  rational  is  tolerable.  Mows  are  not 
naturally  intolerable.  How  is  that?  See  how  the  Lace- 
daemonians |  endure  whipping  when  they  have  learned  that 
whipping  is  consistent  with  reason.  To  hang  yourself  is  not 
intolerable.  When  then  you  have  the  opinion  that  it  is 
rational,  you  go  and  hang  yourself.  In  short,  if  we  observe, 
we  shall  find  that  the  animal  man  is  pained  by  nothing  so 
much  as  by  that  which  is  irrational  ;  and,  on  the  contrarv, 
attracted  to  nothing  so  much  as  to  that  which  is  rational, 

But  the  rational  and  the  irrational  appear  such  in  a  dii 
ferent  way  to  different  persons,  just  as  the  good  and  the  had. 
the  profitable  and  the  unprofitable.  For  this  reason,  partic- 
ularly, we  need  discipline,  in  order  to  learn  how  to  adapt 
the  preconception  of  the  rational  and  the  irrational  to  the 
several  things  conformably  to  nature.  But  in  order  to  deter- 
mine the  rational  and  the  irrational,  we  use  not  only  the  esti- 
mates of  external  things,  but  we  consider  also  what  is  appro- 
priate to  each  person.  For  to  one  man  it  is  consistent  with 

*  Epictetus,  Encheiridion,  c.  1 1  :  "  Never  say  on  the  occasion  of  any- 
thing, '  I  have  lost  it,'  but  say,  '  I  have  returned  it.'  " 

t  The  Spartan  boys  used  to  be  whipped  at  the  altar  of  Artemis  Orthia 
till  blood  flowed  abundantly,   and  sometimes   till  death  ;   but  tliev 
Mttered  even  a  groan  (Cicero,  Tuscul.  ii.  14.  v.  27). 


/•:/>/(' 77:  7T.\.  9 

reason  to  hold  a  chamber  put  for  another,  and  to  look  to  this 
only,  that  if  he  docs  not  hold  it.  he  will  receive  stripes,  and 
he  will  not  receive  his  food  :  but  if  he  shall  hold  the  pot, 
he  will  not  suffer  anything  hard  or  disagreeable.  But  to  an- 
other man  not  only  does  the  holding  of  a  chamberpot  appeal- 
intolerable  for  himself,  but  intolerable  also  for  him  to  allow 
another  to  do  this  office  for  him.  If  then  you  ask  me  whether 
you  should  hold  the  chamber  pot  or  not,  1  shall  say  to  you 
that  the  receiving  of  food  is  worth  more  than  the  not  receiv- 
ing of  it,  and  the  being  scourged  is  a  greater  indignity  than 
not  being  scourged  ;  so  that  if  you  measure  your  interests  by 
these  things,  go  and  hold  the  chamber  pot.  "  But  this,"  you 
say,  "  would  not  be  worthy  of  me."  \Yell,  then,  it  is  you 
who  must  introduce  this  consideration  into  the  inquiry,  not 
I  ;  for  it  is  you  who  know  yourself,  how  much  you  are  worth 
to  yourself,  and  at  what  price  you  sell  yourself ;  for  men  sell 
themselves  at  various  prices. 

For  this  reason,  when  Florus  was  deliberating  whether  he 
should  go  down  to  Nero's  spectacles,*  and  also  perform  in 
them  himself,  Agrippinus  said  to  him,  Go  clown  :  and  when 
Florus  asked  Agrippinus,  \Yhy  do  not  you  go  down  ?  Agrip- 
pinus replied,  Because  I  do  not  even  deliberate  about  the 
matter.  For  he  who  has  once  brought  himself  to  deliberate 
about  such  matters,  and  to  calculate  the  value  of  external 
things,  comes  very  near  to  those  who  have  forgotten  their 
own  character.  For  why  do  you  ask  me  the  question, 
whether  death  is  preferable  or  life  ?  1  say  life.  Pain  or 
pleasure  ?  I  say  pleasure.  But  if  1  do  not  take  a  part  in  the 
tragic  acting,  I  shall  have  my  head  struck  off.  (io  then  and 
take  a  part,  but  I  will  not.  \Yhy  ?  Because  you  consider 
yourself  to  be  only  one  thread  of  those  which  are  in  the 

•  VTO  was  passionately  fond  of  scenic  representations,  and  used  to 
indue  e  the  descendants  of  noble  families,  whose  poverty  made  tlu-iu 
consent,  to  appear  on  the  stage  (Tacitus.  Annals,  xiv.  14;  Suetonius, 
Nero,  c.  ai). 


io  EPICfETUS. 

tunic.  Well  then  it  was  fitting  for  you  to  take  care  how  you 
should  be  like  the  rest  of  men,  just  as  the  thread  has  no  de- 
sign to  be  anything  superior  to  the  other  threads.  But  1 
wish  to  be  purple,*  that  small  part  which  is  bright,  and 
makes  all  the  rest  appear  graceful  and  beautiful.  Why  then 
do  you  tell  me  to  make  myself  like  the  many  ?  and  if  I  do, 
how  shall  I  still  be  purple  ? 

Priscus  Helvidius  |  also  saw  this,  and  acted  conformably. 
For  when  Vespasian  sent  and  commanded  him  not  to  go  into 
the  senate,  he  replied,  ''  It  is  in  your  power  not  to  allow  me  to 
be  a  member  of  the  senate,  but  so  long  as  I  am,  I  must  go  in." 
Well,  go  in  then,  says  the  emperor,  but  say  nothing.  Do 
not  ask  my  opinion,  and  I  will  be  silent.  But  I  must  ask 
your  opinion.  And  I  must  say  what  I  think  right.  But  if 
you  do,  I  shall  put  you  to  death.  When  then  did  I  tell  you 
that  I  am  immortal  ?  You  will  do  your  part,  and  I  will  do 
mine  :  it  is  your  part  to  kill ;  it  is  mine  to  die,  but  not  in  fear  : 
yours  to  banish  me  ;  mine  to  depart  without  sorrow. 

What  good  then  did  Priscus  do,  who  was  only  a  single 
person  ?  And  what  good  does  the  purple  do  for  the  toga  ? 
Why,  what  else  than  this,  that  it  is  conspicuous  in  the  toga 
as  purple,  and  is  displayed  also  as  a  fine  example  to  all 
other  things  ?  But  in  such  circumstances  another  would 
have  replied  to  Caesar  who  forbade  him  to  enter  the  senate, 
I  thank  you  for  sparing  me.  But  such  a  man  Vespasian 

*  The  "  purple  "  is  the  broad  purple  border  on  the  toga  named  the 
toga  prcetexta,  worn  by  certain  Roman  magistrates  and  some  others,  and 
by  senators,  it  is  said,  on  certain  days  (Cic.  Phil.  ii.  43). 

t  Helvidius  Priscus,  a  Roman  senator  and  a  philosopher,  is  com- 
mended by  Tacitus  (Hist.  iv.  4,  5)  as  an  honest  man  :  "  He  followed 
the  philosophers  who  considered  those  things  only  to  be  good  which 
are  virtuous,  those  only  to  be  bad  which  are  foul ;  and  he  reckoned 
power,  rank,  and  all  other  things  which  are  external  to  the  mind  as 
neither  good  nor  bad."  Vespasian,  probably  in  a  fit  of  passion,  being 
provoked  by  Helvidius,  ordered  him  to  be  put  to  death,  and  then 
revoked  the  order  when  it  was  too  late  (Suetonius,  Vespasianus,  c.  15). 


i's.  n 

would  not  even  have  forbidden  to  enter  the  senate,  for  he 
knew  that  he  would  cither  sit  there  like  an  earthen  vessel, 
or,  if  he  spoke,  he  would  say  what  Caesar  wished,  and  add 
even  more. 

In  this  way  an  athlete  also  acted  who  was  in  danger  of 
dying  unless  his  private  parts  were  amputated.  His  brother 
came  to  the  athlete,  who  was  a  philosopher,  and  said,  Come, 
brother,  what  are  you  going  to  do?  Shall  we  amputate  this 
member  and  return  to  the  gymnasium  ?  But  the  athlete 
persisted  in  his  resolution  and  died.  When  some  one  asked 
Kpictetus,  How  he  did  this,  as  an  athlete  or  a  philosopher? 
As  a  man,  Epictetus  replied,  and  a  man  who  had  been  pro- 
claimed among  the  athletes  at  the  Olympic  games  and  had 
contended  in  them,  a  man  who  had  been  familiar  with  such 
a  place,  and  not  merely  anointed  in  Baton's  school.*  An- 
other would  have  allowed  even  his  head  to  be  cut  off,  if  he 
could  have  lived  without  it.  Such  is  that  regard  to  character 
which  is  so  strong  in  those  who  have  been  accustomed  to 
introduce  it  of  themselves  and  conjoined  with  other  things 
into  their  deliberations. 

Come,  then,  Epictetus,  shave  t  yourself,  li  I  am  a  phi- 
losopher, I  answer,  I  will  not  shave  myself.  Hut  I  will  take 
off  your  head  ?  If  that  will  do  you  any  good  take  it  off. 

Some  person  asked,  How  then  shall  every  man  among  us 
perceive  what  is  suitable  to  his  character  ?  How,  he  replied, 
does  the  bull  alone,  when  the  lion  has  attacked,  discover  his 
own  powers  and  put  himself  forward  in  defense  of  the  whole 
herd  ?  It  is  plain  that  with  the  powers  the  perception  of 

*  Baton  was  elected  for  two  years  gymnasiarch  or  superintendent  of  a 
gymnasium  in  or  about  the  time  of  M.  Atirslius  Antoninus.  See 
Schweighaeuser's  note. 

t  This  is  supposed,  as  Casaubon  says,  to  refer  to  Domitian's  order  to 
the  philosophers  to  go  into  exile;  and  some  of  them,  in  order  to  con- 
ceal their  piofesMon  of  philosophy,  shaved  their  beards.  Epictetut 
would  not  take  off  his  beard. 


12  /: /Y(  "/Y;  7  r.V. 

having  them  is  immediately  conjoined;  and,  therefore,  who- 
ever of  us  has  such  powers  will  not  he  ignorant  of  them. 
Now  a  bull  is  not  made  suddenly,  nor  a  brave  man  ;  but  we 
must  discipline  ourselves  in  the  winter  for  the  summer  cam- 
paign, and  not  rashly  run  upon  that  which  does  not  concern 
us. 

Only  consider  at  what  price  you  sell  your  own  will ;  if  for 
no  other  reason,  at  least  for  this,  that  you  sell  it  not  for  a 
small  sum.  But  that  which  is  great  and  superior  perhaps 
belongs  to  Socrates  and  such  as  are  like  him.  Why  then, 
if  we  are  naturally  such,  are  not  a  very  great  number  of  us 
like  him  ?  Is  it  true  then  that  all  horses  become  swift,  that 
all  dogs  are  skilled  in  tracking  footprints  ?  What,  then, 
since  I  am  naturally  dull,  shall  I,  for  this  reason,  take  no 
pains  ?  I  hope  not.  Epictetus  is  not  superior  to  Socrates  ; 
but  if  he  is  not  inferior,  this  is  enough  for  me  ;  for  I  shall 
never  be  a  Milo,  and  yet  I  do  not  neglect  my  body ;  nor 
shall  I  be  a  Crcesus,  and  yet  I  do  not  neglect  my  property ; 
nor,  in  a  word,  do  we  neglect  looking  after  anything  because 
we  despair  of  reaching  the  highest  degree. 


CHAPTER  III. 

HOW    A     MAN     SHOULD     PROCEED    FROM     THE     PRINCIPLE     OP 
GOD    BEING   THE   FATHER    OF   ALL    MEN    TO    THE    REST. 

IF  a  man  should  be  able  to  assent  to  this  doctrine  as  he 
ought,  that  we  are  all  sprung  from  God  *  in  an  especial 
manner,  and  that  God  is  the  father  both  of  men  and  of  gods, 

*  Epictetus  speaks  of  God  and  the  gods.  Also  conformably  to  the 
practice  of  the  people,  he  speaks  of  God  under  the  name  of  Zeus.  The 
gods  of  the  people  were  many,  but  his  God  was  perhaps  one.  "  Father 
of  men  and  gods,"  says  Homer  of  Zeus;  and  Virgil  says  of  Jupiter, 
M  Father  of  gods  and  king  of  men." 


KFICTKTI'S.  13 

T  suppose  that  he  would  never  have  any  ignoble  or  mean 
thoughts  about  himself.  But  if  C:esar  (the  Emperor)  should 
adopt  you,  no  one  could  endure  your  arrogance  ;  and  if  you 
know  that  you  are  the  son  of  Zeus,  will  you  not  be  elated  ? 
Yet  we  do  not  so ;  but  since  these  two  things  are  mingled  in 
the  generation  of  man,  body  in  common  with  the  animals, 
and  reason  and  intelligence  in  common  with  the  gods,  many 
incline  to  this  kinship,  which  is  miserable  and  mortal  ;  and 
some  few  to  that  which  is  divine  and  happy.  Since  then  it 
is  of  necessity  that  every  man  uses  everything  according  to 
the  opinion  which  he  has  about  it,  those,  the  few,  who  think 
that  they  are  formed  for  fidelity  and  modesty  and  a  sure  use 
of  appearances  have  no  mean  or  ignoble  thoughts  about  them- 
selves ;  but  with  the  many  it  is  quite  the  contrary.  For  they 
say,  What  am  I  ?  A  poor,  miserable  man,  with  my  wretched 
bit  of  flesh.  Wretched,  indeed  ;  but  you  possess  something 
better  than  your  bit  of  flesh.  Why  then  do  you  neglect  that 
which  is  better,  and  why  do  you  attach  yourself  to  this  ? 

Through  this  kinship  with  the  flesh,  some  of  us  inclining 
to  it  become  like  wolves,  faithless  and  treacherous  and 
inisi.iiic rvou-.  :  some  become  like  lions,  savage  and  untamed  ; 
hut  the  greater  part  of  us  become  foxes  and  other  worse 
animals.  For  what  else  is  a  slanderer  and  a  malignant  man 
than  a  fox,  or  some  other  more  wretched  and  meaner 
.mimal  ?  See*  then  and  take  care  that  you  do  not  become 
some  one  of  these  miserable  things. 

*  Upton  compares  Matthew  xvi.  6  and  remarks  that  many  expressions 
In  Epictetus  are  not  unlike  the  style  of  the  Gospels,  which  were  written 
in  the  same  period  in  which  Kpktetus  was  teaching.  Schweighaeuser 
also  refers  to  Wetstein's  New  Testament. 


14  MflCTETUS. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

OF    PROGRESS    OR    IMPROVEMENT. 

HE  who  is  making  progress,  having  learned  from  philos- 
ophers that  desire  means  the  desire  of  good  things,  and 
aversion  means  aversion  from  bad  things  ;  having  learned 
too  that  happiness  *  and  tranquillity  are  not  attainable  by 
man  otherwise  than  by  not  failing  to  obtain  what  he  desires, 
and  not  falling  into  that  which  he  would  avoid  ;  such  a  man 
takes  from  himself  desire  altogether  and  defers  it,  f  but  he 
employs  his  aversion  only  on  things  which  are  dependent  on 
his  will.  For  if  he  attempts  to  avoid  anything  independent 
of  his  will,  he  knows  that  sometimes  he  will  fall  in  with  some- 
thing which  he  wishes  to  avoid,  and  he  will  be  unhappy. 
Now  if  virtue  promises  good  fortune  and  tranquillity  and 
happiness,  certainly  also  the  progress  toward  virtue  is  prog- 
ress toward  each  of  these  things.  For  it  is  always  true  that 
to  whatever  point  the  perL  ctir.g  of  anything  leads  us,  prog- 
ress is  an  approach  toward  this  p  ;int. 

How  then  do  we  admit  tha:  virtue  is  such  as  I  have  said, 
and  yet  seek  progress  in  other  things  and  make  a  display 
of  it  ?  What  is  the  product  of  virtue  ?  Tranquillity.  Who 
then  makes  improvement  ?  Is  it  he  who  has  read  many 

*  The  notion  is  that  of  "  flowing  easily,"  as  Seneca  (Epp.  120)  ex- 
plains it :  "  beata  vita,  secundo  defluens  cursu." 

t  The  Latin  translation  is  :  "in  futurum  tempus  rejicit."  Wolf  says  : 
"  Significat  id,  quod  in  Enchiridio  dictum  est :  philosophic  tironem  non 
nimium  tribuere  sibi,  sed  quasi  addubitantem  expoctare  dum  connrmetur 
judicium." 


XPICTETUS.  15 

books  of  Chrysippus  ?  *  But  does  virtue  consist  in  having 
understood  Chrysippus  ?  If  this  is  so,  progress  is  clearly 
nothing  else  than  knowing  a  great  deal  of  Chrysippus. 
But  now  we  admit  that  virtue  produces  one  thing,  and  we 
declare  that  approaching  near  to  it  is  another  thing,  name- 
ly, progress  or  improvement.  Such  a  person,  says  one,  is 
already  able  to  read  Chrysippus  by  himself.  Indeed,  sir, 
you  are  making  great  progress.  What  kind  of  progress  ? 
But  why  do  you  mock  the  man  ?  Why  do  you  draw  him 
away  from  the  perception  of  his  own  misfortunes?  Will 
you  not  show  him  the  effect  of  virtue  that  he  may  learn 
where  to  look  for  improvement  ?  Seek  it  there,  wretch, 
where  your  work  lies.  And  where  is  your  work  ?  In  de- 
sire and  in  aversion,  that  you  may  not  be  disappointed  in 
your  desire,  and  that  you  may  not  fall  into  that  which  you 
would  avoid  ;  in  your  pursuit  and  avoiding,  that  you  commit 
no  error  ;  in  assent  and  suspension  of  assent,  that  you  be 
not  deceived.  The  first  things,  and  the  most  necessary,  are 
those  which  1  have  named.  t  But  if  with  trembling  and 
lamentation  you  seek  not  to  fall  into  that  which  you  avoid, 
tell  me  how  you  are  improving. 

Do  you  then  show  me  your  improvement  in  these  things  ? 
If  J  were  talking  to  an  athlete,  I  should  say,  Show  me  your 
shoulders  ;  •  ud  then  he  might  say,  Here  are  my  Halteres. 
You  and  your  Halteres*  look  to  that.  I  should.  reply,  I 


!  ,!ertius  ((  'hry.-ippus,  lib.  vii.)  states  that  Chrysippus 
wrote  seven  hundred  and  five  books,  or  treatis>  -.  He  was  born  at  Soli, 
in  Cilicia,  or  at  Tarsus,  in  it.  C,  _'S<>,  as  it  is  reckoned,  and  on  going  to 
Athens  he  became  a  pupil  of  the  Stoic  Ckanthes. 

t  Compare  iii.  c.  2. 

\  Haltures  are  gymnastic  instruments  (dalcn.  i.  De  Sanitate  tuenda  ; 
Martial,  xiv.  40;  Juvenal,  vi.  420,  and  the  Scholiast  Upton).  Halteres 
is  a  (Ireek  word,  literally  "  leapers."  They  are  said  to  have  been  masses 
of  lead,  used  for  exercise  and  in  making  jumps.  The  effects  of  such 
weights  in  taking  a  jump  is  well  known  lo  boy*  who  have  used  them. 
A  couple  of  bricks  will  serve  the  purpose. 


1 6  EPICTETUS. 

wish  to  see  the  effect  of  the  Halteres.  So,  when  you  say, 
Take  the  treatise  on  the  active  powers,  and  see  how  I  have 
studied  it,  I  reply,  Slave,  I  am  not  inquiring  about  this, 
but  how  you  exercise  pursuit  and  avoidance,  desire  and 
aversion,  how  you  design  and  purpose  and  prepare  yourself, 
whether  conformably  to  nature  or  not.  If  conformably,  give 
me  evidence  of  it,  and  I  will  say  that  you  are  making  prog- 
ress :  but  if  not  conformably,  be  gone,  and  not  only  ex- 
pound your  books,  but  write  such  books  yourself ;  and  what 
will  you  gain  by  it  ?  Do  you  not  know  that  the  whole  book 
costs  only  five  denarii  ?  Does  then  the  expounder  seem 
to  be  worth  more  than  five  denarii  ?  Never  then  look  for 
the  matter  itself  in  one  place,  and  progress  toward  it  in 
another. 

Where  then  is  progress  ?  If  any  of  you,  withdrawing  him- 
self from  externals,  turns  to  his  own  will  to  exercise  it  and 
to  improve  it  by  labor,  so  as  to  make  it  conformable  to  nature, 
elevated,  free,  unrestrained,  unimpeded,  faithful,  modest ; 
and  if  he  has  learned  that  he  who  desires  or  avoids  the  things 
which  are  not  in  his  power  can  neither  be  faithful  nor  free, 
but  of  necessity  he  must  change  with  them  and  be  tossed 
about  with  them  as  in  a  tempest,  and  of  necessity  must  sub- 
ject himself  to  others  who  have  the  power  to  procure  or  pre- 
vent what  he  desires  or  would  avoid ;  finally,  when  he  rises 
in  the  morning,  if  he  observes  and  keeps  these  rules,  bathes 
as  a  man  of  fidelity,  eats  as  a  modest  man ;  in  like  manner, 
if  in  every  matter  that  occurs  he  works  out  his  chief  principles 
as  the  runner  does  with  reference  to  running,  and  the  trainer 
of  the  voice  with  reference  to  the  voice — this  is  the  man  who 
truly  makes  progress,  and  this  is  the  man  who  has  not 
traveled  in  vain.  But  if  he  has  strained  his  efforts  to  the 
practice  of  reading  books,  and  labors  only  at  this,  and  has 
traveled  for  this,  I  tell  him  to  return  home  immediately,  and 
not  to  neglect  his  affairs  there ;  for  this  for  which  he  has 
traveled  is  nothing.  But  the  other  thing  is  something,  to 


Kt'lCTKTl'S.  17 

study  how  a  man  can  rid  his  life  of  lamentation  and  groan- 
ing, and  saying,  Woe  to  me,  and  wretched  that  I  am,  and  to 
rid  it  also  of  misfortune  and  disappointment,  and  to  learn 
what  death  is,  and  exile,  and  prison,  and  poison,  that  he  may 
be  able  to  say  when  he  is  in  fetters.  Dear  C'rito,*  if  it  is  the 
will  of  the  gods  that  it  be  so,  let  it  be  so;  and  not  to  say, 
Wretched  am  I,  an  old  man  :  have  f  kept  my  gray  hairs  for 
this?  Who  is  it  that  speaks  thus?  I  )<>  you  think  that  I 
shall  name  some  man  of  no  repute  and  of  low  condition  ? 
Does  not  Priam  say  this?  Does  not  (Kdipus  say  this? 
Xay,  all  kings  say  it !  f  For  what  else  is  tragedy  than  the 
perturbations  of  men  who  value  externals  exhibited  in  this 
kind  of  poetry  ?  But  if  a  man  must  learn  by  fiction  that 
no  external  things  which  are  independent  of  the  will  con- 
cern us,  for  my  part  I  should  like  this  fiction,  by  the  aid  of 
which  I  should  live  happily  and  undisturbed.  But  you  must 
consider  for  yourselves  what  you  wish. 

What  then  does  Chrysippus  teach  us  ?  The  reply  is,  To 
know  that  these  things  are  not  false,  from  which  happiness 
comes  and  tranquillity  arises.  Take  my  books,  and  you  will 
learn  how  true  and  conformable  to  nature  are  the  things 
which  make  me  free  from  perturbations.  O  great  good 
fortune!  O  the  great  benefactor  who  points  out  the  way! 
To  Tviptolemus  all  men  have  erected  temples  and  altars,  be- 
cause he  gave  us  food  by  cultivation  ;  but  to  him  who  dis- 
covered truth  and  brought  it  to  light  and  communicated 
it  to  all,  not  the  truth  which  shows  us  how  to  live,  but  how 
to  live  well,  who  of  you  for  this  reason  has  built  an  altar,  o> 
a.  temple,  or  has  dedicated  a  statue,  or  who  worships  God 
for  this?  Because  the  gods  have  given  the  vine,  or  wheat, 
we  sacrifice  to  them :  but  because  they  have  produced  in  the 

*  This  is  said  in  the  Criton  of  Plato,  i  ;  hut  not  in  exactly  the  same 
way. 

t  So  kings  and  such  personages  speuk  in  the  (Ireek  tragedies.  Cora- 
pare  what  M.  Antoninus  (xi.  6)  says  of  Tragedy. 

a 


1 8  EflCTETUS. 

human  mind  that  fruit  by  which  they  designed  to  show  us 
t'he  truth  which  relates  to  happiness,  shall  we  not  thank  God 
for  this  ? 


CHAPTER  V. 

AGAINST    THE    ACADEMICS.* 

IF  a  man,  said  Epictetus,  opposes  evident  truths,  it  is  not 
easy  to  find  arguments  by  which  we  shall  make  him  change 
his  opinion.  But  this  does  not  arise  either  from  the  man's 
strength  or  the  teacher's  weakness  ;  for  when  the  man,  though 
he  has  been  confuted,  is  hardened  like  a  stone,  how  shall  we 
then  be  able  to  deal  with  him  by  argument  ? 

Now  there  are  two  kinds  of  hardening,  one  of  the  under- 
standing, the  other  of  the  sense  of  shame,  when  a  man  is 
resolved  not  to  assent  to  what  is  manifest  nor  to  desist  from 
contradictions.  Most  of  us  are  afraid  of  mortification  of  the 
body,  and  would  contrive  all  means  to  avoid  such  a  thing, 
but  we  care  not  about  the  soul's  mortification.  And  indeed 
with  regard  to  the  soul,  if  a  man  be  in  such  a  state  as  not  to 
apprehend  anything,  or  understand  at  all,  we  think  that  he 
is  in  a  bad  condition  :  but  if  the  sense  of  shame  and  modesty 
is  deadened,  this  we  call  even  power  (or  strength). 

Do  you  comprehend  that  you  are  awake  ?  I  do  not,  the 
man  replies,  for  I  do  not  even  comprehend  when  in  my  sleep 
I  imagine  that  I  am  awake.  Does  this  appearance  then  not 
differ  from  the  other  ?  Not  at  all,  he  replies.  Shall  I  still 
argue  with  this  man  ? '  And  what  fire  or  what  iron  shall  I 
apply  to  him  to  make  him  feel  that  he  is  deadened  ?  He 
does  perceive,  but  he  pretends  that  he  does  not.  He  is  even 

*  See  Lecture  V.,  The  New  Academy,  Levin's  Lectures  Introductory 
to  the  Philosophical  \Vritings  of  Cicero,  Cambridge,  1871. 


r.rrcTF.TUs.  19 

worse  than  a  dead  man.  lie  does  not  see  the  contradiction  : 
he  is  in  a  bad  condition.  Another  does  see  it,  but  he  is  not 
moved,  and  makes  no  improvement  :  he  is  even  in  a  worse 
condition.  His  modesty  is  extirpated,  and  his  sense  of 
shame;  and  the  rational  faculty  has  not  been  cut  off  from 
him,  but  it  is  brutalized.  Shall  J  name  this  strength  of  mind  ? 
Certainly  not,  unit  :so  name  it  such  in  catamites, 

through  which  they  do  and  say  in  public  whatever  comes  into 
their  head. 


CHAPTER  VI. 

OF     P  K  (J  V  I  D  K  N  C  E. 

FFOM  everything  which  is  or  happens  in  the  world,  it  is 
easy  to  praise  Providence,  if  a  man  possesses  these  two  qual- 
ities, the  faculty  of  seeing  what  belongs  and  happens  to  all 
persons  and  things,  and  a  grateful  disposition.  If  he  does 
not  possess  these  two  qualities,  one  man  will  not  see  the  use 
of  things  which  are  and  which  happen  ;  another  will  not  be 
thankful  for  them,  even  if  he  does  know  them.  If  God  had 
made  colors,  but  had  not  made  the  faculty  of  seeing  them, 
what  would  have  been  their  use  ?  None  at  all.  On  the  other 
hand,  if  He  had  made  the  faculty  of  vision,  but  had  not  made 
objects  such  as  to  fall  under  the  faculty,  what  in  that  case 
also  would  have  been  the  use  of  it?  None  at  all.  Well, 
suppose  that  He  had  made  both,  but  had  not  made  light  ? 
in  that  case,  also,  they  would  have  been  of  no  use.  Who  is 
it  then  who  has  fitted  this  to  that  and  that  to  this?  And 
who  is  it  that  has  fitted  the  knife  to  the  case  and  the  case  to 
the  knife  ?  Is  it  no  one  ?  And,  indeed,  from  the  very  struct- 
ure of  tilings  which  have  attained  their  completion,  we  are 
accustomed  to  show  that  the  work  is  certainly  the  act  of 


20  EPfCTETUS. 

some  artificer,  and  that  it  has  not  been  constructed  without 
a  purpose.  Does  then  each  of  these  things  demonstrate  the 
workman,  and  do  not  visible  things  and  the  faculty  of  seeing 
and  light  demonstrate  Him  ?  And  the  existence  of  male  and 
female,  arid  the  desire  of  each  for  conjunction,  and  the  power 
of  using  the  parts  which  are  constructed,  do  not  even  these 
declare  the  workman  ?  If  they  do  not,  let  us  consider  the 
constitution  of  our  understanding  according  to  which,  when 
we  meet  with  sensible  objects,  we  do  not  simply  receive  im- 
pressions from  them,  but  we  also  select  *  something  from 
them,  and  subtract  something,  and  add,  and  compound  by 
means  of  them  these  things  or  those,  and,  in  fact,  pass  from 
some  to  other  things  which,  in  a  manner,  resemble  them  :  is 
not  even  this  sufficient  to  move  some  men,  and  to  induce  them 
not  to  forget  the  workman  ?  If  not  so,  let  them  explain  to 
us  what  it  is  that  makes  each  several  thing,  or  how  it  is 
possible  that  things  so  wonderful  and  like  the  contrivances 
of  art  should  exist  by  chance  and  from  their  own  proper 
motion  ? 

\Yhat,  then,  are  these  things  done  in  us  only  ?  Many,  in- 
deed, in  us  only,  of  which  the  rational  animal  had  peculiarly 
need  ;  but  you  will  find  many  common  to  us  with  irrational 
animals.  Do  they  then  understand  what  is  done  ?  By  no 
means.  For  use  is  one  thing,  and  understanding  is  another  : 
God  had  need  of  irrational  animals  to  make  use  of  appear- 
ances, but  of  us  to  understand  the  use  of  appearances.  It 
is  therefore  enough  for  them  to  eat  and  to  drink,  and 
to  sleep  and  to  copulate,  and  to  do  all  the  other  things 
which  they  severally  do.  But  for  us,  to  whom  He  has  given 
also  the  intellectual  faculty,  these  things  are  not  sufficient ; 
for  unless  we  act  in  a  proper  and  orderly  manner,  and  con- 
formably to  the  nature  and  constitution  of  each  thing,  \ve 
shall  never  attain  our  true  end.  For  where  the  constitutions 
oi  living  beings  are  different,  there  also  the  acts  and  the  ends 

*  Cicero,  De  Off.  i.  c.  4,  on  the  difference  between  man  and  beast. 


EP/CTETUS.  21 

are  different.  In  those  animals  then  whose  constitution  is 
adapted  only  to  use,  use  alone  is  enough  :  but  in  an  animal 
(man),  which  has  also  the  power  of  understanding  the  use, 
unless  there  be  the  due  exercise  of  the  understanding,  he 
will  never  attain  his  proper  end.  Well  then  God  constitutes 
every  animal,  one  to  be  eaten,  another  to  serve  for  agricult- 
ure, another  to  supply  cheese,  and  another  for  some  like  use  : 
for  which  purposes  what  need  is  there  to  understand  appear- 
ances and  to  be  able  to  distinguish  them?  But  God  has  in- 
troduced man  to  be  a  spectator  of  God  *  and  of  His  works; 
and  not  only  a  spectator  of  them,  but  an  interpreter.  For 
this  reason  it  is  shameful  for  man  to  begin  and  to  end  where 
irrational  animals  do,  but  rather  he  ought  to  begin  where 
they  begin,  and  to  end  where  nature  ends  in  us :  and  nature 
ends  in  contemplation  and  understanding,  and  in  away  of  life 
conformable  to  nature.  Take  care  then  not  to  die  without 
having  been  spectators  of  these  things. 

But  you   take   a  journey  to  Olympia  to  see  the   work  of 

*The  original  is  avrov,  which  I  refer  to  God ;  but  it  may   be  ambigu 
^ch\veighaeuser  refers  it  to  man,  and  explains  it  to  mt^f.  liiut  man 
should  be  a  spectator  of  himself,  according  to  the  maxi:  atr6». 

le  that  man  can  in  a  manner  contemplate  himself  and  his  faculties 
as  well  as  external  objects ;  and  as  every  man  can  be  an  object  t.-. 
other  man,  so  a  man  may  be  an  object  to  himself  when  he  examinci 
his  faculties  and  reflects  on  his  own  acts.  Schweighaeuser  asks  how  can 
a  man  be  a  spectator  of  God,  except  so  far  as  he  is  a  spectator  of  God's 
works  ?  It  is  not  enough,  he  says,  to  reply  that  God  and  the  universe, 
whom  and  which  man  contemplates,  are  the  same  thing  to  the  Stoics ; 
for  Epirtetus  always  distinguish^-;  C.od  the  maker  and  governor  of  the 
universe  from  the  universe  itself.  Hut  here  lies  the  difficulty.  Tin- 
universe  is  an  all-comprehensive  term:  it  is  all  that  we  can  in  any  way 
perceive  and  conceive  as  existing  ;  and  it  may  therefore  comprehend  <  Imi, 
not  as  something  distinct  from  the  universe,  but  as  being  the  universe 
himself.  This  form  of  expression  is  an  acknowledgment  of  the  weak- 
ness of  the  human  faculties,  and  contains  the  implicit  assertion  of  Locke 
that  the  notion  of  God  is  beyond  man's  understands 
8.17). 


2J  EPICTETL'S. 

Phidias,"''  and  all  of  you  think  it  is  a  misfortune  to  die  without 
having  seen  such  things.  But  when  there  is  no  need  to  take 
a  journey,  and  where  a  man  is,  there  he  has  the  works  (of 
God)  before  him,  will  you  not  desire  to  see  and  understand 
them  ?  Will  you  not  perceive  either  what  you  are,  or  what 
you  were  born  for,  or  what  this  is  for  which  you  have  re- 
ceived the  faculty  of  sight  ?  But  you  may  say,  there  are 
some  things  disagreeable  and  troublesome  in  life.  And  are 
there  none  in  Olympia  ?  Are  you  not  scorched  ?  Are  you 
not  pressed  by  a  crowd  ?  Are  you  not  without  comfortable 
means  of  bathing  ?  Are  you  not  wet  when  it  rains  ?  Have 
you  not  abundance  of  noise,  clamor,  and  other  disagreeable 
things  ?  But  I  suppose  that  setting  all  these  things  off 
against  the  magnificence  of  the  spectacle,  you  bear  and 
endure.  Well  then  and  have  you  not  received  faculties  by 
which  you  will  be  able  to  bear  all  that  happens  ?  Have  you 
not  received  greatness  of  soul  ?  Have  you  not  received 
manliness  ?  Have  you  not  received  endurance  .>  And  why 
do  I  trouble  myself  about  anything  that  can  happen  if  I 
possess  greatness  of  soul  ?  What  shall  distract  my  mind  or 
disturb  me,  or  appear  painful  ?  Shall  I  not  use  the  power 
for  the  purposes  for  which  I  received  it,  and  shall  I  grieve 
and  lament  over  what  happens  ? 

Yes,  but  my  nose  runs.t  For  what  purpose  then,  slave, 
have  you  hands  ?  Is  it  not  that  you  may  wipe  your  nose? 
Is  it  then  consistent  with  reason  that  there  should  be  run- 
ning of  noses  in  the  world  ?  Xay.  how  much  better  it  is  to 
wipe  your  nose  than  to  find  fault.  What  do  you  think  that 
Hercules  would  have  been  if  there  had  not  been  such  a  lion, 
and  hydra,  and  stag,  and  boar,  and  certain  unjust  and  bestial 
men,  whom  Hercules  used  to  drive  away  and  clear  out  ? 

*  This  work  was  the  colossal  chryselephantine  statue  of  Zeus  (Jupiter) 
by  Phidias,  which  was  at  Olympia.  This  wonderful  work  is  described 
by  Pausanias  (Eliaca,  A,  1 1). 

t  Compare  ii.  16,  13. 


23 

And  what  would  he  have  been  doing  if  there  had  been  noth- 
ing of  the  kind  ?  Is  it  not  plain  that  lit;  would  have  wrapped 
himself  up  and  have  slept  ?  In  the  first  place  then  he  would 
not  have  been  a  Hercules,  when  he  was  dreaming  away  ail 
his  life  in  such  luxury  and  ease  ;  and  even  if  Iv:  had  been 
one  what  would  have  been  the  use  of  him  ?  and  what  the  use 
of  his  arms,  and  of  the  strength  of  the  other  pnrts  of  his 
body,  and  his  endurance  and  noble  spirit,  if  sue  h  circum- 
stances and  occasions  had  not  roused  and  exercised  him  ? 
Well  then  must  a  man  provide  for  himself  such  means  of  ex- 
ercise, and  seek  to  introduce  a  lion  from  some  place  into  his 
country,  and  a  boar  and  a  hydra  ?  This  would  be  folly  and 
madness :  but  as  they  did  exist,  and  were  found,  they  were 
useful  for  showing  what  Hercules  was  and  for  exercising  him. 
( 'ome  then  do  you  also  having  observed  these  things  look  to 
the  faculties  which  you  have,  and  when  you  have  looked  at 
them,  say :  Bring  now,  O  Zeus,  any  difficulty  that  thou  pleasest, 
for  1  have  means  given  to  me  by  thee  and  powers  for  honor- 
ing myself  through  the  things  which  happen.  You  do  not 
so  :  but  you  sit  still,  trembling  for  fear  that  some  things  will 
happen,  and  weeping,  and  lamenting,  and  groaning  for  what 
does  happen  :  and  then  you  blame  the  gods.  For  what  is 
the  consequence  of  such  meanness  of  spirit  but  impiety  ? 
And  yet  God  has  not  only  given  us  these  faculties,  by  which 
we  shall  be  able  to  bear  everything  that  happens  without 
:  depressed  or  broken  by  it ;  but,  like  a  good  king  and 
a  true  father,  He  has  given  us  these  faculties  free  from  hin- 
drance, subject  to  no  compulsion,  unimpeded,  and  has  put 
them  entirely  in  our  own  power,  without  even  having  reserved 
to  Himself  any  power  of  hindering  or  impeding.  You,  who 
have  received  tin-so  powers  free  and  as  your  own,  use  them 
not:  you  do  not  even  see  what  you  have  received,  and  from 
whom  :  some  of  you  being  blinded  to  the  giver,  and  not  even 
acknowledging  your  benefactor,  ard  others,  through  meanness 
of  spirit,  betaking  yourselves  to  f  .  ill-finding  and  making 


24 


charges  against  God.  Yet  I  will  show  to  you  that  you  have 
powers  and  means  for  greatness  of  soul  and  manliness  :  hut 
what  powers  you  have  for  finding  fault  and  making  accusa- 
tions, do  you  show  me. 


CHAPTER  VII. 

OK    THK    t'SK  OK  SOPHISTICAL  ARGUMEXTS    AM)   HYPOTHETICAL 
AND    THE    I. IKK. 

THE  handling  of  sophistical  and  hypothetical  arguments, 
and  of  those  which  derive  their  conclusions  from  questioning, 
and  in  a  word  the  handling  of  all  such  arguments,  relates  to 
the  duties  of  life,  though  the  many  do  not  know  this  truth. 
For  in  every  matter  we  inquire  how  the  wise  and  good  man 
shall  discover  the  proper  path  and  the  proper  method  of 
dealing  with  the  matter.  Let  then  people  either  say  that  the 
grave  man  will  not  descend  into  the  contest  of  question  and 
answer,  or  that,  if  he  does  descend  into  the  contest,  he  will 
take  no  care  about  not  conducting  himself  rashly  or  care- 
lessly in  questioning  and  answering.  But  if  they  do  not 
allow  either  the  one  or  the  other  of  these  things,  they  must 
admit  that  some  inquiry  ought  to  be  made  into  those  topics 
on  which  particularly  questioning  and  answering  are  em- 
ployed. For  what  is  the  end  proposed  in  reasoning  ?  To 
establish  true  propositions,  to  remove  the  false,  to  withhold 
assent  from  those  which  are  not  plain.  Is  it  enough  then  to 
have  learned  only  this  ?  It  is  enough,  a  man  may  reply.  Is 
it  then  also  enough  for  a  man,  who  would  not  make  a  mis- 
take in  the  use  of  coined  money,  to  have  heard  this  precept, 
that  he  should  receive  the  genuine  drachma;;  and  reject  the 
spurious  ?  It  is  not  enough.  What  then  ought  to  be  added 
fo  this  precept  ?  What  else  than  the  faculty  which  prove? 


25 

and  distinguishes  the  genuine  and  the  spurious  drachma:  ? 
Consequently  also  in  reasoning  what  has  been  said  is  not 
enough  ;  but  is  it  necessary  that  a  man  should  acquire  the 
faculty  of  examining  and  distinguishing  the  true  and  the 
false,  and  that  which  is  not  plain?  It  is  necessary.  Besides 
this,  what  is  proposed  in  reasoning  ?  That  you  should  ac- 
cept what  follows  from  that  which  you  have  properly  granted. 
Well,  is  it  then  enough  in  this  case  also  to  know  this  ?  It  is 
not  enough  ;  but  a  man  must  learn  how  one  thing  is  a  con- 
sequence of  other  things,  and  when  one  thing  follows  from 
one  thing,  and  when  it  follows  from  several  collectively. 
Consider  then  if  it  be  not  necessary  that  this  power  should 
also  be  acquired  by  him  who  purposes  to  conduct  himself 
skillfully  in  reasoning,  the  power  of  demonstrating  himself 
the  several  things  which  he  has  proposed,  and  the  power  of 
understanding  the  demonstrations  of  others,  and  of  not  being 
deceived  by  sophists,  as  if  they  were  demonstrating.  There- 
fore there  has  arisen  among  us  the  practice  and  exercise  01 
conclusive  arguments  *  and  figures,  and  it  has  been  shown 
to  be  necessary. 

But  in  fact  in  some  cases  we  have  properly  granted  the 
premises  or  assumptions,  and  there  results  from  them  some- 
thing ;  and  though  it  is  not  true,  yet  none  the  less  it  does 
result.  What  then  ought  I  to  do?  Ought  I  to  admit  th" 
falsehood  ?  And  how  is  that  possible  ?  Well,  should  I  sax 
that  I  did  not  properly  grant  that  which  we  agreed  upon  ? 
But  you  are  not  allowed  to  do  even  this.  Shall  I  then  say 
that  the  consequence  does  not  arise  through  what  has  been 
conceded  ?  But  neither  is  it  allowed.  What  then  must  be 
done  in  this  case  ?  Consider  if  it  is  not  this  :  as  to  have 
borrowed  is  not  enough  to  make  a  man  still  a  debtor,  but  to 
this  must  be  added  the  fact  that  he  continues  to  owe  the 
money  and  that  the  debt  is  not  paid,  so  it  is  not  enough  to 

*  These  are  syllogisms  and  figures,  modes  by  which  the  syllogism  has 
its  proper  conclusion. 


j£  EPfCTETUS. 

cofnpel  you  to  admit  the  inference  that  you  have  granted 
the  premises,  but  you  must  abide  by  what  you  have  granted. 
Indeed,  if  the  premises  continue  to  the  end  such  as  they  were 
<vhen  they  were  granted,  it  is  absolutely  necessary  for  us  to 
abide  by  what  we  have  granted,  and  we  must  accept  their  con- 
sequences :  but  if  the  premises  do  not  remain  *  such  as  they 
were  when  they  were  granted,  it  is  absolutely  necessary  for  us 
also  to  withdraw  from  what  we  granted,  and  from  accepting 
what  does  not  follow  from  the  words  in  which  our  concessions 
were  made.  For  the  inference,  is  now  not  our  inference  nor 

*This,  then,  is  a  case  of  (chap.  vii.  i)  where  there  has  been  a  sophisti- 
cal or  dishonest  change  in  the  premises  or  in  some  term,  by  virtue  of 
which  change  there  appears  to  be  a  just  conclusion,  which,  however,  b 
false  ;  and  it  is  not  a  conclusion  derived  from  the  premises  to  which  we 
assented.  A  ridiculous  example  is  given  by  Seneca,  Ep.  48:  "  Mus 
syllaba  est :  mus  autem  caseum  rodit :  syllaba  ergo  caseum  rodit." 
Seneca  laughs  at  this  absurdity,  and  says  perhaps  the  following  syllogism 
(collcctio)  may  be  a  better  example  of  acuteness  :  "  Mus  syllaba  est :  syl- 
laba autem  caseum  non  rodit :  mus  ergo  caseum  non  rodit."  One  is  as 
good  as  the  other.  We  know  that  neither  conclusion  is  true,  and  we 
see  where  the  error  is.  Menage  says  that  though  the  Stoics  particularly 
cultivated  logic,  some  of  them  despised  it,  and  he  mentions  Seneca, 
Epictetus,  and  Marcus  Antoninus.  Upton,  however,  observes  that 
Epictetus  and  Marcus  Antoninus  did  not  despise  logic  (he  says  nothing 
about  Seneca),  but  employed  it  for  their  own  purposes.  It  has  been 
observed  that  if  a  man  is  asked  whether,  if  every  A  is  R,  every  B  is  also 
A,  he  might  answer  that  it  is.  But  if  you  put  the  conversion  in  this 
material  form  :  "  Every  goose  is  an  animal,''  he  immediately  perceives 
that  he  cannot  say,  "  Every  animal  is  a  goose."  What  does  this  show  ? 
It  shows  that  the  man's  comprehension  of  the  proposition,  every  A  is 
]>,  wns  not  true,  and  that  he  took  it  to  mean  something  different  from 
what  the  person  intended  who  put  the  question.  lie  understood  that  A 
and  P>  were  co-extensive.  Whether  we  call  this  reasoning  or  something 
else,  makes  no  matter.  A  man  whose  understanding  is  sound  cannot  in 
the  nature  of  things  reason  wrong  ;  but  his  understanding  of  the  matter 
on  which  he  reasons  may  be  wrong  somewhere,  and  he  may  not  be  able 
to  discover  where.  A  man  who  has  been  trained  in  the  logical  art  may 
show  him  that  his  conclusion  is  just  according  to  his  understanding  of 
the  terms  and  the  propositions  employed,  but  yet  't  is  not  true. 


£f/CTETL'S.  27 

does  it  result  with  our  assent,  since  \ve  have  withdrawn 
from  the  premises  which  we  granted.  \Ye  ought  then 
both  to  examine  such  kind  of  premises,  and  such  change 
and  variation  of  them  (from  one  meaning  to  another),  by 
which  in  the  course  of  questioning  or  answering,  or  in 
making  the  syllogistic  conclusion,  or  in  any  other  such 
way.  the  premises  undergo  variations,  and  give  occasion  to 
the  foolish  to  be  confounded,  if  they  do  not  see  what  con- 
clusions (consequences)  are.  For  what  reason  ought  we  to 
examine?  In  order  that  we  may  not  in  this  matter  be  em- 
ployed in  an  improper  manner  nor  in  a  confused  way. 

And  the  same  in  hypotheses  and  hypothetical  arguments  : 
for  it  is  necessary  sometimes  to  demand  the  granting  of  some 
hypothesis  as  a  kind  of  passage  to  the  argument  which  fol- 
lows. Must  we  then  allow  every  hypothesis  that  is  proposed, 
or  not  allow  every  one  ?  And  if  not  every  one,  which  should 
we  allow  ?  And  if  a  man  has  allowed  an  hypothesis,  must 
he  in  every  case  abide  by  allowing  it  ?  or  must  he  some- 
times withdraw  from  it.  but  admit  the  consequences  and  not 
admit  contradictions  ?  Yes ;  but  suppose  that  a  man  says, 
If  you  admit  the  hypothesis  of  a  possibility,  I  will  draw  you 
to  an  impossibility.  With  such  a  person  shall  a  man  of 
sense  refuse  to  enter  into  a  contest,  and  avoid  discussion 
and  conversation  with  him  ?  But  what  other  man  than  the 
man  of  sense  can  use  argumentation  and  is  skillful  in  ques- 
tioning and  answering,  and  incapable  of  being  cheated  and 
deceived  by  false  reasoning  ?  And  shall  he  enter  into  the 
contest,  and  yet  not  take  care  whether  he  shall  engage  in 
argument  not  rashly  and  not  carelessly  ?  And  if  he  does 
not  take  care,  how  can  he  be  such  a  man  as  we  conceive  him 
to  be  ?  But  without  some  such  -  nd  preparation,  can 

he  maintain  a  continuous  and  consistent  argument  ?  Let 
them  show  this  ;  and  all  these  speculations  become  super* 
rluous,  and  are  absurd  and  inconsistent  with  our  notion  of  a 
£ood  and  serious 


iS  EP/CTETUS. 

V.'hy  are  we  still  indolent  and  negligent  and  sluggish,  and 
why  do  we  seek  pretenses  for  not  laboring  and  not  being 
watchful  in  cultivating  our  reason  ?  If  then  I  shall  make  a 
mistake  in  these  matters  may  I  not  have  killed  my  father  ? 
Slave,  where  was  there  a  father  in  this  matter  that  you  could 
kill  him  ?  What  then  have  you  done  ?  The  only  fault  that 
was  possible  here  is  the  fault  which  you  have  committed. 
This  is  the  very  remark  which  I  made  to  Rufus  *  when  he 
blamed  me  for  not  having  discovered  the  one  thing  omitted 
in  a  certain  syllogism  :  I  suppose,  I  said,  that  I  have  burnt 
the  Capitol.  Slave,  he  replied,  was  the  thing  omitted  here 
the  Capitol  ?  Or  are  these  the  only  crimes,  to  burn  the 
Capitol  and  to  kill  your  father  ?  But  for  a  man  to  use  ap- 
pearances presented  to  him  rashly  and  foolishly  and  care- 
lessly, and  not  to  understand  argument,  nor  demonstration, 
nor  sophism,  nor,  in  a  word,  to  seem  in  questioning  and 
answering  what  is  consistent  with  that  which  we  have 
granted  or  is  not  consistent ;  is  there  no  error  in  this? 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

THAT  THE  FACULTIES  f   ARE  NOT  SAFE  TO  THE  rNINSTRVCTED. 

IN  as  many  ways  as  we  can  change  things!  which  are 
equivalent  to  one  another,  in  just  so  many  ways  we  can 

*  Rufus  is  Musonius  Rufus  (i.  i).  To  kill  a  father  and  to  burn  the 
Roman  Capitol  are  mentioned  as  instances  of  the  greatest  crimes. 
Comp.  Horace,  Epode,  iii.  Cicero,  De  Amicit.  11  ;  Plutarch,  Tib.  (Jrac- 
chus,  c.  20. 

t  The  faculties,  as  Wolf  says,  are  the  faculties  of  speaking  and  argu- 
ing, which,  as  he  also  says,  make  men  arrogant  and  careless  who  have  no 
solid  knowledge,  according  to  Bion's  maxim,  "arrogance  (self-conceiO 
is  a  hindrance  to  improvement."  See  viii.  8. 

J  Things  means  "  propositions  "  a.nd  "  terms," 


/.v/r '/•/•:  7T.S-. 


29 


change  the  forms  of  arguments  and  enthymemes  in  argumen- 
tation. This  is  an  instance  :  if  you  have  borrowed  and  not 
repaid,  you  o\ve  me  the  money  :  you  have  not  borrowed  and 
you  have  not  repaid ;  then  you  do  not  owe  me  the  money. 
To  do  this  skillfully  is  suitable  to  no  man  more  than  to  the 
philosopher  ;  for  if  the  enthymeme  is  an  imperfect  syllogism, 
it  is  plain  that  he  who  has  been  exercised  in  the  perfect 
syllogism  must  be  equally  expert  in  the  imperfect  also. 

Why  then  do  we  not  exercise  ourselves  and  one  another 
in  this  manner  ?  Because,  I  reply,  at  present,  though  we 
are  not  exercised  in  these  things  and  not  distracted  from  the 
study  of  morality,  by  me  at  least,  still  we  make  no  progress  in 
virtue.  What  then  must  we  expect  if  we  should  add  this 
occupation  ?  and  particularly  as  this  would  not  only  be  an 
occupation  which  would  withdraw  us  from  more  necessary 
things,  but  would  also  be  a  cause  of  self-conceit  and  arrogance, 
and  no  small  cause.  For  great  is  the  power  of  arguing  and 
the  faculty  of  persuasion,  and  particularly  if  it  should  be 
much  exercised,  and  also  receive  additional  ornament  from 
language:  and  so  universally,  every  faculty  acquired  by  the 
uninstructed  and  weak  brings  with  it  the  danger  of  these 
persons  being  elated  and  inflated  by  it.  For  by  what  means 
could  one  persuade  a  young  man  who  excels  in  these  matters, 
that  he  ought  not  to  become  an  appendage  *  to  them,  but  to 
make  them  an  appendage  to  himself  ?  Does  he  not  trample 
on  all  such  reasons,  and  strut  before  us  elated  and  inflated, 
not  enduring  that  any  man  should  reprove  him  and  remind 
him  of  what  he  has  neglected  and  to  what  he  has  turned  aside  ? 

What  then  was  not  Plato  a  philosopher  ?  f     I  reply,  and 

*  A  man,  as  Wolf  explains  it,  should  not  make  oratory,  or  the  art  of 
speaking,  his  chief  excellence.  He  should  use  ii  u>  set  off  something 
which  is  superior. 

t  1'lato  was  eloquent,  and  the  adversary  asks,  if  that  is  :i  reason  for  not 
allowing  him  to  he  a  philosopher.     To  which  the  rejoinder  is  that    Hip- 
wus  |i  physician,  and  eloquent  too.  lint  not  us  u  physician. 


30 

was  not  Hippocrates  a  physician  ?  but  you  see  how  Hippo 
crates  speaks.  Does  Hippocrates  then  speak  thus  in  respect 
of  being  a  physician  ?  \Yhy  do  you  mingle  tilings  which 
have  been  accidentally  united  in  the  same  men  ?  .And  if 
Plato  was  handsome  and  strong,  ought  I  also  to  set  to  work 
and  endeavor  to  become  handsome  or  strong,  as  if  this  was 
necessary  for  philosophy,  because  a  certain  philosopher  was 
at  the  same  time  handsome  and  a  philosopher  ?  \Yill  you  not 
choose  to  see  and  to  distinguish  in  respect  to  what  men 
become  philosophers,  and  what  things  belong  to  them  in  other 
respects  ?  And  if  I  were  a  philosopher,  ought  you  also  to  be 
made  lame  ?*  What  then  ?  Do  I  take  away  these  faculties 
which  yoH  possess?  By  no  means-,  for  neither  do  I  take 
away  the  faculty  of  seeing.  But  if  you  ask  me  what  is  the 
good  of  man,  I  cannot  mention  to  you  anything  else  than 
that  it  is  a  certain  disposition  of  the  will  with  respect  to 
appearances. f 


CHAPTER   TX. 

NOW  FROM  THE   KACT  THAT  WE    ARE  AKIN  TO    COD  A   MAX   MAV 
PROCEED  TO    I  HE  CONSEQUENCES. 

IF  the  things  are  true  which  are  said  by  the  philosophers 
about  the  kinship  between  God  and  man.  what  else  remains 
for  men  to  do  than  what  Socrates  did  ?  Never  in  reply  to 
the  question,  to  what  country  you  belong,  say  that  you  are 

*  Epictetus  was  lame. 

t  In  i.  20,  15,  Epictetus  defines  the  being  or  nature  of  good  to  be  a 
proper  use  of  appearances ;  and  he  also  says,  i.  29.  i.  that  the  nature  of 
the  good  is  a  kind  of  will,  and  the  nature  of  evil  is  a  kind  of  will.  But 
Schweighaeuser  cannot  understand  how  the  "  good  of  man  "  ran  be  "  a 
certain  will  with  regard  to  appearances  ;  "  and  he  suggests  that  Arrian 
may  Have  written,  "  a  certain  will  which  makes  use  of  appearance*." 


F.PICTJ-.Tl'S.  31 

an  Athenian  or  a  Corinthian,  but  that  you  are  a  citizen  of  the 
world.*  For  why  do  you  say  that  you  are  an  Athenian,  and 
why  do  you  not  say  that  you  belong  to  the  small  nook  only 
into  which  your  poor  body  was  cast  at  birth  ?  Is  it  not  plain 
that  you  call  yourself  an  Athenian  or  Corinthian  from  the 
place  which  has  a  greater  authority  and  comprises  not  only 
that  small  nook  itself  and  all  your  family,  but  even  the  whole 
country  from  which  the  stock  of  your  progenitors  is  derived 
down  to  you  ?  He  then  who  has  observed  with  intelligence  the 
administration  of  the  world,  and  has  learned  that  the  greatest 
and  supreme  and  the  most  comprehensive  community  is  that 
which  is  composed  of  men  and  God,  and  that  from  God  have 
descended  the  seeds  not  only  to  my  father  and  grandfather, 
but  to  all  beings  which  are  generated  on  the  enrth  and  are 
produced,  and  particularly  to  rational  beings — for  these  only 
are  by  their  nature  formed  to  have  communion  with  God, 
being  by  means  of  reason  conjoined  with  Him  f — why  should 
not  such  a  man  call  himself  a  citizen  of  the  world,  why  not  a 
son  of  God,$  and  why  should  he  be  afraid  of  anything  which 

*  Cicero,  Tuscul.  v.  37,  has  the  same :  "  Socrates  cum  rogaretur,  cuja- 
tem  se  esse  diceret,  Mundanum  inquit.  Totius  enim  mundi  se  incolam 
et  civem  arbitrabatur."  (Upton.) 

t  It  is  the  possession  of  reason,  he  says,  by  which  man  has  communion 
with  God  ;  it  is  not  by  any  external  means,  or  religious  ceremonial.  A 
modem  expositor  of  Epictetus  says,  "  Through  reason  our  souls  are  as 
closely  connected  and  mixed  up  with  the  deity  as  though  they  were  part 
of  him  "  (Epictet.  i.  14,  6;  ii.  8,  ii,  17,  33).  In  the  Epistle  named  from 
Peter  (ii.  1,4)  it  is  written  :  "  Whereby  are  given  to  us  exceeding  great 
and  precious  promises  that  by  these  (see  v.  3)  ye  might  be  partakers  of 
the  divine  nature,  having  escaped  the  corruption  that  is  in  the  world 
through  lust.'' 

\  So  Jesus  said,  "  Our  Father  which  art  in  heaven."  Compare  Acts 
of  the  Apostles,  xvii.  zS,  where  Paul  quotes  these  words.  It  is  not  true 
then  that  the  "  conception  of  a  parental  deity,"  as  it  has  been  asserted, 
was  unknown  before  the  teaching  of  Jesus,  and,  after  the  time  of  Jesus, 
unknown  to  those  Greeks  who  were  unacquainted  with  His  teaching. 


32  EPICTETUS, 

happens  among  men  ?  Is  kinship  with  Cresar  (the  emperor) 
or  with  any  other  of  the  powerful  in  Rome  sufficient  to 
enable  us  to  live  in  safety,  and  above  contempt  and  without 
any  fear  at  all  ?  and  to  have  God  for  your  maker  and  father 
and  guardian,  shall  not  this  release  us  from  sorrows  and 
fears  ? 

But  a  man  may  say,  Whence  shall  I  get  bread  to  eat  when 
I  have  nothing  ? 

And  how  do  slaves,  and  runaways,  on  what  do  they  rely 
when  they  leave  their  masters  ?  Do  they  rely  on  their  lands 
or  slaves,  or  their  vessels  of  silver  ?  They  rely  on  nothing 
but  themselves,  and  food  does  not  fail  them.*  And  shall  it 
be  necessary  for  one  among  us  who  is  a  philosopher  to  travel 
into  foreign  parts,  and  trust  to  and  rely  on  others,  and  not 
to  take  care  of  himself,  and  shall  he  be  inferior  to  irrational 
animals  and  more  cowardly,  each  of  which  being  self-suf- 
ficient, neither  fails  to  get  its  proper  food,  nor  to  find  a 
suitable  way  of  living,  and  one  conformable  to  nature  ? 

I  indeed  think  that  the  old  manf  ought  to  be  sitting  here, 
not  to  contrive  how  you  may  have  no  mean  thoughts  nor 
mean  and  ignoble  talk  about  yourselves,  but  to  take  care 
that  there  be  not  among  us  any  young  men  of  such  a  mind, 

*  In  our  present  society  there  are  thousands  who  rise  in  the  morning 
and  know  not  how  they  shall  find  something  to  eat.  Some  find  their 
food  by  fraud  and  theft,  some  receive  it  as  a  gift  from  others,  and  some 
lookout  for  any  work  that  they  can  find  and  get  their  pittance  by  honest 
labor.  You  may  see  such  men  everywhere,  if  you  will  keep  your  eyes 
open.  Such  men,  who  live  by  daily  labor,  live  an  heroic  life,  which  puts 
to  shame  the  well-fed  philosopher  and  the  wealthy  Christian.  Epictetus 
has  made  a  great  misstatement  about  irrational  animals.  Millions  die  an- 
nually for  want  of  sufficient  food  ;  and  many  human  beings  perish  in  the 
same  way.  We  can  hardly  suppose  that  he  did  not  know  these  facts. 
Compare  the  passage  in  Matthew  (vi.  25-34).  It  is  said,  v.  26  :  "  Behold 
the  fowls  of  the  air  ;  for  they  sow  not,  neither  do  they  reap,  nor  gather 
into  barns  ;  yet  your  heavenly  Father  feedeth  them.  Are  ye  not  much 
better  than  they  ?  "  The  expositors  of  this  passage  may  be  consulted 

,t  The  old  man  is  Epictetus. 


33 

that  when  they  have  recogni/ed  their  kinship  to  God,  and 
that  we  are  fettered  by  these  bonds,  the  body,  I  mean,  and 
its  possessions,  and  whatever  else  on  account  of  them  is 
necessary  to  us  for  the  economy  and  commerce  of  life,  they 
should  intend  to  throw  off  these  things  as  if  they  were  bur- 
dens painful  and  intolerable,  and  to  depart  to  their  kinsmen. 
But  this  is  the  labor  that  your  teacher  and  instructor  ought 
to  be  employed  upon,  if  he  really  were  what  he  should  be. 
You  should  come  to  him  and  say,  "  Epictetus,  we  can  no 
longer  endure  being  bound  to  this  poor  body,  and  feeding  it 
and  giving  it  drink,  and  rest,  and  cleaning  it,  and  for  the 
sake  of  the  body  complying  with  the  wishes  of  these  and  of 
those.*  Are  not  these  things  indifferent  and  nothing  to  us, 
and  is  not  death  no  evil  ?  And  are  we  not  in  a  manner  kins- 
men of  God,  and  did  we  not  come  from  Him  ?  Allow  us  to 
depart  to  the  place  from  which  we  came ;  allow  us  to  be  re- 
leased at  last  from  these  bonds  by  which  we  are  bound  and 
weighed  down.  Here  there  are  robbers  and  thieves  and 
courts  of  justice,  and  those  who  are  named  tyrants,  and  think 
that  they  have  some  power  over  us  by  means  of  the  body  and 
its  possessions.  Permit  us  to  show  them  that  they  have  no 
power  over  any  man.''  And  I  on  my  part  would  say, 
"  Friends,  wait  for  God  ;  when  He  shall  give  the  signal  f  and 
release  you  from  the  service,  then  go  to  Him  ;  but  for  the 
present  endure  to  dwell  in  this  place  where  He  has  put  you  : 
short  indeed  is  this  time  of  your  dwelling  here,  and  easy  to 
bear  for  those  who  are  so  disposed  :  for  what  tyrant,  or  what 
thief,  or  what  courts  of  justice,  are  formidable  to  those  who 

*  He  means,  as  Wolf  says,  "  on  account  of  the  necessities  of  the  body 
seeking  the  favor  of  the  more  powerful  by  disagreeable  complian 

t  Upton  refers  to  Cicero,  Tuscul.  i.  30 ;  Cato  Major,  c.  20  ;  Somnium 
Scipionis,  c.  3  (I)e  Republica,  iv.  15) ;  the  purport  of  which  passages  is 
that  we  must  not  depart  from  life  without  the  command  of  God.  See 
Marcus  Antoninus,  ii.  17  ;  iii.  5;  v.  33.  But  how  shall  a  man  know  the 
signal  for  departure,  of  which  Epictetus  speaks? 
3 


34  EPICTETUS, 

have  thus  considered  as  things  of  no  value  the  body  and  the 
possessions  of  the  body  ?  Wait  then,  do  not  depart  without 
a  reason." 

Something  like  this  ought  to  be  said  by  the  teacher  to  in- 
genuous youths.  But  now  what  happens  ?  The  teacher  is 
a  lifeless  body,  and  you  are  lifeless  bodies.  When  you  have 
been  well  filled  to-day,  you  sit  down  and  lament  about  the 
morrow,  how  you  shall  get  something  to  eat.  Wretch,  if  you 
have  it,  you  will  have  it ;  if  you  have  it  not,  you  will  depart 
from  life.  The  door  is  open.*  Why  do  you  grieve  ?  where 
does  there  remain  any  room  for  tears?  and  where  is  there 
occasion  for  flattery  ?  why  shall  one  man  envy  another  ?  why 
should  a  man  admire  the  rich  or  the  powerful,  even  if  they 
be  both  very  strong  and  of  violent  temper  ?  for  what  will  they 
do  to  us  ?  We  shall  not  care  for  that  which  they  can  do  ;  and 
what  we  do  care  for,  that  they  cannot  do.  How  did  Socrates 
behave  with  respect  to  these  matters  ?  Why,  in  what  other 
way  than  a  man  ought  to  do  who  was  convinced  that  he  was 
a  kinsman  of  the  gods  ?  "  If  you  say  to  me  now,"  said 
Socrates  to  his  judges, t  "  we  will  acquit  you  on  the  condition 
that  you  no  longer  discourse  in  the  way  in  which  you  have 
hitherto  discoursed,  nor  trouble  either  our  young  or  our  old 
men,  I  shall  answer,  you  make  yourselves  ridiculous  by  think- 
ing that,  if  one  of  our  commanders  has  appointed  me  to  a 
certain  post,  it  is  my  duty  to  keep  and  maintain  it,  and  to 

*  Upton  has  referred  to  the  passages  of  Epictetus  in  which  this  ex- 
pression is  used,  i.  24,  20;  i.  25,  18;  ii.  i,  19,  and  others;  to  Seneca,  De 
Provid.  c.  6,  Ep.  91  ;  to  Cicero,  De  Fin.  iii.  18,  where  there  is  this  con- 
clusion :  "e  quo  apparet  et  sapientis  esse  aliquando  officium  excedere  e 
vita,  quum  beatus  sit;  et  stulti  manere  in  vita  quum  sit  miser."  Com- 
pare Matthew  vi.  31  :  "Therefore  take  no  thought,  saying,  What  shall 
;  ?  or,  What  shall  we  drink  ?  or,  Wherewithal  shall  we  be  clothed? 
(For  after  all  these  things  do  the  Gentiles  seek  :)  for  your  heavenly 
Father  knoweth  that  ye  have  need  of  all  these  things,"  etc. 

\  This  passage  is  founded  on  and  is  in  substance  the  same  as  that  in 
Plato's  Apology,  c.  17. 


EPICTETUS.  35 

resolve  to  die  a  thousand  times  rather  than  desert  it :  but  if 
God  has  put  us  in  any  place  and  way  of  life,  we  ought  to 
desert  it."  Socrates  speaks  like  a  man  who  is  really  a  kins- 
man of  the  gods.  But  we  think  about  ourselves,  as  if  we 
were  only  stomachs,  and  intestines,  and  shameful  parts ;  we 
fear,  we  desire ;  we  flatter  those  who  are  able  to  help  us  in 
these  matters,  and  we  fear  them  also. 

A  man  asked  me  to  write  to  Rome  about  him,  a  man  who, 
as  most  people  thought,  had  been  unfortunate,  for  formerly 
he  was  a  man  of  rank  and  rich,  but  had  been  stripped  of  all, 
and  was  living  here.  I  wrote  on  his  behalf  in  a  submissive 
manner ;  but  when  he  had  read  the  letter,  he  gave  it  back 
to  me  and  said,  "  I  wished  for  your  help,  not  your  pity  :  no 
evil  has  happened  to  me." 

Thus  also  Musonius  Rufus,  in  order  to  try  me,  used  to  say  : 
This  and  this  will  befall  you  from  your  master;  and  when  [ 
replied  that  these  were  things  which  happen  in  the  ordinary 
course  of  human  affairs,  Why  then,  said  he,  should  I  ask 
him  for  anything  when  I  can  obtain  it  from  you  ?  For,  in 
fact,  what  a  man  has  from  himself,  it  is  superfluous  and 
foolish  to  receive  from  another.  Shall  I  then,  who  am  able 
to  receive  from  myself  greatness  of  soul  and  a  generous  spirit, 
receive  from  you  land  and  money  or  a  magisterial  office  ?  I 
hope  not :  I  will  not  be  so  ignorant  about  my  own  posses- 
sions. But  when  a  man  is  cowardly  and  me'an,  what  else 
must  be  done  for  him  than  to  write  letters  as  you  would  about 
a  corpse  ?  *  Please  to  grant  us  the  body  of  a  certain  person 
and  a  sextarius  of  poor  blood.  For  such  a  person  is,  in  fact, 
a  carcass  and  a  sextarius  (a  certain  quantity)  of  blood,  and 
nothing  more.  But  if  he  were  anything  more,  he  would  know 
that  one  man  is  not  miserable  through  the  means  of  another. 

•The  meaning  is  obscure.  Schweighaeuser  thinks  that  the  allusion  is 
f\>  A  defeated  enemy  asking  permission  from  the  conqueror  to  bury  the 
dead.  Kpictetus  considers  a  man  as  a  mere  carcass  who  places  his  hap- 
piness in  externals  and  in  the  favor  of  others. 


36  LMCTLTL'S. 


CHAPTER  X. 

AGAINST  THOSE  WHO   EAGERLY  SEEK.  PREFERMENT  AT  ROME. 

IF  we  applied  ourselves  as  busily  to  our  own  work  as  the 
old  men  at  Rome  do  to  those  matters  about  which  they  are 
employed,  perhaps  we  also  might  accomplish  something. 
I  am  acquainted  with  a  man  older  than  myself  who  is  now 
superintendent  of  corn*  at  Rome,  and  I  remember  the  time 
when  he  came  here  on  his  way  back  from  exile,  and  what 
he  said  as  he  related  the  events  of  his  former  life,  and  how 
he  declared  that  with  respect  to  the  future  after  his  return 
he  would  look  after  nothing  else  than  passing  the  rest  of 
his  life  in  quiet  and  tranquillity.  For  how  little  of  life,  he 
said,  remains  for  me.  I  replied,  you  will  not  do  it,  but  as 
soon  as  you  smell  Rome,  you  will  forget  all  that  you  have 
said  ;  and  if  admission  is  allowed  even  into  the  imperial 
palace,  he  t  will  gladly  thrust  himself  in  and  thank  God. 
If  you  find  me,  Epictetus.  he  answered,  setting  even  one 
foot  within  the  palace,  think  what  you  please.  Well,  what 
then  did  he  do  ?  Before  he  entered  the  city  he  was  met  by 
letters  from  Caesar,  and  as  soon  as  he  received  them  he  for- 
got all,  and  ever  after  has  added  one  piece  of  business  to 
another.  I  wish  that  I  were  now  by  his  side  to  remind  him 

*  A  "  Praefectus  Annonse,"  or  superintendent  of  the  supply  of  corn 
at  Rome,  is  first  mentioned  by  Livy  (iv,  12)  as  appointed  during  a  scar- 
city. At  a  later  time  this  office  was  conferred  on  Cn.  Pompeius  for  five 
years.  Maecenas  (Dion.  52,  c.  24)  advised  Augustus  to  make  a  Prefect  us 
Annonae  or  permanent  officer  over  the  com  market  and  all  other  mar- 
kets. He  would  thus  have  the  office  formerly  exercised  by  the  aediles. 

1 1  cannot  explain  why  the  third  person  is  used  here  instead  of  the 
second.  See  Schweig.'s  note. 


KPICTKTUS.  37 

of  what  he  said  when  he  was  passing  this  way,  and  to  tell 
him  how  much  better  a  seer  I  am  than  he  is. 

Well  then  do  I  say  that  man  is  an  animal  made  for  doing 
nothing  ?  *  Certainly  not.  But  why  are  we  not  active  ?  t 
(We  are  active.)  For  example,  as  to  myself,  as  soon  as  day 
comes,  in  a  few  words  I  remind  myself  of  what  I  must  read 
over  to  my  pupils ;  %  then  forthwith  I  say  to  myself,  But 
what  is  it  to  me  how  a  certain  person  shall  read  ?  the  first 
thing  for  me  is  to  sleep.  And  indeed  what  resemblance  is 
there  between  what  other  persons  do  and  what  we  do  ?  If 
you  observe  what  they  do,  you  will  understand.  And  what 
else  do  they  do  all  day  long  than  make  up  accounts,  inquire 
among  themselves,  give  and  take  advice  about  some  small 
quantity  of  grain,  a  bit  of  land,  and  such  kind  of  profits  ? 
Is  it  then  the  same  thing  to  receive  a  petition  and  to  read  in 
it :  I  entreat  you  to  permit  me  to  export  §  a  small  quantity 
of  corn  ;  and  one  to  this  effect :  "  I  entreat  you  to  learn  from 
Chrysippus  what  is  the  administration  of  the  world,  and  what 
place  in  it  the  rational  animal  holds  ;  consider  also  who  you 
are,  and  what  is  the  nature  of  your  good  and  bad.  Are  these 

*  The  Stoics  taught  that  man  is  adapted  by  his  nature  for  action.  He 
ought  not  therefore  to  withdraw  from  human  affairs,  and  indulge  in  a 
la/y  life,  not  even  a  life  of  contemplation  and  religious  observances  only. 
Upton  refers  to  Antoninus,  v.  i,  viii.  19,  and  Cicero,  De  Fin.  v.  20. 

t  Schweighaeuser  proposes  a  small  alteration  in  the  Greek  text,  but  F 
do  not  think  it  necessary.  When  Epictetus  says,  "  Why  are  we  not  act- 
ive ?  "  He  means,  Why  do  some  say  that  we  are  not  active  ?  And  he 
intends  to  say  that  We  are  active,  but  not  in  the  way  in  which  some 
people  are  active.  I  have  therefore  added  in  (  )  what  is  necessary  to 
make  the  text  intelligible. 

{  This  passage  is  rather  obscure.  Th»;  word  used  signifies,  it  is  said, 
to  read  over  for  the  purpose  of  explaining  as  a  teacher  may  do.  The 
pupil  also  would  read  something  to  the  teacher  for  the  purpose  of  show- 
ing if  he  understood  it.  So  Epictetus  also  says,  "  Hut  what  is  it  to  me," 
etc. 

$  A  plain  allusion  to  restraints  put  on  the  exportation  of  grain. 


38  F.PICTETUS. 

things  like  the  other,  do  they  require  equal  care,  and  is  it 
equally  base  to  neglect  these  and  those  ?  Well  then  are  we 
the  only  persons  who  are  lazy  and  love  sleep  ?  No ;  but 
much  rather  you  young  men  are.  For  we  old  men  when  we 
see  young  men  amusing  themselves  are  eager  to  play  with 
them  ;  and  if  I  saw  you  active  and  zealous,  much  more 
should  I  be  eager  myself  to  join  you  in  your  serious  pursuits." 


CHAPTER  XI. 

OF  NATURAL  AFFECTION. 

WHEN  he  was  visited  by  one  of  the  magistrates.  Epictetus 
inquired  of  him  about  several  particulars,  and  asked  if  he 
had  children  and  a  wife.  The  man  replied  that  he  had  ; 
and  Epictetus  inquired  further,  how  he  felt  under  the  circum- 
stances. Miserable,  the  man  said.  Then  Epictetus  asked, 
In  what  respect,  for  men  do  not  marry  and  beget  children 
in  order  to  be  wretched,  but  rather  to  be  happy.  But  I,  the 
man  replied,  am  so  wretched  about  my  children  that  lately, 
when  my  little  daughter  was  sick  and  was  supposed  to  be  in 
danger,  I  could  not  endure  to  stay  with  her,  but  I  left  home 
till  a  person  sent  me  news  that  she  had  recovered.  Well 
then,  said  Epictetus,  do  you  think  that  you  acted  right  ?  I 
acted  naturally,  the  man  replied.  But  convince  me  of  this 
that  you  acted  naturally,  and  I  will  convince  you  that  every- 
thing which  takes  place  according  to  nature  takes  place 
rightly.  This  is  the  case,  said  the  man,  with  all  or  at  least 
most  fathers.  I  do  not  deny  that :  but  the  matter  about 
which  we  are  inquiring  is  whether  such  behavior  is  right; 
for  in  respect  to  this  matter  we  must  say  that  tumors  also 
come  for  the  good  of  the  body,  because  they  do  come ; 
and  generally  we  must  say  that  to  do  wrong  is  natural,  be- 
cause nearly  all  or  at  least  most  of  us  do  wrong.  Do  you 


EPICTETUS. 


39 


show  me  then  how  your  behavior  is  natural.  I  cannot,  he 
said ;  but  do  you  rather  show  me  how  it  is  not  according  to 
nature,  and  is  not  rightly  done. 

Well,  said  Epictetus,  if  we  were  inquiring  about  white  and 
black,  what  criterion  should  we  employ  for  distinguishing 
between  them  ?  The  sight,  he  said.  And  if  about  hot 
and  cold,  and  hard  and  soft,  what  criterion  ?  The  touch. 
Well  then,  since  we  are  inquiring  about  things  which  are 
according  to  nature,  and  those  which  are  done  rightly  or 
not  rightly,  what  kind  of  criterion  do  you  think  that  we 
should  employ  ?  I  do  not  know,  he  said.  And  yet  not  to 
know  the  criterion  of  colors  and  smells,  and  also  of  tastes, 
is  perhaps  no  great  harm  ;  but  if  a  man  do  not  know  the 
criterion  of  good  and  bad,  and  of  things  according  to 
nature  and  contrary  to  nature,  does  this  seem  to  you  a 
small  harm  ?  The  greatest  harm  (I  think).  Come  tell 
me,  do  all  things  which  seem  to  some  persons  to  be  good 
and  becoming  rightly  appear  such ;  and  at  present  as  to 
Jews  and  Syrians  and  Egyptians  and  Romans,  is  it  possible 
that  the  opinions  of  all  of  them  in  respect  to  food  are  right? 
How  is  it  possible  ?  he  said.  Well,  I  suppose  it  is  absolutely 
necessary  that,  if  the  opinions  of  the  Egyptians  are  right,  the 
opinions  of  the  rest  must  be  wrong  :  if  the  opinions  of  the 
Jews  are  right,  those  of  the  rest  cannot  be  right.  Certainly. 
]>ut  where  there  is  ignorance,  there  also  there  is  want  of 
learning  and  training  in  things  which  are  necessary.  1  It- 
assented  to  this.  You  then,  said  Epictetus,  since  you  know 
this,  for  the  future  will  employ  yourself  seriously  about 
nothing  else,  and  will  apply  your  mind  to  nothing  else  than 
to  learn  the  criterion  of  things  which  are  according  to  nature, 
and  by  using  it  also  to  determine  each  several  thing.  But 
in  the  present  matter  I  have  so  much  as  this  to  aid  you 
toward  what  you  wish.  Does  affection  to  those  of  your 
family  appear  to  you  to  be  according  to  nature  and  to  be 
good?  Certainly.  Well,  is  such  affection  natural  and  good, 


40  F.riCTETl'S. 

and  is  a  thing  consistent  with  reason  not  good  ?  By  no 
means.  Is  then  that  which  is  consistent  with  reason  in  con- 
tradiction with  affection  ?  I  think  not.  You  are  right,  for 
if  it  is  otherwise,  it  is  necessary  that  one  of  the  contradictions 
being  according  to  nature,  the  other  must  be  contrary  to 
nature.  Is  it  not  so?  It  is,  he  said.  Whatever  then  we 
shall  discover  to  be  at  the  same  time  affectionate  and  also 
consistent  with  reason,  this  we  confidently  declare  to  be  right 
and  good.  Agreed.  Well  then,  to  leave  your  sick  child  and 
to  go  away  is  not  reasonable,  and  I  suppose  that  you  will 
not  say  that  it  is  ;  but  it  remains  for  us  to  inquire  if  it  is 
consistent  with  affection.  Yes,  let  us  consider.  Did  you 
then,  since  you  had  an  affectionate  disposition  to  your  child, 
do  right  when  you  ran  off  and  left  her  :  and  has  the  mother 
no  affection  for  the  child  ?  Certainly,  she  has.  Ought  then 
the  mother  also  to  have  left  her,  or  ought  she  not  ?  She 
ought  not.  And  the  nurse,  does  she  love  her  ?  She  does. 
Ought  then  she  also  to  have  left  her  ?  By  no  means.  And 
the  pedagogue,*  does  he  not  love  her  ?  He  does  love  her. 
Ought  then  he  also  to  have  deserted  her  ?  and  so  should  the 
child  have  been  left  alone  and  without  help  on  account  of 
the  great  affection  of  you  the  parents  and  of  those  about 
her,  or  should  she  have  died  in  the  hands  of  those  who 
neither  loved  her  nor  cared  for  her  ?  Certainly  not.  Now 
this  is  unfair  and  unreasonable,  not  to  allow  those  who  have 
equal  affection  with  yourself  to  do  what  you  think  to  be 
proper  for  yourself  to  do  because  you  have  affection.  It  is 
absurd.  Come  then,  if  you  were  sick,  would  you  wish  your 
relations  to  be  so  affectionate,  and  all  the  rest,  children  and 
wife,  as  to  leave  you  alone  and  deserted  ?  By  no  means. 
And  would  you  wish  to  be  so  loved  by  your  own  that  through 
their  excessive  affection  you  would  always  be  left  alone  in 

*  "  When  we  are  children  our  parents  put  us  in  the  hands  of  a  peda- 
gogue to  see  on  all  occasions  that  we  take  no  harm.'' — Epictetus,  Frag 


EPICTKTUS.  4t 

sickness  ?  or  for  this  reason  would  you  rather  pray,  if  it  were 
possible,  to  be  loved  by  your  enemies  and  deserted  by  them  ? 
But  if  this  is  so,  it  results  that  your  behavior  was  not  at  all 
an  affectionate  act. 

Well  then,  was  it  nothing  which  moved  you  and  induced 
you  to  desert  your  child  ?  and  how  is  that  possible  ?  But 
it  might  be  something  of  the  kind  which  moved  a  man  at 
Rome  to  wrap  up  his  head  while  a  horse  was  running 
which  he  favored  ;  and  when  contrary  to  expectation  the 
horse  won,  he  required  sponges  to  recover  from  his  fainting 
fit.  What  then  is  the  thing  which  moved?  The  exact 
discussion  of  this  does  not  belong  to  the  present  occasion 
perhaps ;  but  it  is  enough  to  be  convinced  of  this,  if  what 
the  philosophers  say  is  true,  that  we  must  not  look  for  it 
anywhere  without,  but  in  all  cases  it  is  one  and  the  same 
thing  which  is  the  cause  of  our  doing  or  not  doing  something, 
of  saying  or  not  saying  something,  of  being  elated  or 
depressed,  of  avoiding  anything  or  pursuing  :  the  very  thing 
which  is  now  the  cause  to  me  and  to  you,  to  you  of  coming 
to  me  and  sitting  and  hearing,  and  to  me  of  saying  what  I  do 
say.  And  what  is  this  ?  Is  it  any  other  than  our  will  to  do 
so  ?  No  other.  But  if  we  had  willed  otherwise,  what  else 
should  we  have  been  doing  than  that  which  we  willed  to  do  ? 
This  then  was  the  cause  of  Achilles'  lamentation,  not  the 
death  of  Patroclus ;  for  another  man  does  not  behave  thus 
on  the  death  of  his  companion  ;  but  it  was  because  he  chose 
to  do  so.  And  to  you  this  was  the  very  cause  of  your  then 
running  away,  that  you  chose  to  do  so ;  and  on  the  other 
side,  if  you  should  (hereafter)  stay  with  her,  the  reason 
will  be  the  same.  And  now  you  are  going  to  Rome  because 
you  choose  ;  and  if  you  should  change  your  mind,  you  will 
not  go  thither.  And  in  a  word,  neither  death  nor  exile  nor 
pain  nor  anything  of  the  .kind  is  the  cause  of  our  doing 
anything  or  not  doing  ;  but  our  own  opinions  and  our  wills. 

Do  1  convince  you  of  this  or  not  ?     You  do  convince  me. 


42  RPICTRTUS. 

Such  then  as  the  causes  are  in  each  case,  such  also  are  the 
effects.  When  then  \ve  are  doing  anything  not  rightly, 
from  this  day  \ve  shall  impute  it  to  nothing  else  than  to 
the  will  from  which  we  have  done  it :  and  it  is  that  which 
we  shall  endeavor  to  take  away  and  to  extirpate  more  than 
the  tumors  and  abscesses  out  of  the  body.  And  in  like 
manner  we  shall  give  the  same  account  of  the  cause  of  the 
things  which  we  do  right;  and  we  shall  no  longer  allege  as 
causes  of  any  evil  to  us,  either  slave  or  neighbor,  or  wife  or 
children,  being  persuaded,  that  if  we  do  not  think  things 
to  be  what  we  do  think  them  to  be,  we  do  not  the  acts 
which  follow  from  such  opinions;  and  as  to  thinking  or  not 
thinking,  that  is  in  our  power  and  not  in  externals.  It  is 
so,  he  said.  From  this  day  then  we  shall  inquire  into  and 
examine  nothing  else,  what  its  quality  is,  or  its  state, 
neither  land  nor  slaves  nor  horses  nor  dogs,  nothing  else 
than  opinions.  I  hope  so.  You  see  then  that  you  must 
become  a  Scholasticus,*  an  animal  whom  all  ridicule,  if 
you  really  intend  to  make  an  examination  of  your  own 
opinions  :  and  that  this  is  not  the  work  of  one  hour  or  day, 
you  know  yourself. 


CHAPTER  XII. 

OF    CONTENTMENT. 

WITH  respect  to  gods,  there  are  some  who  say  that  a 
divine  being  does  not  exist :  others  say  that  it  exists,  but  is 
inactive  and  careless,  and  takes  no  forethought  about  any- 
thing ;  a  third  class  say  that  such  a  being  exists  and  exer 
cises  forethought,  but  only  about  great  things  and  heavenly 

*  A  Scholasticus  is  one  who  frequents  the  schools  ;  a  studious  and 
literary  person,  who  does  not  engage  in  the  business  of  active  life. 


EPJCTKTUS.  43 

things,  and  about  nothing  on  the  earth  ;  a  fourth  class  say 
lhat  a  divine  being  exercises  forethought  both  about  things 
on  the  earth  and  heavenly  things,  but  in  a  general 
only,  and  not  about  things  severally.  There  is  a  fifth  class 
to  whom  Ulysses  and  Socrates  belong,  who  say :  "  I  raove 
not  without  thy  knowledge"  *  (Iliad,  x.  278). 

Before  all  other  things  then  it  is  necessary  to  inquire 
about  each  of  these  opinions,  whether  it  is  affirmed  truly 
or  not  truly.  For  if  there  are  no  gods,  how  is  it  our 
proper  end  to  follow  them  ?  t  And  if  they  exist,  but  take 
no  care  of  anything,  in  this  case  also  how  will  it  be  right 
to  follow  them  ?  But  if  indeed  they  do  exist  and  look  after 
things,  still  if  there  is  nothing  communicated  from  them 
to  men,  nor  in  fact  to  myself,  how  even  so  is  it  right  (to 
follow  them)  ?  The  wise  and  good  man  then  after  con- 
sidering all  these  things,  submits  his  own  mind  to  him  who 
administers  the  whole,  as  good  citizens  do  to  the  law  of 
the  state.  He  who  is  receiving  instruction  ought  to  come 
to  be  instructed  with  this  intention,  How  shall  I  follow  the 
gods  in  all  things,  how  shall  I  be  contented  with  the 

*  The  line  is  from  the  prayer  of  Ulysses  to  Athena  :  "  Hear  me,  child 

of  Zeus,  thou  who  standest  by  me  always  in  all  dangers,  nor  do  I  even 

move  without  thy  knowledge."     Socrates  said  that  the  gods  know  ev«ry- 

,  what    is  said   and  done  and  thought    (Xenophon,  Mem.   i.  I,    19). 

( ipare  Cicero,  De  Xat.  Deorum,  i.  i,  2j  and  Dr.  Price's  Dissertation 

on  Providence,  sect  i.  Epictetus  enumerates  the  various  opinions  about 
the  gods  in  ancient  times.  The  reader  may  consult  the  notes  in  Schwelg- 
haeusers  edition.  The  opinions  about  God  among  modern  nations, 
who  are  called  civilized,  and  are  so  more  or  leas,  do  not  seem  to  be  so 
varied  as  in  ancient  times ;  but  the  contrasts  in  modern  opinions  are 
striking.  These  modern  opinions  vary  between  denial  of  a  God,  though 
the  number  of  those  who  deny  i*  perhaps  not  large,  and  the  superstitious 
notions  about  God  and  His  administration  of  the  world,  which  are 
taught  by  teachers,  learned  and  ignorant,  and  exercise  a  great  power  ov«r 
the  minds  of  those  who  are  unable  or  do  not  dare  to  exercise  the  faculty 
of  reason. 

t  "To  follow  God,"  ia  a  Stoical  «xpr««»ion.     Antoninus,  x.  1 1. 


4; 

divine  administration,  and  how  can  I  become  free  ?  For  he 
is  free  to  whom  everything  happens  according  to  his  will, 
and  whom  no  man  can  hinder.  What  then  is  freedom 
madness  ?  Certainly  not :  for  madness  and  freedom  do  not 
consist.  But,  you  say,  I  would  have  everything  result  just 
as  I  like,  and  in  whatever  way  I  like.  You  are  mad,  you 
are  beside  yourself.  Do  you  not  know  that  freedom  is  a 
noble  and  valuable  thing  ?  But  for  me  inconsiderately  to 
wish  for  things  to  happen  as  I  inconsiderately  like,  this 
appears  to  be  not  only  not  noble,  but  even  most  base.  For 
how  do  we  proceed  in  the  matter  of  writing  ?  Do  I  wish 
to  write  the  name  of  Dion  as  I  choose  ?  Xo,  but  I  am 
taught  to  choose  to  write  it  as  it  ought  to  be  written.  And 
how  with  respect  to  music?  In  the  same  manner.  And 
what  universally  in  every  art  or  science?  Just  the  same. 
If  it  were  not  so,  it  would  be  of  no  value  to  know  any- 
thing, if  knowledge  were  adapted  to  every  man's  whim. 
Is  it  then  in  this  alone,  in  this  which  is  the  greatest  and 
the  chief  thing,  I  mean  freedom,  that  I  am  permitted  to 
will  inconsiderately  ?  By  no  means  ;  but  to  be  instructed 
is  this,  to  learn  to  wish  that  everything  may  happen  as  it 
does.*  And  how  do  things  happen  ?  As  the  disposer  has 
disposed  them  ?  And  he  has  appointed  summer  and  winter, 
and  abundance  and  scarcity,  and  virtue  and  vice,  and  ull 
such  opposites  for  the  harmony  of  the  whole  ;  f  and  to  each 

*  This  means  that  we  ought  to  learn  to  be  satisfied  with  everything 
that  happens,  in  fact  with  the  will  of  God.  This  is  a  part  of  education 
according  to  Epictetus.  But  it  does  not  appear  in  our  systems  of  educa- 
tion so  plainly  as  it  does  here.  Antoninus  (iv.  23) :  "  Everything  har- 
monizes with  me,  which  is  harmonious  to  thee,  O  universe.  Nothing 
for  me  is  too  early  nor  too  late,  which  is  in  due  time  for  thee." 

t  Upton  has  collected  the  passages  in  which  this  doctrine  was  men- 
tinned.  One  passage  is  in  Gellius(vi.  i).  from  the  fourth  book  of  Chry- 
sippus  on  Providence,  who  says :  "  nothing  is  more  foolish  than  the 
opinions  of  those  who  think  that  good  could  have  existed  without  evil." 
Schweighaeuser  wishes  that  Epictetus  had  discussed  more  fully  the 


KP/CTETVS.  45 

of  us  he  has  given  a  body,  and  parts  of  the  body,  and 
possessions,  and  companions. 

Remembering  then  this  disposition  of  things,  we  ought  to 
go  to  be  instructed,  not  that  we  may  change  the  constitution 
of  things — for  we  have  not  the  power  to  do  it,  nor  is  it  better 
that  we  should  have  the  power,  but  in  order  that,  as  the 
tilings  around  us  are  what  they  are  and  by  nature  exist,  we 
may  maintain  our  minds  in  harmony  with  the  things  which 
happen.  For  can  we  escape  from  men  ?  and  how  is  it  pos- 
sible ?  And  if  we  associate  with  them,  can  we  change  them  ? 
Vv'ho  gives  us  the  power?  What  then  remains,  or  what 
method  is  discovered  of  holding  commerce  with  them  ?  Is 
there  such  a  method  by  which  they  shall  do  what  seems  fit 
to  them,  and  we  not  the  less  shall  be  in  a  mood  which  is 
conformable  to  nature  ?  But  you  are  unwilling  to  endure  and 
are  discontented  :  and  if  you  are  alone,  you  call  it  solitude  ; 
and  if  you  are  with  men,  you  call  them  knaves  and  robbers  ; 
and  you  find  fault  with  your  own  parents  and  children,  and 
brothers  and  neighbors.  But  you  ought  when  you  are  alone 
to  call  this  condition  by  the  name  of  tranquillity  and  freedom, 
and  to  think  yourself  like  to  the  gods;  and  when  you  .uc- 
with  many,  you  ought  not  to  call  it  crowd,  nor  trouble,  nor 
uneasiness,  but  festival  and  assembly,  and  so  accept  all  con- 
tentedly. 

question  on  the  nature  and  origin  of  Evil.  He  refers  to  the  commen- 
tary of  Simplicius  on  the  Fncheiridion  of  Epictetus,  c.  13  (Sj,  and  34  (27), 
for  his  treatment  of  this  subject.  Epictetus  (Enchciridion,  c.  27),  >uys 
that  "  as  a  mark  is  not  set  up  for  the  purpose  of  missing  it,  so  neither  dors 
the  nature  of  evil  exist  in  the  universe."  Simplicius  observes  (p.  278, 
ed.  Schweig.)  :  "  The  Good  is  that  whii.h  i<  according  to  each  thing's 
nature,  wherein  each  thing  has  its  perfection  :  but  the  Mad  is  tin-  ills- 
position  contrary  to  its  nature  of  the  thing  which  contains  the  bad,  by 
which  disposition  it  is  deprived  of  that  which  is  according  to  nature. 
namely  the  good.  For  if  the  I -id  as  well  as  the  (juod  were  a  disposition 
and  perfection  of  the  f..r..i  ia  which  it  is,  the  bad  itself  would  also  l,e 
good  .ind  would  mil  then  !»•  <  .iMt.-.I  llad." 


46  EPIC  TE  TUS. 

What  Then  is  the  punishment  of  those  who  do  not  accept  ? 
It  is  to  be  what  they  are.  Is  any  person  dissatisfied  with  being 
alone  ?  let  him  be  alone.  Is  a  man  dissatisfied  with  his 
parents  ?  let  him  be  a  bad  son,  and  lament.  Is  he  dissatis- 
fied with  his  children  ?  let  him  be  a  bad  father.  Cast  h:-n 
into  prison.  What  prison  ?  Where  he  is  already,  for  1 
there  against  his  will  ;  and  where  a  man  is  against  his  will, 
there  he  is  in  prison.  So  Socrates  was  not  in  prison,  for  he 
was  there  willingly.  Must  my  leg  then  be  lamed  ?  Wretch, 
do  you  then  on  account  of  one  poor  leg  find  fault  with  the 
world  ?  Will  you  not  willingly  surrender  it  for  the  whole  ? 
Will  you  not  withdraw  from  it  ?  Will  you  not  gladly  part 
with  it  to  him  who  gave  it  ?  And  will  you  be  vexed  and  dis- 
contented with  the  things  established  by  Zeus,  which  he  with 
the  Morae  (fates)  who  were  present  and  spinning  the  thread  of 
your  generation,  defined  and  put  in  order  ?  Know  you  not 
how  small  a  part  you  are  compared  with  the  whole.  I  mean 
with  respect  to  the  body,  for  as  to  intelligence  you  are  not 
inferior  to  the  gods  nor  less  ;  for  the  magnitude  of  intelli- 
gence is  not  measured  by  length  nor  yet  by  height,  but  by 
thoughts. 

Will  you  not  then  choose  to  place  your  good  in  that  in 
which  you  are  equal  to  the  gods?  Wretch  that  I  am  to  have 
such  a  father  and  mother.  What  then,  was  it  permitted  to 
you  to  come  forth  and  to  select  and  to  say :  Let  such  a  man 
at  this  moment  unite  with  such  a  woman  that  I  may  be  pro- 
duced ?  It  was  not  permitted,  but  it  was  a  necessity  for 
your  parents  to  exist  first,  and  then  for  you  to  be  begotten. 
Of  what  kind  of  parents?  Of  such  as  they  were.  Well 
then,  since  they  are  such  as  they  are,  is  there  no  remedy 
given  to  you  ?  Now  if  you  did  not  know  for  what  purpose 
you  possess  the  faculty  of  vision,  you  would  be  unfortunate 
and  wretched  if  you  closed  your  eyes  when  colors  were 
brought  before  them  ;  but  in  that  you  possess  greatness  of 
soul  and  nobility  of  spirit  for  every  event  that  may  happen, 


f-.PfCTETUS. 


47 


and  you  know  not  that  you  possess  them,  are  you  nol  more 
unfortunate  and  wretched  ?  Things  are  brought  close  to  you 
which  are  proportionate  to  the  power  which  you  possess,  but 
you  turn  away  this  power  most  particularly  at  the  very  time 
when  you  ought  to  maintain  it  open  and  discerning.  Do  you 
not  rather  thank  the  gods  that  they  have  allowed  you  to  be 
above  these  things  which  they  have  not  placed  in  your  power ; 
and  have  made  you  accountable  only  for  those  which  are  in  your 
power  ?  As  to  your  parents,  the  gods  have  left  you  free  from 
responsibility  ;  and  so  with  respect  to  your  brothers,  and 
your  body,  and  possessions,  and  death  and  life.  For  what 
then  have  they  made  you  responsible  ?  For  that  which  alone 
is  in  your  power,  the  proper  use  of  appearances.  Why  then 
do  you  draw  on  yourself  the  things  for  v.hich  you  are  not  re- 
sponsible ?  It  is,  indeed,  a  giving  of  trouble  to  yourself. 


CHAPTER  XIIL 

HOW    EVERYTHING    MAV    RE    DONE   ACCEPTABLY  TO   THE  GODS. 

WHEN  some  one  asked,  How  may  a  man  eat  acceptably  to  the 
gods,  he  answered  :  If  he  can  eat  justly  and  contentedly,  and 
with  equanimity,  and  temperately  and  orderly,  will  it  not  be 
also  acceptably  to  the  gods  ?  But  when  you  have  asked  for 
warm  water  and  the  slave  has  not  heard,  or  if  he  did  hear 
has  brought  only  tepid  water,  or  he  is  not  even  found  to  be 
in  the  house,  then  not  to  be  vexed  or  to  burst  with  passion, 
is  not  this  acceptable  to  the  gods  ?  How  then  shall  a  man 
endure  such  persons  as  this  slave  ?  Slavp  yourself,  will  you 
not  bear  with  your  own  brother,  who  has  Zeus  for  his  pro- 
genitor, and  is  like  a  son  from  the  same  seeds  and  of  the 
same  descent  from  above  ?  But  if  you  have  been  put  in  any 
such  higher  place,  will  you  immediately  make  yourself  a 


48 

tyrant  ?  Will  you  not  remember  who  you  are,  and  whom 
you  rule  ?  that  they  are  kinsmen,  that  they  are  brethren  by 
nature,  that  they  are  the  offspring  of  Zeus?*  But  I  have 
purchased  them,  and  they  have  not  purchased  me.  Do  you 
see  in  what  direction  you  are  looking,  that  it  is  toward  the 
earth,  toward  the  pit,  that  it  is  toward  these  wretched  laws 
of  dead  men  ?  f  but  toward  the  laws  of  the  gods  you  are  not 
looking. 


CHAPTER  XIV. 

THAT    THE    DEITY    OVERSEES    ALL    THINGS. 

WHEN  a  person  asked  him  how  a  man  could  be  convinced 
that  all  his  actions  are  under  the  inspection  of  God,  he 
answered,  Do  you  not  think  that  all  things  are  united  in 
one  ?  t  I  do,  the  person  replied.  Well,  do  you  not  think 
that  earthly  things  have  a  natural  agreement  and  union  with 
heavenly  things?  I  do.  And  how  else  so  regularly  -i-.  IT 
by  God's  command,  when  He  bids  the  plants  to  flower,  do 
they  flower  /  v/hen  He  bids  them  to  send  forth  shoots,  do 

*  Mrs.  Carter  compares  Job  xxxi.  15  :  "  Did  not  he  that  made  me  in 
the  womb  make  him  (my  man-servant)  ?  And  did  not  one  fashion  us 
in  the  womb  ?  " 

t  I  suppose  he  means  human  laws,  which  have  made  one  man  a  slave 
to  another  ;  and  when  he  says  "  dead  men,"  he  may  mean  mortal  men, 
as  contrasted  with  the  gods  or  God,  who  has  made  all  men  brothers. 

|  Things  appear  to  be  separate,  but  there  is  a  bond  by  which  they  a.re 
united.  "  All  this  that  yon  see,  wherein  things  divine  and  human  are 
contained,  is  One  :  W2  are  members  of  one  large  body"  (Seneca,  l-'.p. 
95).  "  The  universe  is  either  a  confusion,  a  mutual  involution  of  things 
and  a  dispersion  ;  or  it  is  unity  and  order  and  providence  "  (Antoninus, 
vi.  10)  :  also  vii.  9,  "  all  things  are  implicated  with  one  another,  and  the 
bond  is  holy ;  and  there  is  hardly  anything  unconnected  with  any  other 
thing."  See  also  Cicero,  I)e  Nat.  Deoruin,  ii.  7  ;  and  De  Oratore,  iii.  5. 


ETUS.  49 

they  shoo*  ?  when  He  bids  them  to  produce  fruit,  how  else  do 
they  produce  fruit  ?  when  He  bids  the  fruit  to  ripen,  does  it 
ripen  ?  when  again  He  bids  them  to  cast  down  the  fruits,  how 
else  do  they  cast  them  down  ?  and  when  to  shed  the  leaves,  do 
they  shed  the  leaves  ?  and  when  He  bids  them  to  fold  them- 
selves up  and  to  remain  quiet  and  rest,  how  else  do  they  remain 
quiet  and  rest  ?  And  how  else  at  the  growth  and  the  wane  of 
the  moon,  and  at  the  approach  and  recession  of  the  sun,  are  so 
great  an  alteration  and  change  to  the  contrary  seen  in  earthly 
things  ?  *  But  are  plants  and  our  bodies  so  bound  up  and 
united  with  the  whole,  and  are  not  our  souls  much  more  ? 
and  our  souls  so  bound  up  and  in  contact  with  God  as  parts 
of  Him  and  portions  of  Him;  and  does  not  God  perceive 
every  motion  of  these  parts  as  being  His  own  motion  connate 
with  Himself?  Now  are  you  able  to  think  of  the  divine  ad- 
ministration, and  about  all  things  divine,  and  at  the  same 
time  also  about  human  affairs,  and  to  be  moved  by  ten  thou- 
sand things  at  the  same  time  in  your  senses  and  in  your 
understanding,  and  to  assent  to  some,  and  to  dissent  from 
others,  and  again  as  to  some  things  to  suspend  your  judg- 
ment ;  and  do  you  retain  in  your  soul  so  many  impressions 
from  so  many  and  various  things,  and  being  moved  by  them, 
do  you  fall  upon  notions  similar  to  those  first  impressed, 
and  do  you  retain  numerous  arts  and  the  memories  of  ten 
thousand  things ;  and  is  not  God  able  to  oversee  all  things, 
and  to  be  present  with  all,  and  to  receive  from  all  a  certain 
communication  ?  And  is  the  sun  able  to  illuminate  so  large 
a  part  of  the  All,  and  to  feave  so  little  not  illuminated,  that 
part  only  which  is  occupied  by  the  earth's  shadow  ;  and  He 
who  made  the  sun  itself  and  makes  it  go  round,  being  a 
small  part  of  Himself  compared  with  the  whole,  cannot  He 
perceive  all  things  ? 

But  I  cannot,  the  man  may  reply,  comprehend  all  these 

*  Compare  Swedenborg,  Angelic  Wisdom,  349-35^- 


50  RPJCTETUS. 

things  at  once.  But  who  tells  you  that  you  have  equal 
power  with  Zeus  ?  Nevertheless  he  has  placed  by  every 
man  a  guardian,  every  man's  Demon,*  to  whom  he  has  com- 
mitted the  care  of  the  man,  a  guardian  who  never  sleeps,  is 
never  deceived.  For  to  what  better  and  more  careful  guard- 
ian could  He  have  intrusted  each  of  us  ?  When  then  you 
have  shut  the  doors  and  made  darkness  within,  remember 
never  to  say  that  you  are  alone,  for  you  are  not ;  but  God  is 
within,  and  your  Demon  is  within,  and  what  need  have  they 
of  light  to  see  what  you  are  doing  ?  TO  this  God  you  ought 
to  swear  an  oath  just  as  the  soldiers  do  to  Caesar.  But 
they  who  are  hired  for  pay  swear  to  regard  the  safety  of 
Cassar  before  all  things  ;  and  you  who  have  received  so 
many  and  such  great  favors,  will  you  not  swear,  or  when 
you  have  sworn,  will  you  not  abide  by  your  oath  ?  And 
what  shall  you  swear  ?  Never  to  be  disobedient,  never  to 
make  any  charges,  never  to  find  fault  with  anything  that  he 
has  given,  and  never  unwillingly  to  do  or  to  suffer  anything 
that  is  necessary.  Is  this  oath  like  the  soldier's  oath  ?  The 
soldiers  swear  not  to  prefer  any  man  to  Caesar  :  in  this  oath 
men  swear  to  honor  themselves  before  all. 

*  Antoninus,  v.  27  :  "  Live  with  the  gods.  And  he  does  live  with  the 
gods  who  constantly  shows  to  them  that  his  own  soul  is  satisfied  with 
that  which  is  assigned  to  him,  and  that  it  does  all  that  the  Demon 
wishes,  which  Zeus  hath  given  to  every  man  for  his  guardian  and  guide, 
a  portion  of  himself.  And  this  is  every  man's  understanding  and  rea- 
son." Antoninus  (iii.  5)  names  this  Demon  "  the  god  who  is  in  thee.'' 
St.  Paul  (i  Cor.  i.  3,  16)  says,  "  Know  ye  not  that  ye  are  the  temple  of 
God,  and  that  the  spirit  of  God  dwelleth  in  you  ?  " 


CHAPTER  XV. 
HTHAT  PHILOSOPHY  PROMISES. 

WHEN"  a  man  was  consulting  him  how  he  should  persuade 
his  brother  to  cease  being  angry  with  him,  Epictetus  replied, 
Philosophy  does  not  propose  to  secure  for  a  man  any  exter- 
nal thing.  If  it  did  (or,  if  it  were  not,  as  I  say),  philosophy 
would  be  allowing  something  which  is  not  within  its  province. 
For  as  the  carpenter's  material  is  wood,  and  that  of  the  stat- 
uary is  copper,  so  the  matter  of  the  art  of  living  is  each 
man's  life.  What  then  is  my  brother's  ?  That  again  be- 
longs to  his  own  art ;  but  with  respect  to  yours,  it  is  one  of 
the  external  things,  like  a  piece  of  land,  like  health,  like  rep- 
utation. But  Philosophy  promises  none  of  these.  In  every 
circumstance  I  will  maintain,  she  says,  the  governing  part 
conformable  to  nature.  Whose  governing  part  ?  His  in 
whom  I  am,  she  says. 

How  then  shall  my  brother  cease  to  be  angry  with  me  ? 
Bring  him  to  me  and  I  will  tell  him.  But  I  have  nothing  to 
say  to  you  about  his  anger. 

When  the  man,  who  was  consulting  him,  said,  I  seek  to 
know  this,  How,  even  if  my  brother  is  not  reconciled  to  me, 
shall  I  maintain  myself  in  a  state  conformable  to  nature  ? 
Nothing  great,  said  Epictetus,  is  produced  suddenly,  since 
not  even  the  grape  or  the  fig  is.  If  you  say  to  me  now  that 
you  want  a  fig,  I  will  answer  to  you  that  it  requires  time  : 
let  it  flower*  first,  then  put  forth  fruit,  and  then  ripen.  Is 

*  "  The  philosopher  had  forgot  that  fig-trees  do  not  blossom  "  (Mrs. 
Carter).  The  flowers  of  a  fig  are  inside  the  fleshy  receptacle  which 
becomes  the  fruit. 


52  Ef'lCTETUS. 

then  the  fruit  of  a  fig-tree  not  perfected  suddenly  and  in  one 
hour,  and  would  you  possess  the  fruit  of  a  man's  mind  in  so 
short  a  time  and  so  easily  ?  Do  not  expect  it,  even  if  I  tell 
you. 


CHAPTER  XVI. 

OF    PROVIDENCE. 

Do  NOT  wonder  if  for  other  animals  than  man  all  things 
are  provided  for  the  body,  not  only  food  and  drink,  but 
beds  also,  and  they  have  no  need  of  shoes  nor  bed  mate- 
rials, nor  clothing  ;  but  we  require  all  these  additional 
things.  For  animals  not  being  made  for  themselves,  but 
for  service,  it  was  not  fit  for  them  to  be  made  so  as  to  need 
other  things.  For  consider  what  it  would  be  for  us  to  take 
care  not  only  of  ourselves,  but  also  about  cattle  and  asses, 
how  they  should  be  clothed,  and  how  shod,  and  how  they 
should  eat  and  drink.  Now  as  soldiers  are  ready  for  their 
commander,  shod,  clothed  and  armed  :  but  it  would  be  a 
hard  thing  for  the  chiliarch  (tribune)  to  go  round  and  shoe 
or  clothe  his  thousand  men  ;  so  also  nature  has  formed  the 
animals  which  are  made  for  service,  all  ready,  prepared,  and 
requiring  no  further  care.  So  one  little  boy  with  only  a  stick 
drives  the  cattle. 

But  now  we,  instead  of  being  thankful  that  we  need  not 
take  the  same  care  of  animals  as  of  ourselves,  complain  of 
God  on  our  own  account ;  and  yet,  in  the  name  of  Zeus  and 
the  gods,  any  one  thing  of  those  which  exist  would  be  enough 
to  make  a  man  perceive  the  providence  of  God,  at  least  a 
man  who  is  modest  and  grateful.  And  speak  not  to  me  now 
of  the  great  things,  but  only  of  this,  that  milk  is  produced 
from  grass,  and  cheese  from  milk,  and  wool  from  skins. 


EPICTEITS.  53 

Who  rrmde  these  things  or  devised  them  ?     Xo  one,  you  say. 
Oil.  ama/ing  shamelessness  and  stupidity  ! 

Well,  let  us  omit  the  works  of  nature  and  contemplate  her 
smaller  (subordinate)  acts.  Is  there  anything  less  useful 
than  the  hair  on  the  chin  ?  What  then,  has  not  nature  used 
this  hair  also  in  the  most  suitable  manner  possible  ?  Has 
she  not  by  it  distinguished  the  male  and  the  female  ?  does 
not  the  nature  of  every  man .  forthwith  proclaim  from  a  dis- 
tance, I  am  a  man  ;  as  such  approach  me,  as  such  speak  to 
me  ;  look  for  nothing  else  ;  see  the  signs  ?  Again,  in  the 
case  of  women,  as  she  has  mingled  something  softer  in 
the  voice,  so  she  has  also  deprived  them  of  hair  (on  the 
chin).  You  say,  not  so:  the  human  animal  ought  to  have 
been  left  without  marks  of  distinction,  and  each  of  us  should 
have  been  obliged  to  proclaim,  I  am  a  man.  But  how  is 
not  the  sign  beautiful  and  becoming  and  venerable  ?  how 
much  more  beautiful  than  the  cock's  comb,  how  much  more 
becoming  than  the  lion's  mane  ?  For  this  reason  we  ought 
to  preserve  the  signs  which  God  has  given,  we  ought  not  to 
throw  them  away,  nor  to  confound,  as  much  as  we  can,  the 
distinctions  of  the  sexes. 

these  the  only  works  of  providence  in  us  ?  And  what 
words  are  sufficient  to  praise  them  and  set  them  forth  accord- 
ing to  their  worth  ?  For  if  we  had  understanding,  ought  we 
to  do  anything  else  both  jointly  and  severally  than  to  sing 
hymns  and  bless  the  deity,  and  to  tell  of  his  benefits  ?  Ought 
we  not  when  we  are  digging  and  plowing  and  eating  to  sing 
this  hymn  to  God  ?  "  Great  is  God,  who  has  given  us  such 
implements  with  which  we  shall  cultivate  the  earth  :  great  is 
God,  who  has  given  us  hands,  the  power  of  swallowing,  a 
stomach,  imperceptible  growth,  and  the  power  of  breathing 
while  we  sleep.''  This  is  what  we  ought  to  sing  on  every  oc- 
casion, and  to  sing  the  greatest  and  most  divine  hymn  for 
giving  us  the  faculty  of  comprehending  these  things  and  us- 
ing a  proper  way.  Well  then,  since  most  of  you  have  ben  urn: 


54  EPICTETUS. 

blind,  ought  there  not  to  be  some  man  to  fill  this  office,  and 
on'  behalf  of  all  to  sing  the  hymn  to  God  ?  For  what  else 
can  I  do,  a  lame  old  man,  than  sing  hymns  to  God  ?  If  then 
I  was  a  nightingale,  I  would  do  the  part  of  a  nightingale  ;  if 
I  were  a  swan,  I  would  do  like  a  swan.  But  now  I  am  a 
rational  creature,  and  I  ought  to  praise  God :  this  is  my 
work  ;  I  do  it,  nor  will  I  desert  this  post,  so  long  as  I  am 
allowed  to  keep  it ;  and  I  exhort  you  to  join  in  this  same 
song. 


CHAPTER  XVII. 

THAT    THE    LOGICAL    ART    IS     NECESSARY. 

SINCE  reason  is  the  faculty  which  analyzes  and  perfects  the 
rest,  and  it  ought  itself  not  to  be  unanalyzed,  by  what  should 
it  be  analyzed  ?  for  it  is  plain  that  this  should  be  done  either 
by  itself  or  by  another  thing.  Either  then  this  other  thing 
also  is  reason,  or  something  else  superior  to  reason ;  which 
is  impossible.  But  if  it  is  reason,  again  who  shall  analyze 
that  reason  ?  For  if  that  reason  does  this  for  itself,  our  rea- 
son also  can  do  it.  But  we  shall  require  something  else,  the 
thing  will  go  on  to  infinity  and  have  no  end.*  Reason  there- 
fore is  analyzed  by  itself.  Yes  :  but  it  is  more  urgent  to 
cure  (our  opinionsf }  and  the  like.  Will  you  then  hear  about 

*  This  is  obscure.  The  conclusion,  "  Reason  therefore  is  analyzed  by 
itself"  is  not  in  Epictetus;  but  it  is  implied,  as  Schweighaeuser  says 
(p.  197,  notes).  So  Antoninus,  xi.  i,  writes:  "These  are  the  properties 
of  the  rational  soul ;  it  s  es  itself,  analyzes  itself."  If  reason,  our  rea- 
son, requires  another  reason  to  analyze  it,  that  other  reason  will  require 
another  reason  to  analyze  that  other  reason ;  and  so  on  to  infinity.  If 
reason  then,  our  reason,  can  be  analyzed,  it  must  be  analyzed  by 
itself.  The  notes  on  the  first  part  of  this  chapter  in  the  edition  of 
Schweighaeuser  may  be  read  by  those  who  are  inclined. 

t  "  Our  opinions."     There  is  some   defect  in   the   text,  as  Wolf   re- 


S3 

those  things  ?  Hear.  But  if  you  should  say,  "  I  know  not 
whether  you  are  arguing  truly  or  falsely,"  and  if  1  should  ex- 
press myself  in  any  way  ambiguously,  and  you  should  say  to 
me,  "  Distinguish,"  1  will  bear  with  you  no  longer,  and  1  shall 
say  to  you,  '•  It  is  more  urgent."  *  This  is  the  reason,  I  sup- 
pose, why  they  (the  Stoic  teachers)  place  the  logical  art  first, 
as  in  the  measuring  of  corn  we  place  first  the  examination  of 
the  measure.  But  if  we  do  not  determine  first  what  is  a 
modius,  and  what  is  a  balance,  how  shall  we  be  able  to 
measure  or  weigh  anything  ? 

In  this  case  then  if  we  have  not  fully  learned  and  accu- 
rately examined  the  criterion  of  all  other  things,  by  which 
the  other  things  are  learned,  shall  we  be  able  to  examine 
accurately  and  to  learn  fully  anything  else  ?  Yes ;  but  the 
modius  is  only  wood,  and  a  thing  which  produces  no  fruit. 
But  it  is  a  thing  which  can  measure  corn.  Logic  also  pro- 
duces no  fruit.  As  to  this  indeed  we  shall  see:  but  then 
even  if  a  man  should  grant  this,  it  is  enough  that  logic  has 
the  power  of  distinguishing  and  examining  other  things,  and, 
as  we  may  say,  of  measuring  and  weighing  them.  Who  says 
this?  Is  it  only  Chrysippus,  and  Zeno,  and  Cleanthes  ? 
And  does  not  Antisthenes  say  so  ?  f  And  who  is  it  that 
has  written  that  the  examination  of  names  is  the  beginning 
of  education  ?  And  does  not  Socrates  say  so  ?  And  of 
whom  dors  Xt.-nophon  write,  that  he  began  with  the  examina- 
tion of  names,  what  each  name  signified  ?  t  Is  this  then  the 

marks.     "The  opponent,"  he  says,  "  disp.i;  (Dialectic)  as  a 

thing  which  is  not  necessary  to  make  men  good,  ami  he  prefers  moral 
teaching  to  Logic  :  but  Epictetus  informs  him,  that  a  man  who  is  not  a 
Dialectician  will  not  have  a  sufficient  perception  of  moral  teaching." 

*  lie  repeats  the  words  of  the  supposed  opponent;  and  he  means 
that  his  adversary's  difficulty  shows  the  necessity  of  Dialf 

t  Antisthenes,  who  professed  the  Cynic  philosophy,  rejected  Logic  and 
Physic  (Schweig,  note  p.  201). 

|  Xenophon,  Mem.  iv.  5.  12,  and  i\.  6,  7.     tpictetus  knew  what  edu«*- 


great  and  wondrous  thing  to  understand  or  interpret 
Chrysippus  ?  Who  says  this  ?  What  then  is  the  wondrous 
thing  ?  To  understand  the  will  of  nature.  Well  then  do 
you  apprehend  it  yourself  by  your  own  power  ?  and  what 
more  have  you  need  of  ?  For  if  it  is  true  that  all  men  err 
involuntarily,  and  you  have  learned  the  truth,  of  necessity 
you  must  act  right.  But  in  truth  I  do  not  apprehend  the  will 
of  nature.  Who  then  tells  us  what  it  is  ?  They  say  that  it  is 
Chrysippus.  I  proceed,  and  I  inquire  what  this  interpreter 
of  nature  says.  I  begin  not  to  understand  what  he  says  :  1 
seek  an  interpreter  of  Chrysippus.  Well,  consider  how  this  is 
said,  just  as  if  it  were  said  in  the  Roman  tongue.*  What 
then  is  this  superciliousness  of  the  interpreter?!  There 
is  no  superciliousness  which  can  justly  be  charged  even 
to  Chrysippus,  if  he  only  interprets  the  will  of  nature, 
but  does  not  follow  it  himself;  and  much  more  is  this  so 
with  his  interpreter.  For  we  have  no  need  of  Chrysippus  for 
his  own  sake,  but  in  order  that  we  may  understand  nature. 
Nor  do  we  need  a  diviner  (sacrificer)  on  his  own  account, 
but  because  we  think  that  through  him  we  shall  know  the 
future  and  understand  the  signs  given  by  the  gods  ;  nor  do 
we  need  the  viscera  of  animals  for  their  own  sake,  but  be- 
cause through  them  signs  are  given  ;  nor  do  we  look  with 

tion  ought  to  he.  We  learn  language,  and  we  ought  to  learn  what  it 
means.  When  children  learn  words,  they  should  learn  what  the  thing  is 
which  is  signified  by  the  word.  In  the  case  of  children  this  can  only  be 
clone  imperfectly  as  to  some  words,  but  it  may  be  done  even  then  in 
some  degree  ;  and  it  must  be  done,  or  the  word  signifies  nothing,  or,  what 
is  equally  bad,  the  word  is  misunderstood.  All  of  us  pass  our  lives  in 
ignorance  of  many  words  which  we  use  ;  some  of  us  in  greater  ignorance 
than  others,  but  all  of  us  in  ignorance  to  some  degree. 

*  The  supposed  interpreter  says  this.  When  Epictetus  says  "  the 
Roman  tongue,"  perhaps  he  means  that  the  supposed  opponent  is  a 
Roman  and  does  not  know  Greek  well. 

t  Kncheiridion,  c.  49.  "  When  a  man  gives  himself  great  airs  because 
he  can  understand  and  expound  Chrysippus,  say  to  vour:>elf.  If  Chrysip- 


EPIC  I'l:  Tl  '.V.  e  *r 

j  / 

wonder  on  the  crow  or  raven,  but  on  God,  who  through  them 
gives  signs  ?  * 

I  go  then  to  the  interpreter  of  these  things  and  the  sacn- 
ficer,  and  I  say,  Inspect  the  viscera  for  me,  and  tell  me  what 
signs  they  give.  The  man  takes  the  viscera,  opens  them, 
and  interprets  them  :  Man,  he  says,  you  have  a  will  free  by 
nature  from  hindrance  and  compulsion  •  this  is  written  here 
in  the  viscera.  I  will  show  you  this  first  in  the  matter  of 
assent.  Can  any  man  hinder  you  from  assenting  to  the 
truth  ?  Xo  man  can.  Can  any  man  compel  you  to  receive 
what  is  false?  Xo  man  can.  You  see  that  in  this  matter 
you  have  the  faculty  of  the  will  free  from  hindrance,  free 
from  compulsion,  unimpeded.  Well  then  in  the  matter  of 
desire  and  pursuit  of  an  object,  is  it  otherwise  ?  And  what 
can  overcome  pursuit  except  another  pursuit  ?  and  what 
can  overcome  desire  and  aversion  (^Xto-tv)  except  another 
desire  and  aversion  ?  But,  you  object :  "  If  you  place  before 
me  the  fear  of  death,  you  do  compel  me."  No,  it  is  not 
what  is  placed  before  you  that  compels,  but  your  opinion 
that  it  is  better  to  do  so  and  so  than  to  die.  In  this  matter 
then  it  is  your  opinion  that  compelled  you  ;  that  is,  will  com- 
pelled will,  f  For  if  God  had  made  that  part  of  himself,  which 

pus  had  not  written  obscurely,  this  man  would  have  had  nothing  to  be 
proud  of."  See  the  rest. 

•Compare  Xenophon,  Mem.  i.  i,  3. 

t  This  is  true.  If  you  place  before  a  man  the  fear  of  death,  you 
threaten  him  with  the  fear  of  death.  The  man  may  yield  to  the  threat 
and  do  what  it  is  the  object  of  the  threat  to  make  him  do  ;  or  he  may 
make  resistance  to  him  who  attempts  to  enforce  the  threat ;  or  he  may 
refuse  to  yield,  and  so  take  the  consequence  of  his  refusal.  If  a  man 
yields  to  the  threat,  he  does  so  for  the  reason  which  Kpictetus  gives, 
and  freedom  of  choice,  and  consequently  freedom  of  will  really  exists  in 
tliis  case.  The  Roman  law  did  not  allow  contracts  or  agreements  made 
under  the  influence  of  threats  to  be  valid  ;  and  the  reason  for  declaring 
them  invalid  was  not  the  want  of  free  will  in  him  who  yielded  to  the 
threat,  but  the  fact  that  threats  are  directly  contrary  to  the  purpose  of  all 
law,  which  purpose  is  to  secure  the  independent  action  of  every  person 


58  EPICTE/L'S. 

he  took  from  himself  and  gave  to  us,  of  such  a  nature  as  to  be 
hindered  or  compelled  either  by  himself  or  by  another,  he 
would  not  then  be  God  nor  would  he  be  taking  care  of  us  as 
he  ought.  This,  says  the  diviner,  I  find  in  the  victims : 
these  are  the  things  which  are  signified  to  you.  If  you 
choose,  you  are  free ;  if  you  choose,  you  will  blame  no  one  : 
you  will  charge  no  one.  All  will  be  at  the  same  time  accord- 
ing to  your  mind  and  the  mind  of  God.  For  the  sake  of 
this  divination  I  go  to  this  diviner  and  to  the  philosopher, 
not  admiring  him  for  this  interpretation,  but  admiring  the 
things  which  he  interprets. 


CHAPTER  XVIII. 

THAT    WK   OUGHT    NOT   TO    UK    ANGRY  WITH     THE   ERRORS 
(FAULTS)  OF  OTHERS. 

IF  what  philosophers  say  is  true,  that  all  men  have  one 
principle,  as  in  the  case  of  assent  the  persuasion  that  a  thing 
is  so,  and  in  the  case  of  dissent  the  persuasion  that  a  thing 
is  not  so,  and  in  the  case  of  a  suspense  of  judgment  the 
persuasion  that  a  thing  is  uncertain,  so  also  in  the  case  of  a 
movement  toward  anything  the  persuasion  that  a  thing  is  for 
a  man's  advantage,  and  it  is  impossible  to  think  that  one 
thing  is  advantageous  and  to  desire  another,  and  to  judge 
one  thing  to  be  proper  and  to  move  toward  another,  why 
then  are  we  angry  with  the  many  ?  *  They  are  thieves  and 

in  all  things  allowed  by  law.  This  matter  is  discussed  by  Savigny,  Das 
heut.  Romische  Recht,  iii.  §114.  See  the  title  "  Quod  metus  causa,"  in 
the  Digest,  4.  2.  Compare  also  Epictetus,  iv.  i,  68,  etc. 

*  Epictetus  says  that  men  will  do  as  they  do,  so  long  as  they  think  as 
they  think.  He  only  traces  to  their  origin  the  bad  acts  which  bad 
men  do  ;  and  he  says  that  we  should  pity  them  and  try  to  mend  them. 


EPJCTETUS.  59 

robbers,  you  may  say.  What  do  you  mean  by  thieves  and 
robbers?  They  are  mistaken  about  good  and  evil.  Ought 
we  then  to  be  angry  with  them,  or  to  pity  them  ?  But  show 
them  their  error,  and  you  will  see  how  they  desist  from  their 
errors.  If  they  do  not  see  their  errors,  they  have  nothing 
superior  to  their  present  opinion. 

Ougtit  not  then  this  robber  and  this  adulterer  to  be  de- 
stroyed ?  By  no  means  say  so,  but  speak  rather  in  this  way  : 
This  man  who  has  been  mistaken  and  deceived  about  the 
most  important  things,  and  blinded,  not  in  the  faculty  of 
vision  which  distinguishes  white  and  black,  but  in  the  faculty 
which  distinguishes  good  and  bad,  should  we  not  destroy 
him  ?  If  you  speak  thus,  you  will  see  how  inhuman  this  is 
which  you  say,  and  that  it  is  just  as  if  you  would  say,  Ought 
we  not  to  destroy  this  blind  and  cleaf  man  ?  But  if  the 
greatest  harm  is  the  privation  of  the  greatest  things,  and  the 
greatest  thing  in  every  man  is  the  will  or  choice  such  as  it 
ought  to  be,  and  a  man  is  deprived  of  this  will,  why  are  you 
also  angry  with  him  ?  Man,  you  ought  not  to  be  affected 

Now  the  best  man  in  the  world,  if  he  sees  the  origin  and  direct  cause  of 
bad  acts  in  men,  may  pity  them  for  their  wickedness,  and  he  will  do 
right.  lie  will  pity,  and  still  he  will  punish  severely,  if  the  interests  of 
society  require  the  guilty  to  be  punished  :  but  he  will  not  punish  in  anger. 
Epictetus  says  nothing  about  legal  penalties ;  and  I  assume  that  he 
would  not  say  that  the  penalties  are  always  unjust,  if  I  understand  his 
principles.  His  discourse  is  to  this  effect,  as  the  title  tells  us,  that  we 
ought  not  to  be  angry  with  the  errors  of  others  ;  the  matter  of  the  dis- 
is  the  feeling  and  disposition  which  we  ought  to  have  toward 

•.vho  do  wrong,  "  because  they  are  mistaken  about  good  and  evil." 
He  does  not  discuss  the  question  of  the  origin  of  these  men's  mistakes 
further  than  this  :  men  think  that  a  thing  or  act  is  advantageous  ;  and 
it  is  impossible  for  them  to  think  that  one  thing  is  advantageous  and  to 

another  thing.  Their  error  is  in  their  opinion.  Then  he  fills  us 
to  show  them  their  error,  and  they  will  desist  from  their  errors.  He  is 
not  here  examining  the  way  of  showing  them  their  error ;  by  which  I 
suppose  that  he  means  convincing  them  of  their  error.  He  seems  to  ad- 
mit that  it  may  not  be  possible  to  convince  them  of  their  errors  ;  for  h« 


6o  Kt'ICTETCS. 

contrary  to  nature  by  the  bad  things  of  another.*  Pity  him 
rather  :  drop  this  readiness  to  be  offended  and  to  hate,  and 
these  words  which  the  many  utter  :  "  these  accursed  and 
odious  fellows."  How  have  you  been  made  so  wise  at  once  ? 
and  how  are  you  so  peevish  ?  Why  then  are  we  angry  ?  Is 
it  because  we  value  so  much  the  things  of  which  these  men 
rob  us  ?  Do  not  admire  your  clothes,  and  then  you  will  not 
be  angry  with  the  thief.  Do  not  admire  the  beauty  of  your 
wife,  and  you  will  not  be  angry  with  the  adulterer.  Learn 
that  a  thief  and  an  adulterer  have  no  place  in  the  things 
which  are  yours,  but  in  those  which  belong  to  others  and 
which  are  not  in  your  power.  If  you  dismiss  these  things 
and  consider  them  as  nothing,  with  whom  are  you  still  angry  ? 
But  so  long  as  you  value  these  things,  be  angry  with  yourself 
rather  than  with  the  thief  and  the  adulterer.  Consider  the 
matter  thus  :  you  have  fine  clothes  ;  your  neighbor  has  not : 
you  have  a  window  ;  you  wish  to  air  the  clothes.  The  thief 
does  not  know  wherein  man's  good  consists,  but  he  thinks 
that  it  consists  in  having  fine  clothes,  the  very  thing  which 
you  also  think.  Must  he  not  then  come  and  take  them  away  ? 
When  you  show  a  cake  to  greedy  persons,  and  swallow  it  all 
yourself,  do  you  expect  them  not  to  snatch  it  from  you  ?  Do 
not  provoke  them  :  do  not  have  a  window  :  do  not  air  your 
clothes.  I  also  lately  had  an  iron  lamp  placed  by  the  side  of 
my  household  gods  :  hearing  a  noise  at  the  door,  I  ran 
down,  and  found  that  the  lamp  had  been  carried  off.  I 
reflected  that  he  who  had  taken  the  lamp  had  done  nothing 
strange.  What  then  ?  To-morrow,  I  said,  you  will  find  an 
earthen  lamp  :  for  a  man  only  loses  that  which  he  has.  I 
have  lost  my  garment.  The  reason  is  that  you  had  a  gar- 
ment. I  have  pain  in  my  head.  Have  you  any  pain  in 
your  horns  ?  Why  then  are  you  troubled  ?  for  we  only  lose 

says,  "  if  they  do  not  see  their  errors,  they  have  nothing  superior  to  their 
present  opinion." 

*  Here  the  text,  9,  10,  1 1  is  defective. 


r.jTs.  61 

those  things,  we  have  only  pains  about  those  things  which 
we  possess.* 

But  the  tyrant  will  chain — what  ?  the  leg.  He  will  take 
away — what  ?  the  neck.  What  then  will  he  not  chain  and 
not  take  away  ?  the  will.  This  is  why  the  ancients  taught 
the  maxim.  Know  thyself. t  Therefore  we  ought  to  exercise 
ourselves  in  small  \  things,  and  beginning  with  them  to  pro- 
<vrd  to  the  greater.  I  have  pain  in  the  head.  Do  not  say, 
alas  !  I  have  pain  in  the  ear.  Do  not  say,  alas  !  And  I  do 
not  say,  that  you  are  not  allowed  to  groan,  but  do  not  groan 
inwardly ;  and  if  your  slave  is  slow  in  bringing  a  bandage, 
do  not  cry  out  and  torment  yourself,  and  say,  "  Everybody 
hates  me  :  "  for  who  would  not  hate  such  a  man  ?  l-'or  the 
future,  relying  on  these  opinions,  walk  about  upright,  free  : 
not  trusting  to  the  size  of  your  body,  as  an  athlete,  for  a  man 
ought  not  to  be  invincible  in  the  way  that  an  ass  is.§ 

Who  then  is  the  invincible  ?  It  is  he  whom  none  of  the 
things  disturb  which  are  independent  of  the  will.  Then 
examining  one  circumstance  after  another  1  observe,  as  in 
the  case  of  an  athlete  ;  he  has  come  off  victorious  in  the  first 
contest :  well  then,  as  to  the  second  ?  and  what  if  there 
should  be  great  heat  ?  and  what,  if  it  should  be  at  Olympia  ? 
And  the  same  I  say  in  this  case  :  if  you  should  throw  money 

*The  conclusion  explains  what  precedes.  A  man  can  have  no  pain  in 
his  horns,  because  he  has  none.  A  man  cannot  be  vexed  about  the  loss 
of  a  thing  if  he  does  not  possess  it.  Upton  says  that  Kpictetus  alludes 
to  the  foolish  quibble:  "  If  you  have  not  lost  a  thing,  you  have  it :  but 
you  have  not  lost  horns;  therefore  you  have  horns  "  (Seneca,  Ep.  45). 
Kpictetus  says,  "  You  do  not  lose  a  thing  when  you  have  it  not." 

t  Compare  what  is  said  in  Xenophon,  Mem.  iv.  2,  24,  on  the  expres- 
sion Know  thyself. 

J  This  ought  to  be  the  method  in  teaching  children. 

§  That   is  obstinate,  as  this  animal  is  generally  ;   and   sometimes  very 
obstinate.     The  meaning  then  is,  as  Sweighaeuser  says  :  "  a  man  should 
be    invincible,  not  with  a  kind  of  stupid  obstinacy  or  laziness   and  s'.uu- 
iit-ss  in  moving  himself  like  an  ass,  but  he  should   be  invincible    \\  < 
,  reflection,  meditation,  study,  and  diligeiu  t-  " 


62  KPICTF.TUS. 

in  his  way,  he  will  despise  it.  Well,  suppose  you  put  a 
young  girl  in  his  way,  what  then  ?  and  what,  if  it  is  in  the 
dark  ?  *  what  if  it  should  be  a  little  reputation,  or  abuse  : 
and  what  if  it  should  be  praise  ;  and  what  if  it  should  be 
death  ?  He  is  able  to  overcome  all.  What  then  if  it  be  in 
heat,  and  what  if  it  is  in  the  rain,  and  what  if  .he  be  in  a 
melancholy  (mad)  mood,  and  what  if  he  be  asleep  ?  He  will 
still  conquer.  This  is  my  invincible  athlete. 


CHAPTER   XIX. 

HOW    WE    SHOVI.D     BK11AVK    TO    TYRANTS. 

IF  a  man  possesses  any  superiority,  or  thinks  that  he  does, 
when  he  does  not, -such  a  man,  if  he  is  uninstructed,  will  of 
necessity  be  puffed  up  through  it.  For  instance,  the  tyrant 
says,  "  I  am  master  of  all  ?  "  And  what  can  you  do  for  me  ? 
Can  you  give  me  desire  which  shall  have  no  hindrance  ? 
How  can  you  ?  Have  you  the  infallible  power  of  avoiding 
what  you  would  avoid  ?  Have  you  the  power  of  moving 
toward  an  object  without  error  ?  And  how  do  you  possess 
this  power  ?  Come,  when  you  are  in  a  ship,  do  you  trust  to 
yourself  or  to  the  helmsman  ?  And  when  you  are  in  a 
chariot,  to  whom  do  you  trust  but  to  the  driver  ?  And  how 
is  it  in  all  other  arts  ?  Just  the  same.  In  what  then  lies 
your  power  ?  All  men  pay  respect  to  me.  Well,  I  also  pay 
respect  to  my  platter,  and  I  wash  it  and  wipe  it ;  and  for  the 
sake  of  my  oil  flask,  I  drive  a  peg  into  the  wall.  Well  then, 
are  these  things  superior  to  me  ?  Xo,  but  they  supply  some 
of  my  wants,  and  for  this  reason  I  take  care  of  them.  Well, 
do  I  not  attend  to  my  ass  ?  Do  I  not  wash  his  feet  ?  Do  I 

*  "  From  the  rustics  came  the  old  proverb,  for  when  they  commend  a 
nan's  fidelity  and  goodness  they  say  he  is  a  man  with  whom  you  may 
Jkiay  the  game  with  the  fingers  in  the  dark.''  Cicero,  De  Officiis,  iii.  19. 


i-ricrrrrs.  r,- 

not  clean  him  ?  Do  you  not  kno\v  that  every  man  has  regard 
to  himself,  and  to  you  just  the  same  as  he  has  regard  to  his 
ass  ?  For  who  has  regard  to  you  as  a  man  ?  Show  me. 
Who  \vishes  to  become  like  you  ?  Who  imitates  you,  as  lie 
imitates  Socrates  ?  But  I  can  cut  off  your  head.  You  say 
right.  I  had  forgotten  that  I  must  have  regard  to  you,  as  1 
would  to  a  fever*  and  the  bile,  and  raise  an  altar  to  you,  as 
there  is  at  Rome  an  altar  to  fever. 

What  is  it  then  that  disturbs  and  terrifies  the  multitude  ? 
is  it  the  tyrant  and  his  guards?  [By  no  means.]  I  hope 
that  it  is  not  so.  It  is  not  possible  that  what  is  by  nature 
free  can  be  disturbed  by  anything  else,  or  hindered  by  any 
other  thing  than  by  itself.  But  it  is  a  man's  own  opinions 
which  disturb  him  :  for  when  the  tyrant  says  to  a  man,  "  1 
will  chain  your  leg,"  he  who  values  his  leg  says,  "  Do  not ; 
have  pity:"  but  he  who  values  his  own  will  says,  "I fit 
appears  more  advantageous  to  you,  chain  it.''  Do  you  not 
cai\  ?  I  do  not  care.  I  will  show  you  that  1  am  master. 
You  cannot  do  that.  Zeus  has  set  me  free  :  do  you  think 
that  he  intended  to  allow  his  o\vn  son  f  to  be  enslaved  ? 
But  you  are  master  of  my  carcass  :  take  it.  So  when  you 
approach  me,  you  have  no  regard  to  me  ?  ^No,  but  I  have 
regard  to  myself ;  and  if  you  wish  me  to  say  that  I  have  re- 
gard to  you  also,  I  tell  you  that  I  have  the  same  regard  to 
you  that  I  have  to  my  pipkin. 

This  is  not  a  perverse  self-regard,  for  the  animal  is  con- 
stituted so  as  to  do  all  things  for  itself.  For  even  the  sun 
does  all  things  for  itself  ;  nay.  even  Zeus  himself.  But 
when  he  chooses  to  be  the  Giver  of  rain  and  the  Giver  of 
fruits,  and  the  Father  of  gods  and  men,  you  see  that  he 
cannot  obtain  these  functions  and  these  names,  if  he  is  not 

*  Febris,  fever,  was  a  goddess  at  Rome.  Upton  refers  to  an  inscrip- 
tion in  Gruter,  97,  \\hit  !i  1><  liDivar."  Compare  Lactantius, 
DC  falsa  relipone,  c.  20. 

1  Comp.  i.  c.  3. 


r,.,  i-.ricrr.rrs. 

useful  to  man  ;  and,  universally,  he  has  made  the  nature  of  the 
rational  animal  such  that  it  cannot  obtain  any  one  of  its  own 
proper  interests,  if  it  does  not  contribute  something  to  the 
common  interest*  In  this  manner  and  sense  it  is  not  un- 
sociable for  a  man  to  do  everything  for  the  sake  of  himself. 
For  what  do  you  expect  ?  that  a  man  should  neglect  himself 
and  his  own  interest  ?  And  how  in  that  case  can  there  be 
one  and  the  same  principle  in  all  animals,  the  principle  of 
attachment  (regard)  to  themselves  ? 

What  then  ?  when  absurd  notions  about  things  independent 
of  our  will,  as  if  they  were  good  and  (or)  bad,  lie  at  the 
bottom  of  our  opinions,  \ve  must  of  necessity  pay  regard  to 
tyrants ;  for  I  wish  that  men  would  pay  regard  to  tyrants 
only,  and  not  also  to  the  bedchamber  men.f  How  is  it  that 
the  man  becomes  all  at  once  wise,  when  Caesar  has  made 
him  superintendent  of  the  close  stool  ?  How  is  it  that  we 
say  immediately,  "  Felicion  spoke  sensibly  to  me."  I  wish 
he  were  ejected  from  the  bedchamber,  that  he  might  again 
appear  to  you  to  be  a  fool. 

Kpaphroditus  \  had  a  shoemaker  whom  he  sold  because 
he  was  good  for  nothing.  This  fellow  by  some  good  luck  was 
bought  by  one  of  Casar's  men,  and  became  Ca>sar's  shoe- 
maker. You  should  have  seen  what  respect  Epaphroditus 

*  This  has  been  misunderstood  by  Wolf.  Schweighaeuser,  who 
always  writes  like  a  man  of  sense,  says :  '•  Kpictetus  means  by  '  our 
proper  interests,'  the  interests  proper  to  man,  as  a  man,  as  a  rational 
being;  and  this  interest  or  good  consists  in  the  proper  use  of  our  powers, 
and  so  far  from  being  repugnant  to  common  interest  or  utility,  it  con- 
tains within  itself  the  notion  of  general  utility  and  cannot  be  separated 
from  it. 

t  A  lord  of  the  bedchamber,  as  we  might  say.  Seneca,  De  Constantia 
Sapientis,  c.  14,  speaks  "of  the  pride  of  the  nomenclator  (the announcer 
of  the  name),  of  the  arrogance  of  the  bedchamber  man."  Even  the 
clerk  of  the  close-stool  was  an  important  person.  Slaves  used  to  carry 
this  useful  domestic  vessel  on  a  journey.  Horat.  Sat.  i.  6,  109  (Upton) 

J  Once  the  master  of  Kpictetus  (i,  i,  to.) 


EPICTETt'S.  65 

paid  to  him  :  "  How  does  the  good  Felicion  do,  f  pray?  '' 
Then  if  any  of  us  asked,  "  What  is  master  (Epaphroditus) 
doing  ?  "  the  answer  was,  "  He  is  consulting  about  something 
with  Felicion."  Had  he  not  sold  the  man  as  good  for 
nothing  ?  Who  then  made  him  wise  all  at  once  ?  This  is  an 
instance  of  valuing  something  else  than  the  things  which 
depend  on  the  will. 

Has  a  man  been  exalted  to  the  tribuneship  ?  All  who 
meet  him  offer  their  congratulations  ;  one  kisses  his  eyes, 
another  the  neck,  and  the  slaves  kiss  his  hands.*  He  goes 
to  his  house,  he  finds  torches  lighted.  He  ascends  the 
Capitol  :  he  offers  a  sacrifice  on  the  occasion.  Xow  who 
ever  sacrificed  for  having  had  good  desires  ?  for  having  acted 
conformably  to  nature  ?  For  in  fact  we  thank  the  gods  for 
those  things  in  which  we  place  our  good.f 

A  person  was  talking  to  me  to-day  about  the  priesthood 
of  Augustus. $  I  say  to  him  :  "Man,  let  the  thing  alone  : 
you  will  spend  much  for  no  purpose."  But  he  replies, 
"Those  who  draw  up  agreements  will  write  my  name."  Do 
you  then  stand  by  those  who  read  them,  and  say  to  such 
persons,  "  It  is  I  whose  name  is  written  there  ?  ''  And  if 
you  can  now  be  present  on  all  such  occasions,  what  will  you 

*  Hand-kissing  was  in  those  times  of  tyranny  the  duty  of  a  >Iave, 
not  of  a  free  man.  This  servile  practice  still  exists  ajnong  men  called 
free. 

t  Matthew  vi.  2r,  "  for  where  your  treasure  is,  there  will  your  heart  be 
also.''  So  these  people  show  by  thanking  God,  what  it  is  for  which 
they  are  thankful. 

J  Casaubon,  in  a  learned  note  on  Suetonius,  Augustus,  c.  iS,  informs 
us  that  divine  honors  were  paid  to  Augustus  at  Xicopolis,  which  town 
he  founded  after  victory  at  Actium.  The  priesthood  of  Augustus  at 
N'icopolis  was  a  high  office,  and  the  priest  gave  his  name  to  the  year  ; 
that  is,  when  it  was  intended  in  any  writing  to  fix  the  year,  either  in  any 
writing  which  related  to  public  matters,  or  in  instruments  used  in  private 
affairs,  the  name  of  the  priest  of  Augustus  was  used,  and  this  was  also 
the  practice  in  most  Greek  cities. 

5 


66  EflCTETUS. 

do  when  you  are  dead  ?  My  name  will  remain.  Write  it  on 
a  stone,  and  it  will  remain.  But  come,  what  remembrance 
of  you  will  there  be  beyond  Xicopolis  ?  But  I  shall  wear  a 
crown  of  gold.  If  you  desire  a  crown  at  all,  take  a  crown  of 
s  and  put  it  on,  for  it  will  be  more  elegant  '.n  appearance. 


CHAPTER  XX 

ABOUT  REASON,   HOW  IT  CONTEMPLATES  ITSELF.* 

EVERY  art  and  faculty  contemplates  certain  things  espe- 
cially. When  then  it  is  itself  of  the  same  kind  with  the 
objects  which  it  contemplates,  it  must  of  necessity  contem- 
plate itself  also  :  but  when  it  is  of  an  unlike  kind,  it  cannot 
contemplate  itself.  For  instance,  the  shoemaker's  art  is  em- 
ployed on  skins,  but  itself  is  entirely  distinct  from  the 
material  of  skins  :  for  this  reason  it  does  not  contemplate  it- 
self. Again,  the  grammarian's  art  is  employed  about  articu- 
late speech  ;  is  then  the  art  also  articulate  speech  ?  By  no 
means.  For  this  reason  it  is  not  able  to  contemplate  itself. 
Now  reason,  for  what  purpose  has  it  been  given  by  nature  ? 
For  the  right  use  of  appearances.  What  is  it  then  itself  ? 
A  system  (combination)  of  certain  appearances.  So  by  its 
nature  it  has  the  faculty  of  contemplating  itself  also.  Again, 
sound  sense,  for  the  contemplation  of  what  things  does  it 
belong  to  us  ?  Good  and  evil,  and  things  which  are  neither. 
What  is  it  then  itself  ?  Good.  And  want  of  sense,  what  is 
it  ?  Evil.  Do  you  see  then  that  good  sense  necessarily  con- 
templates both  ilself  and  the  opposite  ?  For  this  reason  it  is 
the  chief  and  the  first  work  of  a  philosopher  to  examine  ap- 
pearances, and  to  distinguish  them,  and  to  admit  none  with- 

*  A  comparison  of  lib.  i.  chap  i,  will  help  to  explain  this  chapter 
Compare  also  lib.  i.  chap.  17. 


out  examination.  You  see  even  in  the  matter  of  coin,  in 
which  our  interest  appears  to  be  somewhat  concerned,  how 
we  have  invented  an  art,  and  how  many  means  the  assayer 
uses  to  try  the  value  of  coin,  the  sight,  the  touch,  the  smell, 
and  lastly  the  hearing.  He  throws  the  coin  (denarius)  down, 
and  observes  the  sound,  and  lie  is  not  content  with  its  sound- 
ing once,  but  through  his  great  attention  he  becomes  a  musi- 
cian. In  like  manner,  where  we  think  that  to  be  mistaken 
and  not  to  be  mistaken  make  a  great  difference,  there  we  apply 
great  attention  to  discovering  the  things  which  can  deceive. 
But  in  the  matter  of  our  miserable  ruling  faculty,  yawning 
and  sleeping,  we  carelessly  admit  every  appearance,  for  the 
harm  is  not  noticed. 

When  then  you  would  know  how  careless  you  are  with 
respect  to  good  and  evil,  and  how  active  with  respect  to 
things  which  are  indifferent  (neither  good  nor  evil),  observe 
how  you  feel  with  respect  to  being  deprived  of  the  sight  of 
the  eyes,  and  how  with  respect  to  being  deceived,  and  you 
will  discover  that  you  are  far  from  feeling  as  you  ought  to 
do  in  relation  to  good  and  evil.  But  this  is  a  matter  which 
requires  much  preparation,  and  much  labor  and  study.  Well 
then  do  you  expect  to  acquire  the  greatest  of  arts  with  small 
labor  ?  And  yet  the  chief  doctrine  of  philosophers  is  very 
brief.  If  you  would  know,  read  Zeno's  *  writings  and  you 
will  see.  For  how  few  words  it  requires  to  say  that  man's 
end  (or  object)  is  to  follow  f  the  gods,  and  that  the  nature  <>f 
good  is  a  proper  use  of  appearances.  But  if  you  say,  What 
is  God,  what  is  appearance,  and  what  is  particular  and  what 

*  Zeno,  a  native-  of  ('ilium,  in  the  island  of  Cyprus,  is  said  to  have 
come  when  he  was  young  to  Athens,  where  lie  spent  the  rest  of  a 
long  life  in  the  study  and  teaching  of  Philosophy.  Ue  was  the  founder 
of  the  Stoic  sect,  and  a  man  respected  for  his  ability  and  high  character. 
lie  wrote  many  philosophical  works.  Zeno  was  succeeded  in  his 
school  by  Cleanthes. 

t  Follow.     See  i.  i  2,  5. 


68  KJ'fCTKTUS. 

is  universal  *  nature  ?  then  indeed  many  words  are  necessary. 
If  then  Epicurus  should  come  and  say.  that  the  good  must  be 
in  the  body  ;  in  this  case  also  many  words  become  necessurv. 
and  we  must  be  taught  what  is  the  leading  principle  in  vis. 
and  the  fundamental  and  the  substantial  ;  and  as  it  is  not 
probable  that  the  good  of  a  snail  is  in  the  shell,  it  is  probable 
that  the  good  of  a  man  is  in  the  body  ?  Hut  you  yourself, 
Epicurus,  possess  something  better  than  this.  What  is  that 
in  you  which  deliberates,  what  is  that  which  examines  every- 
thing, what  is  that  which  forms  a  judgment  about  the  body 
itself,  that  it  is  the  principal  part  ?  and  why  do  you  light  your 
lamp  and  labor  for  us,  and  write  so  many  f  books  ?  it  is  that 
we  may  not  be  ignorant  of  the  truth,  who  we  are,  and  what 
we  are  with  respect  to  you  ?  Thus  the  discussion  requires 
many  words. 


CHAPTER    XXI. 

ACSAINST  THOSK  WHO   WISH   TO  J!K  ADMIRED. 

\VHKN  a  man  holds  his  proper  station  in  life,  he  does  not 
gape  after  things  beyond  it.  Man,  what  do  you  wish  to 

*  "  I  now  have  what  the  universal  nature  wills  me  to  have,  and  I  do 
what  my  nature  now  wills  me  to  do."  M.  Antoninus,  v.  25,  and  xi.  5. 
Kpictetus  never  attempts  to  say  what  God  is.  He  was  too  wise  to 
attempt  to  do  what  man  cannot  do.  But  man  does  attempt  to  do  it, 
and  only  shows  the  folly  of  his  attempts,  and,  I  think,  his  presumption 
also. 

t  Kpictirus  is  said  to  have  written  more  than  any  other  person,  as 
many  as  three  hundred  volumes  (ir6yu>8pot,  rolls).  Chrysippus  was  his 
rival  in  this  respect.  For  if  Epicurus  wrote  anything,  Chrysippus  vied 
with  him  in  writing  as  much;  and  for  this  reason  he  often  repeated 
himself,  because  he  did  not  read  over  what  he  had  written,  and  he  left  his 
writings  uncorrected  in  consequence  of  his  hurry.  Diogenes  Laertius, 
x. — Upton.  See  i.  4. 


77:77  IV.  69 

happen  to  you  ?  I  am  satisfied  if  I  desire  and  avoid  con- 
formably to  nature,  if  I  employ  movements  toward  and  from 
an  object  as  I  am  by  nature  formed  to  do,  and  purpose  and 
design  and  assent.  Why  then  do  you  strut  before  us  as  if 
you  had  swallowed  a  spit  ?  My  wish  has  always  been  that 
those  who  meet  me  should  admire  me,  and  those  who  follow 
me  should  exclaim.  Oh,  the  great  philosopher.  Who  are 
they  by  whom  you  wish  to  be  admired  ?  Are  they  not  those 
of  whom  you  are  used  to  say,  that  they  are  mad  ?  Well  then 
do  you  wish  to  be  admired  by  madmen  ? 


CHAPTER  XXII. 

ON     PR  K  COGNITIONS. 

PRECOGNITIONS  are  common  to  all  men,  and  precognition 
is  not  contradictory  to  precognition.  For  who  of  us  does 
not  assume  that  Good  is  useful  and  eligible,  and  in  all  cir- 
cumstances that  we  ought  to  follow  and  pursue  it  ?  And 
who  of  us  does  not  assume  that  Justice  is  beautiful  and  be- 
coming? Wlien  then  does  the  contradiction  arise?  It 
arises  in  the  adaptation  of  the  precognitions  to  the  particular 
cases.  When  one  man  says,  He  has  done  well :  he  is  a 
brave  man,  and  another  says,  "  Not  so ;  but  he  has  acted 
foolishly  ;  "  then  the  disputes  arise  among  men.  This  is  the 
dispute  among  the  Jews  and  the  Syrians  and  the  Egyptians 
and  the  Romans  ;  not  whether  holiness  should  be  preferred 
to  all  things  and  in  all  cases  should  be  pursued,  but  whether 
it  is  holy  to  eat  pig's  flesh  or  not  holy.  You  will  find  this 
dispute  also  between  Agamemnon  and  Achilles  ;  for  call  them 
forth.  What  do  you  say,  Agamemnon  ?  ought  not  that  to 
which  is  proper  and  right  ?  Certainly.  \\V11,  what 


70  I'.riCTF.TUS. 

do  you  say,  Achilles  ?  do  you  not  admit  that  what  is  good 
ought  to  be  done  ?  f  do  most  certainly.  Adapt  your  pre- 
cognitions  then  to  the  present  matter.  Here  the  dispute 
begins.  Agamemnon  says,  I  ought  to  give  up  Chryseis  to 
her  father.  Achilles  says,  You  ought.  It  is  certain  that  one 
of  the  two  makes  a  wrong  adaptation  of  the  precognition  of 
"ought"  or  "duty."  Further.  Agamemnon  says,  Then  if  I 
ought  to  restore  Chryseis,  it  is  fit  that  I  take  his  prize  from 
some  of  you.  Achilles  replies,  "  Would  you  then  take  her 
whom  I  love?"  Yes,  her  whom  you  love.  Must  I  then 
be  the  only  man  who  goes  without  a  prize  ?  And  must 
I  be  the  only  man  who  has  no  prize  ?  Thus  the  dispute 
begins. 

What  then  is  education  ?  Education  is  the  learning  how 
to  adapt  the  natural  precognitions  to  the  particular  things 
conformably  to  nature;  and  then  to  distinguish  that  of  things 
some  are  in  our  power,  but  others  are  not ;  in  our  power  are 
will  and  all  acts  which  depend  on  the  will  ;  things  not  in 
our  power  are  the  body,  the  parts  of  the  body,  possessions, 
parents,  brothers,  children,  country,  and  generally,  all  with 
whom  we  live  in  society.  In  what  then  should  we  place  the 
good?  To  what  kind  of  things  shall  we  adapt  it?  To  the 
things  which  are  in  our  power  ?  Is  not  health  then  a  good 
thing,  and  soundness  of  limb,  and  life  ?  and  are  not  children 
and  parents  and  country?  Who  will  tolerate  you  if  you 
deny  this  ? 

Let  us  then  transfer  the  notion  of  good  to  these  things. 
Is  it  possible  then,  when  a  man  sustains  damage  and  does 
not  obtain  good  things,  that  he  can  be  happy?  It  is  not 
possible.  And  can  he  maintain  toward  society  a  proper 
behavior?  He  cannot.  For  I  am  naturally  formed  to  look 
after  my  own  interest.  If  it  is  my  interest  to  have  an  estate 
in  land,  it  is  my  interest  also  to  take  it  from  my  neighbor. 
If  it  is  my  interest  to  have  a  garment,  it  is  mv  interest  also 


F.riCTKTL'S.  7r 

to  steal  it  from  the  bath.*  This  is  the  origin  of  wars,  civil 
commotions,  tyrannies,  conspiracies.  And  how  shall  I  be 
still  able  to  maintain  my  duty  toward  Zeus?  for  if  I  sustain 
damage  and  am  unlucky,  he  takes  no  care  of  me  ;  and  what 
is  he  to  me  if  he  allows  me  to  be  in  the  condition  in 
which  I  am  ?  1  now  begin  to  hate  him.  Why  then  do  we 
build  temples,  why  set  up  statues  to  Zeus,  as  well  as  to  evil 
demons,  such  as  to  Fever;  |  and  how  is  Zeus  the  Saviour, 
and  how  the  giver  of  rain,  and  the  giver  of  fruits?  And 
in  truth  if  we  place  the  nature  of  Good  in  any  such  things, 
all  this  follows. 

What  should  we  do  then  ?  This  is  the  inquiry  of  the 
true  philosopher  who  is  in  labor.  \  Now  I  do  not  see  what 
the  Good  is  nor  the  Bad.  Am  I  not  mad  ?  Yes.  But  sup- 
pose that  I  place  the  good  somewhere  among  the  things 
which  depend  on  the  will  :  all  will  laugh  at  me.  There  will 
come  some  gray-head  wearing  many  gold  rings  on  his  fingers, 
and  he  will  shake  his  head  and  say,  Hear,  my  child.  It  is 
right  that  you  should  philosophize  ;  but  you  ought  to  have 

*  The  bath  was  a  place  of  common  resort,  where  a  thief  had  the  op- 
portunity of  carrying  off  a  bather's  clothes.  From  men's  desires  to  have 
that  they  have  not,  and  do  not  choose  to  labor  for,  spring  the  disorders 
of  society,  as  it  is  said  in  the  epistle  of  James,  c.  iv.,  v.  i,  to  which  Mrs-. 
Carter  refers. 

t  See  page  65,  note. 

J  Upton  refers  to  a  passage  in  the  Theajtetus  (p.  150,  Steph.),  where 
Socrates  professes  that  it  is  his  art  to  discover  whether  a  young  man's 
mind  is  giving  birth  to  an  idol  (an  unreality)  and  a  falsity,  or  to  some- 
thing productive  and  true;  and  he  says  p.  (151)  that  those  who  associ- 
ate with  him  are  like  women  in  childbirth,  for  they  are  in  labor  and 
full  of  trouble  nights  and  days  much  more  than  women,  and  his  art  has 
the  power  of  stirring  up  and  putting  to  rest  this  labor  of  childbirth. 
The  conclusion  in  the  chapter  is  not  clear.  The  student  is  supposed  to 
be  addressed  by  some  rich  old  man,  who  really  does  not  know  what  to 
s.iv  ;  and  the  best,  way  of  getting  rid  of  him  and  his  idle  talk  is  by  dis- 
missing him  with  a  joke.  See  Schweighaeuser'a  note. 


7  2  I-J'ICTETUS. 

some  brains  also  :  all  this  that  you  are  doing  is  silly.  You 
learn  the  syllogism  from  philosophers ;  but  you  know  how  to 
act  better  than  philosophers  do.  Man,  why  then  do  you 
blame  me,  if  I  know  ?  What  shall  I  say  to  this  slave  ?  If  I 
am  silent,  he  will  burst.  I  must  speak  in  this  way  :  Excuse 
me,  as  you  would  excuse  lovers  :  I  am  not  my  own  master  : 
1  am  mad. 


CHAPTER   XXIII. 

AGAINST      EPICURUS. 

EVEN  Epicurus  perceives  that  -we  are  by  nature  social, 
but  having  once  placed  our  good  in  the  husk  *  he  is  no 
longer  able  to  say  anything  else.  For  on  the  other  hand  he 
strongly  maintains  this,  that  we  ought  not  to  admire  nor 
to  accept  anything  which  is  detached  from  the  nature  of 
good  ;  and  he  is  right  in  maintaining  this.  How  then  are 
we  [suspicious], j  if  we  have  no  natural  affection  to  our 
children  ?  Why  do  you  advise  the  wise  man  not  to  bring 
up  children  ?  Why  are  you  afraid  that  he  may  thus  fail  into 
trouble  ?  For  does  he  fall  into  trouble  on  account  of  the 
mouse  which  is  nurtured  in  the  house  ?  What  does  he 
care  if  a  little  mouse  in  the  house  makes  lamentation  to  him  ? 
But  Fpicurus  knows  that  if  once  a  child  is  born,  it  is  no 
longer  in  our  power  not  to  love  it  nor  care  about  it.  For 
this  reason,  Epicurus  says,  that  a  man  who  has  any  sense 

*  That  is  in  the  body;  see  i.  20,  17.  Compare  ii.  20,  at  the  begin- 
ning of  the  chapter. 

I  The  word  is  not  intelligible.  Schweighaeuser  suggests  that  it  should 
read,  "  how  have  we  any  care  for  others  ?  "  Epicurus  taught  that  we 
should  not  marry  nor  beget  children  nor  engage  in  public  alfuirs,  be- 
cause these  things  disturb  our  tranquillity. 


73 

also  does  not  engage  in  political  matters;  for  he  knows 
what  a  man  must  do  who  is  engaged  in  such  things  ;  for, 
indeed,  if  you  intend  to  behave  among  men  as  you  do 
among  a  swarm  of  flies,  what  hinders  you  ?  But  Epicurus, 
who  knows  this,  ventures  to  say  that  we  should  not  bring  up 
children.  But  a  sheep  does  not  desert  its  own  offspring, 
nor  yet  a  wolf ;  and  shall  a  man  desert  his  child  ?  What  do 
you  mean  ?  that  we  should  be  as  silly  as  sheep  ?  but  not  even 
do  they  desert  their  offspring  :  or  as  savage  as  wolves,  but 
not  even  do  wolves  desert  their  young.  Well,  who  would 
follow  your  advice,  if  he  saw  his  child  weeping  after  falling 
on  the  ground  ?  For  my  part  I  think  that  even  if  your 
mother  and  your  father  had  been  told  by  an  oracle  that  you 
would  say  what  you  have  said,  they  would  not  have  cast  3-011 
away. 


CHAPTER  XXIV. 

HOW    WE    SHOULD     STRl"<;GI.K     WITH     CIRCUMS  TAN'OKS. 

IT  is  circumstances  (difficulties)  which  show  what  men 
are.*  Therefore  when  a  difficulty  falls  upon  you,  remem- 
ber that  God,  like  a  trainer  of  wrestlers,  has  matched  you 
with  a  rough  young  man.  For  what  purpose  ?  you  may  say. 
Why  that  you  may  become  an  Olympic  conqueror ;  but  it  is 
not  accomplished  without  sweat.  In  my  opinion  no  man  has 
had  a  more  profitable  difficulty  than  you  have  had,  if  you 
choose  to  make  use  of  it  as  an  athlete  would  deal  with  a 

*  So  Ovid  says,  Trist.  iv.  3,  79: 

• 

"  Qux  latet  inque  honis  cessat  non  cognita  rebus, 
Apparet  virtus  arguiturqne  mails." 


young  antagonist.  \Ve  are  now  sending  a  scout  to  Rome  ;  * 
but  no  in. in  sends  a  cowardly  scout,  who,  if  he  only  hears  a 
noise  and  sees  a  shadow  anywhere,  comes  running  back  in 
terror  and  reports  that  the  enemy  is  close  at  hand.  So  now 
if  you  should  come  and  tell  us.  Fearful  is  the  state  of  affairs  at 
Rome,  terrible  is  death  ;  terrible  is  exile  ;  terrible  is  calumny  ; 
terrible  is  poverty ;  fly.  my  friends  ;  the  enemy  is  near  \ve 
shall  answer.  Begone,  prophesy  for  yourself  ;  we  have  com- 
mitted only  one  fault,  that  we  sent  such  a  scout. 

Diogt-nes.t  who  was  sent  as  a  scout  before  you,  made  a 
different  report  to  us.  He  says  that  death  is  no  evil,  for 
neither  is  it  base  :  he  says  that  fame  (reputation)  is  the  noise 
of  madmen.  And  what  has  this  spy  said  about  pain,  about 
pleasure,  and  about  poverty  ?  He  says  that  to  be  naked  is 
better  than  any  purple  robe,  and  to  sleep  on  the  bare  ground 
is  the  softest  bed  ;  and  he  gives  as  a  proof  of  each  thing  that 
he  affirms  his  own  courage,  his  tranquillity,  his  freedom,  and 
the  healthy  appearance  and  compactness  of  his  body.  There 
is  no  enemy  near,  he  says  ;  all  is  peace.  How  so,  Diogenes  ? 
See,  he  replies,  if  1  am  struck,  if  I  have  been  wounded,  if 
I  have  fled  from  any  man.  This  is  what  a  scout  ought  to 
be.  But  you  come  to  us  and  tell  us  one  thing  after  another. 


*  In  the  time  of  Domitian,  philosophers  were  banished  from  Rome 
and  Italy  by  a  Senatusconsultum  (Sueton.  Domitian,  c.  10 ;  Dion,  67,  c. 
13),  and  at  that  time  Kpictetus,  as  Gellius  says  (xv.  11),  went  from  Rome 
to  Nicopolis  in  Kpirus,  where  he  opened  a  school.  We  may  suppose 
that  tpictetus  is  here  speaking  of  some  person  who  had  gone  from 
Nicopolis  to  Rome  to  inquire  about  the  state  of  affairs  there  under  the 
cruel  tyrant  Domitian.  (Schweighaeuser.) 

t  Diogenes  was  brought  to  king  Philip  after  the  battle  of  Chaeronea 
as  a  spy  (Hi.  22.  2.)).  Plutarch  in  the  treatise,  Qtiomodo  assentator  ab 
amico  dignoscatur,  c.  30,  states  that  when  Philip  asked  Diogenes  if  he 
was  a  spy,  he  replied,  Certainly  I  am  a  spy,  Philip,  of  your  want  of  judg- 
ment and  of  your  folly,  which  lead  you  without  any  necessity  to  put  to 
the  hazard  your  kingdom  and  your  life  in  one  single  hour. 


75 


Will  you  not  go  back,  and  you  will  see  clearer  when  you 
have  laid  aside  fear  ? 

\Yhat  then  shall  I  do?  \Vhat  do  yo,  do  when  you  leave 
a  ship  ?  Do  you  take  away  the  helm  or  the  oars?  What 
then  do  you  take  away  ?  You  take  what  is  your  own.  your 
bottle  and  your  wallet ;  and  now  if  you  think  of  what  is  your 
own,  you  will  never  claim  what  belongs  to  others.  The  em- 
peror (Domitian)  says.  Lay  aside  your  laticlave.*  See.  I  put 
on  the  angusticlave.  Lay  aside  this  also.  See,  I  have  only 
my  toga.  Lay  aside  your  toga.  See,  I  am  now  naked.  But 
you  still  raise  my  envy.  Take  then  all  my  poor  body;  when, 
at  a  man's  command,  I  can  throw  away  my  poor  body,  do  I 
still  fear  him  ? 

But  a  certain  person  will  not  leave  to  me  the  succession 
to  his  estate.  What  then  ?  had  I  forgotten  that  not  one  of 
these  things  was  mine  ?  How  then  do  we  call  them  mine  ? 
Just  as  we  call  the  bed  in  the  inn.  If  then  the  innkeeper  at 
his  death  leaves  yon  the  beds,  all  well  ;  but  if  he  leaves 
them  to  another,  he  will  have  them,  and  you  will  seek 
another  bed.  If  then  you  shall  not  find  one,  you  will  sleep 
on  the  ground  :  only  sleep  with  a  good  will  and  snore,  and 
remember  that  tragedies  have  their  place  among  the  rich  and 
kings  and  tyrants,  but  no  poor  man  fills  a  part  in  the  tragedy, 
except  as  one  of  the  Chorus.  Kings  indeed  commence  with 
prosperity  :  %l  ornament  the  palaces  with  garlands,"  then  about 
the  third  or  fourth  act  they  called  out,  "  O  Cithadron,f  why 
didst  thou  receive  me  ?  "  Slave,  where  are  the  crowns,  where 
the  diadem  ?  The  guards  help  thee  not  at  all.  When  then 
you  approach  any  of  these  persons,  remember  this  that  you 
are  approaching  a  tragedian,  not  the  actor,  but  (Kdipus  him- 

*  The  garment  with  the  broad  border,  the  laticlave,  was  the  dress  of  a 
senator;  the  garment  with  the  narrow  border,  the  angusticlave,  was  the 
dress  of  a  man  of  the  equestrian  order. 

T  The  exclamation  of  CEdipus  in  the  CEdipus  Tyrannus  of  Sophocles, 
v.  1390. 


self.  But  you  say,  such  a  man  is  happy ;  for  he  walks  about 
with  many,  and  I  also  place  myself  with  the  many  and  walk 
about  with  many.  In  sum  remember  this :  the  door  is 
open  ;  *  be  not  more  timid  than  little  children,  but  as  they 
say,  when  the  thing  does  not  please  them,  "  I  will  play  no 
longer,"  so  do  you,  when  things  seem  to  you  of  such  a  kind, 
say  I  will  no  longer  play,  and  begone  :  but  if  you  stay,  do  not 
complain. 


CHAPTER  XXV. 

ON    THE    SAME. 

IF  these  things  are  true,  and  if  we  are  not  silly,  and  are 
not  acting  hypocritically  when  we  say  that  the  good  of  man 
is  in  the  will,  and  the  evil  too,  and  that  everything  else  does 
not  concern  us,  why  are  we  still  disturbed,  why  are  we  still 
afraid  ?  The  things  about  which  we  have  been  busied  are  in 
no  man's  power  :  and  the  things  which  are  in  the  power  of 
others,  we  care  not  for.  What  kind  of  trouble  have  we  still  ? 
But  give  me  directions  ?  Why  should  I  give  you  directions  ? 
has  not  Zeus  given  you  directions  ?  Has  he  not  given  to 
you  what  is  your  own  free  from  hindrance  and  free  from  im- 
pediment, and  what  is  not  your  own  subject  to  hindrance 
and  impediment  ?  What  directions  then,  what  kind  of  orders 
did  you  bring  when  you  came  from  him  ?  Keep  by  every 

*  This  means  "you  can  die  when  you  please."  Comp.  i.  c.  9.  The 
power  of  dying  when  you  please  is  named  by  Plinius  (X.  II.  ii.  c.  7)  the 
best  thing  that  God  has  given  to  man  amid  all  the  sufferings  of  life. 
Horace,  Kpp.  ii.  2,  213 — 

"  Vivere  si  recte  nescis,  decede  peritis : 
Lusisti  satis,  edisti  satis  atque  bibisti  : 
Tempus  abire  tibi.' 


KPICTKTUS.  77 

means  what  is  your  own  ;  do  not  desire  what  belongs  to 
others.  Fidelity  (integrity)  is  your  own,  virtuous  shame  is 
your  own  ;  who  then  can  take  these  things  from  you  ?  who 
else  than  yourself  will  hinder  you  from  using  them  ?  But 
how  do  you  act  ?  when  you  seek  what  is  not  your 
own,  you  lose  that  which  is  your  own.  Having  such 
promptings  and  commands  from  Zeus,  what  kind  do  you 
still  ask  from  me  ?  Am  I  more  powerful  than  he,  am  I 
more  worthy  of  confidence  ?  lint  if  you  observe  these,  do 
you  want  any  others  besides  ?  Well,  but  he  has  not  given 
these  orders,  you  will  say.  Produce  yourprecognitions,  pro- 
duce the  proofs  of  philosophers,  produce  what  you  have  often 
heard,  and  produce  what  you  have  said  yourself,  produce 
what  you  have  read,  produce  what  you  have  meditated  on  ; 
and  you  will  then  see  that  all  these  things  are  from  God.* 
How  long  then  is  it  fit  to  observe  these  precepts  from 

*  The  conclusion  "and  you  will  then  see,"  is  not  in  the  text,  but  it  is 
what  Kpictetus  means.  The  argument  is  complete.  If  we  admit  the 
existence  of  God,  and  that  he  is  our  father,  as  Epictetus  teaches,  we 
have  from  him  the  intellectual  powers  which  we  possess  ;  and  those  men 
in  whom  these  powers  have  been  roused  to  activity,  and  are  exercised, 
require  no  other  instructor.  It  is  true  that  in  a  large  part  of  mankind 
these  powers  are  inactive  and  are  not  exercised,  or  if  they  are  exercised, 
it  is  in  a  very  imperfect  way.  But  those  who  contemplate  the 
improvement  of  the  human  race,  hope  that  all  men,  or  if  not  all 
men,  a  great  number  will  be  roused  to  the  exercise  of  the  powers 
which  they  have,  and  that  human  life  will  be  made  more  con- 
formable to  Nature,  that  is,  that  man  will  use  the  powers  which 
he  has,  and  will  not  need  advice  and  direction  from  other  men,  who 
professing  that  they  are  wise  and  that  they  can  teach,  prove  by  their 
teaching  and  often  by  their  example  that  they  are  not  wise,  and  are 
incapable  of  teaching.  This  is  equally  true  for  those  who  may  deny  or 
doubt  about  the  existence  of  God.  They  cannot  deny  that  man  has  tl.  - 
intellectual  powers  which  he  does  possess;  and  they  are  certainly  n,,t 
the  persons  who  will  proclaim  their  mv.'i  want  of  these  powers.  If  man 
has  them  and  can  exercise  them,  the  fact  is  sufficient  :  and  \\v  need  n,.r 
dispute  about  the  source  of  these  powers  which  are  in  man  Naturally, 
that  i-,  according  to  thr  i  oii^titution  ol'  !ii->  Nature. 


?8  KPJCTETUS. 

God,  and  not  to  break  up  the  play  ?  *  As  long  as  the  play 
is  continued  with  propriety.  In  the  Saturnalia  f  a  king  i.-> 
chosen  by  lot,  for  it  has  been  the  custom  to  play  at  this 
game.  The  king  commands  :  Do  you  drink,  Do  you  mix  the 
wine,  Do  you  sing,  Do  you  go,  Do  you  come.  I  obey  that 
the  game  may  not  be  broken  up  through  me.  But  if  he  says, 
think  that  you  are  in  evil  plight :  I  answer,  I  do  not  think 
so ;  and  who  will  compel  me  to  think  so  ?  Further,  we 
agreed  to  play  Agamemnon  and  Achilles.  He  who  is  ap- 
pointed to  play  Agamemnon  says  to  me,  Go  to  Achilles  and 
tear  from  him  Briseis.  I  go.  He  says,  Come,  and  I  come. 

For  as  we  behave  in  the  matter  of  hypothetical  arguments, 
so  ought  we  to  do  in  life.  Suppose  it  to  be  night.  I  sup- 
pose that  it  is  night.  Well  then  ;  is  it  day  ?  Xo,  for  I  ad- 
mitted the  hypothesis  that  it  was  night.  Suppose  that  you 
think  that  it  is  night  ?  Suppose  that  I  do.  But  also  think 
that  it  is  night.  That  is  not  consistent  with  the  hypothesis. 
So  in  this  case  also  Suppose  that  you  are  unfortunate. 
Well,  suppose  so.  Are  you  then  unhappy  ?  Yes.  Well 
then  are  you  troubled  with  an  unfavorable  demon  (fortune)  ? 
Yes.  But  think  also  that  you  are  in  misery.  This  is  not 
consistent  with  the  hypothesis ;  and  another  (Zeus)  forbids 
me  to  think  so. 

How  long  then  must  we  obey  such  orders  ?  As  long  as  it 
is  profitable ;  and  this  means  as  long  as  I  maintain  that 
which  is  becoming  and  consistent.  Further,  some  men  are 
sour  and  of  bad  temper,  and  they  say,  "  I  cannot  sup  with 
this  man  to  be  obliged  to  hear  him  telling  daily  how  he 

*  See  the  end  of  the  preceding  chapter.  Upton  compares  Horace's 
"  Incidcre  ludum  ''  (Epp.  i.  14,  36).  Compare  also  Epictetus,  ii.  16,  37. 

t  A  festival  at  Rome  in  December,  a  season  of  jollity  and  license 
(Livy,  xxii.  i).  Compare  the  passage  in  Tacitus,  Ann.  xiii.  15,  in  which 
Nero  is  chosen  by  lot  to  be  king :  and  Seneca,  De  Constant.  Sapient. 
c.  12,  "  Illi  (pueri)  inter  ipsos  magistratus  gerunt,  et  praetextam  fascesque 
ac  tribunal  imitantur." 


EPICTETUS.  79 

fought  in  Mysia :  "  "I  told  you,  brother,  how  I  ascended 
the  hill :  then  I  began  to  be  besieged  again."  But  another 
says,  "  I  prefer  to  get  my  supper  and  to  hear  him  talk  as 
much  as  he  likes."  And  do  you  compare  these  estimates 
(judgments):  only  do  nothing  in  a  depressed  mood,  nor  as 
one  afflicted,  nor  as  thinking  that  you  are  in  misery,  for  no 
man  compels  you  to  that.  Has  it  smoked  in  the  chamber  ? 
If  the  smoke  is  moderate,  I  will  stay  ;  if  it  is  excessive,  I 
go  out :  for  you  must  always  remember  this  and  hold  it  fast, 
that  the  door  is  open.  Well,  but  you  say  to  me,  Do  not  live 
in  Xicopolis.  I  will  not  live  there.  Nor  in  Athens.  I  will 
not  live  in  Athens.  Nor  in  Rome.  I  will  not  live  in  Rome. 
Live  in  Gyarus.*  I  will  live  in  Gyarus.  But  it  seems  like  a 
great  smoke  to  live  in  Gyarus  ;  and  I  depart  to  the  place 
where  no  man  will  hinder  me  from  living,  for  that  dwelling- 
place  is  open  to  all  ;  and  as  to  the  last  garment,  that  is  the 
poor  body,  no  one  has  any  power  over  me  beyond  this.  This 
was  the  reason  why  Demetrius  f  said  to  Nero,  "  You  threaten 
me  with  death,  but  nature  threatens  you."  If  I  set  my  ad- 
miration on  the  poor  body,  I  have  given  myself  up  to  be  a 
slave  :  if  on  my  little  possessions,  I  also  make  myself  a  slave  : 
for  I  immediately  make  it  plain  with  what  I  may  be 
caught :  as  if  the  snake  draws  in  his  head,  I  tell  you  to  strike 
that  part  of  him  which  he  guards  ;  and  do  you  be  assured 
that  whatever  part  you  choose  to  guard,  that  part  your  master 

*  Gyarus  or  Gyara   a   wretched    island  in    the  /Kgean    sea,  to  which 
criminals  were  sent  under  the  empire  cf  Rome.     Juvenal,  Sat.  i-  73. 

i  Demetrius  was  a  Cynic  philosopher,  of  whom  Seneca  (De  Benef. 
vii.  i)  says  :  "lie  was  in  my  opinion  a  great  man,  even  if  he  is  com- 
pared with  the  greatest."  One  of  his  sayings  was  :  "  You  gain  more  by 
•-ing  -A  f<-u  precepts  of  philosophy,  if  you  have  them  ready  and 
use  them,  than  by  learning  many,  if  you  have  them  not  at  hand." 
Seneca  often  mentions  Demetrius.  The  saying  in  the  text  is  also  at- 
tributed to  Ana.xagoras  (Life  by  Diogenes  Laertius)  and  to  Socrates  by 
Xenophon  (Apologia,  27). 


go  A/Y6-7/;7Y/.Y. 

will  attack.  Remembering  this  whom  will  you  still  Hatter  or 
fear  ? 

But  I  should  like  to  sit  where  the  Senators  sit.*  Do  you 
see  that  you  are  putting  yourself  in  straits,  you  are  squeezing 
yourself.  How  then  shall  I  see  well  in  any  other  way  in  the 
amphitheater  ?  Man,  do  not  be  a  spectator  at  all ;  and  you 
will  not  be  squeezed.  Why  do  you  give  yourself  trouble  ? 
( )r  wait  a  little,  and  when  the  spectacle  is  over,  seat  yourself 
in  the  place  reserved  for  the  Senators  and  sun  yourself.  For 
remember  this  general  truth,  that  it  is  we  who  squeeze  our- 
selves, who  put  ourselves  in  straits  ;  that  is  our  opinions 
squeeze  us  and  put  us  in  straits.  For  what  is  it  to  be  reviled  ? 
Stand  by  a  stone  and  revile  it ;  and  what  will  you  gain  ?  If 
then  a  man  listens  like  a  stone,  what  profit  is  there  to  the 
reviler?  But  if  the  reviler  has  as  a  stepping-stone  (or  lad- 
der) the  weakness  of  him  who  is  reviled,  then  he  accomplishes 
something.  Strip  him.  What  do  you  mean  by  him  ?  Lay 
hold  of  his  garment,  strip  it  off.  I  have  insulted  you.  Much 
good  may  it  do  you. 

This  was  the  practice  of  Socrates  :  this  was  the  reason 
why  he  always  had  one  face.  But  we  choose  to  practice  and 
study  anything  rather  than  the  means  by  which  we  shall  be 
unimpeded  and  free.  You  say,  Philosophers  talk  paradoxes. f 
But  are  there  no  paradoxes  in  the  other  arts  ?  and  what  is 
more  paradoxical  than  to  puncture  a  man's  eye  in  order  that 
he  may  see  ?  If  any  one  said  this  to  a  man  ignorant  of  the 
surgical  art,  would  he  not  ridicule  the  speaker  ?  Where  is 

*  At  Rome,  and  probably  in  other  towns,  there  were  seats  reserved  for 
the  different  classes  of  nu-n  at  the  public  spectacles. 

I  Paradoxes,  ••  things  contrary  to  opinion,"  are  contrasted  with  paralo- 
"  things  contrary  to  reason  "(iv.  I,  173)  Cicero  says  (Proemium 
to  his  Paradoxes),  that  paradoxes  are  "  something  which  cause  surprise 
and  contradict  common  opinion;"  and  in  another  place  he  says  that  the 
Romans  jiavu  tlit-  name  of  ••  ;ulmirabilia  "  to  the  Stoic  paradoxes.  The 
puncture  of  the  oye  is  the  operation  for  cataract. 


KI'fCTKTUS. 


the  wonder  then  if  in  philosophy  aisomany  things  which  are 
true  appear  paradoxical  to  the  inexperienced  ? 


CHAITKR  XXVI. 

WHAT    IS    THK    J.A\\'    OF    I.IFK. 

a  person  was  reading  hypothetical  arguments, 
Epictetus  said.  This  also  is  an  hypothetical  law  that  we 
must  accept  what  follows  from  the  hypothesis.  But  much 
before  this  law  is  the  law  of  life,  that  we  must  act  conform- 
ably to  nature.  For  if  in  every  matter  and  circumstance  we 
wish  to  observe  what  is  natural,  it  is  plain  that  in  everything 
we  ought  to  make  it  our  aim  that  neither  that  which  is  conse- 
quent shall  escape  us,  and  that  we  do  not  admit  the  contra- 
dictory. First  then  philosophers  exercise  us  in  theory  * 
(contemplation  of  things),  which  is  easier  ;  and  then  next  they 

*  This  is  a  profound  and  useful  remark  of  Kpictetus.  General  prin- 
ciples are  most  easily  understood  and  accepted.  The  difficulty  is  in  the 
application  of  them.  What  is  more  easy,  for  example,  than  to  under- 
stand general  principles  of  law  which  are  true  and  good  ?  Hut  in  prac- 
•.^es  are  presented  to  us  which,  as  Hacon  says,  are  "immersed  in 
mailer;"  and  it  is  this  matter  which  makes  the  difficulty  of  applying  the 
principles,  and  requires  the  ability  and  study  of  an  experienced  man. 
It  is  easy,  and  it  is  right,  to  teach  the  young  the  general  principles  of 
the  rules  of  life  ;  hut  the  difficulty  of  applying  them  is  that  in  which  the 
young  and  the  old  too  often  fail.  So  if  you  ask  whether  virtue  can  be 
taught,  the  answer  is  that  the  rules  for  a  virtuous  life  can  be  delivered; 
but  the  application  of  the  rules  is  the  difficulty,  as  teachers  of  religion 
and  morality  know  well,  if  they  are  tit  to  teach.  If  they  do  not  know 
this  truth,  they  are  neither  tit  to  teach  the  rules,  nor  to  lead  the  way  to 
the  practice  of  them  by  the  only  method  which  is  possible  ;  and  this 
method  is  by  their  own  examine,  assisted  by  the  examples  of  those  who 
direct  the  education  of  youth,  and  of  those  with  whom  young  persons 
live. 

6 


Sj  RPICTETUS. 

lead  us  to  the  more  difficult  things  ;  for  in  theory,  there  is 
nothing  which  draws  us  away  from  following  what  is  taught ; 
but  in  the  matters  of  life,  many  are  the  things  which  distract 
us.  He  is  ridiculous  then  who  says  that  he  wishes  to  begin 
with  the  matters  of  real  life,  for  it  is  not  easy  to  begin  with  the 
more  difficult  things  ;  and  we  ought  to  employ  this  fact  as 
an  argument  to  those  parents  who  are  vexed  at  their  children 
learning  philosophy  :  Am  I  doing  wrong  then,  my  father, 
and  do  I  not  know  what  is  suitable  to  me  and  becoming  ? 
If  indeed  this  can  neither  be  learned  nor  taught,  why  do  you 
blame  me  ?  but  if  it  can  be  taught,  teach  me ;  and  if  you  can- 
not, allow  me  to  learn  from  those  who  say  that  they  know 
how  to  teach.  For  what  do  you  think  ?  do  you  suppose  that 
I  voluntarily  fall  into  evil  and  miss  the  good  ?  I  hope  that 
it  may  not  be  so.  What  is  then  the  cause  of  my  doing 
wrong  ?  Ignorance.  Do  you  not  choose  then  that  I  should 
get  rid  of  my  ignorance  ?  Who  was  ever  taught  by  anger 
the  art  of  a  pilot  or  music  ?  Do  you  think  then  that  by 
means  of  your  anger  I  shall  learn  the  art  of  life  ?  He  only 
is  allowed  to  speak  in  this  way  who  has  shown  such  an  in- 
tention.* ISut  if  a  man  only  intending  to  make  a  display 
at  a  banquet  and  to  show  that  he  is  acquainted  with  hypo- 
thetical arguments  reads  them  and  attends  the  philosophers, 
what  other  object  has  he  than  that  some  man  of  senatorial! 
rank  who  sits  by  him  may  admire  ?  For  there  (at  Rome )  are 
the  really  great  materials  (opportunities),  and  the  riches  here 
cu  Nicopolis.)  appear  to  be  trifles  there.  This  is  the  reason 
why  it  is  difficult  for  a  man  to  be  master  of  the  appearances, 
where  the  things  which  disturb  the  judgment  are  great.  I 
know  a  certain  person  who  complained,  as  he  embraced  the 
knees  of  Epaphroditus,  that  he  had  only  one  hundred  and 

"  Such  an  intention  "  appears  to  mean  "  the  intention  of  learning." 
"  The  son  alone  can  say  this  to  his  father,  when  the  sou  studies  philos- 
ophy for  the  purpose  of  living  a  good  life,  and  not  for  the  purpose  of 
ili>j>lay." — Wolf. 


fifty  times  ten  thousand  denarii  *  remaining.     What  then  did 
Kpaphroditus   do?     Did   he  laugh   at  him,  as   \ve    slav 
Epaphroditus   did?     No,  but  he   cried  out  with   amazement, 
"  Poor  man,   how  then   did  you    keep   silence,  how   did  you 
endure  it  ?  " 

When  Epictetus  had  reproved  (called)  the  person  who  was 
reading  the  hypothetical  arguments,  and  the  teacher  who  had 
suggested  the  reading  was  laughing  at  the  reader,  Epictetus 
said  to  the  teacher,  "You  are  laughing  at  yourself:  you  did 
not  prepare  the  young  man  nor  did  you  ascertain  whether  he 
was  able  to  understand  these  matters;  hut  perhaps  you  are 
only  employing  him  as  a  reader."  Well  then,  said  Epictetus, 
if  a  man  has  not  ability  enough  to  understand  a  complex 
(syllogism),  do  we  trust  him  in  giving  praise,  do  we  trust  him 
i:i  giving  blame,  do  we  allow  that  he  is  able  to  form  a  judg- 
ment about  good  or  bad  ?  and  if  such  a  man  blames  any  one. 
docs  the  man  care  for  the  blame?  and  if  he  praises  any  one, 
is  the  man  elated,  when  in  such  small  matters  as  an  hypo- 
thetical syllogism  he  who  praises  cannot  see  what  is  conse- 
quent on  the  hypothesis  ? 

This  then  is  the  beginning  of  philosophy,!  a  man's  per- 
ception of  the  state  of  his  ruling  faculty  ;  for  when  a  man 
knows  that  it  is  weak,  then  he  will  not  employ  it  on  things 
of  the  greatest  difficulty.  Hut  at  present,  if  men  cannot 
swallow  even  a  morsel,  they  buy  whole  volumes  and  attempt 
to  devour  them  ;  and  this  is  the  reason  why  they  vomit  them 
up  or  suffer  indigestion  :  and  then  come  gripings,  defluxes, 
and  fevers. t  Such  men  ought  to  consider  what  their  ability 

*  This  was  a  large  sum.  He  is  speaking  of  drachmae,  or  of  the  Ro- 
man equivalents  denarii.  Jn  Roman  language  the  amount  would  he 
briefly  expressed  hy  "  sexagies  centena  milli?  II.  S.."  or  simply  by 
'•'  sexii.  •  ii.  c.  1 1. 

f  Seneca,    1  ><•    Tranquillitate  animi,  c.  9,  says  :  "  What   is  the 
countless  books  and  libraries,  when  the  owner  scarcely  reads  in  his  whole 
life  the  uibK  ;its  ?     The  number  only  confuses  a   I 


X4  RPICTRTUS. 

is.  In  theory  il  is  easy  to  convince  an  ignorant  person  :  hut 
in  the  affairs  of  real  life  no  one  offers  himself  to  he  convinced 
and  we  hate  the  man  who  has  convinced  us.  Hut  Socrates 
advised  us  not  to  live  a  life  which  is  not  subjected  to  ex- 
amination.* 


CHAPTER  XXVII. 

IV      IIOW      MAXV       WAYS       AJ'PEARAXCES      EXIST,      AXD      WHAT 
AIDS    WK    SHOri.D     PROVIDE    AdAIXST  THEM. 

APPEARAXCES  are  to  us  in  four  ways  :  for  either  things 
appear  as  they  are ;  or  they  are  not,  and  do  not  even  ap- 
pear to  he  ;  or  they  are,  and  do  not  appear  to  he  ;  or  tln-v 
are  not.  and  yet  appear  to  he.  Further,  in  all  these  cases 
to  form  a  right  judgment  (to  hit  the  mark)  is  the  office  of 
an  educated  man.  But  whatever  it  is  that  annoys 
(troubles)  us.  to  that  we  ought  to  apply  a  remedy.  If  the 
sophisms  of  Pyrrho  f  and  of  the  Academics  are  what  annoys 
(troubles),  we  must  apply  the  remedy  to  them.  If  it  is 
the  persuasion  of  appearances,  by  which  some  things  ap- 
pear to  he  good,  when  they  are  not  good,  let  us  seek  a 
remedy  for  this.  If  it  is  habit  which  annoys  us,  we  must 
try  to  seek  aid  against  habit.  What  aid  then  can  we  find 
against  habit  ?  The  contrary  habit.  You  hear  the  igno- 
rant say  :  "  That  unfortunate  person  is  dead  :  his  father  and 

not  instruct  him.      It  is  much  better  to  give  yourself  up  to  a  few  authors 
than  to  wander  through  many." 

*  See  Plato's  Apology,  c.  28  ;  and  Antoninus,  iii.  5. 

t  Pyrrho  was  a  native  of  Elis,  in  the  Peloponnesus.  He  is  said  to 
Ir.uv  accompanied  Alexander  the  Great  in  his  Asiatic  expedition  (Dio- 
genes l.aerthis,  ix.  61).  The  time  of  his  birth  is  not  stated,  but  it  is 
siiil  that  he  lived  to  the  age  of  ninety. 


mother  are  overpowered  with  sorrow  :  he  was  cut  off  by  an 
untimely  death  and  in  a  foreign  land.''  Hear  the  con- 
trary way  of  speaking :  Tear  yourself  from  these  expres- 
sions :  oppose  to  one  habit  the  contrary  habit  ;  to  sophistry 
oppose  reason,  and  the  exercise  and  discipline  of  reason ; 
against  persuasive  (deceitful)  appearances  we  ought  to  have 
manifest  precognitions,  cleared  of  all  impurities  and  ready 
to  hand. 

When  death  appears  an  evil,  we  ought  to  have  this  rule 
in  readiness,  that  it  is  fit  to  avoid  evil  things,  and  that 
death  is  a  necessary  thing.  For  what  shall  I  do,  and  where 
shall  I  escape  it  ?  Suppose  that  I  am  not  Sarpedon,  the  son 
of  Zeus,  nor  able  to  speak  in  this  noble  way  :  I  will  go  and  I 
am  resolved  either  to  behave  bravely  myself  or  to  give  to 
another  the  opportunity  of  doing  so ;  if  I  cannot  succeed 
in  doing  anything  myself,  I  will  not  grudge  another  the  doing 
of  something  noble.  Suppose  that  it  is  above  our  power  to 
act  thus ;  is  it  not  in  our  power  to  reason  thus?  Tell  me 
where  I  can  escape  death  :  discover  for  me  the  country, 
show  me  the  men  to  whom  I  must  go,  whom  death  does  not 
visit.  Discover  to  me  a  charm  against  death.  If  I  have  not 
one,  what  do  you  wish  me  to  do  ?  I  cannot  escape  from 
death.  Shall  I  not  escape  from  the  fear  of  death,  but  shall 
I  die  lamenting  and  trembling?  For  the  origin  of  perturba- 
tion is  this,  to  wish  for  something,  and  that  this  should  not 
happen.  Therefore  if  I  am  able  to  change  externals  accord- 
ing to  my  wish,  I  change  them ;  but  if  I  cannot,  I  am  ready 
to  tear  out  the  eyes  of  him  who  hinders  me.  For  the  nature 
of  man  is  not  to  endure  to  be  deprived  of  the  good,  and  mot 
to  endure  the  falling  into  the  evil.  Then  at  last,  when  I  am 
neither  able  to  change  circumstances  nor  to  tear  out  the 
eyes  of  him  who  hinders  me,  I  sit  down  and  groan,  and  abuse 
whom  I  can,  Zeus  and  the  rest  of  the  gods.  For  if  they  do 
not  care  for  me,  what  are  they  to  im-  ?  Yes.  but  you  will  he 
an  impious  man.  In  wh.a  n-sM-.-rt  then  will  it  be  worse  for 


EPfCTE 

me  than  it  is  now?  To  sum  up,  remember  this,  that  unless 
piety  and  your  interest  be  in  the  same  thing,  piety  cannot  be 
maintained  in  any  man.  Do  not  these  things  seem  neces- 
(true)? 

Let  the  followers  of  Pyrrho  and  the  Academics  come  and 
make  their  objections.  For  I,  as  to  my  part,  have  no  leisure 
for  these  disputes,  nor  am  I  able  to  undertake  the  defense 
of  co'mmon  consent  (opinion).*  If  I  had  a  suit  even  about 
a  bit  of  land,  I  would  call  in  another  to  defend  my  interests. 
With  what  evidence  then  am  I  satisfied  ?  With  that  which 
belongs  to  the  matter  in  hand.f  How  indeed  perception  is 
effected,  whether  through  the  whole  body  or  any  part,  perhaps 
I  cannot  explain  :  for  both  opinions  perplex  me.  But  that 
you  and  I  are  not  the  same,  I  know  with  perfect  certainty. 
How  do  you  know  it  ?  When  I  intend  to  swallow  anything, 
I  never  carry  it  to  your  mouth,  but  to  my  own.  When  I  in- 
tend to  take  bread,  I  never  lay  hold  of  a  broom,  but  I  always 
go  to  the  bread  as  to  a  mark.  And  you  yourselves  (the  Pyr- 
rhonists).  who  take  away  the  evidence  of  the  senses,  do  you 
act  otherwise  ?  Who  among  you,  when  he  intended  to  enter 
a  bath,  ever  went  ir.to  a  mill  ? 

What  then  ?     Ought  we  not  with  all   our  power  to  hold  to 

*  "  This  means,  the  received  opinion  about  the  knowledge  and  cer- 
tainty of  things,  which  knowledge  and  certainty  the  Sceptic  philoso- 
phers attack  by  taking  away  general  assent  or  consent  "  (Wolf)-  Lord 
Shaftesbury  accepts  this  explanation.  See  also  Schweig.'s  note. 

t  "  The  chief  question  which  was  debated  between  the  Pyrrhonists 
and  the  Academics  on  one  side,  and  the  Stoics  on  the  other,  was  this, 
whether  there  i*  a  criterion  of  truth ;  and  in  the  first  place,  the  question 
is  about  the  evidence  of  the  senses,  or  the  certainty  of  truth  in  tho.ve 
things  which  are  perceived  by  the  senses.'' — Schweighaeuser.  The 
strength  of  the  Stoic  system  was  that  "  it  furnishes  a  ground-work  of 
common  sense,  and  the  universal  belief  of  mankind,  on  which  to  found 
sufficient  certitude  for  the  requirements  of  life  :  on  the  other  hand,  the 
rual  question  of  knowledge,  in  the  philosophical  sense  of  the  word,  was 
abandoned."  Levin's  Six  Lectures,  p.  70. 


r.rfCTI-'.Tl'S.  87 

this  also,  the  maintaining  of  general  opinion,  and  fortifying 
ourselves  against  the  arguments  which  are  directed  against 
it  ?  Who  denies  that  we  ought  to  do  this  ?  Well,  he  should 
do  it  who  is  able,  who  has  leisure  for  it ;  but  as  to  him  who 
trembles  and  is  perturbed  and  is  inwardly  broken  in  heart 
(spirit),  he  must  employ  his  time  better  on  something  else. 


CHAPTER  XXVIII. 

THAT  WE  OUGHT  NOT  TO  BE  ANGRY  WITH  MEN  ;    AND  WHAT  ARK 
THE  SMALL  AND  THE  GREAT  THINGS  AMONG  MEN.* 

WHAT  is  the  cause  of  assenting  to  anything  ?  The  fact  that 
it  appears  to  be  true.  It  is  not  possible  then  to  assent  to 
that  which  appears  not  to  be  true.  Why?  Because  this  is 
the  nature  of  the  understanding,  to  incline  to  the  true,  to  be 
dissatisfied  with  the  false,  and  in  matters  uncertain  to  with- 
hold assent.  What  is  the  proof  of  this  ?  Imagine  (persuade 
yourself),  if  you  can,  that  it  is  now  night.  It  is  not  possible. 
Take  away  your  persuasion  that  it  is  day.  It  is  not  possible. 
Persuade  yourself  or  take  away  jour  persuasion  that  the  stars 
are  even  in  number.t  It  is  impossible.  When  then  any 
man  assents  to  that  which  is  false,  be  assured  that  he  did 
not  intend  to  assent  to  it  as  false,  for  every  soul  is  unwillingly 
deprived  of  the  truth,  as  Plato  says  :  but  the  falsity  seemed 
to  him  to  be  true.  Well,  in  acts  what  have  we  of  the  like 
kind  as  we  have  here  truth  or  falsehood  ?  We  have  the  fit 
and  the  not  fit  (duty  and  not  duty\  the  profitable  and  the 
unprofitable,  that  which  is  suitable  to  a  person  and  that  which 
is  not,  and  whatever  is  like  these.  Can  then  a  man  think 

j  c.  18  of  this  book, 
t  We  cannot  conceive  that  the  number  of  »iar-<  is  ( ithur  even  or  odd. 


that  a  thing  is  useful  to  him  and  not  choose  it?  lie  cannot. 
How  says  Medea  ?  *- 

"  "I'is  true  I  know  what  evil  I  shall  do, 

Hut  passion  overpowers  tliL-  better  counsel." 

She  thought  that  to  indulge  her  passion  and  take  vengeance 
on  her  husband  was  more  profitable  than  to  spare  her  children. 
It  was  so  :  but  she  was  deceived.  Show  her  plainly  that  she 
is  deceived,  and  she  will  not  do  it  :  but  so  long  as  you  do 
n< it  show  it,  what  can  she  follow  except  that  which  appears  to 
herself  (her  opinion)  ?  Nothing  else.  Why  then  are  you 
angry  with  the  unhappy  woman  that  she  has  been  bewildered 
about  the  most  important  things,  and  is  become  a  viper  in- 
stead of  a  human  creature  ?  And  why  not,  if  it  is  possible, 
rather  pity,  as  we  pity  the  blind  and  the  lame,  so  those  who 
are  blinded  and  maimed  in  the  faculties  which  are  supreme  ? 

Whoever  then  clearly  remembers  this,  that  to  man  the 
measure  of  every  act  is  the  appearance  (the  opinion)— whether 
the  thing  appears  good  or  bad  :  if  good,  he  is  free  from  blame  ; 
if  bad,  himself  suffers  the  penalty,  for  it  is  impossible  that 
he  who  is  deceived  can  be  one  person,  and  he  who  suffers 
another  person — whoever  remembers  this  will  not  be  angry 
with  any  man,  will  not  be  vexed  at  any  man,  will  not  revile 
or  blame  any  man,  nor  hate  nor  quarrel  with  any  man. 

So  then  all  these  great  and  dreadful  deeds  have  this  origin, 
in  the  appearance  (opinion )  ?  Yes,  this  origin  and  no  other. 
The  Iliad  is  nothing  else  than  appearance  and  the  use  of 
appearances.  It  appeared  f  to  Alexander  to  carry  oft"  the  wife 
of  Menelaus  ;  it  appeared  to  Helene  to  follow  him.  If  then 

t  The  Medea  of  Euripides,  1079. 

*  This  is  the  literal  version.  It  does  not  mean  "  that  it  appeared 
riylu,"  as  Mrs.  Carter  translates  it.  Alexander  never  thought  whether  it 
was  right  or  wrong.  All  that  appeared  to  him  was  the  possessing  of 
Ilelene,  and  he  used  the  means  for  getting  possession  of  her,  as  a  dog 
who  spies  and  pursues  some  wild  animal. 


/-:/•/(  •/•/•:  7T.S-.  89 

it  had  appeared  to  Menelaus  to  feel  that  it  was  a  gain  to  be 
deprived  of  such  a  wife,  what  would  have  happened?  X  >: 
only  would  the  Iliad  have  been  lost,  but  the  Odyssey  also. 
On  so  small  a  matter  then  did  such  great  things  depend  ? 
But  what  do  you  mean  by  such  great  things  ?  Wars  and 
civil  commotions,  and  the  destruction  of  many  men  and  cities. 
And  what  great  matter  is  this?  Is  it  nothing?  But  what 
great  matter  is  the  death  of  many  oxen,  and  many  sheep, 
and  many  nests  of  swallows  or  storks  being  burnt  or  destroyed  ? 
Are  these  things  then  like  those  ?  Very  like.  Bodies  of 
men  are  destroyed,  and  the  bodies  of  oxen  and  sheep  ;  the 
dwellings  of  men  are  burnt,  and  the  nests  of  storks.  What 
is  there  in  this  great  or  dreadful  ?  Or  show  me  what  is  the 
difference  between  a  man's  house  and  a  stork's  nest,  as  far  as 
each  is  a  dwelling  ;  except  that  man  builds  his  little  houses 
of  beams  and  tiles  and  bricks,  and  the  stork  builds  them  of 
sticks  and  mud.  Are  a  stork  and  a  man  then  like  things  ? 
What  say  you  ?  In  body  they  are  very  much  alike. 

Does  a  man  then  differ  in  no  respect  from  a  stork  ?  Don't 
suppose  that  I  say  so  ;  but  there  is  no  difference  in  these 
matters  (which  I  have  mentioned).  In  what  then  is  the 
difference  ?  Seek  and  you  will  find  that  there  is  a  difference 
in  another  matter.  See  whether  it  is  not  in  a  man  the 
understanding  of  what  he  does,  see  if  it  is  not  in  social  com- 
munity, in  fidelity,  in  modesty,  in  steadfastness,  in  intelli- 
gence. Where  then  is  the  great  good  and  evil  in  men  ?  It 
is  where  the  difference  is.  If  the  difference  is  preserved  and 
remains  fenced  round,  and  neither  modesty  is  destroyed,  nor 
fidelity,  nor  intelligence,  then  the  man  also  is  preserved  ;  but 
if  any  of  these  things  is  destroyed  and  stormed  like  a  city^ 
then  the  man  too  perishes ;  and  in  this  consist  the  great 
things.  Alexander,  you  say,  sustained  great  damage  then 
when  the  Hellenes  invaded  and  when  they  ravaged  Troy,  and 
when  his  brothers  perished.  By  no  means  :  for  no  man  is 
damaged  by  an  action  which  is  not  his  own  ;  but  what  hap- 


3  ,  EPIC  rr.  TUX. 

1  at  that  time  was  only  the  destructions  of  storks'  nests  : 
now  the  ruin  of  Alexander  was  when  he  lost  the  character 
of  modesty,  fidelity,  regard  to  hospitality,  and  to  decency. 
When  was  Achilles  ruined  ?  \Yas  it  when  Patroclus  died  ? 
Xot  so.  But  it  happened  when  he  began  to  be  angry,  when 
he  wept  for  a  girl,  when  he  forgot  that  he  wras  at  Troy  not 
to  get  mistresses,  but  to  fight.  These  things  are  the  ruin  of 
men,  this  is  being  besieged,  this  is  the  destruction  of  cities, 
when  right  opinions  are  destroyed,  when  they  are  corrupted. 
When  then  women  are  carried  off.  when  children  are  made 
captives,  and  when  the  men  are  killed,  are  these  not  evils  ? 
How  is  it  then  that  you  add  to  the  facts  these  opinions? 
Explain  this  to  me  also.  I  shall  not  do  that ;  but  how  is  it 
that  you  say  that  these  are  not  evils  ?  Let  us  come  to  the 
rules:  produce  the  precognitions :  for  it  is  because  this  is 
neglected  that  we  cannot  sufficiently  wonder  at  what  men 
do.  When  we  intend  to  judge  of  weights,  we  do  not  judge 
by  guess  :  where  we  intend  to  judge  of  straight  and  crooked, 
we  do  not  judge  by  guess.  In  all  cases  where  it  is  our  in- 
terest to  know  what  is  true  in  any  matter,  never  will  any 
man  among  us  do  anything  by  guess.  But  in  things  which 
depend  on  the  first  and  on  the  only  cause  of  doing  right  or 
wrong,  of  happiness  or  unhappiness,  of  being  unfortunate  or 
fortunate,  there  only  we  are  inconsiderate  and  rash.  There 
is  then  nothing  like  scales  (balance),  nothing  like  a  rule  : 
but  some  appearance  is  presented,  and  straightway  I  act 
according  to  it.  Must  I  then  suppose  that  I  am  superior  to 
Achilles  or  Agamemnon,  so  that  they  by  following  appear- 
ances do  and  suffer  so  many  evils  :  and  shall  not  the  appear- 
ance he  sufficient  for  me  ?  And  what  tragedy  has  any  other 
beginning?  The  Atreus  of  Euripides,  what  is  it?  An  ap- 
pearance. The  CKdipus  of  Sophocles,  what  is  it  ?  An 
appearance.  The  Phujnix?  An  appearance.  The  Hip- 
polytus  ?  An  appearance.  What  kind  of  a  man  then  do 
you  suppose  him  to  be  who  pays  no  regard  to  this  matter? 


KPfCTETL'S. 


And  what  is  the  name  of  those  who  follow  every  appear 
ance  ?  They  are  called  madmen.  Do  we  then  act  at  all 
differently  ? 


CHAPTER  XXIX. 

OX  CONSTANCY  (OR   FIRMNESS) 

TitK  being  (nature)  of  the  Good  is  a  certain  Will ;  the 
being  of  the  Bad  is  a  certain  kind  of  Will.  What  then  are 
externals  ?  Materials  for  the  Will,  about  which  the  will 
being  conversant  shall  obtain  its  own  good  or  evil.  How 
shall  it  obtain  the  good  ?  If  it  does  not  admire*  (overvalue) 
the  materials  ;  for  the  opinions  about  the  materials,  if  the 
opinions  are  right,  make  the  will  good  :  but  perverse  and 
distorted  opinions  make  the  will  bad.  God  has  fixed  this 
law.  and  says,  li  If  you  would  have  anything  good,  receive  it 
from  yourself.'1  You  .say.  No,  but  I  will  have  it  from  an- 
other. Do  not  so  :  but  receive  it  from  yourself.  Therefore 
when  the  tyrant  threatens  and  calls  me.  I  say,  Whom  do  you 
threaten  ?  If  he  says,  I  will  put  you  in  chains,  I  say,  You 
threaten  my  hands  and  my  feet.  If  he  says,  I  will  cut  off 
vow  head,  I  reply,  You  threaten  my  head.  If  he  says,  I 
will  throw  you  into  prison,  I  say,  You  threaten  the  whole  of 
this  poor  body.  If  he  threatens  me  with  banishment,  I  say 
\\w.  same.  !><>es  lie  then  not  threaten  you  at  all?  If  I  feel 
that  all  these  things  do  not  concern  me.  he  does  not  threaten 

*  This  is  the  maxim  of  Horace.  Kpp.  i.  <>;  and  Macleam/s  note — 

•'  Nil  iidmirari  prope  re*  e.st  una,  Nimiiei, 

Solaque  qua;  possit  facere  et  servare  bcatum  ;  " 

on  which  I'pton  remarks  that  this  maxim  is  explained  very  philosophi- 
cally and  learnedly  Ly  Lord  Shafteslmry  (the  author  of  the  Characterib- 
tics),  vol.  iii-  p.  202. 


9,  EPICTETUS. 

me  at  all  ;  but  if  J  fear  any  of  them,  it  is  1  whom  he 
threatens.  Whom  then  do  1  fear  ?  the  master  of  what  ? 
The  master  of  things  which  are  in  my  own  power  ?  There 
is  no  such  master.  Do  I  fear  the  master  of  things  which 
are  not  in  my  power  ?  And  what  are  these  things  to  me  ? 

Do  you  philosophers  then  teach  us  to  despise  kings?  \ 
hope  not.  Who  among  us  teaches  to  claim  against  them 
the  power  over  things  which  they  possess  ?  Take  my  poor 
body,  take  my  property,  take  my  reputation,  take  those  who 
are  about  me.  If  I  advise  any  persons  to  claim  these  things. 
t!u-y  may  truly  accuse  me.  Yes,  but  I  intend  to  command 
your  opinions  also.  And  who  has  given  you  this  power  ? 
How  can  you  conquer  the  opinion  of  another  man  ?  By 
applying  terror  to  it,  he  replies,  I  will  conquer  it.  Do  you 
not  know  that  opinion  conquers  itself,  *  and  is  not  conquered 
by  another?  But  nothing  else  can  conquer.  Will  except  the 
Will  itself.  For  this  reason  too  the  law  of  God  is  most 
powerful  and  most  just,  which  is  this  :  Let  the  stronger 
always  be  superior  to  the  weaker.  Ten  are  stronger  than 
one.  For  what  ?  For  putting  in  chains,  for  killing,  for 
dragging  whither  they  choose,  for  taking  away  what  a  man 
has.  The  ten  therefore  conquer  the  one  in  this  in  which  they 
are  stronger.  In  what  then  are  the  ten  weaker  ?  If  the  one 
possesses  right  opinions  and  the  others  do  not.  Well  then, 
can  the  ten  conquer  in  this  matter  ?  How  is  it  possible  ?  If 
we  were  placed  in  the  scales,  must  not  the  heavier  draw  down 
the  scale  in  which  it  is  ? 

How  strange  then  that  Socrates  should  have  been  so 
treated  by  the  Athenians.  Slave,  why  do  you  say  Socrates  ? 
Speak  of  the  thing  as  it  is  :  how  strange  that  the  poor  body 
of  Socrates  should  have  been  carried  off  and  dragged  to 
prison  by  stronger  men,  and  that  any  one  should  have  given 
hemlock  to  the  poor  body  of  Socrates,  and  that  it  should 

*  Tins  is  explained  by  what  follows.  Opinion  does  not  really  con- 
quer itself;  but  one  opinion  can  conquer  another,  and  nothing  else  can. 


:/ '/( '77:  '// '.V. 


93 


breathe  out  the  life.  Do  these  things  seem  strange,  do 
they  seem  unjust,  do  you  on  account  of  these  things  blame 
God  ?  Had  Socrates  then  no  equivalent  for  these  things  ? 
Where  then  for  him  \vas  the  nature  of  good  ?  Whom  shall 
we  listen  to,  you  or  him  ?  And  what  does  Socrates  say  ? 
Anytus  and  Melitus*  can  kill  me,  but  they  cannot  hurt  me  : 
and  further,  he  says,  "  If  it  so  pleases  God,  so  let  it  be." 

But  show  me  that  he  who  has  the  inferior  principles 
overpowers  him  who  is  superior  in  principles.  You  will 
never  show  this,  nor  come  near  showing  it ;  for  this  is  the 
law  of  nature  and  of  God  that  the  superior  shall  always 
overpower  the  inferior.  In  what?  In  that  in  which  it  is 
superior.  One  body  is  stronger  than  another  :  many  are 
stronger  than  one  :  the  thief  is  stronger  than  he  who  is  not 
a  thief.  This  is  the  reason  why  I  also  lost  my  lamp,|  be- 
cause in  wakefulness  the  thief  was  superior  to  me.  But 
the  man  bought  the  lamp  at  this  price  :  for  a  lamp  he  be- 
came a  thief,  a  faithless  fellow,  and  like  a  wild  beast.  This 
seemed  to  him  a  good  bargain.  Be  it  so.  But  a  man  has 
seized  me  by  the  cloak,  and  is  drawing  me  to  the  public 
place  :  then  others  bawl  out,  Philosopher,  what  has  been  the 
use  of  your  opinions  ?  see  you  are  dragged  to  prison,  you  are 
going  to  be  beheaded.  And  what  system  of  philosophy  could 
I  have  made  so  that,  if  a  stronger  man  should  have  laid  hold 
of  my  cloak,  I  should  not  be  dragged  off ;  that  if  ten  men 
should  have  laid  hold  of  me  and  cast  me  into  prison,  I 
should  not  be  cast  in  ?  Have  I  learned  nothing  else  then  ? 
I  have  learned  to  see  that  everything  which  happens,  if  it  be 
independent  of  my  will,  is  nothing  to  me.  I  may  ask  if  you 
have  not  gained  by  this.  Why  then  do  you  seek  advantage 
in  anything  else  than  in  that  in  which  you  have  learned  that 
advantage  is  ? 

Then  sitting  in   prison  I  say  :  The  man  who  cries  out   in 

*  The  two  chief  prosecutors  of  Socrates  (Plato,  Apology,  c.  |S; 
J''.pictetns,  ii.  2,  i  ^)  I  See  i.  18,  15. 


r,^  EriCTETVS. 

this  way*  neither  hears  what  words  mean,  nor  understands 
what  is  said,  nor  does  he  care  at  all  to  know  what  philoso- 
ophers  say  or  what  they  do.  Let  him  alone. 

But  now  he  says  to  the  prisoner,  Come  out  from  your 
prison.  If  you  have  no  further  need  of  me  in  prison.  I  come 
out :  if  you  should  have  need  of  me  again,  I  will  enter  the 
prison.  How  long  will  you  act  thus  ?  So  long  as  reason 
requires  me  to  be  with  the  body  :  but  when  reason  does  not 
require  this,  take  away  the  body,  and  fare  you  well.f  Only 
we  must  not  do  it  inconsiderately,  nor  weakly,  nor  for  any 
slight  reason  ;  for,  on  the  other  hand,  God  does  not  wish  it 
to  be  done,  and  he  has  need  of  such  a  world  and  such  in- 
habitants in  it..t  But  if  he  sounds  the  signal  for  retreat,  as 
he  did  to  Socrates,  we  must  obey  him  who  gives  the  signal, 
as  if  he  were  a  general.  ^ 

\Yell  then,  ought  we  to  say  such  things  to  the  many  ? 
\Viiy  should  we  ?  Is  it  not  enough  for  a  man  to  be  per- 
suaded himself?  When  children  come  clapping  their  hands 
and  crying  out.  4i  To-day  is  the  good  Saturnalia,"  ||  do  we 
say,  "  The  Saturnalia  are  not  good  "  ?  By  no  means,  but  we 
clap  our  hands  also.  Do  you  also  then,  when  you  are  not 
able  to  make  a  man  change  his  mind,  be  assured  that  he  is  a 
child,  and  clap  your  hands  with  him.  and  if  you  do  not  choose 
to  do  this,  keep  silent. 

A  man  must  keep  this   in    mind  ;  and   when    he   is  called 

*  (  ine  of  those  who  cry  out  "  Philosopher,"  etc. 

e  i.  9,  20.  |  See  i.  6,  13. 

§  Socrates  was  condemned  by  the  Athenians  to  die,  and  he  was  con- 
tent  to  die,  and  thought  that  it  was  a  good  thing;  and  this  was  the  rea- 
son why  he  made  such  a  defense  as  he  did,  which  brought  on  him  con- 
demnation ;  and  he  preferred  condemnation  to  escaping  it  by  entreating 
the  dicast.s  (judges),  and  lamenting,  and  saying  and  doing  things  unworthy 
of  himself,  as  others  did. — Plato,  Apology,  cc.  29- "53.  Compare  Epict.  i. 
9,  1 6. 

||  See  i.  25,  8. 


EPICTETrS. 


95 


to  any  such  difficulty,  he  should  know  that  the  time  is 
come  for  showing  if  he  has  been  instructed.  For  he  who 
is  come  into  a  difficulty  is  like  a  young  man  from  a  school 
who  has  practiced  the  resolution  of  syllogisms  :  and  if  any 
person  proposes  to  him  an  easy  syllogism,  he  says.  Rather 
propose  to  me  a  syllogism  which  is  skillfully  complicated 
that  I  may  exercise  myself  on  it.  Even  athletes  are  dissat- 
isfied with  slight  young  men,  and  say,  "  He  cannot  lift 
me."  "This  is  a  youth  of  noble  disposition."*  [You  do 
not  so]  :  but  when  the  time  of  trial  is  come,  one  of  you 
must  weep  and  say,  "  I  wish  that  \  had  learned  more, 
little  more  of  what  ?  If  you  did  not  learn  these  things  in 
order  to  show  them  in  practice,  why  did  you  learn  them  ?  I 
think  that  there  is  some  one  among  you  who  are  sitting  here, 
who  is  suffering  like  a  woman  in  labor,  and  saying,  ''Oh, 
that  such  a  difficulty  does  not  present  itself  to  me  as  that 
v!  !"h  has  come  to  this  man;  oh,  that  1  should  be  wasting 
m)  life  in  a  corner,  when  I  might  be  crowned  at  Olympia. 
When  will  any  one  announce  to  me  such  a  contest  ? "  Such 
ought  to  be  the  disposition  of  all  of  you.  Even  among  the 
gladiators  of  Caesar  (the  Emperor)  there  are  some  who  com- 
plain grievously  that  they  are  not  brought  forward  and 
matched,  and  they  offer  up  prayers  to  God  and  address 
themselves  to  their  superintendents  entreating  that  they 
might  fight.*  And  will  no  one  among  you  show  himself 
such  ?  I  would  willingly  take  a  voyage  [to  Rome]  for  this 

*  See    Schweighaeuser's   note.      This  appears   to  he    the  remark  of 
Epictetus.     If  it  is  so,  what  follows  is  not  clear.     Schweighaeu-- 
plains  it,  "  But  most  of  you  act  otherwise." 

t  The  Roman  emperors  kept  gladiators  for  their  own  amusement  and 
that  of  the  people  (Lipsius,  Saturanalia.  ii.  16).  Seneca  says  (De  Provid. 
c.  4).  "  1  have  heard  a  mirmillo  (a  kind  of  gladiator)  in  the  time  of  C. 
Caesar  (Caligula)  complaining  of  the  rarity  of  gladiatorial  exhibitions  : 
"  What  a  glorious  period  of  life  is  wasting."  "  Virtue,"  says  Seneca» 
"  is  eager  after  dangers  ;  and  it  considers  only  what  it  seeks,  not  what  It 
may  suffer." — Upton. 


96 

purpose  and  see  what  my  athlete  is  doing,  how  he  is  study 
ing  his  subject.  I  do  not  choose  such  a  subject,  he  says, 
\Vhy.  is  it  in  your  power  to  take  what  subject  you  choose  ? 
There  has  been  given  to  you  such  a  body  as  you  have,  such 
parents,  such  brethren,  such  a  country,  such  a  place  in  your 
country  :  then  you  come  to  me  and  say,  Change  my  subject. 
Have  you  not  abilities  which  enable  you  to  manage  the  sub- 
ject which  has  been  given  to  you  ?  [You  ought  to  say] :  It 
is  your  business  to  propose  ;  it  is  mine  to  exercise  myself 
veil.  However,  you  do  not  say  so,  but  you  say,  Do  not  pro- 
pose to  me  such  a  tropic,*  but  such  [  as  I  would  choose] : 
do  not  urge  against  me  such  an  objection,  but  such  [as  I 
would  choose]."  There  will  be  a  time  perhaps  when  tragic 
actors  will  suppose  that  they  are  [only]  masks  and  buskins 
and  the  long  cloak. t  I  say,  these  things,  man,  are  your 
material  and  subject.  Utter  something  that  we  may  kno'v 
whether  you  are  a  tragic  actor  or  a  buffoon  ;  for  both  of  you 
have  all  the  rest  in  common.  If  any  one  then  should  take 
away  the  tragic  actor's  buskins  and  his  mask,  and  introduce 
him  on  the  stage  as  a  phantom,  is  the  tragic  actor  lost,  or 
does  he  still  remain  ?  If  he  has  voice,  he  still  remains. 

An  example  of  another  kind.  •'  Assume  the  governorship 
of  a  province."  I  assume  it,  and  when  I  have  assumed  it,  I 
show  how  an  instructed  man  behaves.  "  Lay  aside  the  lati- 

*Tropic,  a  logical  term  used  by  Stoics,  which  Schweighaeuser  tran- 
slates "  propositio  connexa  in  syllogismo  hypothetico.''  The  meaning 
of  the  whole  is  this.  You  do  not  like  the  work  which  is  set  before  you  : 
as  we  say.  you  are  not  content  "  to  do  your  duty  in  that  state  of  life 
unto  which  it  shall  please  God  to  call  you."  Now  this  is  as  foolish,  says 
Wolf.  a«  for  a  man  in  any  discussion  to  require  that  his  adversary 
should  raise  no  objection  except  such  as  may  serve  the  man's  own  case. 

t  Theie  win  ue  a  time  when  Tragic  actors  shall  not  know  what  their 
business  is,  but  will  think  that  it  is  all  show.  So,  says  Wolf,  philoso- 
phers will  be  only  beard  and  cloak,  and  will  not  show  by  their  life  and 
morals  what  they  really  are  ;  or  they  will  be  like  false  monks,  who  only 
wear  the  cowl,  and  do  not  show  a  life  of  piety  and  sanctity. 


/./>/( •/•/-.  "I  T.v.  97 

clave  (tlie  mark  of  senatorial  rank)  and  clothing  yourself  in 
come  forward  in  this  character."  What  then  have  I 
not  the  power  of  displaying  a  good  voice  (that  is,  of  doing 
something  that  I  ought  to  do)  ?  How  then  do  you  now 
appear  (on  the  stage  of  life)?  As  a  witness  summoned  by 
(»od.  "  Come  forward,  *  you,  and  bear  testimony  for  me, 
for  you  are  worthy  to  be  brought  forward  as  a  witness  by 
me  :  is  anything  external  to  the  will  good  or  bad  ?  do  1  hurt 
any  man  ?  have  I  made  every  man's  interest  dependent  on 
any  man  except  himself  ?  What  testimony  do  you  give  for 
God  ? "  I  am  in  a  wretched  condition,  Master  t  (Lord),  and 
I  am  unfortunate  :  no  man  cares  for  me,  no  man  gives  me 
anything  ;  all  blame  me,  all  speak  ill  of  me.  Is  this  the 
evidence  that  you  are  going  to  give,  and  disgrace  his  sum- 
mons, who  has  conferred  so  much  honor  on  you,  and  thought 
you  worthy  of  being  called  to  bear  such  testimony  ? 

But  suppose  that  he  who  has  the  power  has  declared,  "  I 
judge  you  to  be  impious  and  profane."  What  has  happened 
to  you  ?  I  have  been  judged  to  be  impious  and  profane  ? 
Nothing  else  ?  Nothing  else.  But  if  the  same  person  had 
passed  judgment  on  an  hypothetical  syllogism  (<n>vnt*.tfvov), 
and  had  made  a  declaration,  "the  conclusion  that,  if  it  is 
day,  it  is  light,  I  declare  to  be  false,"  what  has  happened  to 
the  hypothetical  syllogism  ?  who  is  judged  in  this  case  ?  who 
has  been  condemned  ?  the  hypothetical  syllogism,  or  the  man 
who  has  been  deceived  by  it  ?  Does  he  then  who  has  the 
power  of  making  any  declaration  about  you  know  what  is 
pious  or  impious  ?  Has  he  studied  it,  and  has  he  learned  it  ? 
Where  ?  From  whom  ?  Then  is  it  the  fact  that  a  musician 

*  God  is  introduced  as  speaking. — Schweighaeuser. 

t  The  word  is  Kvpun,  the  name  by  which  a  slave  in  Epictetus  ad- 
drev>es  his  master  (duminus),  a  physician  is  addressed  by  his  patient, 
and  in  other  cases  also  it  is  used.  It  is  also  used  by  the  Evangelists. 
They  speak  of  the  angel  of  the  Lord  (Matt.  i.  24) ;  and  Jesus  is  addressed 
bythe  same  term  (Matt.  viii.  2),  Lord  or  master. 
7 


9g  EP1CTETUS 

pays  no  regard  to  him  who  declares  that  the  lowest  *  chord  m 
the  lyre  is  the  highest ;  nor  yet  a  geometrician,  if  he  declares 
that  the  lines  from  the  center  of  a  circle  to  the  circumference 
are  not  equal  ;  and  shall  he  who  is  really  instructed  pay 
any  regard  to  the  uninstructed  man  when  he  pronounces 
judgment  on  what  is  pious  and  what  is  impious,  on  what  is 
just  and  unjust  ?  Oh,  the  signal  wrong  done  by  the  instructed. 
Did  they  learn  this  here  ?  * 

Will  you  not  leave  the  small  arguments  about  these  matters 
to  others,  to  lazy  fellows,  that  they  may  sit  in  a  corner  and 
receive  their  sorry  pay,  or  grumble  that  no  one  gives  them 
anything ;  and  will  you  not  come  forward  and  make  use  of 
what  you  have  learned  ?  For  it  is  not  these  small  arguments 
that  are  wanted  now  :  the  writings  of  the  Stoics  are  full  of 
them.  What  then  is  the  thing  which  is  wanted  ?  A  man 
who  shall  apply  them,  one  who  by  hi*  acts  shall  bear  testi- 
mony to  his  words,  f  Assume,  I  entreat  you,  this  character, 
that  we  may  no  longer  use  in  the  schools  the  examples  of  the 
ancients,  but  may  have  some  example  of  our  own. 

To  whom  then  does  the  contemplation  of  these  matters 
(philosophical  inquiries)  belong  ?  To  him  who  has  leisure, 
for  man  is  an  animal  that  loves  contemplation.  But  it  is 
shameful  to  contemplate  these  things  as  runaway  slaves  do ; 

*  In  "  the  lowest  chord  or  note,"  it  must  be  remembered  that  the 
names  employed  in  the  Greek  musical  terminology  are  precisely  the  op- 
posite to  ours. 

t  I  think  that  Schweighaeusers  interpretation  is  right,  that  "  the  in- 
structed "  are  those  who  think  that  they  are  instructed  but  are  not,  as 
they  show  by  their  opinion  that  they  accept  in  moral  matters  the  judg- 
ment of  an  ignorant  man,  whose  judgment  in  music  or  geometry  they 
would  not  accept. 

\  "  What  is  the  profit,  my  brethren,  if  any  one  should  say  that  he 
hath  faith  and  have  not  works?  .  .  .  Thus  also  faith,  if  it  hath  not 
works,  is  dead  in  itself.  But  a  man  may  say,  Thou  hast  faith,  and  I 
have  works  :  shew  nvj  thy  faith  without  thy  works,  and  I  will  shew  thee 
my  faith  by  my  works  : ." — Epistle  of  James,  ii.  14-18. 


EPICTETUS.  99 

we  should  sit,  as  in  a  theater,  free  from  distraction,  and  listen 
at  one  time  to  the  tragic  actor,  at  another  lime  to  the  h-.te 
player ;  and  not  do  as  slaves  do.  As  soon  as  the  slave  has 
taken  his  station  he  praises  the  actor  and  at  the  same  time 
looks  round  :  then  if  any  one  calls  out  his  master's  name,  the 
slave  is  immediately  frightened  and  disturbed.  It  is  shame- 
ful for  philosophers  thus  to  contemplate  the  works  of  nature. 
For  what  is  a  master  ?  Man  is  not  the  master  of  man  ;  but 
death  is,  and  life  and  pleasure  and  pain  ;  for  if  he  comes 
without  these  things,  bring  Cassar  to  me  and  you  will  see  how 
firm  I  am.  But  when  he  shall  come  with  these  things, 
thundering  and  lightning,*  and  when  I  am  afraid  of  them, 
what  do  I  do  then  except  to  recognize  my  master  like  the 
runaway  slave  ?  But  so  long  as  I  have  any  respite  from  these 
terrors,  as  a  runaway  slave  stands  in  the  theater,  so  do  1 :  I 
bathe,  I  drink,  I  sing  ;  but  all  this  I  do  with  terror  and 
uneasiness.  But  if  I  shall  release  myself  from  my  masters, 
that  is  from  those  things  by  means  of  which  masters  are 
formidable,  what  further  trouble  have  I,  what  master  have  I 
still? 

What  then,  ought  we  to  publish  these  things  to  all  men  ? 
No,  but  we  ought  to  accommodate  ourselves  to  the  igno- 
rant t  and  to  say  :  "  This  man  recommends  to  me  that  which 
he  thinks  good  for  himself:  I  excuse  him."  For  Socrates 
also  excused  the  jailer,  who  had  the  charge  of  him  in  prison 
and  was  weeping  when  Socrates  was  going  to  drink  the 


*  I'pton  supposes  that  Kpictetus  is  alluding  to  the  verse  of  Aris- 
tophanes (Acharn.  531),  where  it  is  said  of  Pericles  : 

"  He  flashed,  he  thundered,  and  confounded  Hellas." 

t  He  calls  the  uninstructed  and  ignorant  by  the  Greek  word  "  Idiotae," 
"idiots,"  which  we  now  use  in  a  peculiar  sense.  An  Idiota  was  a  pri- 
vate individual  as  opposed  to  one  who  filled  some  public  office  ;  and 
thence  it  had  generally  the  sense  of  one  who  was  ignorant  of  any  parti- 
cular art,  as,  for  instance,  one  who  had  not  studied  philosophy. 


poison,  and  said,  How  generously  he  laments  over  us.  * 
Does  he  then  say  to  the  jailer  that  for  this  reason  we  have 
sent  away  the  women  ?  No,  but  he  says  it  to  his  friends 
who  were  able  to  hear  (understand)  it ;  and  he  treats  the 
jailer  as  a  child. 


CHAPTER  XXX. 

WHAT    WE    OUGHT    TO     HAVE     READY     IN     DIFFICULT     CIRCUM- 
STANCES, f 

WHEN  you  are  going  in  to  any  great  personage,  remember 
that  another  also  from  above  sees  what  is  going  on,  and  that 
you  ought  to  please  him  rather  than  the  other.  He  then  who 
sees  from  above  asks  you :  In  the  schools  what  used  you  to 
say  about  exile  and  bonds  and  death  and  disgrace  ?  I  used 
to  say  that  they  are  things  indifferent  (neither  good  nor  bad)- 
What  then  do  you  say  of  them  now  ?  Are  they  changed  at 
all  ?  No.  Are  you  changed  then  ?  No.  Tell  me  then  what 
things  are  indifferent  ?  The  things  which  are  independent  of 
the  will.  Tell  me,  also,  what  follows  from  this.  The  things 
which  are  independent  of  the  will  are  nothing  to  me.  Tell 
me  also  about  the  Good,  what  was  your  opinion?  A  will 
such  as  we  ought  to  have  and  also  such  a  use  of  appearances. 

*  Compare  the  I'haedon  of  Pluto  (p.  116).  The  children  of  Socrates 
were  brought  in  to  see  him  before  lie  took  the  poison  by  which  he  died; 
and  also  the  wives  of  the  friends  of  Socrates  who  attended  him  to  hia 
death.  Socrates  had  ordered  his  wife  Xanthippe  to  be  led  home  before 
he  had  his  last  conversation  with  his  friends,  and  she  was  taken  away 
lamenting  and  bewailing. 

t  The  reader  may  understand  why  Kpictetus  gave  such  a  lesson  as 
this,  if  he  will  remember  the  tyranny  under  which  men  at  that  time 
lived. 


ETCS.  ior 

And  the  end  (purpose),  what  is  it  ?     To  follow  thee.     Do  you 
say  this  now  also  ?     I  say  the  same  now  also. 

Then  go  into  the  great  personage  boldly  and  remember 
these  things  ;  and  you  will  see  what  a  youth  is  who  has 
studied  these  things  when  he  is  among  men  who  have  not 
studied  them.  I  indeed  imagine  that  you  will  have  such 
thoughts  as  these  :  Why  do  we  make  so  great  and  so  main- 
preparations  for  nothing?  Is  this  the  thing  which  men 
name  power  ?  Is  this  the  antechamber  ?  this  the  men  of  the 
bedchamber  ?  this  the  armed  guards  ?  Is  it  for  this  that  1 
listened  to  so  many  discourses  ?  All  this  is  nothing  :  but  I 
hzi-rc  been  preparing  myself  as  for  something  great. 


BOOK   II. 


CHAPTER  I. 

THAT   CONFIDENCE   (COURAGE)    IS    NOT    INCONSISTENT    WITH 
CAUTION. 

THE  opinion  of  the  philosophers  perhaps  seems  to  some 
to  be  a  paradox ;  but  still  let  us  examine  as  well  as  we  can, 
if  it  is  true  that  it  is  possible  to  do  everything  both  with 
caution  and  with  confidence.  For  caution  seems  to  be  in  a 
manner  contrary  to  confidence,  and  contraries  are  in  no  way 
consistent.  That  which  seems  to  many  to  be  a  paradox  in 
the  matter  under  consideration  in  my  opinion  is  of  this  kind  : 
if  we  asserted  that  we  ought  to  employ  caution  and  confi- 
dence in  the  same  things,  men  might  justly  accuse  us  of 
bringing  together  things  which  cannot  be  united.  But  now 
where  is  the  difficulty  in  what  is  said  ?  for  if  these  things 
are  true,  which  have  been  often  said  and  often  proved,  that 
the  nature  of  good  is  in  the  use  of  appearances,  and  the 
nature  of  evil  likewise,  and  that  things  independent  of  our 
will  do  not  admit  either  the  nature  of  evil  nor  of  good,  what 
paradox  do  the  philosophers  assert  if  they  say  that  where 
things  are  not  dependent  on  the  will,  there  you  should  em- 
ploy confidence,  but  where  they  are  dependent  on  the  will, 
there  you  should  employ  caution  ?  For  if  the  bad  consists 
in  a  bad  exercise  of  the  will,  caution  ought  only  to  be  used 
where  things  are  dependent  on  the  will.  But  if  things  in- 

I03 


104  /•iriCTETl'S. 

dependent  of  the  will  and  not  in  our  power  are  nothing  to 
us,  with  respect  to  these  we  must  employ  confidence  ;  and 
thus  we  shall  both  be  cautious  and  confident  and  indeed  con- 
fident because  of  our  caution.  For  by  employing  caution 
toward  things  which  are  really  bad.  it  will  result  that  we  shall 
have  confidence  with  respect  to  things  which  are  not  so. 

\Ye  are  then  in  the  condition  of  deer  ;  *  when  they  flee 
from  the  huntsman's  feathers  in  fright,  whither  do  they  turn 
and  in  what  do  they  seek  refuge  as  safe  ?  They  turn  to  the 
nets,  and  thus  they  perish  by  confounding  things  which  are 
objects  of  fear  with  things  that  they  ought  not  to  fear. 
Thus  we  also  act :  in  what  cases  do  we  fear  ?  In  things 
which  are  independent  of  the  will.  In  what  cases  on  the 
contrary  do  we  behave  with  confidence,  as  if  there  were  no 
danger  ?  In  things  dependent  on  the  will.  To  be  deceived 
then,  or  to  act  rashly,  or  shamelessly  or  with  base  desire  to 
seek  something,  does  not  concern  us  at  all,  if  we  only  hit  the 
mark  in  things  which  are  independent  of  our  will.  But  where 
there  is  death,  or  exile  or  pain  or  infamy,  there  we  attempt  to 
run  away,  there  we  are  struck  with  terror.  Therefore  as  we 
may  expect  it  to  happen  with  those  who  err  in  the  greatest 
matters,  we  convert  natural  confidence  (that  is,  according  to 
nature)  into  audacity,  desperation,  rashness,  shamelessness  ; 
and  we  convert  natural  caution  and  modesty  into  cowardice 
and  meanness,  which  are  full  of  fear  and  confusion.  For  if 
a  man  should  transfer  caution  to  those  things  in  which  the 
will  may  be  exercised  and  the  acts  of  the  will,  he  will  imme- 
diately by  willing  to  be  cautious  have  also  the  power  of  avoid- 
ing what  he  chooses  :  but  if  he  transfer  it  to  the  things  which 
are  not  in  his  power  and  will,  and  attempt  to  avoid  the  things 
which  are  in  the  power  of  others,  he  will  of  necessity  fear, 

*  It  was  the  fashion  of  hunters  to  frighten  deer  by  displaying  feathers 
of  various  colors  on  ropes  or  strings  and  thus  frightening  them  toward 
the  nets.  Virgil,  Georg.  iii.  372 — 

Puniceaeve  agitant  pavidos  formidine  pennae. 


105 

he  will  be  unstable,  he  will  be  disturbed.  For  death  or  pain 
is  not  formidable,  but,  the  fear  of  pain  or  death.  For  this 
reason  we  commend  the  poet*  who  said 

Not  death  is  evil,  but  a  shameful  death. 

Confidence  (courage)  then  ought  to  be  employed  against 
death,  and  caution  against  the  fear  of  death.  But  now  we 
do  the  contrary,  and  employ  against  death  the  attempt  to 
escape  ;  and  to  our  opinion  about  it  we  employ  carelessness, 
rashness  and  indifference.  These  things  Socrates  f  properly 
used  to  call  tragic  masks  ;  for  as  to  children  masks  appear 
terrible  and  fearful  from  inexperience,  we  also  are  affected 
in  like  manner  by  events  (the  things  which  happen  in  life) 
for  no  other  reason  than  children  are  by  masks.  For  what 
is  a  child  ?  Ignorance.  What  is  a  child  ?  Want  of  knowl- 
edge. For  when  a  child  knows  these  things,  he  is  in  no  way 
inferior  to  us.  What  is  death  ?  A  tragic  mask.  Turn  it 
and  examine  it.  See,  it  does  not  bite.  The  poor  body 
must  be  separated  \  from  the  spirit  either  now  or  later  as  it 
was  separated  from  it  before.  Why  then  are  you  troubled, 
if  it  be  separated  now?  for  if  it  is  not  separated  now,  it  will 
be  separated  afterward.  Why?  That  the  period  of  the 
universe  may  be  completed,§  for  it  has  need  of  the  present, 

*  Euripides,  fragments. 

1  In  the  Phaulon,  c.  24,  or  p.  78. 

}  It  was  the  opinion  of  some  philosophers  that  the  soul  was  a  portion 
of  the  divinity  sent  down  into  human  bodies. 

§  This  was  a  doctrine  of  Heraclitus  and  of  Zeno.  Zeno  (Diog.  Laert. 
vii.  137)  speaks  of  (lod  as  "  in  certain  periods  or  revolutions  of  time  ex- 
hausting into  himself  the  universal  substance  (ovSta)  and  again  generat- 
ing it  out  of  himself."  Antoninus  (xi.  i)  speaks  of  the  periodical  re- 
novation of  all  things.  For  man,  whose  existence  is  so  short,  the 
doctrine  of  all  existing  things  perishing  in  the  course  of  time  and  then 
l>eing  renewed,  is  of  no  practical  value.  The  present  is  enough  for 
most  men.  Hut  for  the  few  who  are  able  to  embrace  in  thought  the 


I06  //'/(.'/'A' 7  Y'.s. 

and  the  future,  and  of  the  past.  What  is  pain  ?  A  nia.-,k. 
Turn  it  and  examine  it.  The  poor  flesh  is  moved  roughly, 
then  on  the  contrary  smoothly.  If  this  does  not  satisfy 
(please)  you,  the  door  is  open  :  *  if  it  does,  bear  (with  things ). 
For  the  door  ought  to  be  open  for  all  occasions  ;  and  so  we 
have  no  trouble. 

What  then  is  the  fruit  of  these  opinions  ?  It  is  that  which 
ought  to  be  the  most  noble  and  the  most  becoming  to  those 
who  are  really  educated,  release  from  perturbation,  release 
from  fear,  freedom.  For  in  these  matters  we  must  not  be- 
lieve the  many,  who  say  that  free  persons  only  ought  to  be 
educated,  but  we  should  rather  believe  the  philosophers  who 
say  that  the  educated  only  are  free.  How  is  this  ?  In  this 
manner.  Is  freedom  anything  else  than  the  power  of  living 
as  we  choose  ?  Nothing  else.  Tell  me  then,  ye  men,  do 
you  wish  to  live  in  error  ?  We  do  not.  No  one  then  who 
lives  in  error  is  free.  Do  you  wish  to  live  in  fear  ?  Do  you 
wish  to  live  in  sorrow  ?  Doyou  wish  to  live  in  perturbation  ? 
By  no  means.  No  one  then  who  is  in  a  state  of  fear  or 
sorrow  or  perturbation  is  free ;  but  whoever  is  delivered 
from  sorrows  and  fears  and  perturbations,  he  is  at  the  same 
time  also  delivered  from  servitude.  How  then  can  we  con- 
tinue to  believe  you,  most  dear  legislators,  when  you  say,  We 
only  allow  free  persons  to  be  educated  ?  For  philosophers 
say  we  allow  none  to  be  free  except  the  educated ;  that  is, 

past,  the  present  and  the  future,  the  contemplation  of  the  perishable 
nature  of  all  exisiting  things  may  have  a  certain  value  by  elevating  their 
minds  above  the  paltry  things  which  others  prize  above  their  worth. 

•  Sec.  i.  9,  note  7.  Schweighaeuser  says  that  he  does  not  quite  see 
what  is  the  meaning  of  "  ought  to  be  open ; "  and  he  suggests  that 
Epictetus  intended  to  say  "we  ought  to  consider  that  the  door  is  open 
for  ail  occasions  ;  "  but  the  occasions,  he  says,  ought  to  be  when  things 
are  such  that  a  man  can  in  no  way  bear  them  or  cannot  honorably  en- 
dure them,  and  such  occasions  the  wise  man  considers  to  be  the  voice  of 
God  giving  to  him  the  signal  to  retire. 


EPICTETUS. 


107 


God  does  not  allow  it.  When  then  a  man  has  turned  *  round 
before  the  praetor  his  own  slave,  has  he  done  nothing  ?  He 
has  done  something.  What  ?  He  has  turned  round  his  own 
slave  before  the  prcetor.  Has  he  done  nothing  more  ?  Yes  : 
he  is  also  bound  to  pay  for  him  the  tax  called  the  twentieth. 
Well  then,  is  not  the  man  who  has  gone  through  this  cere- 
mony become  free  ?  No  more  than  he  is  become  free  from 
perturbations.  Have  you  who  are  able  to  turn  round  (free) 
others  no  master  ?  is  not  money  your  master,  or  a  girl  or  a 
boy,  or  some  tyrant,  or  some  friend  of  the  tyrant?  why  do 
you  tremble  then  when  you  are  going  off  to  any  trial  (danger) 
of  this  kind  ?  It  is  for  this  reason  that  I  often  say,  study 
and  hold  in  readiness  these  principles  by  which  you  may 
determine  what  those  things  are  with  reference  to  which  you 
ought  to  have  confidence  (courage),  and  those  things  with 
reference  to  which  you  ought  to  be  cautious  :  courageous  in 
that  which  does  not  depend  on  your  will  ;  cautious  in  that 
which  does  depend  on  it. 

Well  have  I  not  read  to  you,  f  and  do  you  not  know  what 
I  was  doing?  In  what?  In  my  little  dissertations.  Show 
me  how  you  are  with  respect  to  desire  and  aversion 


*  This  is  an  allusion  to  one  of  the  Roman  modes  of  manumitting  a 
slave  before  the  praetor.     Compare  Persius,  Sat.  V.  75  — 

—  Heu  steriles  veri,  quibus  una  Qairitem 
Vertigo  facit  ; 
and  again 

Verterit  hunc  dominus,  momento  turbinis  exit 
Marcus  Dama. 

The  sum  paid  on  manumission  was  a  tax  of  five  per  cent.,  established 
in  B.  C.  356  (Livy,  vii.  16),  and  paid  by  the  slave.  Epictetus  here  speaks 
of  the  tax  being  paid  by  the  master  ;  but  in  iii.  26  he  speaks  of  it  as  paid 
by  the  enfranchised  slave.  See  Bureau  de  la  Malle,  Economie  Politique 
des  Remains,  i.  290,  ii.  469. 

t  These  are  the  words  of  some  pupil  who  is  boasting  of  what  he  has 
written. 


10S  EPJCTETUS, 

and  show  me  it"  you  do  not  fail  in  getting  what  you  wish,  and 
if  you  do  not  fall  into  the  things  which  you  would  avoid  : 
but  as  to  these  long  and  labored  sentences  you  will  take 
them  and  blot  them  out. 

What  then  did  not  Socrates  write  ?  And  who  wrote  so 
much?*  But  how?  As  he  could  not  always  have  at  hand 
one  to  argue  against  his  principles  or  to  be  argued  against 
in  turn,  he  used  to  argue  with  and  examine  himself,  and  he 
was  always  treating  at  least  some  one  subject  in  a  practical 
way.  These  are  the  things  which  a  philosopher  writes.  But 
little  dissertations  and  that  method,  which  I  speak  of,  he 
leaves  to  others,  to  the  stupid,  or  to  those  happy  men  who 
being  free  from  perturbations  have  leisure,  or  to  such  as  are 
too  foolish  to  reckon  consequences. 

And  will  you  now,  when  the  opportunity  invites,  go  and 
display  those  things  which  you  possess,  and  recite  them, 
and  make  an  idle  show,  and  say,  See  Low  I  make  dialogues  ? 
Do  not  so,  my  man  :  but  rather  say  :  See  how  I  am  not  dis- 
appointed of  that  which  I  desire  :  See  how  I  do  not  fall  into 
that  which  1  would  avoid.  Set  death  before  me,  and  you 
will  see.  Set  before  me  pain,  prison,  disgrace  and  condemna- 
tion. This  is  the  proper  display  of  a  young  man  who  is 
come  out  of  the  schools.  But  leave  the  rest  to  others,  and 
let  no  one  ever  hear  you  say  a  word  about  these  things  ; 
and  if  any  man  commends  you  for  them,  do  not  allow  it ; 
but  think  that  you  are  nobody  and  know  nothing.  Only 
show  that  you  know  this,  how  never  to  be  disappointed  in 
your  desire  and  how  never  to  fall  into  that  which  you  would 
avoid.  Let  others  labor  at  forensic  causes,  problems  and 

*  No  other  author  speaks  of  Socrates  having  written  anything.  It  is 
therefore  very  difficult  to  explain  this  passage  in  which  Arrian,  who  took 
down  the  words  of  Epictetus,  represents  him  as  saying  that  Socrates 
wrote  so  much.  Socrates  talked  much,  and  Epictetus  may  have  spoken 
of  talking  as  if  it  were  writing;  for  he  must  have  known  that  Socrates 
was  not  a  writer. 


KP/CTETl'S.  1Q<) 

syllogisms  :  do  you  labor  at  thinking  about  death,  *  chains, 
the  rack,  exile  ;  f  and  do  all  this  with  confidence  and  reliance 
on  him  who  has  called  you  to  these  sufferings,  who  has 
judged  you  worthy  of  the  place  in  which  being  stationed  you 
will  show  what  things  the  rational  governing  power  can  do 
when  it  takes  its  stand  against  the  forces  which  are  not  within 
the  power  of  our  will.  And  thus  this  paradox  will  no  longer 
appear  either  impossible  or  a  paradox,  that  a  man  ought  to 
be  at  the  same  time  cautious  and  courageous  :  courageous 
toward  the  things  which  do  not  depend  on  the  will,  and 
cautious  in  things  which  are  within  the  power  of  the  will. 


CHAPTER  II. 

OF  TRANQUILLITY  (FREEDOM   FROM   PERTURBATION'). 

CONSIDER,  you  who  are  going  into  court,  what  you  wish  to 
maintain  and  what  you  wish  to  succeed  in.  For  if  you  wish 
to  maintain  a  will  conformable  to  nature,  you  have  every 
security,  every  facility,  you  have  no  troubles.  For  it  you 
wish  to  maintain  what  is  in  your  own  power  and  is  naturally 

*  "  The  whole  life  of  philosophers,"  says  Cicero  (Tusc.  i.  30),  follow- 
ing Plato,  "is  a  reflection  upon  death." 

t  "  Some  English  readers,  too  happy  to  comprehend  how  chains, 
torture,  exile  and  sudden  executions,  can  be  ranked  among  the  com- 
mon accidents  of  life,  may  be  surprised  to  find  Kpictetus  so  frequently 
endeavoring  to  prepare  his  hearers  for  them.  I'.ut  it  must  be  recollected 
that  he  addressed  himself  to  persons  who  livfd  under  the  Roman 
emperors,  from  those  tyranny  the  very  best  o(  men  wi-it:  perpetually  liable 
to  such  kind  of  dangers." — Mrs.  Carter.  All  men  even  now  are  exposed 
to  the  accidents  and  misfor:  i  ,t  which  there  is  no  security,  and 

even    the    most   fortune ..-.-  of    men  must   die   at   last.     The  lessons   of 
Epictetus  may  be  us  useful  now  as  they  were  in  his  time.     See  i.  30. 


EPIC  TE  TUS. 

md  if  you  are  content  with  these,  what  else  do  you  care 
for  ?  For  who  is  the  master  of  such  things  ?  Who  can  take 
them  away?  If  you  choose  to  be  modest  and  faithful,  who 
shall  not  allow  you  to  be  so  ?  If  you  choose  not  to  be  re- 
strained or  compelled,  who  shall  compel  you  to  desire  what 
you  think  that  you  ought  not  to  desire  ?  who  shall  compel 
you  to  avoid  what  you  do  not  think  fit  to  avoid  ?  But  what 
do  you  say  ?  The  judge  will  determine  against  you  some- 
thing that  appears  formidable  ;  but  that  you  should  also 
suffer  in  trying  to  avoid  it,  how  can  he  do  that  ?  When  then 
the  pursuit  of  objects  and  the  avoiding  of  them  are  in  your 
power,  what  else  do  you  care  for  ?  Let  this  be  your  preface,* 
this  your  narrative,  this  your  confirmation,  this  your  victory, 
this  your  peroration,  this  your  applause  (or  the  approbation 
which  you  will  receive). 

Therefore  Socrates  said  to  one  who  was  reminding  him  to 
prepare  for  his  trial,!  Do  you  not  think  then  that  I  have 
been  preparing  for  it  all  my  life  ?  By  what  kind  of  prepara- 
tion ?  I  have  maintained  that  which  was  in  my  own  power. 
How  then  ?  I  have  never  done  anything  unjust  either  in  my 
private  or  in  my  public  life. 

But  if  you  wish  to  maintain  externals  also,  your  poor  body, 
your  little  property  and  your  little  estimation,  I  advise  you 
tu  make  from  this  moment  all  possible  preparation,  and  then 
consider  both  the  nature  of  your  judge  and  your  adversary. 
If  it  is  necessary  to  embrace  his  knees,  embrace  his  knees; 
if  to  weep,  weep  ;  if  to  groan,  groan.  For  when  you  have 
subjected  to  externals  what  is  your  own,  then  be  a  slave  and 
do  not  resist,  and  do  not  sometimes  choose  to  be  a  slave,  and 
sometimes  not  choose,  but  with  all  your  mind  be  one  or  the 
other,  either  free  or  a  slave,  either  instructed  or  uninstructed, 

*  Epictetus  refers  to  the  rhetorical  divisions  of  a  speech. 

t  Xenophon  (Mem.  iv.  c.  8,  4)  has  reported  this  saying  of  Socrates  on 
the  authority  of  Hermogenes.  Compare  the  Apology  of  Xenophon 
near  the  beginning. 


EPICTETUS.  nr 

either  a  well-bred  cock  or  a  mean  one,  either  endure  t»  r>c 
beaten  until  you  die  or  yield  at  once  ;  and  let  it  not  happen 
to  you  to  receive  many  stripes  and  then  to  yield.  But  if 
these  things  are  base,  determine  immediately.  Where  is  the 
nature  of  evil  and  good  ?  It  is  where  truth  is  :  where  truth 
is  and  where  nature  is,  there  is  caution  :  where  truth  is,  there 
is  courage  where  nature  is. 

For  what  do  you  think  ?  do  you  think  that,  if  Socrates  had 
wished  to  preserve  externals,  he  would  have  come  forward 
and  said  :  Anytus  and  Melitus  can  certainly  kill  me,  but  to 
harm  me  they  are  not  able  ?  Was  he  so  foolish  as  not  to  see 
that  this  way  leads  not  to  the  preservation  of  life  and  fortune, 
but  to  another  end  ?  What  is  the  reason  then  that  he  takes 
no  account  of  his  adversaries,  and  even  irritates  them  ?  Just 
in  the  same  way  my  friend  Heraclitus,  who  had  a  little  suit 
in  Rhodes  about  a  bit  of  land,  and  had  proved  to  the  judges 
that  his  case  was  just,  said  when  he  had  come  to  the  pero- 
ration of  his  speech,  I  will  neither  entreat  you  nor  do  I  care 
what  judgment  you  will  give,  and  it  is  you  rather  than  I  who 
are  on  your  trial.  And  thus  he  ended  the  business.*  What 
need  was  there  of  this  ?  Only  do  not  entreat ;  but  do  not 
also  say,  "  I  do  not  entreat ;  "  unless  there  is  a  fit  occasion 
to  irritate  purposely  the  judges,  as  was  the  case  with  Socrates. 
And  you,  if  you  are  preparing  such  a  peroration,  why  do  you 
wait,  why  do  you  obey  the  order  to  submit  to  trial  ?  For  if 
you  wish  to  be  crucified,  wait  and  the  cross  will  come  :  but 
if  you  choose  to  submit  and  to  plead  your  cause  as  well  as 
you  can,  you  must  do  what  is  consistent  with  this  object, 
provided  you  maintain  what  is  your  own  (your  proper  char- 
acter). 

For  this  reason  also  it  is  ridiculous  to  say,  Suggest  some- 
thing to  mef  (tell  me  what  to  do).  What  should  I  suggest 

*  The  words  may  mean  either  what  I  have  written  in  the  text,  or  "and 
so  he  lost  his  suit." 

t  "  The  meaning  is,  You  inust  not  ask  for  advice  when  you  arc  come 


j,_,  l-.riCTETU.S. 

to  you  ?  Well,  form  my  mind  so  as  to  accommodate  itself  to 
any  event.  Why  that  is  just  the  same  as  if  a  man  who  is 
ignorant  of  letters  should  say,  Tell  me  what  to  write  when 
any  name  is  proposed  to  me.  For  if  I  should  tell  him  to 
write  Dion,  and  then  another  should  come  and  propose  to 
him  not  the  name  of  Dion  but  that  of  Theon.  what  will  be 
done?  what  will  he  write  ?  But  if  you  have  practiced  writ- 
ing, you  are  also  prepared  to  write  (or  to  do)  anything  that 
is  required.  If*  you  are  not,  what  can  I  now  suggest?  For 
if  circumstances  require  something  else,  what  will  you  say  or 
what  will  you  do?  Remember  then  this  genei.il  precept  and 
you  will  need  no  suggestion.  But  if  you  gape  after  externals, 
you  must  of  necessity  ramble  up  and  down  in  obedience  to 
the  will  of  your  master.  And  who  is  the  master  ?  He  who 
has  the  power  over  the  things  which  you  seek  to  gain  or  try 
to  avoid. t 

into  a  difficulty,  but  every  man  ought  to  have  such  principles  as  to  be 
ready  on  all  occasions  to  act  as  he  ought :  just  as  he  who  knows  how  to 
write  can  write  any  name  which  is  proposed  to  him." — Wolf. 

*  "  i he  reader  must  know  that  these  dissertations  were  spoken  ex- 
urapore,  and  that  one  thing  after  another  would  come  into  the  thoughts 
of  the  speaker.  So  the  reader  will  not  be  surprised  that  when  the  dis- 
course is  on  the  maintenance  of  firmness  or  freedom  from  perturbations, 
Kpictetus  should  now  speak  of  philosophical  preparation,  which  is  most 
efficient  for  the  maintenance  of  firmness." — Wolf. 

t  In  the  Encheiridion  or  Manual  (c.  14)  it  is  written,  "  Eve;1)'  man's 
master  is  he  who  has  the  power  to  give  to  a  man  or  take  away  that  which 
he  would  have  or  not  have  :  whoever  then  wishes  to  be  free,  let  him 
neither  seek  anything  or  avoid  anything  which  is  in  the  power  of  others  : 
if  he  does  not  act  thus,  he  will  be  a  slave." 


WICTI-.TUS.  113 


CHAPTER  III. 

TO    THOSE    WHO    RECOMMEND    PERSONS    TO    PHILOSOPHERS. 

DIOGENES  said  well  to  one  who  asked  from  him  letters  of 
recommendation.  '•  That  you  are  a  man,"  he  said,  "  he  will 
know  as  soon  as  he  sees  you  ;  and  he  will  know  whether  you 
are  good  or  bad,  if  he  is  by  experience  skillful  to  distinguish 
the  good  and  the  bad  ;  but  if  he  is  without  experience,  he 
will  never  know,  if  I  write  to  him  ten  thousand  times."* 
For  it  is  just  the  same  as  if  a  drachma  (a  piece  of  silver 
money)  asked  to  be  recommended  to  a  person  to  be  tested. 
Jf  he  is  skillful  in  testing  silver,  he  will  know  what  you  are, 
for  you  (the  drachma)  will  recommend  yourself.  We  ought 
then  in  life  also  to  have  some  skill  as  in  the  case  of  silver 
coin  that  a  man  may  be  able  to  say,  like  the  judge  of  silver, 
llring  me  any  drachma  and  1  will  test  it.  But  in  the  case  of 
syllogisms  I  would  say,  Bring  any  man  that  you  please,  and 
I  will  distinguish  for  you  the  man  who  knows  how  to  resolve 
syllogisms  and  the  man  who  does  not.  Why  ?  Because  I 
know  how  to  resolve  syllogisms.  I  have  the  power,  which  a 
man  must  have  who  is  able  to  discover  those  who  have  the 
power  of  resolving  syllogisms.  But  in  life  how  do  I  act? 
At  one  time  I  call  a  thing  good,  and  at  another  time  bad. 

*  Cicero  (De  legibus,  i.  9)  says  that  the  face  expresses  the  hidden 
character.  Euripides  (Medea,  518)  says  better,  that  no  mark  is  im- 
pressed on  the  body  by  which  we  can  distinguish  the  good  man  from 
the  bad.  Shakespeare  says 

There's  no  art 

To  find  the  mind's  construction  in  \\\v  face. 
g  Maclk:th,  act  i.  sc.  4. 


What  is  the  reason  ?     The  contrary  to  that  which  is  in  the 
case  of  syllogisms,  ignorance  and  inexperience. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

AGAINST     A      PERSON     WHO     HAD     ONCE     BEEN      DETECTED     IN 
ADULTERY. 

As  EPICTETUS  was  saying  that  man  is  formed  for  fidelity, 
and  that  he  who  subverts  fidelity  subverts  the  peculiar  charac- 
teristic of  men,  there  entered  one  of  those  who  are  con- 
sidered to  be  men  of  letters,  \vho  had  once  been  detected  in 
adultery  in  the  city.  Then  Epictetus  continued,  But  if  we 
lay  aside  this  fidelity  for  which  we  are  formed  and  make 
designs  against  our  neighbor's  wife,  what  are  we  doing  ? 
What  else  but  destroying  and  overthrowing  ?  Whom,  the 
man  of  fidelity,  the  man  of  modesty,  the  man  of  sanctity.  Is 
this  all  ?  And  are  we  not  overthrowing  neighborhood,  and 
friendship,  and  the  community ;  and  in  what  place  are  we 
putting  ourselves  ?  How  shall  I  consider  you,  man  ?  As  a 
neighbor,  as  a  friend  ?  What  kind  of  one  ?  As  a  citizen  ? 
Wherein  shall  I  trust  you  ?  So  if  you  were  an  utensil  so  worth- 
less that  a  man  could  not  use  you,  you  would  be  pitched  out 
on  the  dung  heaps,  and  no  man  would  pick  you  up.  But  if 
being  a  man  you  are  unable  to  fill  any  place  which  befits  a 
man.  what  shall  we  do  with  you  ?  For  suppose  that  you 
cannot  hold  the  place  of  a  friend,  can  you  hold  the  place  of 
a  slave  ?  And  who  will  trust  you  ?  Are  you  not  then  con- 
tent that  you  also  should  be  pitched  somewhere  on  a  dung 
heap,  as  a  useless  utensil,  and  a  bit  of  dung?  Then  will  you 
say,  no  man  cares  for  me,  a  man  of  letters  ?  They  do  not, 
because  you  are  bad  and  useless.  It  is  just  as  if  the  wasps 
complained  because  no  man  cares  for  them,  but  all  fly  from 


/•'/'/C  -/•/••  7V.  V.  ii- 

tliem,  and  if  a  man  can,  he  strikes  them  and  knocks  them 
down.  You  have  such  a.  sting  that  you  throw  into  trouble 
and  pain  any  man  that  you  wound  with  it.  \Yhat  would  you 
have  us  do  with  you  ?  You  have  no  place  where  you  can  be 
put. 

What  then,  are*  not  women  common  by  nature  ?  *  So  I 
say  also ;  for  a  little  pig  is  common  to  all  the  invited  guests, 
but  when  the  portions  have  been  distributed,  go  if  you  think 
it  right,  and  snatch  up  the  portion  of  him  who  reclines  next 
to  you,  or  slyly  steal  it,  or  place  your  hand  down  by  it  and 
lay  hold  of  it,  and  if  you  cannot  tear  away  a  bit  of  the  meat, 
grease  your  fingers  and  lick  them.  A  fine  companion  over 
cups,  and  Socratic  guest  indeed  ?  Well,  is  not  the  theater 
common  to  the  citizens?  When  then  they  have  taken  their 
seats,  come,  if  you  think  proper,  and  eject  one  of  them.  In 
this  way  women  also  are  common  by  nature.  When  then  the 
legislator,  like  the  master  of  a  feast,  has  distributed  them, 
will  you  not  also  look  for  your  own  portion  and  not  filch  and 
handle  what  belongs  to  another.  But  I  am  a  man  of  letters 
and  understand  Archedemus.  |  Understand  Archedemus 
then,  and  be  an  adulterer,  and  faithless,  and  instead  of  a 
man,  be  a  wolf  or  an  ape  :  for  what  is  the  difference  ?  t 

is  not  clear  what  is  meant  by  women  being  common  by  nature  in 
any  rational  sense.  Zeno  and  his  school  said  (Diogenes  Laertius,  vii.  ; 
Xt'iio.  p.  195.  London,  1664)  :  "  it  is  their  opinion  also  that  the  women 
should  be  common  among  the  wise,  so  that  any  man  should  use  any 
woman,  as  Zeno  says  in  his  Polity,  and  Chrysippus  in  the  book  on  Polity, 
and  Diogenes  the  Cynic  and  Plato  ;  and  we  shall  love  all  the  children 
equally  like  fathers,  and  the  jealousy  about  adultery  will  be  removed." 
These  wise  men  knew  little  about  human  nature,  if  they  taught  such 
doctrines. 

t  Archedemus  was  a  Stoic  philosopher  of  Tarsus.  We  know  little 
about  him. 

[  A  man  may  be  a  philosopher  or  pretend  to  be;  and  at  the  same 
time  he  may  be  a  beast. 


CHAPTER  V. 

HOW   MAGNANIMITY    IS    CONSISTENT   WITH    CARE. 

THINGS  themselves  (materials)  are  indifferent ;  *  but  the 
use  of  them  is  not  indifferent.  How  then  shall  a  man  pre- 
serve firmness  and  tranquillity,  and  at  the  same  time  be 
careful  and  neither  rash  nor  negligent  ?  If  he  imitates  those 
who  play  at  dice.  The  counters  are  indifferent ;  the  dice 
are  indifferent.  How  do  I  know  what  the  cast  will  be  ?  But 
to  use  carefully  and  dexterously  the  cast  of  the  dice,  this  is 
my  business.  Thus  then  in  life  also  the  chief  business  is 
this :  distinguish  and  separate  things,  and  say,  Externals 
are  not  in  my  power  :  will  is  in  my  power.  Where  shall  I 
seek  the  good  and  the  bad  ?  Within,  in  the  things  which  are 
my  own.  But  in  what  does  not  belong  to  you  call  nothing 
either  good  or  bad,  or  profit  or  damage  or  anything  of  the 
kind. 

What  then  ?  Should  we  use  such  things  carelessly  ?  In 
no  way  :  for  this  on  the  other  hand  is  bad  for  the  faculty 
of  the  will,  and  consequently  against  nature;  but  we 
should  act  carefully  because  the  use  is  not  indifferent,  and 
we  should  also  act  with  firmness  and  freedom  from  pertur- 
bations because  the  material  is  indifferent.  For  where  the 
material  is  not  indifferent,  there  no  man  can  hinder  me  nor 
compel  me.  Where  I  can  be  hindered  and  compelled,  the 
obtaining  of  those  things  is  not  in  my  power,  nor  is  it  good 

*  The  materials  on  which  man  works  are  neither  good  nor  bad,  and 
so  they  are,  as  Epictetus  names  them,  indifferent.  But  the  use  of  things 
or  of  material,  is  not  indifferent.  They  may  he  used  well  or  ill,  con- 
formably to  nature  or  not. 


Kr/CTKTI'S.  117 

nr  bad  ;  but  the  use  is  cither  bad  or  good,  and  the  use  is  in 
my  power.  But  it  is  difficult  to  mingle  and  to  bring  together 
these  t\vo  things,  the  carefulness  of  him  who  is  affected  by 
the  matter  (or  things  about  him)  and  the  firmness  of  him 
who  has  no  regard  for  it  ;  but  it  is  not  impossible  :  and  if  it 
is,  happiness  is  impossible.  But  we  should  act  as  we  do  in 
the  case  of  a  voyage.  What  can  I  do  ?  I  can  choose  the 
master  of  the  ship,  the  sailors,  the  day,  the  opportunity. 
Then  comes  a  storm.  What  more  have  I  to  care  for  ?  for 
my  part  is  done.  The  business  belongs  to  another — the 
master.  But  the  ship  is  sinking — what  then  have  I  to  do  ? 
I  do  the  only  thing  that  I  can,  not  to  be  drowned  full  of 
fear,  nor  screaming,  nor  blaming  God,  but  knowing  that 
what  has  been  produced  must  also  perish  :  for  I  am  not  an 
immortal  being,  but  a  man,  a  part  of  the  whole,  as  an  hour 
is  a  part  of  the  day  :  I  must  be  present  like  the  hour,  and 
past  like  the  hour.  What  difference  then  does  it  make  to  me, 
how  I  pass  away,  whether  by  being  suffocated  or  by  a  fever, 
for  I  must  pass  through  some  such  means  ? 

This  is  just  what  you  will  see  those  doing  who  play  at 
ball  skillfully.  -\o  one  cares  about  the  ball  as  being  good 
or  bad,  but  about  throwing  and  catching  it.  In  this  there- 
fore is  the  skill,  in  this  the  art,  the  quickness,  the  judgment, 
so  that  if  I  spread  out  my  lap  I  may  not  be  able  to  catch  it, 
and  another,  if  I  throw,  may  catch  the  ball.  But  if  with 
perturbation  and  fear  we  receive  or  throw  the  ball,  what 
kind  of  play  is  it  then,  and  wherein  shall  a  man  be  steady, 
and  how  shall  a  man  see  the  order  in  the  game  ?  But  one 
will  say,  Throw ;  or,  Do  not  throw;  and  another  will  say, 
You  have  thrown  once.  This  is  quarreling,  not  play. 

Socrates  then  knew  how  to  play  at  ball.  How  ?  By  using 
pleasantry  in  the  court  where  he  was  tried.  Tell  me,  he 
says,  Anytus,  how  do  you  say  that  I  do  not  believe  in  God. 
The  Demons,  who  are  they,  think  you  ?  Are  they  not  sons 
of  Gods,  or  compounded  of  gods  and  men?  When  Anytus 


admitted  this,  Socrates  said,  \Yho  then,  think  you,  can  be- 
lieve that  there  are  mules  (half  asses),  but  not  asses  :  and 
this  he  said  as  if  he  were  playing  at  ball.*  And  what  was 
the  ball  in  that  case  ?  Life,  chains,  banishment,  a  draught 
of  poison,  separation  from  wife  and  leaving  children  orphans. 
These  were  the  things  with  which  he  was  playing  ;  but  still 
he  did  play  and  threw  the  ball  skillfully.  So  we  should  do  : 
we  must  employ  all  the  care  of  the  players,  but  show  the 
same  indifference  about  the  ball.  For  we  ought  by  all  means 
to  apply  our  art  to  some  external  material,  not  as  valuing 
the  material,  but,  whatever  it  may  be,  showing  our  art  in  it. 
Thus  too  the  weaver  does  not  make  wool,  but  exercises  his 
art  upon  such  as  he  receives.  Another  gives  you  food  and 
property  and  is  able  to  take  them  away  and  your  poor  body 
also.  When  then  you  have  received  the  material,  work  on 
it.  if  then  you  come  out  (of  the  trial)  without  having  suf- 
fered anything,  all  who  meet  you  will  congratulate  you  on 
your  escape  ;  but  he  who  knows  how  to  look  at  such  things, 
if  he  shall  see  that  you  have  behaved  properly  in  the  matter, 
will  commend  you  and  be  pleased  with  you  ;  and  if  he  shall 
find  that  you  owe  your  escape  to  any  want  of  proper  behavior, 
he  will  do  the  contrary.  For  where  rejoicing  is  reasonable, 
there  also  is  congratulation  reasonable. 

How  then  is  it  said  that  some  external  things  are  accord- 
ing to  nature  and  others  contrary  to  nature  ?  It  is  said  as 
it  might  be  said  if  we  were  separated  from  union  (or  soci- 
ety) :  for  to  the  foot  I  shall  say  that  it  is  according  to  nature 
for  it  to  be  clean  ;  but  if  you  take  it  as  a  foot  and  as  a  thing 
not  detached  (independent),  it  will  befit  it  both  to  step  into 
the  mud  and  tread  on  thorns,  and  sometimes  to  be  cut  off 

*  In  Plato's  Apology  c.  15,  Socrates  addresses  Meletus;  and  he  says, 

It  would  be  equally  absurd  if  a  man  should  believe  that   there  are  foals 

of  horses  and  as^es,  and  should  not  believe  that  there  are  horses  and 

Hut  Socrates  says  nothing  of  the  mules,  for  the  word  mules  in 

some  texts  of  Uic  Apology  is  manifestly  wrong. 


I:  /  (  .\.  1  ly 

for  the  benefit  of  the  whole  body  ;  otherwise  it  is  no  longer 
a  foot.  \\'e  should  think  in  some  such  way  about  ourselves 
also.  'What  are  you  ?  A  man.  If  you  consider  yourself  as 
detached  from  other  men,  it  is  according  to  nature  to  live  to 
old  age,  to  be  rich,  to  be  healthy.  But  if  you  consider  your- 
self as  a  man  and  a  part  of  a  certain  whole,  it  is  for  the  sake 
of  that  whole  that  at  one  time  you  should  be  sick,  at  another 
time  take  a  voyage  and  run  into  danger,  and  at  another  time 
be  in  want,  and  in  some  cases  die  prematurely.  \Yhy  then 
are  you  troubled  ?  Do  you  not  know,  that  as  a  foot  is  no 
longer  a  foot  if  it  is  detached  from  the  body,  so  you  are  no 
longer  a  man  if  you  are  separated  from  other  men.  For 
what  is  a  man  ?  A  part  of  a  state,  of  that  first  which  con- 
sists of  Gods  and  of  men  ;  then  of  that  which  is  called  next 
to  it,  which  is  a  small  image  of  the  universal  state.  What 
then,  must  I  be  brought  to  trial  ;  must  another  have  a  fever, 
another  sail  on  the  sea,  another  die,  and  another  be  con- 
demned ?  Yes,  for  it  is  impossible  in  such  a  body,  in  such 
a  universe  of  things,  among  so  many  living  together,  that 
such  things  should  not  happen,  some  to  one  and  others  to 
others.  It  is  your  duty  then  since  you  are  come  here,  to  say 
what  you  ought,  to  arrange  these  things  as  it  is  fit.*  Then 
some  one  says,  "  I  shall  charge  you  with  doing  me  wrong." 
Much  good  may  it  do  you  :  I  have  done  my  part  ;  but 
whether  you  also  have  done  yours,  you  must  look  to  that ; 
for  there  is  some  danger  of  this  too,  that  it  may  escape  your 
notice. 

*  He  tells  some  imaginary  person,  who    hears  him,  that   since  he  is 
come  into  the  world,  he  must  do  his  duty  in  ii. 


120 


CHAPTER  VI. 

OF  INDIFFERENCE.* 

THE  hypothetical  proposition  is  indifferent :  the  judgment 
about  it  is  not  indifferent,  but  it  is  either  knowledge  or  opin- 
ion or  error.  Thus  life  is  indifferent :  the  use  is  riot  indiffer- 
ent. When  any  man  then  tells  you  that  these  things  also 
are  indifferent,  do  not  become  negligent ;  and  when  a  man 
invites  you  to  be  careful  (about  such  things),  do  not  become 
abject  and  struck  with  admiration  of  material  things.  And 
it  is  good  for  you  to  know  your  own  preparation  and  power, 
that  in  those  matters  where  you  have  not  been  prepared,  you 
may  keep  quiet,  and  not  be  vexed,  if  others  have  the  advan- 
tage over  you.  For  you  too  in  syllogisms  will  claim  to  have 
the  advantage  over  them  ;  and  if  others  should  be  vexed  at 
this,  you  will  console  them  by  saying,  "I  have  learned  them, 
and  you  have  not."  Thus  also  where  there  is  need  of  any 
practice,  seek  not  that  which  is  required  from  the  need  (of 
such  practice),  but  yield  in  that  matter  to  those  who  have 
had  practice,  and  be  yourself  content  with  firmness  of  mind. 

Go  and  salute  a  certain  person.  How?  Not  meanly. 
But  I  have  been  shut  out,  for  I  have  not  learned  to  make 
my  way  through  the  window ;  and  when  I  have  found  the 
door  shut,  I  must  either  come  back  or  enter  through  the 

*  This  discussion  is  with  a  young  philosopher  who,  intending  to  return 
from  Nicopolis  to  Rome,  feared  the  tyranny  of  Domitian,  who  was 
particularly  severe  toward  philosophers.  See  also  the  note  on  i.  24, 
3.  Schweig.  Compare  Plin.  Epp.  i.  12,  and  the  expression  of  Corellius 
Rufus  about  the  detestable  villain,  the  emperor  Domitian.  The  title 
"  of  Indifference"  means  "  of  the  indifference  of  things  ;  "  of  the  things 
which  are  neither  good  nor  bad. 


I  ;  i 

window.  But  still  speak  to  him.  In  what  way?  Not 
meanly.  But  suppose  that  you  have  not  got  what  you 
wanted.  Was  this  your  business,  and  not  his  ?  Why  then 
do  you  claim  that  which  belongs  to  another?  Always 
remember  what  is  your  own,  and  what  belongs  to  another ; 
and  you  will  not  be  disturbed.  Chrysippus  therefore  said 
well,  So  long  as  future  things  are  uncertain,  I  always  cling 
to  those  which  are  more  adapted  to  the  conservation  of  that 
which  is  according  to  nature  ;  for  God  himself  has  given  me 
the  faculty  of  such  choice.  But  if  I  knew  that  it  was  fated 
(in  the  order  of  things)  for  me  to  be  sick,  I  would  even  move 
toward  it ;  for  the  foot  also,  if  it  had  intelligence,  would  move 
to  go  into  the  mud.*  For  why  are  ears  of  corn  produced  ? 
Is  it  not  that  they  may  become  dry  ?  And  do  they  not  be- 
come dry  that  they  may  be  reaped  ?  f  for  they  are  not 
separated  from  communion  with  other  things.  If  then  they 
had  perception,  ought  they  to  wish  never  to  be  reaped  ? 
But  this  is  a  curse  upon  ears  of  corn,  never  to  be  reaped.  So 
we  must  know  that  in  the  case  of  men  too  it  is  a  curse  not  to 
die,  just  the  same  as  not  to  be  ripened  and  not  to  be  reaped. 
But  since  we  must  be  reaped,  and  we  also  know  that  we  are 
reaped,  we  are  vexed  at  it ;  for  we  neither  know  what  we  are 
nor  have  we  studied  what  belongs  to  man,  as  those  who  have 
studied  horses  know  what  belongs  to  horses.  But  Chrys- 
antas  I  when  he  was  going  to  strike  the  enemy  checked 

*  Sec.  ii.  5,  24. 

t  Kpictetus  alludes  to  the  verses  from  the  Hypsipyle  of  Euripides. 
Compare  Antoninus  (vii.  40) ;  "  Life  must  be  reaped  like  the  ripe  ears  of 
corn:  one  man  is  born;  another  dies."  Cicero  (Tuscul.  Disp.  iii.  2^) 
has  translated  six  verses  from  Euripides,  and  among  them  are  these 

two  : 

turn  vita  omnibus 
Metenda  ut  fruges ;  sic  jubet  necessitas. 

J  The  story  is  in  Xenophon's  Cyropzdia  (IV.  near  the  beginning) 
where  Cyrus  says  that  he  called  Chrysantas  by  name.  Epictetus,  as 
Upton  remarks,  quotes  from  memory. 


122  KPICTKfTS. 

himself  when  he  heard  the  trumpet  sounding  a  retreat:  so 
it  seemed  better  to  him  to  obey  the  general's  command  than 
to  follow  his  own  inclination.  But  not  one  of  us  chooses, 
even  when  necessity  summons,  readily  to  obey  it,  but  weep- 
ing and  groaning  we  suffer  what  we  do  suffer,  and  we  call 
them  "circumstances."  What  kind  of  circumstances,  man? 
If  you  give  the  name  of  circumstances  to  the  things  which 
are  around  you,  all  things  are  circumstances;  but  if  you  call 
hardships  by  this  name,  what  hardship  is  there  in  the  dying 
of  that  which  has  been  produced  ?  But  that  which  destroys 
is  either  a  sword,  or  a  wheel,  or  the  sea,  or  a  tile,  or  a  tyrant. 
\Yhy  do  you  care  about  the  way  of  going  down  to  Hades  ? 
All  ways  are  equal.*  But  if  you  will  listen  to  the  truth,  the 
way  which  the  tyrant  sends  you  is  shorter.  A  tyrant  never 
killed  a  man  in  six  months  :  but  a  fever  is  often  a  year  about 
it.  All  these  things  are  only  sound  and  the  noise  of  empty 
names. 

I  am  in  danger  of  my  life  from  Caesar.  And  am  not  I 
in  danger  who  dwell  in  Nicopolis,  where  there  are  so 
many  earthquakes :  and  when  you  are  crossing  the 
Hadriatic,  what  hazard  do  you  run?  Is  it  not  the  hazard 
of  your  life?  But  I  am  in  danger  also  as  to  opinion.  Do 
you  mean  your  own  ?  how  ?  For  who  can  compel  you  to 
have  any  opinion  which  you  do  not  choose  ?  But  is  it  as  to 
another  man's  opinion  ?  and  what  kind  of  danger  is  yours,  if 
others  have  false  opinions  ?  But  I  am  in  danger  of  being 
banished.  What  is  it  to  be  banished  ?  To  be  somewhere 
else  than  at  Rome  ?  Yes  :  what  then  if  I  should  be  sent  to 

*  So  Anaxagoras  said  that  the  road  to  the  other  world  (ad  inferos) 
is  the  same  from  all  places.  (Cicero,  Tusc.  Disp.  i.  43.)  What  follows 
is  one  of  the  examples  of  extravagant  assertion  in  Epictetus.  A  tyrant 
may  kill  by  a  slow  death  as  a  fever  does.  I  suppose  that  Epictetus 
would  have  some  answer  to  that.  Except  to  a  Stoic  the  ways  to  death 
are  not  indifferent :  some  ways  of  dying  are  painful,  and  even  he  who 
can  endure  with  fortitude,  would  prefer  an  easy  death. 


EPICTETUS.  123 

Gyara?*  If  that  suits  you,  you  will  go  there  :  but  if  it  does 
not.  you  can  go  to  another  place  instead  of  Gyara,  whither 
he  also  will  go,  who  sends  you  to  Gyara,  whether  he  choose 
or  not.  Why  then  do  you  go  up  to  Rome  as  if  it  were  some- 
thing great?  It  is  not  worth  all  this  preparation,  that  an  in- 
genuous youth  should  say,  It  was  not  worth  while  to  have 
heard  so  much  and  to  have  written  so  much  and  to  have  sat 
so  long  by  the  side  of  an  old  man  who  is  not  worth  much. 
Only  remember  that  division  by  which  your  own  and  not 
your  own  are  distinguished :  never  claim  anything  which 
belongs  to  others.  A  tribunal  and  a  prison  are  each  a  place, 
one  high  and  the  other  low;  but  the  will  can  be  maintained 
equal,  if  you  choose  to  maintain  it  equal  in  each.  And  we 
shall  then  be  imitators  of  Socrates,  when  we  are  able  to 
write  paeans  in  prison. f  But  in  our  present  disposition,  con- 
sider if  we  could  endure  in  prison  another  person  saying  to 
us.  Would  you  like  me  to  read  Pagans  to  you  ?  Why  do  you 
trouble  me  ?  do  you  not  know  the  evils  which  hold  me  ? 
Can  I  in  such  circumstances  listen  to  paeans  ?  What  cir- 
cumstances ?  1  am  going  to  die.  And  will  other  men.  be 
immortal  ? 


CHAPTER  VII. 

HOW   WE   OUGHT   TO    USE    DIVINATION. 

THROUGH  an  unreasonable  regard  to  divination  many  of 
us  omit  many  duties.  \  P'or  what  more  can  the  diviner  see 

*  See  page  82  note. 

t  Diogenes  Laertius  reports  in  his  life  of  Socrates  that  he  wrote  in 
prison  a  Paean,  and  he  gives  the  first  line  which  contains  an  address  to 
Apollo  and  Artemis. 

}  Divination  was  a  great  part  of  ancient  religion,  and,  as  Epictetus 
says,  it  led  men  "  to  omit  many  duties."  In  a  certain  sense  there  was 


,24  KI'ICTKTUS. 

than  death  or  danger  or  disease,  or  generally  things  of  that 
kind  ?  If  then  I  must  expose  myself  to  danger  for  a  friend, 
and  if  it  is  my  duty  even  to  die  for  him,  what  need  have  I 
then  for  divination  ?  Have  I  not  within  me  a  diviner  who 
has  told  me  the  nature  of  good  and  of  evil,  and  has  explained 
to  me  the  signs  (or  marks)  of  both  ?  What  need  have  I  then 
to  consult  the  viscera  of  victims  or  the  flight  of  birds,  and 
why  do  I  submit  when  he  says,  It  is  for  your  interest  ?  For 
does  he  know  what  is  for  my  interest,  does  he  know  what  is 
good  ;  and  as  he  has  learned  the  signs  of  the  viscera,  has  he 
also  learned  the  signs  of  good  and  evil  ?  For  if  he  knows 
the  signs  of  these,  he  knows  the  signs  both  of  the  beautiful 
and  of  the  ugly,  and  of  the  just  and  of  the  unjust.  Do  you 
tell  me,  man,  what  is  the  thing  which  is  signified  for  me  :  is 
it  life  or  death,  poverty  or  wealth  ?  But  whether  these  things 
are  for  my  interest  or  whether  they  are  not,  I  do  not  intend 
to  ask  you.  Why  don't  you  give  your  opinion  on  matters  of 
grammar,  and  why  do  you  give  it  here  about  things  on  which 
we  are  all  in  error  and  disputing  with  one  another  ?  *  The 
woman,  therefore,  who  intended  to  send  by  a  vessel  a 
month's  provisions  to  Gratilla  f  in  her  banishment,  made  a 

some  meaning  in  it.  If  it  is  true  that  those  who  believe  in  God  can 
see  certain  signs  in  the  administration  of  the  world  by  which  they  can 
judge  what  their  behavior  ought  to  be,  they  can  learn  what  their  duties 
are.  If  these  signs  are  misunderstood,  or  if  they  are  not  seen  right,  men 
may  be  governed  by  an  abject  superstition.  So  the  external  forms  of 
any  religion  may  become  the  means  of  corruption  and  of  human  debase- 
ment, and  the  true  indications  of  God's  will  may  be  neglected.  Upton 
compares  Lucan  (ix.  572),  who  sometimes  said  a  few  good  things. 

*  A  man  who  gives  his  opinion  on  grammar  gives  an  opinion  on  a 
thing  of  which  many  know  something.  A  man  who  gives  his  opinion 
on  divination  or  on  future  events,  gives  an  opinion  on  things  of  which 
we  all  know  nothing.  When  then  a  man  affects  to  instruct  on  things 
unknown,  we  may  ask  him  to  give  his  opinion  on  things  which  are  known, 
and  so  wa  may  learn  what  kind  of  man  he  is. 

t  Gratilla  was  a  lady  of  rank,  who  was  banished  from  Rome  and 
Italy  by  Domitian.  Pliny,  Epp.  iii.  u. 


good  answer  to  him  who  said  that  Domitian  would  seize  what 
she  sent,  I  would  rather,  she  replied,  that  Domitian  should 
seize  all  than  that  I  should  not  send  it. 

What  then  leads  us  to  frequent  use  of  divination  ?  Cow- 
ardice, the  dread  of  what  will  happen.  This  is  the  reason 
why  we  flatter  the  diviners.  Pray,  master,  shall  I  succeed 
to  the  property  of  my  father  ?  Let  us  see:  let  us  sacrifice 
on  the  occasion.  Yes,  master,  as  fortune  chooses.  When 
he  has  said,  You  shall  succeed  to  the  inheritance,  we  thank 
him  as  if  we  received  the  inheritance  from  him.  The  con- 
sequence is  that  they  play  upon  us.* 

What  then  should  we  do  ?  We  ought  to  come  (to  divi- 
nation) without  desire  or  aversion,  as  the  wayfarer  asks  of 
the  man  whom  he  meets  which  of  two  roads  leads  (to  his 
journey's  end),  without  any  desire  for  that  which  leads  to 
the  right  rather  than  to  the  left,  for  he  has  no  wish  to  go 
by  any  road  except  the  road  which  leads  (to  his  end).  In 
the  same  way  ought  we  to  come  to  God  also  as  a  guide  ;  as 
we  use  our  eyes,  not  asking  them  to  show  us  rather  such  things 
as  we  wish,  but  receiving  the  appearances  of  things  such  as  the 
eyes  present  them  to  us.  But  now  we  trembling  take  the 
augur  (bird  interpreter)  by  the  hand,  and  while  we  invoke 
God  we  entreat  the  augur,  and  say,  Master  have  mercy  on 
me  ;  suffer  me  to  come  safe  out  of  this  difficulty.  Wretch, 
would  you  have  then  anything  other  than  what  is  best  ?  Is 
there  then  anything  better  than  what  pleases  God  ?  Why  do 
you,  so  far  as  in  your  power,  corrupt  your  judge  and  lead 
astray  your  adviser  ? 

*  As  knavish  priests  have  often  played  on  the  fears  and  hopes  of  the 
superstitious. 


CHAPTER  VTIT. 

WHAT    IS    THK    NATURi:    OK    THE    OOOD  ?  * 

GOD  is  beneficial.  But  the  Good  also  is  beneficial. f  It 
is  consistent  then  that  where  the  nature  of  God  is,  there  also 
the  nature  of  the  good  should  be.  What  then  is  the  nature 
of  God  ?  t  Flesh  ?  Certainly  not.  An  estate  in  land  ?  By 
no  means.  Fame  ?  No.  Is  it  intelligence,  knowledge, 
right  reason  ?  Yes.  Herein  then  simply  seek  the  nature  of 
the  good  ;  for  I  suppose  that  you  do  not  seek  it  in  a  plant. 
No.  Do  you  seek  it  in  an  irrational  animal  ?  No.  If  then 
you  seek  it  in  a  rational  animal,  why  do  you  still  seek  it 
anywhere  except  in  the  superiority  of  rational  over  irra- 
tional animals  ?  £  Now  plants  have  not  even  the  power 
of  using  appearances,  and  for  this  reason  you  do  not  apply 
the  term  good  to  them.  The  good  then  requires  the  use 
of  appearances.  Does  it  require  this  use  only?  For  if 
you  say  that  it  requires  this  use  only,  say  that  the  good,  and 
that  happiness  and  unhappiness  are  in  irrational  animals 
also.  But  you  do  not  say  this,  and  you  do  right ;  for  if  they 
possess  even  in  the  highest  degree  the  use  of  appearances, 

*  Schweighaeuser  observes  that  the  title  of  this  chapter  would  more 
correctly  be  God  in  man.  There  is  no  better  chapter  in  the  book. 

1  Socrates  (Xenophon,  Mem.  iv.  6,  8)  concludes  "  that  the  useful  is 
good  to  him  to  whom  it  is  useful." 

}  I  do  not  remember  that  Kpictetus  has  attempted  any  other  descrip- 
tion of  the  nature  of  God.  He  has  done  more  wisely  than  some  who 
have  attempted  to  answer  a  question  which  cannot  be  answered.  But 
see  ii.  14,  1 1-13. 

§  Compare  Cicero,  de  Offic.  i.  27. 


yet  they  have  not  the  faculty  of  understanding  the  use  of 
appearances;  and  there  is  good  reason  for  this,  for  .they 
exist  for  the  purpose  of  serving  others,  and  they  exercise  no 
superiority.  For  the  ass,  I  suppose,  docs  not  exist  for  any 
superiority  over  others.  No ;  but  because  we  had  need  of  a 
back  which  is  able  to  bear  something  ;  and  in  truth  we  had 
need  also  of  his  being  able  to  walk,  and  for  this  reason  he 
received  also  the  faculty  of  making  use  of  appearances,  for 
otherwise  he  would  not  have  been  able  to  walk.  And  here 
then  the  matter  stopped.  For  if  he  had  also  received  the 
faculty  of  comprehending  the  use  of  appearances,  it  is  plain 
that  consistently  with,  reason  he  would  not  then  have  been 
subjected  to  us,  nor  would  he  have  done  us  these  services, 
but  he  would  have  been  equal  to  u.s  and  like  to  us. 

Will  you  not  then  seek  the  nature  of  good  in  the  rational 
animal  ?  for  if  it  is  not  there,  you  will  not  choose  to  say  that 
it  exists  in  any  other  thing  (plant  or  animal  .1.  What  then  ? 
are  not  plants  and  animals  also  the  works  of  God  ?  They 
are ;  but  they  are  not  superior  things,  nor  yet  parts  of  the 
gods.  But  you  are  a  superior  thing  ;  you  are  a  portion 
separated  from  the  deity  ;  you  have  in  yourself  a  certain 
portion  of  him.  Why  then  are  you  ignorant  of  your  own 
noble  descent  ?  *  Why  do  you  not  know  whence  you  came  ? 
will  you  not  remember  when  you  are  eating,  who  you  are  who 
eat  and  whom  you  feed  ?  When  you  are  in  conjunction  with  a 
woman,  will  you  not  remember  who  you  are  who  do  this  thing  ? 
When  you  are  in  social  intercourse,  when  you  are  exercising 
yourself,  when  you  are  engaged  in  discussion,  know  you  not 
that  you  are  nourishing  a  god,  that  you  are  exercising  a  god  ? 
Wretch,  you  are  carrying  about  a  god  with  you,  and  you  know 
it  not.f  Do  you  think  that  I  mean  some  god  of  silver  or  of 

/le  descent.  See  i.  c.  (j.  The  doctrine  that  (  iod  is  in  man  is  an 
old  doctrine. 

or.  vi.  19.  "What  ?  know  ye  not  that  your  body  is  the  temple 
of  the  Holy  Ghost  which  is  in  you,  which  ye  have  of  God  and  ye  ar«uot 


J2.S  EPJCTETUS. 

gold,  and  external  ?  \'ou  carry  him  within  yourself,  and  you 
perceive  not  that  you  are  polluting  him  by  impure  thoughts 
and  dirty  deeds.  And  if  an  image  of  God  were  present,  you 
would  not  dare  to  do  any  of  the  things  which  you  are  doing : 
but  when  God  himself  is  present  within  and  sees  all  and 
hears  all,  you  are  not  ashamed  of  thinking  such  things  and 
doing  such  things,  ignorant  as  you  are  of  your  own  nature 
and  subject  to  the  anger  of  God.  Then  why  do  we  fear  when 
\ve  are  sending  a  young  man  from  the  school  into  active  life,  lest 
he  should  do  anything  improperly,  eat  improperly,  have  im- 
proper intercourse  with  women  ;  and  lest  the  rags  in  which  he 
is  wrapped  should  debase  him,  lest  fine  garments  should  make 

yo-ir  own  ?"  This  follows  v.  18,  which  is  an  exhortation  to  "  flee  forni- 
cation." The  passage  in  2  Cor.  vi.  16  is  "  And  what  agreement  hath 
:h«  temple  of  God  with  idols  ?  for  ye  are  the  temple  of  the  living  God ; 
a.s  God  hath  said,  I  will  dwell  in  them  and  walk  in  them,"  etc.  It  is  cer- 
tain that  Kpictetus  knew  nothing  of  the  writers  of  the  Epistles  in  the 
New  Testament ;  but  whence  did  these  writers  learn  such  forms  of  ex- 
pression as  we  find  in  the  passages  cited  by  Mrs.  Carter?  I  believe  that 
they  drew  them  from  the  Stoic  philosophers  who  wrote  before  Kpictetus 
and  that  they  applied  them  to  the  new  religion  svhich  they  were  teaching. 
The  teaching  of  Paul  and  of  Kpictetus  does  not  differ:  the  spirit  of  God 
is  in  man.  Swedenborg  says,  "  Tn  these  two  faculties  (rationality  and 
liberty)  the  Ix>rd  resides  with  every  man,  whether  he  be  good  or  evil, 
they  being  the  Lord's  mansions  in  the  human  race.  But  the  mansion 
of  the  Lord  is  nearer  with  a  man,  in  proportion  as  the  man  opens  the 
superior  degrees  by  these  faculties  ;  for  by  the  opening  thereof  he  comes 
into  superior  degrees  of  love  __and  wisdom,  and  consequently  nearer  to 
the  Lord.  Hence  it  may  appear  that  as  these  degrees  are  opened,  so  a 
man  is  in  the  Lord  and  the  Lord  in  him."  Swedenlx>rg,  Angelic  Wis- 
dom, 240.  Again,  "  the  faculty  of  thinking  rationally,  viewed  in  itself, 
is  not  man's,  but  God's  in  man."  I  am  not  quite  sure  in  what  sense  the 
administration  of  the  Eucharist  ought  to  be  understood  in  the  Church 
of  English  service.  Some  English  divines  formerly  understood,  and 
perhaps  some  now  understand,  the  ceremony  as  a  commemoration  of 
the  blood  of  Christ  shed  for  us  and  of  his  body  which  was  broken  ;  as 
we  see  in  T.  Burnet's  Posthumous  work  (de  Fide  et  Officiis  Christian- 
orum,  p.  So).  It  was  a  commemoration  of  the  last  supper  of  Jesus  and 
the  Apostles.  15ut  this  does  not  appear  to  be  the  sense  in  which  the 


EFICTETUS.  129 

him  proud  ?  This  youth  (if  he  acts  thus)  does  not  know  his 
own  God :  he  knows  not  with  whom  he  sets  out  (into  the 
world).  But  can  we  endure  when  he  says,  "  I  wish  I  had 
you  (God)  with  me."  Have  you  not  God  with  you  ?  and  do 
you  seek  for  any  other,  when  you  have  him  ?  or  will  God  tell 
you  anything  else  than  this  ?  Jf  you  were  a  statue  of  Phidias, 
either  Athena  or  Zeus,  you  would  think  both  of  yourself  and 
of  the  artist,  and  if  you  had  any  understanding  (power  of 
perception)  you  would  try  to  do  nothing  unworthy  of  him  who 
made  you  or  of  yourself,  and  try  not  to  appear  in  an  unbe- 
coming dress  (attitude)  to  those  who  look  on  you.  But  now 
because  Zeus  has  made  you,  for  this  reason  do  you  care  not 

ceremony  is  now  understood  by  some  priests  and  by  some  members  of 
the  Church  of  England,  whose  notions  approach  near  to  the  doctrine  of 
the  Catholic  mass.  Nor  does  it  appear  to  be  the  sense  of  the  prayer 
made  before  delivering  the  bread  and  wine  to  the  Communicants,  for  the 
prayer  is  "  Grant  us,  gracious  Lord,  so  to  eat  the  flesh  of  thy  dear  Son 
Jesus  Christ  and  to  drink  his  blood  that  our  sinful  bodies  may  be  made 
clean  by  his  body  and  our  souls  washed  through  his  most  precious  blood 
and  that  we  may  evermore  dwell  in  him  and  he  in  us."  This  is  a  dif- 
ferent thing  from  Kpictetus'  notion  of  God  being  in  man,  and  also  dif- 
ferent, as  I  understand  it,  from  the  notion  contained  in  the  two  passages 
of  Paul;  for  it  is  there  said  generally  that  the  Holy  Ghost  is  in  man  or 
God  in  man,  not  that  God  is  in  man  by  virtue  of  a  particular  ceremony. 
It  should  not  be  omitted  that  there  is  after  the  end  of  the  Communion 
service  an  admonition  that  the  sacramental  bread  and  wine  remain  what 
they  were,  "  and  that  the  natural  body  and  blood  of  our  Saviour  Christ 
are  in  heaven  and  not  here  ;  it  being  against  the  truth  of  Christ's  natural 
body  to  be  at  one  time  in  more  places  than  one."  It  was  affirmed  by 
the  Reformers  and  the  best  writers  of  the  English  Church  that  the  pres- 
ence of  Christ  in  the  Eucharist  is  a  spiritual  presence,  and  in  this 
opinion  they  followed  Calvin  and  the  Swiss  divines  :  and  yet  in  the 
Prayer  book  we  have  the  language  that  I  have  quoted  ;  and  even  Cal- 
vin, who  only  maintained  a  spiritual  presence,  said,  "  that  the  verity  is 
nevertheless  joined  to  the  signs,  and  that  in  the  sacrament  we  have 
4  true  Communion  in  Christ's  body  and  blood.' "  (Contemporary  Review, 
p.  464,  August,  1874).  \Vhat  would  Kpictetus  have  thought  of  the  sub- 
tleties of  our  days  ? 

9 


I3o  EPICTETUS. 

how  you  shall  appear  ?  And  yet  is  the  artist  (in  the  one 
like  the  artist  in  the  other  ?  or  the  work  in  the  one  case  like 
case)  the  other  ?  And  what  work  of  an  artist,  for  in- 
stance, has  in  itself  the  faculties,  which  the  artist  shows  in 
making  it?  Is  it  not  marble  or  bronze,  or  gold  or  ivory? 
and  the  Athena  of  Phidias  when  she  has  once  extended  the 
hand  and  received  in  it  the  figure  of  Victory  *  stands  in  that 
attitude  forever.  But  the  works  of  God  have  power  of  motion, 
they  breathe,  they  have  the  faculty  of  using  the  appearances 
of  things,  and  the  power  of  examining  them.  Being  the  work 
of  such  an  artist  do  you  dishonor  him  ?  And  what  shall  I 
say,  not  only  that  he  made  you,  but  also  intrusted  you  to 
yourself  and  made  you  a  deposit  to  yourself  ?  Will  you  not 
think  of  this  too,  but  do  you  also  dishonor  your  guardianship  ? 
But  if  God  had  intrusted  an  orphan  to  you.  would  you  thus 
neglect  him  ?  He  has  delivered  yourself  to  your  care,  and 
says,  I  had  no  one  fitter  to  intrust  him  to  than  yourself : 
keep  him  for  me  such  as  he  is  by  nature,  modest,  faithful, 
erect,  unterrified,  free  from  passion  and  perturbation.  And 
then  you  do  not  keep  him  such. 

But  some  will  say,  whence  has  this  fellow  got  the  arro- 
gance which  he  displays  and  these  supercilious  looks  ?  I 
have  not  yet  so  much  gravity  as  befits  a  philosopher ;  for  I 
do  not  yet  feel  confidence  in  what  I  have  learned  and  in 
what  I  have  assented  to  :  I  still  fear  my  own  weakness. 
Let  me  get  confidence  and  then  you  shall  see  a  countenance 
such  as  I  ought  to  have  and  an  attitude  such  as  I  ought  to 
have  :  then  I  will  show  to  you  the  statue,  when  it  is  perfect- 
ed, when  it  is  polished.  What  do  you  expect  ?  a  supercilious 

*Thc  Athena  of  Phidias  was  in  the  Parthenon  on  the  Athenian 
Acropolis,  a  colossal  chryselephantine  statue,  that  is,  a  frame-work  of 
wood,  covered  with  ivory  and  gold  (Pausanias,  i.  24).  The  figure  of 
Victory  stood  on  the  hand  of  the  goddess,  as  we  frequently  see  in  coins. 
Sec  ;  f-  ,23,  and  Cicero,  cle  Natura  Deorum,  Hi.  34. 


7T.V.  l^i 

countenance?  Does  the  Zeus  at  Olyinpia  *  lift  up  his  brow  ? 
No,  his  look  is  fixed  as  becomes  him  who  is  ready  to  say 

Irrevocable  is  my  word  and  shall  not  fail. — Iliad,  i  526. 

Such  will  I  show  myself  to  you,  faithful,  modest,  noble,  free 
from  perturbation.  What,  and  immortal  too,  exempt  from 
old  age,  and  from  sickness  ?  No,  but  dying  as  becomes  a 
god,  sickening  as  becomes  a  god.  This  power  I  possess  ; 
this  I  can  do.  But  the  rest  I  do  not  possess,  nor  can  I  do. 
I  will  show  the  nerves  (strength)  of  a  philosopher.  What 
nerves  f  are  these?  A  desire  never  disappointed,  an  aver- 
sion t  which  never  falls  on  that  which  it  would  avoid,  a 
proper  pursuit,  a  diligent  purpose,  an  assent  which  is  not 
rash.  These  you  shall  see. 


CHAPTER   IX. 

THAT  WHEN  WK  CANNOT  FULFILL  THAT  WHICH  THE  CHAR 
ACTER  OF  A  MAN  PROMISES,  WK.  ASSUME  THE  CHARACTER 
OF  A  PHILOSOPHER. 

IT  is  no  common  (easy)  thing  to  do  this  only,  to  fulfill  the 
promise  of  a  man's  nature.  For  what  is  a  man  ?  The  an- 
swer is,  a  rational  and  mortal  being.  Then  by  the  rational 

great  statue  a:  Olympia  was  the  work  of  I'hidias  (I'ausaiiias,  v. 
n).  It  was  a  seated  colossal  chryselephantine  Statue,  and  held  a  Victory 
in  the  right  hand. 

'   An  allusion  to  the    combatants  in    ilu-  public  exercises,  \\ 
show  their  shoulders,  muscles   and  sinews  as  a  proof  of    their  strength. 
See  i.  4,  ii.  18,  iii.  _»_•. 

J  See  Book  iii.  c.  2. 


l$2  KPICTKTl'S. 

faculty  from  whom  are  we  separated  ?*  From  wild  beasts. 
And  from  what  others  ?  From  sheep  and  like  animals.  Take 
care  then  to  do  nothing  like  a  wild  beast  :  but  if  you  do.  you 
have  lost  the  character  of  a  m  in  ;  you  have  not  fulfilled  your 
promise.  See  that  you  do  nothing  like  a  sheep  :  but  if  you  do. 
in  this  case  the  man  is  lost.  What  then  do  we  do  as  sheep  ? 
When  we  act  gluttonously,  when  we  act  lewdly,  svhen  wj 
act  rashly,  filthily,  inconsiderately,  to  what  have  we  declined  ? 
To  sheep.  What  have  we  lost  ?  The  rational  faculty.  When 
we  act  contentiously  and  harmfully  and  passionately,  and 
violently,  to  what  have  we  declined  ?  To  wild  beasts.  Con- 
sequently some  of  us  are  great  wild  beasts,  and  others  little 
beasts,  of  a  bad  disposition  and  small,  whence  we  may  say, 
Let  me  be  eaten  by  a  lion,  t  Hut  in  all  these  ways  the  promise 
of  a  man  acting  as  a  man  is  destroyed.  For  when  is  a  conjunc- 
tive (complex)  proposition  maintained?!  When  it  fulfills 
what  its  nature  promises ;  so  that  the  preservation  of  a  com- 
plex proposition  is  when  it  is  a  conjunction  of  truths.  When 
is  a  disjunctive  maintained  ?  When  it  fulfills  what  it  prom- 
ises. When  are  rlutes,  a  lyre,  a  horse,  a  dog,  preserved  ? 

The  abuse  of  the  faculties,  which  are  proper  to  man,  called  ration- 
ality and  liberty,  is  the  origin  of  evil.  By  rationality  is  meant  the  faculty 
of  understanding  truths  and  thence  falses  and  goods  and  then  evils  ; 
and  by  liberty  is  meant  the  faculty  of  thinking,  willing  and  acting  free!1/ 
— and  these  faculties  distinguish  man  from  beasts.''  Swedenborg, 
Angelic  Wisdom.  264  and  also  240.  See  Epictetus,  ii.  c.  S. 

t  This  seems  to  be  a  proverb.  If  [  am  eaten,  let  me  be  eaten  by  the 
nobler  animal. 

J  A  conjunctive  or  complex  axiom  or  lemma.  Gellius  (xvi.  S)  gives 
an  example  :  "  P.  Scipio,  the  son  of  Paulus,  was  both  twice  consul  and 
triumphed,  and  exercised  the  censorship  and  was  the  colleague  of  I.. 
Mummius  in  his  censorship."  Gellius  adds,  "in  every  conjunctive  if 
there  is  one  falsehood,  though  the  other  parts  are  true,  the  whole  is  said 
to  be  false."  For  the  whole  is  proposed  as  true:  therefore  if  one  part 
is  false,  the  whole  is  not  true.  The  disjunctive  is  of  this  kind:  >:  pleasure 
is  either  bad  or  good,  or  neither  good  nor  bad." 


133 

(when  they  severally  ki-ep  their  promise  i.  What  is  the  won- 
der then  if  man  also  in  like  mannei  is  preserved,  and  in  like 
manner  is  lost  ?  K.ich  man  is  improved  and  preserved  by 
corresponding  acts,  the  carpenter  by  acts  of  carpentry,  the 
grammarian  bv  acts  of  grammar.  Hut  if  a  man  accustoms 

O  * 

himself  to  write  ungrammatically,  of  necessity  his  art  will  be 
corrupted  and  destroyed.  Thus  modest  actions  preserve 
the  modest  man,  and  immodest  actions  destroy  him  :  and 
actions  of  fidelity  preserve  the  faithful  man,  and  the  con- 
trary actions  destroy  him.  And  on  the  other  hand  con- 
trary actions  strengthen  contrary  characters  :  shamelessness 
strengthens  the  shameless  man,  faithlessness  the  faithless 

O 

man,  abusive  words  the  abusive  man.  anger  the  man  of  an 
angry  temper,  and  unequal  receiving  and  giving  make  the 
avaricious  man  more  avaricious. 

For  this  reason  philosophers  admonish  us  not  to  be  satis- 
fied with  learning  only,  but  also  to  add  study,  and  then  prac- 
tice.* For  we  have  long  been  accustomed  to  do  contrary 
things,  and  we  put  in  practice  opinions  which  are  contrary 
to  true  opinions.  If  then  we  shall  not  also  put  in  practice 
right  opinions,  we  shall  be  nothing  more  than  the  expositors 
of  the  opinions  of  others.  For  now  who  among  us  is  not 

*  We  often  say  a  man  leam.s  a  particular  thing';  and  there  are  men 
who  profess  to  teach  certain  things,  such  as  a  language,  or  an  art  ;  ;ind 
they  mean  by  teaching  that  the  taught  shall  learn  ;  and  learning  means 
that  they  shall  be  able  to  do  what  they  learn.  He  who  teaches  an  art 
professes  that  the  scholar  shall  be  able  to  practice  the  art,  the  art  of 
making  shoes  for  example,  or  other  useful  things.  There  are  men  who 
profess  to  teach  religion,  and  morality,  and  virtue  generally.  Thesr 
men  may  tell  us  what  they  conceive  to  be  religion,  and  morality,  and 
virtue ;  and  those  who  are  said  to  be  taught  may  know  what  their 
teachers  have  told  them.  But  the  learning  of  religion,  and  of  morality, 
and  of  virtue,  mean  that  the  learner  will  do  the  acts  of  religion  and  of 
morality  and  of  virtue;  which  is  a  very  different  thin^  from  knowing 
what  the  acts  of  religion,  of  morality,  and  of  virtue  are.  The  tcac  her's 
tearhin.n  i-  in  fact  only  made  etricient  by  his  f.\ani]>lr,  by  hi.-  doing  thai 
i  IK-  lead.- 


I34  EPICTETl'S. 

able  to  discuss  according  to  the  rules  of  art  about  good  and 
evil  things  (in  this  fashion)  ?  That  of  things  some  are  good, 
and  some  are  bad,  and  some  are  indifferent :  the  good  then 
are  virtues,  and  the  things  which  participate  in  virtues  ;  and 
the  bad  are  the  contrary :  and  the  indifferent  are  wealth, 
health,  reputation.  Then,  if  in  the  midst  of  our  talk  there 
should  happen  some  greater  noise  than  usual,  or  some  of 
those  who  are  present  should  laugh  at  us,  we  are  disturbed. 
Philosopher,  where  are  the  things  which  you  were  talking 
about  ?  Whence  did  you  produce  and  utter  them  ?  From 
the  lips,  and  thence  only.  Why  then  do  you  corrupt  the 
aids  provided  by  others  ?  Why  do  you  treat  the  weightiest 
matters  as  if  you  were  playing  a  game  of  dice  ?  For  it  is  one 
thing  to  lay  up  bread  and  wine  as  in  a  storehouse,  and 
another  thing  to  eat.  That  which  has  been  eaten,  is 
digested,  distributed,  and  is  become  sinews,  flesh,  bones, 
blood,  healthy  color,  healthy  breath.  Whatever  is  stored 
up,  when  you  choose  you  can  readily  take  and  show  it ;  but 
you  have  no  other  advantage  from  it  except  so  far  as  to  ap- 
pear to  possess  it.  For  what  is  the  difference  between  ex- 
plaining these  doctrines  and  those  of  men  who  have  different 
opinions  ?  Sit  down  now  and  explain  according  to  the  rules 
of  art  the  opinions  of  Epicurus,  and  perhaps  you  will  explain 
his  opinions  in  a  more  useful  manner  than  Epicurus  him- 
self.* Why  then  do  you  call  yourself  a  Stoic  ?  Why  do 

*  "  He  is  not  a  Stoic  philosopher,  who  can  only  explain  in  a  subtle 
and  proper  manner  the  Stoic  principles :  for  the  same  person  can  ex- 
plain the  principles  of  Epicurus,  of  course  for  the  purpose  of  refuting 
them,  and  perhaps  he  can  explain  them  better  than  Epicurus  himself. 
Consequently  he  might  be  at  the  same  time  a  Stoic  and  an  Epicurean  ; 
which  is  absurd." — Schweig.  Me  means  that  the  mere  knowledge  of 
Stoic  opinions  does  not  make  a  man  a  Stoic,  or  any  other  philosopher. 
A  man  must  according  to  Stoic  principles  practice  them  in  order  to  be 
a  Stoic  philosopher.  So  if  we  say  that  a  man  is  a  religious  man,  he 
must  do  the  acts  which  his  religion  teaches;  for  it  is  by  his  acts  only 
that  we  can  know  him  to  be  a  religious  man.  What  lie  says  and  pro- 


EPfCTETUS. 


135 


you  deceive  the  many  ?  Why  do  you  act  the  part  of  a 
Jew.  *  when  you  are  a  Greek?  Do  you  not  see  how  (why) 
each  is  called  a  Jew,  or  a  Syrian,  or  an  Egyptian  ?  and  when 
we  see  a  man  inclining  to  two  sides,  we  are  accustomed  to 
say.  This  man  is  not  a  Jew,  but  he  acts  as  one.  But  when 
he  has  assumed  the  affects  of  one  who  has  been  imbued  with 
Jewish  doctrine  and  has  adopted  that  sect,  then  he  is  in  fact 
and  he  is  named  a  Jew.  t  Thus  we  too  being  falsely  imbued 
(baptized),  are  in  name  Jews,  but  in  fact  we  are  something 
else.  Our  affects  (feelings)  are  inconsistent  with  our  words  ; 
we  are  Mr  from  practicing  what  we  say,  and  that  of  which 
we  are  proud,  as  if  we  knew  it.  Thus  being  unable  to  fulfill 
even  what  the  character  of  a  man  promises,  we  even  add  to 
it  the  profession  of  a  philosopher,  which  is  as  heavy  a  burden, 
as  if  a  man  who  is  unable  to  bear  ten  pounds  should  attempt 
to  raise  the  stone  which  Ajax  \  lifted. 

* 

fesses  may  be  false  ;  and  no  man  knows  except  himself  whether  his 
words  and  professions  are  true.  The  uniformity,  regularity,  and  con- 
sistency of  his  acts  are  evidence  which  cannot  be  mistaken. 

*  It  has  been  suggested  that  Epictetus  confounded  under  the  name  of 
Jews  those  who  were  Jews  and  those  who  were  Christians.  We  know 
that  some  Jews  l)ecame  Christians. 

t  It  is  possible,  as  I  have  said,  by  Jews  Kpictetus  means  Christians, 
for  Christians  and  Jews  are  evidently  confounded  by  some  writers,  as 
the  first  Christians  were  of  the  Jewish  nation.  In  book  iv.  c.  7,  Epk:- 
tetus  gives  the  name  of  (ralilxans  to  the  Jews.  The  term  (".alilacans 
points  to  the  country  of  the  great  teacher.  Paul  says  (Romans,  ii.  28), 
"  For  he  is  not  a  Jew.  which  is  one  outwardly — but  he  is  a  Jew  which  is 
one  inwardly."  etc.  His  remarks  (ii.  17-29}  on  the  man  "  who  is  called 
a  Jew,  and  rests  in  the  law  and  makes  his  boast  of  God  "  may  be  com- 
pared with  what  Epictetus  says  of  a  man  who  is  called  a  philosopher, 
and  does  not  practice  that  which  he  professes. 

\  See  ii.  24,  26 ;    Iliad,  vii.  264,  etc. 


EPICTETUS. 


CHAPTER  X. 

HOW    WK    MAY    DISCOVKR    THE    DUTIKS    OF    LIFE    FROM    VAMES. 

COXSIHER  who  you  are.  In  the  first  place,  you  are  a 
man  ;  *  and  this  is  one  who  has  nothing  superior  to  the  fac- 
ulty of  the  will,  but  all  other  things  subjected  to  it ;  and  the 
faculty  itself  he  possesses  unenslaved  and  free  from  Subjec- 
tion. Consider  then  from  what  things  you  have  been  sepa- 
rated by  reason.  You  have  been  separated  from  wild  beasts  : 
you  have  been  separated  from  domestic  animals.  Further, 
you  are  a  citizen  of  the  world,  f  and  a  part  of  it,  not  one  of 
the  subservient  (serving),  but  one  of  the  principal  (ruling) 
parts,  for  you  are  capable  of  comprehending  the  divine  ad- 
ministration and  of  considering  the  connection  of  things. 
What  then  does  the  character  of  a  citizen  promise  (profess)  ? 
To  hold  nothing  as  profitable  to  himself  ;  to  deliberate  about 
nothing  as  if  he  were  detached  from  the  community,  but  to 
act  as  the  hand  or  foot  would  do,  if  they  had  reason  and 
understood  the  constitution  of  nature,  for  they  would  never 
put  themselves  in  motion  nor  desire  anything  otherwise  than 
with  reference  to  the  whole.  Therefore  the  philosophers  say 
well,  that  if  the  good  man  had  foreknowledge  of  what  would 
happen,  he  would  co-operate  toward  his  own  sickness  and 
death  and  mutilation,  since  he  knows  \  that  these  things  are 

*  Cicero  (de  Fin.  iv.  10) ;  Seneca,  Ep.  95. 

I  See  i.  9.  M.  Antoninus,  vi.  44  :  "  But  my  nature  is  rational  and 
social ;  and  my  city  and  country,  so  far  as  I  am  Antoninus,  is  Rome, 
but  so  far  as  I  am  a  man,  it  is  the  world." 

|  This  may  appear  extravagant  ;  but  it  is  possible  to  explain  it,  and 
even  to  assent  to  it.  If  a  man  believes  that  all  is  wisely  arranged  in  the 
course  of  human  events,  he  would  not  try  to  resist  that  which  he  knows 


F.PICTRTUS.  137 

assigned  to  him  according  U»  the  universal  arrangement,  and 
that  the  whole  is  superior  to  the  part,  and  the  state  to  the 
citizen.*  Hut  now  because  we  do  not  know  the  future,  it  is 
our  duty  to  stick  to  the  things  which  are  in  their  nature  more 
suitable  for  our  choice,  for  we  were  made  among  other 
things  for  this. 

After  this  remember  that  you  are  a  son.  What  does  this 
character  promise  ?  To  consider  that  everything  which  is 
the  son's  belongs  to  the  father,  to  obey  him  in  all  things, 
never  to  blame  him  to  another,  nor  to  say  or  do  anything 
which  does  him  injury,  to  yield  to  him  in  all  things  and 
give  way,  co-operating  with  him  as  far  as  you  can.  After 
this  know  that  you  are  a  brother  also,  and  that  to  this 
character  it  is  due  to  make  concessions ;  to  be  easily  per- 
suaded, to  speak  good  of  your  brother,  never  to  claim  in 
opposition  to  him  any  of  the  things  which  are  independent 
of  the  will,  but  readily  to  give  them  up.  that  you  may  have 
the  larger  share  in  what  is  dependent  on  the  will.  For  see 
what  a  thing  it  is,  in  place  of  a  lettuce,  if  it  should  so  hap- 
pen, or  a  seat,  to  gain  for  yourself  goodness  of  disposition. 
How  great  is  the  advantage.! 

Next  to  this,  if  you  are  senator  of  any  state,  remember 
that  you  are  a  senator :  if  a  youth,  that  you  are  a  youth  :  if 
an  old  man,  that  you  are  an  old  man  ;  for  each  of  such 
names,  if  it  comes  to  be  examined,  marks  out  the  proper 

it  is  appointed  for  him  to  suffer :  he  would  submit  and  he  would  endure. 
If  Epictetus  means  that  the  man  would  actively  promote  the  end  or 
purpose  which  he  foreknew,  in  order  that  his  acts  may  be  consistent 
with  what  he  foreknows  and  with  his  duty,  perhaps  the  philosopher's 
saying  is  too  hard  to  deal  with  ;  and  as  it  rests  on  an  impossible  as- 
sumption of  foreknowledge,  we  maybe  here  wiser  than  the  philosophers, 
if  we  say  no  more  about  it.  Compare  Seneca,  de  Provid.  c.  5. 

*  Antoninus,  vi.  42  :  "  \Ve  are  all  working  together  to  one  end,  some 
with  knowledge  and  design,  and  others  without  knowing  what  they  do." 

t  A  lettuce  is  an  example  of  the  most  trifling  thing.  A  seat  probably 
means  a  seat  of  superiority.a  magistrate's  seal,  a  Roman  sella  curulis. 


I38  KP/CTKTl'S. 

duties.  But  if  you  go  and  blame  your  brother,  I  say  to 
you.  You  have  forgotten  who  you  are  and  what  is  your 
name.  In  the  next  place,  if  you  were  a  smith  and  made 
a  wrong  use  of  the  hammer,  you  would  have  forgotten  the 
smith  ;  and  if  you  have  forgotten  the  brother  and  instead 
of  a  brother  have  become  an  enemy,  would  you  appear  not 
to  have  changed  one  thing  for  another  in  that  case?  And 
if  instead  of  a  man,  who  is  a  tame  animal  and  social,  you 
are  become  a  mischievous  wild  beast,  treacherous,  and 
biting,  have  you  lost  nothing?  Hut  (I  suppose)  you  must 
a  bit  of  money  that  you  may  suffer  damage?  And 
the  loss  of  nothing  else  do  a  man  damage  ?  If  you 
had  lost  the  art  of  grammar  or  music,  would  you  think 
the  loss  of  it  a  damage  ?  and  if  you  shall  lose  modesty, 
moderation  (Vara<rro\^u)  and  gentleness,  do  you  think  the 
loss  nothing  ?  And  yet  the  things  first  mentioned  are  lost 
by  some  cause  external  and  independent  of  the  will,  and 
the  second  by  our  own  fault ;  and  as  to  the  first  neither  to 
have  them  nor  to  lose  them  is  shameful ;  but  as  to  the 
second,  not  to  have  them  and  to  lose  them  is  shameful  and 
matter  of  reproach  and  a  misfortune.  What  does  ttie  pathic 
lose  ?  He  loses  the  (character  of)  man.  What  does  he  lose 
who  makes  the  pathic  what  he  is  ?  Many  other  things  ;  and 
he  also  loses  the  man  no  less  than  the  other.  What  does 
he  lose  who  commits  adultery  ?  He  loses  the  (character  of 
the )  modest,  the  temperate,  the  decent,  the  citizen,  the 
neighbor.  What  does  he  lose  who  is  angry  ?  Something 
else.  What  does  the  coward  lose  ?  Something  else.  No 
man  is  bad  without  suffering  some  loss  and  damage.  If 
then  you  look  for  the  damage  in  the  loss  of  money  only,  all 
these  men  receive  no  harm  or  damage ;  it  may  be,  they  have 
even  profit  and  gain,  when  they  acquire  a  bit  of  money  by 
any  of  these  deeds.  But  consider  that  if  you  refer  every- 
thing to  a  small  coin,  not  even  he  who  loses  his  nose  is  in 
your  opinion  damaged.  Yes,  you  say,  for  he  is  mutilated 


EPJ  139 

in  his  body.  \Vell  ;  but  docs  he  who  has  lost  his  smell  only 
lose  nothing?  Is  there  tlun  no  energy  of  the  soul  which  is 
an  advantage  to  him  who  p  it,  and  a  damage  to  him 

who  has  lost  it  ?  Tell  me  what  sort  (of  energy)  you  mean. 
Have  we  not  a  natural  modesty  ?  We  have.  Does  IK:  who 
loses  this  sustain  no  damage  ?  is  he  deprived  of  nothing, 
does  he  part  with  nothing  of  the  things  which  belong  to 
him  ?  Have  we  not  naturally  fidelity  ?  natural  affection,  a 
natural  disposition  to  help  others,  a  natural  disposition  to 
forbearance  ?  The  man  then  who  allows  himself  to  be  dam- 
aged in  these  matters,  can  he  be  free  from  harm  and  unin- 
jured ?  What  then  ?  shall  I  not  hurt  him,  who  has  hurt 
me  ?  *  In  the  first  place  consider  what  hurt  (^Xd^)  is, 
and  remember  what  you  have  heard  from  the  philosophers. 
For  if  the  good  consists  in  the  will  (purpose,  intention, 
irpoaipfofi),  and  the  evil  also  in  the  will,*  see  if  what  you 
say  is  not  this  :  What  then,  since  that  man  has  hurt  him- 
self by  doing  an  unjust  act  to  me,  shall  I  not  hurt  my- 
self by  doing  some  unjust  act  to  him?  Why  do  we  not 
imagine  to  ourselves  (mentally  think  of)  something  of  this 
kind?  But  where  there  is  any  detriment  to  the  body  or 
to  our  possession,  there  is  harm  there  ;  and  where  the  same 
thing  happens  to  the  faculty  of  the  will,  there  is  (you  sup- 
pose) no  harm  ;  for  he  who  has  been  deceived  or  he  who  has 
clone  an  unjust  act  neither  suffers  in  the  head  nor  in  the 
eye  nor  in  the  hip,  nor  does  he  lose  his  estate  ;  and  we  wish 
for  nothing  else  than  (security  to)  these  things.  But 
whether  we  shall  have  the  will  modest  and  faithful  or 
shameless  and  faithless,  we  care  not  the  least,  except  only 
in  the  school  so  far  as  a  few  words  are  concerned.  There- 

*  Socrates:  We  must  by  no  means  then  do  an  act  of  injustice.  Crito: 
Certainly  not.  Socrates:  Xor  yet  when  you  are  wronged  must  you  do 
wrong  in  return,  as  most  people. think,  since  you  must  in  no  way  do  an 
unjust  act.  Plato,  Crito,  c.  10. 

t  See  the  beginning  of  ii.  16. 


,40  EP1CTETUS. 

fore  our  proficiency  is  limited  to  these  few  words ;  but 
beyond  them  it  does  not  exist  even  in  the  slightest  de- 
gree.* 


CHAPTER  XI. 

*  • 

WHAT  THE    BEGINNING   OF    PHILOSOPHY   IS. 

THE  beginning  of  philosophy,  to  him  at  least  who  enters  on 
it  in  the  right  way  and  by  the  door,  is  a  consciousness  of  his 
own  weakness  and  inability  about  necessary  things.  For  we 
come  into  the  world  with  no  natural  notion  of  a  right-angled 
triangle,  or  of  a  diesis  (a  quarter  tone),  or  of  a  half  tone  ; 
but  we  learn  each  of  these  things  by  a  certain  transmission 
according  to  art ;  and  for  this  reason  those  who  do  not  know 
them,  do  not  think  that  they  know  them.  But  as  to  good  and 
evil,  and  beautiful  and  ugly,  and  becoming  and  unbecoming, 
and  happiness  and  misfortune,  and  proper  and  improper,  and 
what  we  ought  to  do  and  what  we  ought  not  to  do,  who  ever 
came  into  the  world  without  having  an  innate  idea  of 
them  ?  Wherefore  we  all  use  these  names  and  we  en- 
deavor to  fit  the  preconceptions  f  to  the  several  cases 
(things)  thus  :  he  has  done  well,  he  has  not  done  well ; 
he  has  done  as  he  ought,  not  as  he  ought;  he  has  been 
unfortunate,  he  has  been  fortunate ;  he  is  unjust,  he  is 
just :  who  does  not  use  these  names  ?  who  among  us  defers 

*  The  same  remark  will  apply  to  most  dissertations  spoken  or  written 
on  moral  subjects  :  they  are  exercises  of  skill  for  him  who  delivers  or 
writes  them,  or  matter  for  criticism  and  perhaps  a  way  of  spending  an 
idle  hour  for  him  who  listens;  and  that  is  all.  Epictetus  blame*  our 
indolence  and  indifference  as  to  acts,  and  the  trifling  of  the  schools  of 
philosophy  in  disputation. 

t  See  I  c.  2. 


EPICTETUS.  141 

the  use  of  them  till  he  has  learned  them,  as  he  defers  the  use 
of  the  words  about  lines  (geometrical  figures)  or  sounds  ? 
And  the  cause  of  this  is  that  we  come  into  the  world  already 
taught  as  it  were  by  nature  some  things  on  this  matter,  and 
proceeding  from  these  we  have  added  to  them  self-con- 
ceit. For  why,  a  man  says,  do  I  not  know  the  beautiful 
and  the  ugly  ?  Have  I  not  the  notion  of  it  ?  You  have. 
Do  I  not  adapt  it  to  particulars  ?  You  do.  Do  I  not 
then  adapt  it  properly  ?  In  that  lies  the  whole  question  ; 
and  conceit  is  added  here.  For  beginning  from  these  things 
which  are  admitted  men  proceed  to  that  which  is  matter  of 
dispute  by  means  of  unsuitable  adaptation  ;  for  if  they  pos- 
sessed this  power  of  adaptation  in  addition  to  those  things, 
what  would  hinder  them  from  being  perfect  ?  But  now  since 
you  think  that  you  properly  adapt  the  preconceptions  to  the 
particulars,  tell  me  whence  you  derive  this  (assume  that  you 
do  so).  Because  I  think  so.  But  it  does  not  seem  so  to  an- 
other, and  he  thinks  that  he  also  makes  a  proper  adaptation  ; 
or  does  he  not  think  so  ?  He  does  think  so.  Is  it  possible 
then  that  both  of  you  can  properly  apply  the  preconceptions 
to  things  about  which  you  have  contrary  opinions  ?  It  is  not 
possible.  Can  you  then  show  us  anything  better  toward 
adapting  the  preconceptions  beyond  your  thinking  that  you  do  ? 
Does  the  madman  do  any  other  things  than  the  things  which 
seem  to  him  right  ?  Is  then  this  criterion  sufficient  for  him 
also  ?  It  is  not  sufficient.  Come  then  to  something  which  is 
superior  to  seeming  (roG5oic«V).  What  is  this  ? 

Observe  this  is  the  begining  of  philosophy,  a  perception  of 
the  disagreement  of  men  with  one  another,  and  an  inquiry  in- 
to the  cause  of  the  disagreement,  and  a  condemnation  and 
distrust  of  that  which  only  "  seems,"  and  a  certain  investiga 
tion  of  that  which  "  seems  "  whether  it  "  seems  "  rightly,  and 
a  discovery  of  some  rule  (/tav6pot),  as  we  have  discovered 
a  balance  in  the  determination  of  weights,  and  a  carpenter's 
rule  (Or  square)  in  the  case  of  straight  and  crooked  things. 


1 42  Kl'JCTETUS. 

This  is  the  beginning  of  philosophy.  Must  we  say  that  nil 
things  are  right  which  seem  so  to  all  ?  And  how  is  it  possible 
that  contradictions  can  be  right  ?  Not  all  then,  but  all  which 
seem  to  us  to  be  right.  How  more  to  you  than  those 
which  seem  right  to  the  Syrians  ?  why  more  than  what 
seem  right  to  the  Egyptians  ?  why  more  than  what  seems 
right  to  me  or  to  any  other  man  ?  Not  at  all  more.  What 
then  "seems  "  to  every  man  is  not  sufficient  for  determining 
what  ''  is  "  ;  for  neither  in  the  case  of  weights  or  measures 
are  we  satisfied  with  the  bare  appearance,  but  in  each  case 
we  have  discovered  a  certain  rule.  In  this  matter  then  is 
there  no  rule  superior  to  what  "  seems  "  ?  And  how  is  it 
possible  that  the  most  necessary  things  among  men  should 
have  no  sign  (mark),  and  be  incapable  of  being  discovered  ? 
There  is  then  some  rule.  And  why  then  do  we  not  seek  the 
rule  and  discover  it,  and  afterward  use  it  without  vary- 
ing from  it,  not  even  stretching  out  the  finger  without  it  ?  * 
For  this,  I  think,  is  that  which  when  it  it  is  discovered  cures 
of  their  madness  those  who  use  mere  "  seeming  "  as  a  meas- 
ure, and  misuse  it ;  so  that  for  the  future  proceeding  from 
certain  things  (principles)  known  and  made  clear  we  may 
use  in  the  case  of  particular  things  the  preconceptions  which 
are  distinctly  fixed. 

What  is  the  matter  presented  to  us  about  which  we  are  in- 
quiring ?  Pleasure  (for  example).  Subject  it  to  the  rule,  throw 
it  into  the  balance.  Ought  the  good  to  be  such  a  thing  that  il 
is  fit  that  we  have  confidence  in  it  ?  Yes.  And  in  which 
we  ought  to  confide  ?  It  ought  to  be.  Is  it  fit  to  trust  t<> 
anything  which  is  insecure  ?  No.  Is  then  pleasure  anything 
secure  ?  No.  Take  it  then  and  throw  it  out  of  the  scale, 
and  drive  it  far 'away  from  the  place  of  good  things.  But  if 
you  are  not  sharp-sighted,  and  one  balance  is  not  enough  for 

*  Doing  nothing  without  the  rule.  This  is  a  Greek  proverb  used  also 
by  Persius,  Sat.  v.  119;  compare  Cicero,  de  Fin.  iii.  17  ;  and  Antoninus, 
ii.  1 6. 


EffCTETUS.  143 

you.  bring  another.  Is  it  fit  to  be  elated  over  what  is  good  ? 
Yes.  Is  it  proper  then  to  be  elated  over  present  pleasure  ? 
See  that  you  do  not  say  that  it  is  proper  ;  but  if  you  do, 
I  shall  then  not  think  you  are  worthy  even  of  the  balance.* 
Thus  things  are  tested  and  weighed  when  the  rules  are  ready. 
And  to  philosophize  is  this,  to  examine  and  confirm  the 
rules  ;  and  then  to  use  them  when  they  are  known  is  the  act 
of  a  wise  and  good  man.t 


CHAPTER  XII. 

OF     DISPUTATION    OR     DISCUSSION. 

WHAT  things  a  man  must  learn  in  order  to  be  able  to  apply 
the  art  of  disputation,  has  been  accurately  shown  by  our 
philosophers  (the  Stoics) ;  but  with  respect  to  the  proper  use 
of  the  things,  we  are  entirely  without  practice.  Only  give  to 
any  of  us,  whom  you  please,  an  illiterate  man  to  discuss  with, 
and  he  cannot  discover  how  to  deal  with  the  man.  But  when 
he  has  moved  the  man  a  little,  if  he  answers  beside  the  pur- 
pose, he  does  not  know  how  to  treat  him.  but  he  then  either 
abuses  or  ridicules  him,  and  says.  He  is  an  illiterate  man  ; 
it  is  not  possible  to  do  anything  with  him.  Now  a  guide, 
when  he  has  found  a  man  out  of  the  road,  leads  him  into  the 
right  way  :  he  does  not  ridicule  or  abuse  him  and  then  leave 
him.  Do  you  also  show  the  illiterate  man  the  truth,  and  you 

*  That  is,  so  far  shall  I  consider  you  from  being  able  to  judge  rightly 
of  things  without  a  balance  that  I  shall  understand  that  not  even  with 
the  aid  of  a  balance  can  you  do  it,  that  yo:i  cannot  even  use  a  balance, 
and  consequently  that  you  are  not  worth  a  single  word  from  me. 

t  This  is  a  just  conclusion.  \Vc  must  fix  the  canons  or  rules  by 
which  things  are  tried  ;  and  then  the  rules  may  be  applied  by  the  wise 
and  good  to  all  cases. 


I44  KPICTETUS. 

will  see  that  he  follows.  But  so  long  as  you  do  not  show 
him  the  truth,  do  not  ridicule  him,  but  rather  feel  your  own 
incapacity. 

How  then  did  Socrates  act  ?  He  used  to  compel  his 
adversary  in  disputation  to  bear  testimony  to  him,  and 
he  wanted  no  other  witness.*  Therefore  he  could  say, 
"  I  care  not  for  other  witnesses,  but  I  am  always  satisfied 
with  the  evidence  (testimony)  of  my  adversary,  and  I  do  not 
ask  the  opinion  of  others,  but  only  the  opinion  of  him  who  is 
disputing  with  me."  For  he  used  to  make  the  conclusions 
drawn  from  natural  notions  so  plain  that  every  man  saw  the 
contradiction  (if  it  existed)  and  withdrew  from  it  (thus): 
Does  the  envious  t  man  rejoice  ?  By  no  means,  but  he  is 
rather  pained.  Well,  Do  you  think  that  envy  is  pain  over 
evils  ?  and  what  envy  is  there  of  evils  ?  Therefore  he  made 
his  adversary  say  that  envy  is  pain  over  good  things.  Well 
then,  would  any  man  envy  those  who  are  nothing  to  him  ? 
By  no  means.  Thus  having  completed  the  notion  and  dis- 
tinctly fixed  it  he  would  go  away  without  saying  to  his  adver- 
sary, Define  to  me  envy  :  and  if  the  adversary  had  defined 

*  1  hi-  i-  >vhat  i=-  said  in  the  Gorgias  or  Plato,  pp   472,  474. 

t  Socrates'  notion  of  envy  is  stated  by  Xenophon  (Mem.  iii.  9,  8),  to 
be  this  :  "  it  is  the  pain  or  vexation  which  men  have  at  the  prosperity  of 
their  friends,  and  that  such  are  the  only  envious  persons."  Bishop 
Butler  gives  a  better  definition ;  at  least  a  more  complete  description  of 
the  thing.  "  Emulation  is  merely  the  desire  and  hope  of  equality  with 
or  superiority  over  others,  with  whom  we  may  compare  ourselves. 
There  does  not  appear  to  be  any  other  grief  in  the  natural  passion,  but 
only  that  want  which  is  implied  in  desire.  However  this  may  be  so 
strong  as  to  be  the  occasion  of  greater/if/;  To  desire  the  attainment  of 
this  equality  or  superiority,  by  the  particular  means  of  others  being 
brought  down  to  our  level,  or  below  it,  is,  I  think,  the  distinct  notion  of 
envy.  From  whence  it  is  easy  to  see,  that  the  real  end  which  the 
natural  passion,  emulation,  and  which  the  unlawful  one,  envy,  aims  at  is 
the  same;  namely,  that  equality  or  superiority :  and  consequently  that 
to  do  mischief  is  not  the  end  of  envy,  but  merely  the  means  it  makes  use 
of  to  attain  its  end." — Sermons  upon  Human  Nature,  1. 


envy,  he  did  not  say,  You  have  defined  it  badly,  for  the 
terms  of  the  definition  do  not  correspond  to  the  thing  defined. 
These  are  technical  terms,  and  for  this  reason  disagreeable 
and  hardly  intelligible  to  illiterate  men,  which  terms  we 
(philosophers)  cannot  lay  aside.  But  that  the  illiterate  man 
himself,  who  follows  the  appearances  presented  to  him 
should  be  able  to  concede  anything  or  reject  it,  we  can  never 
by  the  use  of  these  terms  move  him  to  do.  Accordingly  being 
conscious  of  our  own  inability,  we  do  not  attempt  the  thing  ; 
at  least  such  of  us  as  have  any  caution  do  not.  But  the 
greater  part  and  the  rash,  when  they  enter  into  such  disputa- 
tions, confuse  themselves  and  confuse  others  ;  and  finally 
abusing  their  adversaries  and  abused  by  them,  they  walk 
away. 

Now  this  was  the  first  and  chief  peculiarity  of  Socrates, 
never  to  be  irritated  in  argument,  never  to  utter  anything 
abusive,  anything  insulting,  but  to  bear  with  abusive  persons 
and  to  put  an  end  to  the  quarrel.  It  you  would  know  what 
great  power  he  had  in  this  way  read  the  Symposium  of  Xeno- 
phon,*  and  you  will  see  how  many  quarrels  he  put  an  end  to. 
Hence  with  good  reason  in  the  poets  also  this  power  is  most 
highly  praised. 

Quickly  with  skill  he  settles  great  disputes. 

Hesiod,  Theogony,  v.  X;-. 

Well  then  ;  the  matter  is  not  now  very  safe,  and  particu- 
larly at  Rome ;  for  he  who  attempts  to  do  it,  must  not  do  it 
in  a  corner,  you  may  be  sure,  but  must  go  to  a  man  of  con- 
sular rank,  if  it  so  happen,  or  to  a  rich  man,  and  ask  him,  Can 
you  tell  me,  Sir,  to  whose  care  you  have  intrusted  your  horses  ? 
I  can  tell  you.  Have  you  intrusted  them  to  any  person  in- 
differently and  to  one  who  has  no  experience  of  horses  ?  By 

*  The    Symposium    or   Hanquet    of    Xenophon    is    extant.     Compare 
Kpictetus,  iii.  16,  5,  and  iv.  c.  5,  the  beginning. 
10 


146  EP/CTETUS. 

no  means.  Well  then ;  can  you  tell  me  to  whom  you  intrust 
your  gold  or  silver  things  or  your  vestments  ?  I  don't  intrust 
even  these  to  any  one  indifferently.  Well  ;  your  own  body, 
have  you  already  considered  about  intrusting  the  care  of  it  to 
any  person  ?  Certainly.  To  a  man  of  experience,  I  sup- 
pose, and  one  acquainted  with  the  aliptic,*  or  with  the  heal- 
ing art  ?  Without  doubt.  Are  these  the  best  things  that  you 
have,  or  do  you  also  possess  something  else  which  is  better 
than  all  these  ?  What  kind  of  a  thing  do  you  mean  ?  That 
I  mean  which  makes  use  of  these  things,  and  tests  each  of 
them,  and  deliberates.  Is  it  the  soul  that  you  mean  ?  You 
think  right,  for  it  is  the  soul  that  I  mean.  In  truth  L  do  think 
that  the  soul  is  a  much  better  thing  than  all  the  others 
which  I  possess.  Can  you  then  show  us  in  what  way  you 
have  taken  care  of  the  soul  ?  for  it  is  not  likely  that  you,  who 
are  so  wise  a  man  and  have  a  reputation  in  the  city,  incon- 
siderately and  carelessly  allow  the  most  valuable  thing  that 
you  possess  to  be  neglected  and  to  perish  ?  Certainly  not. 
But  have  you  taken  care  of  the  soul  yourself ;  and  have  you 
learned  from  another  to  do  this,  or  have  you  discovered  the 
means  yourself  ?  Here  comes  the  danger  that  in  the  first 
place  he  may  say,  What  is  this  to  you,  my  good  man,  who  are 
you  ?  Next,  if  you  persist  in  troubling  him,  there  is  danger 
that  he  may  raise  his  hands  and  give  you  blows.  I  was  once 
myself  also  an  admirer  of  this  mode  of  instruction  until  I  fell 
into  these  dangers.! 

*  The  aliptic  art  is  the  art  of  anointing  and  rubbing,  one  of  the  best 
means  of  maintaining  a  body  in  health.  The  iatric  or  healing  art  is  the 
art  of  restoring  to  health  a  diseased  body.  The  aliptic  art  is  also  equiv- 
alent to  tiie  gymnastic  art,  or  the  art  of  preparing  for  gymnastic  exer- 
cises, which  are  also  a  means  of  preserving  the  body's  health,  when  the 
exercises  are  good  and  moderate. 

t  Epictetus  in  speaking  of  himself  and  of  his  experience  at  Rome. 


EMCTETUS.  147 


CHAPTER  XIII. 

<»\    AVXIKTV   (sourrrrnE). 

WHEN*  I  see  a  man  anxious,  I  say,  What  does  this  man 
want  ?  If  he  did  not  want  something  which  is  not  in  his 
power,  how  could  lie  be  anxious  ?  For  this  reason  a  lute 
player  when  he  is  singing  by  himself  has  no  anxiety,  but 
when  he  enters  the  theater,  he  is  anxious  even  if  he  has  a 
good  voice  and  plays  well  on  the  lute  ;  for  he  not  only  wishes 
to  sing  well,  but  also  to  obtain  applause  :  but  this  is  not  in 
in  his  power.  Accordingly,  where  he  has  skill,  there  he  has 
confidence.  15ring  any  single  person  who  knows  nothing  of 
music,  and  the  musician  does  not  care  for  him.  But  in  the 
matter  where  a  man  knows  nothing  and  has  not  been  prac- 
ticed, there  he  is  anxious.  What  matter  is  this  ?  He  knows 
not  what  a  crowd  is  or  what  the  praise  of  a  crowd  is.  How- 
ever he  has  learned  to  strike  the  lowest  chord  and  the 
highest ;  *  but  what  the  praise  of  the  many  is,  and  what  power 
it  has  in  life  he  neither  knows  nor  has  he  thought  about  it. 
Hence  he  must  of  necessity  tremble  and  grow  pale.  I  can- 
not then  say  that  a  man  is  not  a  lute  player  when  I  see  him 
afraid,  but  I  can  say  something  else,  and  not  one  thing,  but 
many.  And  first  of  all  I  call  him  a  stranger  and  say, 
This  man  does  not  know  in  what  part  of  the  world  he  is,  but 
though  he  has  been  here  so  long,  he  is  ignorant  of  the  laws 
of  the  State  and  the  customs,  and  what  is  permitted  and  what 
is  not ;  and  he  has  never  employed  any  lawyer  to  tell  him 
and  to  explain  the  laws.  But  a  man  does  not  write  a  will,  if 
he  does  not  know  how  it  ought  to  be  written,  or  he  employs 

*  See  page  98,  note, 


I48  hl'ICTETUS. 

a  person  who  does  know :  nor  does  he  rashly  seal  a  bond  o-. 
write  a  security.  But  he  uses  his  desire  without  a  lawyer's 
advice,  and  aversion,  and  pursuit  (movement),  and  attempt 
and  purpose.  How  do  you  mean  without  a  lawyer?  He 
does  not  know  that  he  wills  what  is  not  allowed,  and  does 
not  will  that  which  is  of  necessity  ;  and  he  does  not  know 
either  what  is  his  own  or  what  is  another  man's  :  but  if  he 
did  know,  he  would  never  be  impeded,  he  would  never  be 
hindered,  he  would  not  be  anxious.  Ho\v  so  ?  Is  any  man 
then  afraid  about  things  which  are  not  evils  ?  No.  Js  he 
afraid  about  things  which  are  evils,  but  still  so  far  within  his 
power  that  they  may  not  happen  ?  Certainly  he  is  not.  It 
then  the  things  which  are  independent  of  the  will  are  neither 
good  nor  bad,  and  all  things  which  do  depend  on  the  will  are 
within  our  power,  and  no  man  can  either  take  them  from  us 
or  give  them  to  us.  if  we  do  not  choose,  where  is  room  left 
for  anxiety  ?  But  we  are  anxious  about  our  poor  body,  our 
little  property,  about  the  will  of  Caesar  :  but  not  anxious 
about  things  internal.  Are  we  anxious  about  not  forming  a 
false  opinion?  No,  for  this  is  in  my  power.  About  not 
exerting  our  movements  contrary  to  nature  ?  No.  not  even 
about  this.  \Yhen  then  you  see  a  man  pale,  as  the  physician 
says,  judging  from  the  complexion,  this  man's  spleen  is  dis- 
ordered, that  man's  liver •  so  also  say,  this  man's  desire  and 
aversion  are  disordered, -he  is  not  in  the  right  way,  he  is  in  a 
fever.  For  nothing  else  changes  the  color,  or  causes  trem- 
bling or  chattering  of  the  teeth,  or  causes  a  man  to 

Sink  in  his  knees  and  shift  from  foot  to  foot. — Iliad,  xiii.  _Si. 

For  this  reason  when  Zeno  was  going  to  meet  Antigonus,* 
he  was  not  anxious,  for  Antigonus  had  no  power  over  any  of 

*  In  Diogenes  Laertius  (Zeno,  vii.)  there  is  a  letter  from  Antigonus  to 
Xt-no  and  /eno's  answer.  Simplicius  (note  on  the  Encheiridion,  c.  51) 
supposes  this  Antigonus  to  be  the  kin.c;  of  Syria;  but  Upton  remarks 
ihat  it  is  Antigonus  Gonatas,  king  of  Macedonia. 


KTICTETUS.  149 

the  things  which  Zeno  admired  ;  and  Zeno  did  not  care  for 
those  things  over  which  Antigonus  had  power.  But  Antig- 
onus  was  anxious  when  he  was  going  to  meet  Zeno,  for  he 
wished  to  please  Zeno  ;  but  this  was  a  thing  external  (out  of 
his  power).  But  Zeno  did  not  want  to  please  Antigonus; 
for  no  man  who  is  skilled  in  any  art  wishes  to  please  one 
who  has  no  such  skill. 

Should  I  try  to  please  you  ?  Why  ?  I  suppose,  you  know 
the  measure  by  which  one  man  is  estimated  by  another. 
Have  you  taken  pains  to  learn  what  is  a  good  man  and  what 
is  a  bad  man,  and  how  a  man  becomes  one  or  the  other  ? 
Why  then  are  you  not  good  yourself  ?  How,  he  replies,  am 
I  not  good  ?  Because  no  good  man  laments  or  groans  or 
weeps,  no  good  man  is  pale  and  trembles,  or  says,  How  will 
he  receive  me.  how  will  he  listen  to  me  ?  Slave,  just  as  it 
pleases  him.  Why  do  you  care  about  what  belongs  to  others  ? 
Is  it  now  his  fault  if  he  receives  badly  what  proceeds  from 
you  ?  Certainly.  And  is  it  possible  that  a  fault  should  be 
one  man's,  and  the  evil  in  another  ?  No.  Why  then  are  you 
anxious  about  that  which  belongs  to  others  ?  Your  question 
is  reasonable ;  but  I  am  anxious  how  I  shall  speak  to  him- 
Cannot  you  then  speak  to  him  as  you  choose  ?  But  I  fear 
that  I  may  be  disconcerted  ?  If  you  are  going  to  write  the 
name  of  Dion,  are  you  afraid  that  you  would  be  disconcerted  ? 
By  no  means.  Why  ?  is  it  not  because  you  have  practiced 
writing  the  name  ?  Certainly.  Well,  if  you  were  going  to 
read  the  name,  would  you  not  feel  the  same  ?  and  why  ? 
Because  every  art  has  a  certain  strength  and  confidence  in 
the  things  which  belong  to  it.  Have  you  then  not  practiced 
speaking?  and  what  else  did  you  learn  in  the  school?  Syl- 
logisms and  sophistical  propositions  ?  4  For  what  purpose  ? 
was  it  not  for  the  purpose  of  discoursing  skillfully  ?  and  is 
not  discoursing  skillfully  the  same  as  discoursing  seasonably 


•See 


EffCTfTVS. 

and  cautiously  and  with  intelligence,  and  also  without  mak- 
ing mistakes  and  without  hindrance,  and  besides  all  this  with 
confidence  ?  Yes.  When  then  you  are  mounted  on  a  horse 
and  go  into  a  plain,  are  you  anxious  at  being  matched  against 
a  man  who  is  on  foot,  and  anxious  in  a  matter  in  which  you 
are  practiced,  and  he  is  not  ?  Yes,  but  that  person  (to  whom 
I  am  going  to  speak)  has  power  to  kill  me.  Speak  the  truth 
then,  unhappy  man,  and  do  not  brag,  nor  claim  to  be  a 
philosopher,  nor  refuse  to  acknowledge  your  masters,  but  so 
long  as  you  present  this  handle  in  your  body,  follow  every 
man  who  is  stronger  than  yourself.  Socrates  used  to  prac- 
tice speaking,  he  who  talked  as  lie  did  to  the  tyrants,*  to  the 
dicasts  (judges),  he  who  talked  in  his  prison.  Diogenes  had 
practiced  speaking,  he  who  spoke  as  he  did  to  Alexander,  to 
the  pirates,  to  the  person  who  bought  him.  These  men  were 
confident  in  the  things  which  they  practiced.  But  do  you 
walk  off  to  your  own  affairs  and  never  leave  them  :  go  and 
sit  in  a  corner,  and  weave  syllogisms,  and  propose  them  to 
another.  There  is  not  in  you  the  man  who  can  rule  a  state. 

'The  Thirty  tyrants  of  Athens,  as  they  were  named  (Xenophon, 
Hellenica,  ii.).  The  talk  of  Socrates  with  Critias  and  Charicles,  two 
of  the  Thirty,  is  reported  in  Xenophon's  Memorabilia  (i.  2,  33).  The 
defense  of  Socrates  before  those  who  tried  him  and  his  conversation  in 
prison  are  reported  in  Plato's  Apology,  and  in  the  Phaedon  and  Crito. 
Diogenes  was  captured  by  some  pirates  and  sold  (iv.  i,  115). 


CHAPTER  XIV. 

TO    NASti. 

WHEX  a  certain  Roman  entered  with  his  son  and  listened 
to  one  reading,  Epictetus  said,  This  is  the  method  of  instruc- 
tion ;  and  he  stopped.  When  the  Roman  asked  him  to  go 
on,  Epictetus  said,  Every  art  when  it  is  taught  causes  labor  to 
him  who  is  unacquainted  with  it  and  is  unskilled  in  it,  and 
indeed  the  things  which  proceed  from  the  arts  immediately 
show  their  use  in  the  purpose  for  which  they  were  made  ;  and 
most  of  them  contain  something  attractive  and  pleasing. 
For  indeed  to  be  present  and  to  observe  how  a  shoemaker 
learns  is  not  a  pleasant  thing  :  but  the  shoe  is  useful  and  also 
not  disagreeable  to  look  at.  And  the  discipline  of  a  smith 
when  he  is  learning  is  very  disagreeable  to  one  who  chances 
to  be  present  and  is  a  stranger  to  the  art :  but  the  work  shows 
the  use  of  the  art.  But  you  will  see  this  much  more  in 
music ;  for  if  you  are  present  while  a  person  is  learning,  the 
discipline  will  appear  most  disagreeable  ;  and  yet  the 
results  of  music  are  pleasing  and  delightful  to  those 
who  know  nothing  of  music.  And  here  we  conceive  the 
work  of  a  philosopher  to  be  something  of  this  kind ;  he  must 
adapt  his  wish  to  what  is  going  on,*  so  that  neither  any  of 
the  things  which  are  taking  place  shall  take  place  con- 
trary to  our  wish,  nor  any  of  the  things  which  do  not  take 
place  shall  not  take  place  when  we  wish  that  they  should. 
From  this  the  result  is  to  those  who  have  so  arranged  the 

*  Encheiridion,  c.  8  :  '•  Do  not  seek  (wish)  that  things  which  take 
place  shall  take  place  as  you  desire,  hut  desire  that  things  which  take 
place  shall  take  place  a*  they  do,  and  you  will  live  a  tranquil  life." 


,-2  Kf'JCTETl'S. 

work  of  philosophy,  not  to  fail  in  the  desire,  nor  to  fall  in 
with  that  which  they  would  avoid  ;  without  uneasiness, 
without  fear,  without  perturbation  to  pass  through  life  tlu-in- 
st-lves,  together  with  their  associates  maintaining  the  relations 
both  natural  and  acquired.*  as  the  relation  of  son,  of  father, 
of  brother,  of  citizen,  of  man.  of  wife,  of  neighbor,  of  fellow- 
traveler,  of  ruler,  of  ruled.  The  work  of  a  philosopher  we 
conceive  to  be  something  like  this.  It  remains  next  to  in- 
quire how  this  must  be  accomplished. 

\Ye  see  then  that  the  carpenter  when  he  has  learned  cer- 
tain things  becomes  a  carpenter ;  the  pilot  by  learning 
certain  things  becomes  a  pilot.  May  it  not  then  in  philos- 
ophy also  not  be  sufficient  to  wish  to  be  wise  and  good,  and 
that  there  is  also  a  necessity  to  learn  certain  things  ? 
We  inquire  then  what  these  things  are.  The  philosophers 
say  that  we  ought  first  to  learn  that  there  is  a  God  and  that 
he  provides  for  all  things  ;  also  that  it  is  not  possible  to  con- 
ceal from  him  our  acts,  or  even  our  intentions  and  thoughts. t 

*  Compare  iii.  2,  4.  iv.  8,  20.  Antoninus  (viii.  27)  writes  :  "  There  are 
three  relations  [between  thee  and  other  things] :  the  one  to  the  body 
which  surrounds  thee ;  the  second  to  the  divine  cause  from  which  all 
things  come  to  all ;  and  the  third  to  those  who  live  with  thee."  This  is 
precise,  true  and  practical.  Those  who  object  to  "  the  divine  cause," 
may  write  in  place  of  it  "  the  nature  and  constitution  of  things;  "  for 
there  is  a  constitution  of  things,  which  the  philosopher  attempts  to  dis- 
cover ;  and  for  most  practical  purposes,  it  is  immaterial  whether  we  say 
that  it  is  of  divine  origin  or  has  some  other  origin,  or  no  origin  can  be 
discovered.  The  fact  remains  that  a  constitution  of  things  exists  ;  or,  if 
that  expression  be  not  accepted,  we  may  say  that  we  conceive  that  it 
exists  and  we  cannot  help  thinking  so. 

t  See  i.  14,  13,  ii.  8,  14.  Socrates  (Xen.  Mem.  i.  i,  19)  said  the  same. 
That  man  should  make  himself  like  the  gods  is  said  also  by  Antoninus, 
x.  8.  See  Plato,  l)e  Legg.  i.  4.  (Upton.)  When  God  is  said  to  pro- 
vide for  all  things  this  is  what  the  Greeks  called  "  Providence."  (Epic- 
tetus,  i.  16,  iii.  17.)  In  the  second  of  these  passages  there  is  a  short 
answer  to  some  objections  made  to  providence.  Epictetus  could  only 
or  believe  what  God  is  by  the  observation  of  phenomena ;  and  he 


EPICTETUS.  153 

The  next  thing  is  to  learn  what  is  the  nature  of  the  God  -  : 
for  such  as  they  are  discovered  to  be,  he,  who  would  please 
and  obey  them,  must  try  with  all  his  power  to  be  like  them. 
If  the  divine  is  faithful,  manal  so  must  be  faithful  :  if  it  is 
free,  man  also  must  be  free  ;  if  beneficent,  man  also  must  be 
benificent  :  if  magnanimous,  man  also  must  be  magnanimous  : 
as  being  then  an  imitator  of  God,  he  must  do  and  say  every- 
thing consistently  with  this  fact. 

With  what  then  must  we  begin  ?  If  you  will  enter  on  the 
discussion,  I  will  tell  you  that  you  must  first  understand 
names  *  (words).  So  then  you  say  that  I  do  not  now  under- 
stand names.  You  do  not  understand  them.  How  then  do 
I  use  them  ?  Just  as  the  illiterate  use  written  language,  as 
cattle  use  appearances  :  for  use  is  one  thing,  understanding  is 
another.  But  if  you  think  that  you  understand  them,  pro- 
duce whatever  word  you  please,  and  let  us  try  whether  we 

could  only  know  what  he  supposed  to  be  God's  providence  by  observing 
his  administration  of  the  world  and  all  that  happens  in  it.  Among  other 
works  of  God  is  man,  who  possesses  certain  intellectual  powers  which 
enable  him  to  form  a  judgment  of  God's  works,  and  a  judgment  of  man 
himself.  Man  has  or  is  supposed  to  have  certain  moral  sentiments,  or  a 
capacity  of  acquiring  them  in  some  way.  ( >n  the  supposition  that  all 
man's  powers  are  the  gift  of  God,  man's  power  of  judging  what  happens 
in  the  world  under  God's  providence  is  the  gift  of  God  ;  and  if  he  should 
not  be  satisfied  with  God's  administration,  we  have  the  conclusion  that 
man,  whose  powers  are  from  God,  condemns  that  administration  which 
is  also  from  God.  Thus  God  and  man,  who  is  God's  work,  are  in  op- 
position to  one  another.  If  a  man  rejects  the  belief  in  a  deity  and  in  a 
providence,  because  of  the  contradictions  and  difficulties  involved  in  this 
belief  or  supposed  to  be  involved  in  it,  and  if  he  finds  the  contradictions 
and  difficulties  **ich  as  he  cannot  reconcile  with  his  moral  sentiments 
and  judgments,  he  will  be  consistent  in  rejecting  the  notion  of  a  deity 
and  of  providence.  But  he  must  also  consistently  admit  that  his  moral 
sentiments  and  judgments  are  his  own,  and  that  he  cannot  show  how  he- 
acquired  them,  or  how  he  has  any  of  the  corporeal  or  intellectual 
powers  which  he  is  daily  using.  By  the  hypothesis  they  are  not  from 
God.  All  then  that  a  man  can  say  is  that  he  has  such  powers. 
*  See  ii.  10,  i.  17,  12,  ii.  u,  4,  etc.  M.  Antoninus,  x.  8. 


'54 


F.PICT!:  7!'S. 


understand  it.  But  it  is  a  disagreeable  tiling  fur  a  man  to  be 
confuted  who  is  now  old,  and,  it  may  be.  has  now  served 
his  three  campaigns.  I  too  know  this  :  for  now  you  are 
come  to  me  as  if  you  were  in  want  of  nothing:  and  what 
could  you  even  imagine  to  be  wanting  to  you  ?  You  are 
rich,  you  have  children  and  a  wife  perhaps,  and  many  slaves  : 
Cffisar  knows  you,  in  Rome  you  have  many  friends,  you  ren- 
der their  dues  to  all,  you  know,  how  to  requite  him  who  does 
you  a  favor,  and  to  repay  in  the  same  kind  him  who  does  you 
a  wrong.  What  do  you  lack  ?  If  then  I  shall  show  you 
that  you  lack  the  things  most  necessary  and  the  chief  tilings 
for  happiness,  and  that  hitherto  you  have  looked  after  every- 
thing rather  than  what  you  ought,  and,  to  crown  all,*  that 
you  neither  know  what  God  is  nor  what  man  is,  nor  what 
is  good  nor  what  is  bad  ;  and  as  to  what  I  have  said  about 
your  ignorance  of  ether  matters,  that  may  perhaps  be  en- 
dured, but  if  I  say  that  you  know  nothing  about  yourself,  how 
is  it  possible  that  you  should  endure  me  and  bear  the  proof  and 
stay  here  ?  It  is  not  possible  ;  but  you  immediately  go  off  in 
bad  humor.  And  yet  what  harm  have  I  done  you  ?  unless 
the  mirror  also  injures  the  ugly  man  because  it  shows  him 
to  himself  such  as  he  is  ;  unless  the  physician  also  is  sup- 
posed to  insult  the  sick  man,  when  he  says  to  him,  Man.  do 
you  think  that  you  ail  nothing  ?  1-5 ut  you  have  a  fever  :  go 
without  food  to-day  :  drink  water.  And  no  one  says.  What  an 
insult  !  But  if  you  say  to  a  man,  Your  desires  are  inflamed, 
your  aversions  are  low,  your  intentions  are  inconsistent, 
your  pursuits  (movements)  are  not  conformable  to  nature, 
your  opinions  are  rash  and  false,  the  man  immediately  goes 
away  and  says.  He  has  insulted  me. 

Our  way  of  dealing  is  like  that  of  a  crowded  assembly. 
Beasts  are  brought  to  be  sold  and  oxen  ;  and  the  greater  part 
of  the  men  come  to  buy  and  sell,  and  there  are  some  few  who 

*  The  original  is  "  to  add  'the  colophon,"  which  is  a  proverbial  expres- 
sion and  signifies  to  give  the  last  touch  to  a  thing. 


EPICTETUS.  155 

come  to  look  at  the  market  and  to  inquire  how  it  is  carried 
on,  and  why.  and  who  rixt-s  the  meeting  and  for  what 
purpose.  So  it  is  here  also  in  this  assembly  (of  life)  :  some 
like  cattle  trouble  themselves  about  nothing  except  their  fod- 
der. For  to  all  of  you  who  are  busy  about  possessions  and 
lands  and  slaves  and  magisterial  offices,  these  are  nothing 
except  fodder.  But  there  are  a  few  who  attend  the  assem- 
bly, men  who  love  to  look  on  and  consider  what  is  the 
world,  who  governs  it.  Has  it  no  governor  ?  *  And  how  is 
it  possible  that  a  city  or  a  family  cannot  continue  to  exist,  not 
even  the  shortest  time,  without  an  administrator  and  guardian, 
and  that  so  great  and  beautiful  a  system  should  be  adminis- 
tered with  such  order  and  yet  without  a  purpose  and  by 
chance  ?  t  There  is  then  an  administrator.  What  kind  of 
administrator  and  how  does  he  govern  ?  And  who  are  we, 
who  were  produced  by  him.  and  for  what  purpose  ?  Have 
we  some  connection  with  him  and  some  relation  toward 
him,  or  none  ?  This  is  the  way  in  which  these  few  are 
affected,  and  then  they  apply  themselves  only  to  this  one 
thing,  to  examine  the  meeting  and  then  to  go  away.  What 
then  ?  They  are  ridiculed  by  the  many,  as  the  spectators  at 
the  fair  are  by  the  traders  :  and  if  the  beasts  had  any 
understanding,  they  would  ridicule  those  who  admired  any- 
thing else  than  fodder. 

*Sunt  in  Fortunae  qui  casibus  omnia  ponunt, 
Et  mundum  credunt  nullo  rectore  moveri. 

Juvenal,  xiii.  86. 

t  From  the  fact  that  man  has  some  intelligence  Voltaire  concludes 
that  we  must  admit  that  there  is  a  greater  intelligence.  (Letter  to  Mdc_ 
Necker.  Vol.  67,  ed.  Kehl.  p.  278.) 


EPICTETUS. 


CHAPTER  XV. 

TO    OR    AGAINST    THOSK    WHO    OBSTINATELY    PERSIST    IN 
WHAT    THEY    HAVE  DETERMINED. 

WHEN*  some  persons  have  heard  these  words,  that  a  man 
ou^lit  to  be  constant  (firm),  and  that  the  will  is  naturally 
frt;c  and  not  subject  to  compulsion,  but  that  all  other 
things  are  subject  to  hindrance,  to  slavery,  and  are  in  the 
power  of  others,  they  suppose  that  they  ought  without 
deviation  to  abide  by  everything  which  they  have  deter- 
mined. But  in  the  first  place  that  which  has  been  deter- 
mined ought  to  be  sound  (true).  I  require  tone  (sinews) 
in  the  body,  but  such  as  exists  in  a  healthy  body,  in  an 
athletic  body  ;  but  if  it  is  plain  to  me  that  you  have  the 
tone  of  a  frenzied  man  and  you  boast  of  it,  I  shall  say  to 
you,  man,  seek  the  physician  :  this  is  not  tone,  but  atony 
(deficiency  in  right  tone).  In  a  different  way  something 
of  the  same  kind  is  felt  by  those  who  listen  to  these  dis- 
courses in  a  wrong  manner  ;  which  was  the  case  with  one  of 
my  companions  who  for  no  reason  resolved  to  starve  him- 
self to  death.  I  heard  of  it  when  it  was  the  third  day  of 
his  abstinence  from  food  and  I  went  to  inquire  what  had 
happened.  I  have  resolved,  he  said.  But  still  tell  me 
what  it  was  which  induced  you  to  resolve  ;  for  if  you  have 
resolved  rightly,  we  shall  sit  with  you  and  assist  you  to  de- 
part; but  if  you  have  made  an  unreasonable  resolution, 
chatige  your  mind.  We  ought  to  keep  to  our  determina- 
tions. What  are  you  doing,  man  ?  We  ought  to  keep  not 
to  all  our  determinations,  but  to  those  which  are  right ;  for 
if  you  are  now  persuaded  that  it  is  right,  do  not  change 


»57 

your  mind,  if  you  think  fit,  but  persist  and  say,  we  ought 
to  abide  by  our  determinations.  Will  you  not  make  tin- 
beginning  and  lay  the  foundation  in  an  inquiry  whether 
the  determination  is  sound  or  not  sound,  and  so  then  build 
on  it  firmness  and  security  ?  But  if  you  lay  a  rotten  and 
ruinous  foundation,  will  not  your  miserable  little  building 
fall  down  the  sooner,  the  more  and  the  stronger  are  the 
materials  which  you  shall  lay  on  it  ?  Without  any  reason 
would  you  withdraw  from  us  out  of  life  a  man  who  is  a 
friend,  and  a  companion,  a  citizen  of  the  same  city,  both 
the  great  and  the  small  city.*  Then  while  you  are  com- 
mitting murder  and  destroying  a  man  who  has  done  no 
wrong,  do  you  say  that  you  ought  to  abide  by  your  deter- 
minations ?  And  if  it  ever  in  any  way  came  into  your  head 
to  kill  me,  ought  you  to  abide  by  your  determinations  ? 

Now  this  man  was  with  difficulty  persuaded  to  change 
his  mind.  But  it  is  impossible  to  convince  some  persons 
at  present;  so  that 'I  seem  now  to  know,  what  I  did  not 
know  before,  the  meaning  of  the  common  saying,  That  you 
can  neither  persuade  nor  break  a  fool.t  May  it  never  be 
my  lot  to  have  a  wise  fool  for  my  friend  :  nothing  is  more 
untractable.  "  I  am  determined,"  the  man  says.  Madmen 
are  also  ;  but  the  more  firmly  they  form  a  judgment  on 
things  which  do  not  exist,  the  more  ellebore  J  they  re- 
quire. Will  you  not  act  like  a  sick  man  and  call  in  the 
physician  ?  I  am  sick,  master,  help  me  ;  consider  what  I 

*The  great  city  is  the  world. 

t  The  meaning  is  that  you  cannot  lead  a  fool  from  his  purpose  either 
by  words  or  force.  "  A  wise  fool"  must  mean  a  fool  who  thinks  him- 
self wise  :  and  such  we  sometimes  set-.  "  Though  thou  shouldst  bray  a 
fool  in  the  mortar  among  wheat  with  a  pestle,  yet  will  not  his  foolish- 
ness depart  from  him."  1'roverbs  xxvii.  22. 

{  Kllebore  was  a  medicine  used  in  madness.  Horace  says,  Sat.  ii.  j, 
82— 

panda  est  ellebori  multo  pars  maxima  avaris. 


1 5  8 

must  do :  it  is  my  duty  to  obey  you.  So  it  is  here  also  :  I 
know  not  what  1  ought  to  do,  but  I  am  come  to  learn.  Not 
so  ;  but  speak  to  me  about  other  things  :  upon  this  I  have 
determined.  What  other  things  ?  for  what  is  greater  and 
more  useful  than  for  you  to  'be  persuaded  that  it  is  not 
sufficient  to  have  made  your  determination  and  not  to 
change  it.  This  is  the  tone  (energy)  of  madness,  not  of 
health.  I  will  die,  if  you  compel  me  to  this.  VVhy,  man  ? 
What  has  happened?  I  have  determined — I  have  had  a 
lucky  escape  that  you  have  not  determined  to  kill  me — I 
take  no  money.*  Why  ?  I  have  determined — Be  assured 
that  with  the  very  tone  (energy)  which  you  now  use  in  re- 
fusing to  take,  there  is  nothing  to  hinder  you  at  some  time 
from  inclining  without  reason  to  take  money  and  then  say- 
ing, I  have  determined.  As  in  a  distempered  body,  subject 
to  defluxions.  the  humor  inclines  sometimes  to  these  parts, 
and  then  to  those,  so  too  a  sickly  soul  knows  not  which  waj 
to  incline  :  but  if  to  this  inclination  and  movement  there  is 
added  a  tone  (obstinate  resolution),  then  the  evil  becomes 
past  help  and  cure. 

*  "  Epictetus  seems  in  this  discussion  to  be  referring  to  some  professor, 
who  had  declared  that  he  would  not  take  money  from  his  hearers,  and 
then,  indirectly  at  least,  had  blamed  our  philosopher  for  receiving  some 
fee  from  his  hearers."  Schweig. 


EPICTETUS. 


'59 


CHAPTER  XVI. 

THAT  WE  DO   NOT  STRIVE  TO  USE  OUR  OPINIONS  ABOUT 
GOOD   AND    EVIL. 

WHERE  is  the  good  ?  In  the  will.*  Where  is  the  evil  ? 
In  the  will.  Where  is  neither  of  them?  In  those  things 
•which  are  independent  of  the  will.  Well  then  ?  Does  any 
one  among  us  think  of  these  lessons  out  of  the  schools  ? 
Does  any  one  meditate  (strive)  by  himself  to  give  an  answer 
to  things  f  as  in  the  case  of  questions  ?  Is  it  day  ?  Yes. 
Is  it  night?  No.  Well,  is  the  number  of  stars  even  ?  \  I 
cannot  say.  When  money  is  shown  (offered)  to  you,  have 
you  studied  to  make  the  proper  answer,  that  money  is  not  a 
good  thing  ?  Have  you  practiced  yourself  in  these  answers, 
or  only  against  sophisms  ?  Why  do  you  wonder  then  if  in 
the  cases  which  you  have  studied,  in  those  you  have  im- 
proved ;  but  in  those  which  you  have  not  studied,  in  those 
you  remain  the  same  ?  When  the  rhetorician  knows  that  he 
has  written  well,  that  he  has  committed  to  memory  what  lie 
has  written,  and  brings  an  agreeable  voice,  why  is  he  still 
anxious  ?  Because  he  is  not  satisfied  with  having  studied. 
What  then  does  he  want  ?  To  be  praised  by  the  audience  ? 
For  the  purpose  then  of  being  able  to  practice  declamation 
he  has  been  disciplined  :  but  with  respect  to  praise  and 

*See  ii.  to,  25. 

t  "  To  answer  to  things  "  means  to  act  in  a  way  suitable  to  circum- 
stances, to  be  a  match  for  them. 

\  Perhaps  this  was  a  common  puzzle.  The  man  answers  right ;  he 
cannot  say. 


,r.o  /•:/•/(•'/•/•:  rrs. 

blame  he  has  not  been  disciplined.  For  when  did  he  hear 
from  any  one  what  praise  is,  what  blame  is,  what  the  nature 
of  each  is,  what  kind  of  praise  should  be  sought,  or  what 
kind  of  blame  should  be  shunned  ?  And  when  did  he  prac- 
tice this  discipline  which  follows  these  words  (things)  ?  * 
Why  then  do  you  still  wonder,  if  in  the  matters  which  a  man 
has  learned,  there  he  surpasses  others,  and  in  those  in  which 
he  has  not  been  disciplined,  there  he  is  the  same  with  the  many. 
So  the  lute  player  knows  how  to  play,  sings  well,  and  has  a  fine 
dress,  and  yet  he  trembles  when  he  enters  on  the  stage  ; 
for  these  matters  he  understands,  but  he  does  not  know 
what  a  crowd  is,  nor  the  shouts  of  a  crowd,  nor  what  ridicule 
is.  Neither  does  he  know  what  anxiety  is,  whether  it  is  our 
work  or  the  work  of  another,  whether  it  is  possible  to  stop  it 
or  not.  For  this  reason  if  he  has  been  praised,  he  leaves  the 
theater  puffed  up,  but  if  he  has  been  ridiculed,  the  swollen 
bladder  has  been  punctured  and  subsides. 

This  is  the  case  also  with  ourselves.  What  do  we  admire  ? 
Externals.  About  what  things  are  we  busy?  Externals. 
And  have  we  any  doubt  then  why  we  fear  or  why  we  are  anx- 
ious? What  then  happens  when  we  think  the  things, 
which  are  coming  on  us,  to  be  evils  ?  It  is  not  in  our  power 
not  to  be  afraid,  it  is  not  in  our  power  not  to  be  anxious. 
Then  we  say,  Lord  God,  how  shall  I  not  be  anxious  ?  Fool, 
have  you  not  hands,  did  not  God  make  them  for  you  ?  Sit 
down  now  and  pray  that  your  nose  may  not  run.f  Wipe 
yourself  rather  and  do  not  blame  him.  Well  then,  has  he 
given  to  you  nothing  in  the  present  case  ?  Has  he  not  given 
to  you  endurance  ?  has  he  not  given  to  you  magnanimity  ? 
has  he  not  given  to  you  manliness  ?  When  you  have  such 

*That  is  which  follows  praise  or  blame.  He  seems  to  mean  making 
the  proper  use  of  praise  or  of  blame. 

t  By  the  words  "Sit  down  "  Epictetus  indicates  the  man's  baseness 
and  indolence,  who  wishes  God  to  do  for  him  that  which  lie  can  do  him- 
self and  ought  to  do, 


A/VC'77-./Y'.V.  161 

hands,  do  you  still  look  for  one  who  shall  wipe  your  nose  ? 
But  we  neither  study  these  things  nor  care  for  them.  Give 
me  a  man  who  cares  how  he  shall  do  anything,  not 
for  the  obtaining  of  a  thing,  but  who  cares  about  his  own 
energy.  What  man,  when  he  is  walking  about,  cares  for 
his  own  energy  ?  who,  when  he  is  deliberating,  cares  about 
his  own  deliberation,  and  not  about  obtaining  that  about 
which  he  deliberates  ?  And  if  he  succeeds,  he  is  elated  and 
says,  How  well  we  have  deliberated  ;  did  I  not  tell  you, 
brother,  that  it  is  impossible,  when  we  have  thought  about 
anything,  that  it  should  not  turn  out  thus  ?  But  if  the  thing 
should  turn  out  otherwise,  the  wretched  man  is  humbled  ; 
he  knows  not  even  what  to  say  about  what  has  taken  place. 
Who  among  us  for  the  sake  of  this  matter  has  consulted  a 
seer  ?  Who  among  us  as  to  his  actions  has  not  slept  in  in- 
difference ?  Who  ?  Give  (name)  to  me  one  that  I  may  see 
the  man  whom  I  have  long  been  looking  for,  who  is  truly 
noble  and  ingenuous,  whether  young  or  old  ;  name  him.* 

*"  It  is  observable,  that  this  most  practical  of  all  the  philosophers 
owns  his  endeavors  met  with  little  or  no  success  among  his  scholars. 
The  Apostles  speak  a  very  different  language  in  their  epistles  to  the 
first  converts  of  Christianity:  and  the  Acts  of  the  Apostles,  and  all  the 
monuments  of  the  primitive  ages,  bear  testimony  to  the  reformation  of 
manners  produced  by  the  Gospel.  This  difference  of  success  might  in- 
deed justly  be  expected  from  the  difference  of  the  two  systems.''  Mrs. 
Carter. — I  have  not  quoted  this  note  of  Mrs.  Carter,  because  I  think 
that  it  is  true.  We  do  not  know  what  was  the  effect  of  the  teaching  of 
Epictetus,  unless  this  passage  informs  us,  if  Mrs.  Carter  has  drawn  a 
right  inference  from  it.  The  language  of  Paul  to  the  Corinthians  i.s  not 
very  different  from  that  of  Epictetus,  and  he  speaks  very  unfavorably  of 
some  of  his  Corinthian  converts.  We  may  allow  that  "a  reformation 
of  manners  was  produced  by  the  Gospel "  in  many  of  the  converts  to 
Christianity,  but  there  is  no  evidence  that  this  reformation  was  produced 
in  all :  and  there  is  evidence  that  it  was  not.  The  corruptions  in  the 
early  Christian  church  and  in  subsequent  ages  are  a  proof  that  the  re- 
forms: made  by  the  Gospel  were  neither  universal  nor  permanent;  and 
tins  is  the  result  which  our  knowledge  of  human  nature  would  lead  us 
to  expect. 
II 


j62  EP1CTETUS. 

Why  then  are  we  still  surprised,  if  we  are  well  practiced 
in  thinking  about  matters  (any  given  subject),  but  in  our  acts 
are  low,  without  decency,  worthless,  cowardly,  impatient  of 
labor,  altogether  bad  ?  For  we  do  not  care  about  things  nor 
do  we  study  them.  But  if  we  had  feared  not  death  or 
banishment,  but  fear  itself,*  we  should  have  studied  not  to 
fall  into  those  things  which  appear  to  us  evils.  Now  in  the 
school  we  are  irritable  and  wordy  ;  and  if  any  little  question 
arises  about  any  of  these  things,  we  are  able  to  examine  them 
fully.  But  drag  us  to  practice,  and  you  will  find  us  miserably 
shipwrecked.  Let  some  disturbing  appearance  come  on  us, 
and  you  will  know  what  we  have  been  studying  and  in  what 
we  have  been  exercising  ourselves.  Consequently  through 
want  of  discipline  we  are  always  adding  something  to  the  ap- 
pearance and  representing  things  to  be  greater  than  what  they 
are.  For  instance  as  to  myself,  when  I  am  on  a  voyage  and 
look  down  on  the  deep  sea,  or  look  round  on  it  and  see  no 
land,  I  am  out  of  my  mind  and  imagine  that  I  must  drink  up 
all  this  water  if  I  am  wrecked,  and  it  does  not  occur  to  me 
that  three  pints  are  enough.  What  then  disturbs  me  ? 
The  sea  ?  No,  but  my  opinion.  Again,  when  an  earthquake 
shall  happen,  I  imagine  that  the  city  is  going  to  fall  on  me  ; 
but  is  not  one  little  stone  enough  to  knock  my  brains  out  ? 

What  then  are  the  things  which  are  heavy  on  us  and  dis- 
turb us?  What  else  than  opinions?  What  else  than  opinions 
lies  heavy  upon  him  who  goes  away  and  leaves  his  companions 
and  friends  and  places  and  habits  of  life  ?  Now  little  chil- 
dren, for  instance,  when  they  cry  on  the  nurse  leaving  them 
for  a  short  time,  forget  their  sorrow  if  they  receive  a  small 
cake.  Do  you  choose  then  that  we  should  compare  you  to 
little  children  ?  No,  by  Zeus,  for  I  do  not  wish  to  be  paci- 
fied by  a  small  cake,  but  by  right  opinions.  And  what  are 
these  ?  Such  as  a  man  ought  to  study  all  clay,  and  not  to  be 
affected  by  anything  that  is  not  his  own,  neither  by  com- 
*  See  ii.  i,  13. 


KP/CTETUS.  163 

pan  ion  nor  place  nor  gymnasia,  and  not  even  by  his  own 
body,  but  to  remember  the  law  and  to  have  it  before  his 
eyes.  And  what  is  the  divine  law?  To  keep  a  man's  own, 
not  to  claim  that  which  belongs  to  others,  but  to  use  what  is 
given,  and  when  it  is  not  given,  not  to  desire  it ;  and  when 
a  thing  is  taken  away,  to  give  it  up  readily  and  immediately, 
and  to  be  thankful  for  the  time  that  a  man  has  had  the  use 
of  it,  if  you  would  not  cry  for  your  nurse  and  mamma.  For 
what  matter  does  it  make  by  what  thing  a  man  is  subdued, 
and  on  what  he  depends  ?•  In  what  respect  are  you  better 
than  he  who  cries  for  a  girl,  if  you  grieve  for  a  little  gymna- 
sium, and  little  porticoes  and  young  men  and  such  places  of 
amusement  ?  Another  comes  and  laments  that  he  shall  no 
longer  drink  the  water  of  Dirce.  Is  the  Marcian  water  worse 
than  that  of  Dirce  ?  But  I  was  used  to  the  water  of  Dirce.* 
And  you  in  turn  will  be  used  to  the  other.  Then  if  you  be- 
come attached  to  this  also,  cry  for  this  too,  and  try  to  make 
a  verse  like  the  verse  of  Euripides, 

The  hot  baths  of  Nero  and  the  Marcian  water. 

See  how  tragedy  is  made  when  common  things  happen  to 
silly  men. 

When  then  shall  I  see  Athens  again  and  the  Acropolis  ? 
Wretch,  are  you  not  content  with  what  you  see  daily  ?  have 
you  anything  better  or  greater  to  see  than  the  sun,  the  moon, 
the  stars,  the  whole  earth,  the  sea  ?  But  if  indeed  you  com- 
prehend him  who  administers  the  \Vhole,  and  carry  him 
about  in  yourself,  do  you  still  desire  small  stones,  and  a 
beautiful  rock  ?  t  When  then  you  are  going  to  leave  the  sun 

*  Dirce,  a  pure  stream  in  Boeotia,  which  flows  into  the  Ismenus.  The 
Marcian  water  is  the  Marcian  aqueduct  at  Rome,  which  was  con- 
structed 15.  (.'..  144,  and  was  the  best  water  that  Rome  had.  Some  of 
the  arches  of  this  aqueduct  exist.  The  "bright  stream  of  Dirce  "  is 
spoken  of  in  the  Hercules  Furens  of  Euripides  (v.  573). 

t  The  "  small  stones  "  are  supposed  to  be  the  marbles  which  decorated 
Athens,  and  the  rock  to  be  the  Acropolis. 


164  /;/'/t  •/•/•;  7  r.v. 

itself  and  the  moon,  what  will  you  do?  will  yon  sit  and  weep 
like  children  ?  \Vell,  what  have  you  been  doing  in  the 
school  ?  what  did  you  hear,  what  did  you  learn  ?  why  did 
you  write  yourself  a  philosopher,  when  you  might  have  writ- 
ten the  truth  ;  as,  "  I  made  certain  introductions,  and  I  read 
Chrysippus,  but  I  did  not  even  approach  the  door  of  a 
philosopher."  For  how  should  I  possess  anything  of  the 
kind  which  Socrates  possessed,  who  died  as  he  did,  who 
lived  as  he  did,  or  anything  such  as  Diogenes  possessed  ? 
Do  you  think  that  any  one  of  such  men  wept  or  grieved,  be- 
cause he  was  not  going  to  see  a  certain  man,  or  a  certain 
woman,  nor  to  be  in  Athens  or  in  Corinth,  but,  if  it  should 
so  happen,  in  Susa  or  in  Ecbatana  ?  For  if  a  man  can  quit 
the  banquet  when  he  chooses,  and  no  longer  amuse  himself, 
does  he  still  stay  and  complain,  and  does  he  not  stay,  as  at 
any  amusement,  only  so  long  as  he  is  pleased  ?  Such  a  man, 
I  suppose,  would  endure  perpetual  exile  or  to  be  condemned 
to  death.  Will  you  not  be  weaned  now,  like  children,  and 
take  more  solid  food,  and  not  cry  after  mammas  and  nurses, 
which  are  the  lamentations  of  old  women  ?  But  if  I  go  away, 
I  shall  cause  them  sorrow.  You  cause  them  sorrow  ?  By 
no  means ;  but  that  will  cause  them  sorrow  which  also 
causes  you  sorrow,  opinion.  What  have  you  to  do  then  ? 
Take  away  your  own  opinion,  and  if  these  women  are  wise, 
they  will  take  away  their  own  :  if  they  do  not,  they  will  la- 
ment through  their  own  fault. 

My  man,  as  the  proverb  says,  make  a  desperate  effort  on 
behalf  of  tranquillity  of  mind,  freedom  and  magnanimity. 
Lift  up  your  head  at  last  as  released  from  slavery.  Dare  to 
look  up  to  God  and  say.  Deal  with  me  for  the  future  as  thou 
wilt  ;  I  am  of  the  same  mind  as  thou  art ;  I  am  thine  :  I 
refuse  nothing  that  pleases  thee  :  lead  me  where  thou  wilt : 
clothe  me  in  any  dress  thou  choosest :  is  it  thy  will  that  I 
should  hold  the  office  of  a  magistrate,  that  I  should  be  in 
the  condition  of  a  private  man,  stay  here  or  be  an  exile,  be 


165 

poor,  be  rich  ?  I  will  make  thy  defense  to  men  in  behalf  of 
all  these  conditions.*  I  will  show  the  nature  of  each  thing 
what  it  is.  You  will  not  do  so ;  but  sit  in  an  ox's  belly,  and 
wait  for  your  mamma  till  she  shall  feed  you.  Who  would 
Hercules  have  been,  if  he  had  sat  at  home  ?  He  would  have 
been  Eurystheus  and  not  Hercules.  Well,  and  in  his  travels 
through  the  world  how  many  intimates  and  how  many  friends 
had  he  ?  But  nothing  more  dear  to  him  than  God  ?  For 
this  reason  it  was  believed  that  he  was  the  son  of  God,  and 
he  was.  In  obedience  to  God  then  he  went  about  purging 
away  injustice  and  lawlessness.  But  you  are  not  Hercules 
and  you  are  not  able  to  purge  away  the  wickedness  of 
others ;  nor  yet  are  you  Theseus,  able  to  purge  away  the  evil 
things  of  Attica.  Clear  away  your  own.  From  yourself, 
from  your  thoughts  cast  away  instead  of  Procrustes  and 
Sciron,|  sadness,  fear,  desire,  envy,  malevolence,  avarice, 
effeminacy,  intemperance.  But  it  is  not  possible  to  eject 
these  things  otherwise  than  by  looking  to  God  only,  by  fixing 
your  affections  on  him  only,  by  being  consecrated  to  his 
commands.  But  if  you  choose  anything  else,  you  will  with 
sighs  and  groans  be  compelled  to  follow  £  what  is  stronger 
than  yourself,  always  seeking  tranquillity  and  never  able  to 
find  it ;  for  you  seek  tranquillity  there  where  it  is  not,  and 
you  neglect  to  seek  it  where  it  is. 

*"  There  are  innumerable  passages  in  St.  Paul,  which,  in  reality,  bear 
that  noble  testimony  which  Kpictetus  here  requires  in  his  imaginary 
character.  Such  are  those  in  which  he  glories  in  tribulation ;  speaks 
with  an  heroic  contempt  of  life,  when  set  in  competition  with  the  per- 
formance of  his  duties ;  rejoices  in  bonds  and  imprisonments,  and  the 
view  of  his  approaching  martyrdom  ;  and  represents  afflictions  as  a  proof 
of  ( 'rod's  love.  See  Acts  xx.  23,  24  ;  Rom.  v.  3,  viii.  38,  39;  2  Tim.  iv. 
6." — Mrs.  Carter. 

t  Procrustes  and  Sciron,  two  robbers  who  infested  Attica  and  were 
destroyed  by  Theseus,  as  Plutarch  tells  in  his  life  of  Theseus. 

{  Antoninus,  x.  28,  "  only  to  the  rational  animal  is  it  given  to  follow 
voluntarily  what  happens  ;  but  simply  to  follow  is  a  necessity  imposed 
on  all,"  <'«<mpar«:  Seneca,  (,)ua:.-<t.  Nat.  ii.  51;. 


,66  EPICTETUS. 


CHAPTER  XVII. 

HOW   WE    MUST   ADAPT    PRECONCEPTIONS    TO   PARTICULAR 
CASES. 

WHAT  is  the  first  business  of  him  who  philosophizes  ?  To 
throw  away  self-conceit.*  For  it  is  impossible  for  a  man  to 
begin  to  learn  that  which  he  thinks  that  he  knows.  As  to 
things  then  which  ought  to  be  done  and  ought  not  to  be  done, 
and  good  and  bad,  and  beautiful  and  ugly,  all  of  us  talking 
of  them  at  random  go  to  the  philosophers  ;  and  on  these 
matters  we  praise,  we  censure,  we  accuse,  we  blame,  we 
judge  and  determine  about  principles  honorable  and  dis- 
honorable. But  why  do  we  go  to  the  philosophers  ?  Because 
\re  wish  to  learn  what  we  do  not  think  that  we  know.  And 
what  is  this  ?  Theorems.  For  we  wish  to  learn  what 
philosophers  say  as  being  something  elegant  and  acute  ;  and 
some  wish  to  learn  that  they  may  get  profit  from  what  they 
learn.  It  is  ridiculous  then  to  think  that  a  person  wishes 
to  learn  one  thing,  and  will  learn  another  ;  or  further,  that 
a  man  will  make  proficiency  in  that  which  he  does  not  learn. 
But  the  many  are  deceived  by  this  which  deceived  also  the 
rhetorician  Theopompus,*  when  he  blames  even  Plato  for 
wishing  everything  to  be  defined.  For  what  does  he  say  ? 
Did  none  of  us  before  you  use  the  words  Good  or  Just,  or 

*  See  ii.  11,  i,  and  iii.  14,  S. 

t  This  rhetorician  or  orator,  as  Epictetus  names  him,  appears  to  be 
the  same  person  as  Theopompus  of  Chios,  the  historian. 


EPICTETUS.  167 

do  we  utter  the  sounds  in  an  unmeaning  and  empty  way 
without  understanding  what  they  severally  signify  ?  Now 
who  tells  you,  Theopompus,  that  we  had  not  natural  notion* 
of  each  of  these  things  and  preconceptions  (trpoX^eis)  ?  But 
it  is  not  possible  to  adapt  preconceptions  to  their  cor- 
respondent objects  if  we  have  not  distinguished  (analyzed) 
them,  and  inquired  what  object  must  be  subjected  to  each 
preconception.  You  may  make  the  same  charge  against 
physicians  also.  For  who  among  us  did  not  use  the  words 
healthy  and  unhealthy  before  Hippocrates  lived,  or  did  we 
utter  these  words  as  empty  sounds  ?  For  we  have  also  a 
certain  preconception  of  health,*  but  we  are  not  able  to 
adapt  it.  For  this  reason  one  says,  abstain  from  food  ; 
another  says,  give  food ;  another  says,  bleed  :  and  another 
says,  use  cupping.  What  is  the  reason  ?  is  it  any  other  than 
that  a  man  cannot  properly  adapt  the  preconception  of 
health  to  particulars  ? 

So  it  is  in  this  matter  also,  in  the  things  which  concern 
life.  Who  among  us  does  not  speak  of  good  and  bad,  of 
useful  and  not  useful  ;  for  who  among  us  has  not  a  precon- 
ception of  each  of  these  things?  Is  it  then  a  distinct  and 
perfect  preconception?  Show  this.  How  shall  J  show 
this  ?  Adapt  the  preconception  properly  to  the  particular 
things.  Plato,  for  instance,  subjects  definitions  to  the  pre- 
conception of  the  useful,  but  you  to  the  preconception  of  the 
useless.  Is  it  possible  then  that  both  of  you  are  right? 
How  is  it  po.ssible  ?  Does  not  one  man  adapt  the  precon- 
ception of  good  to  the  matter  of  wealth,  and  another  not  to 
wealth,  but  to  the  matter  of  pleasure  and  to  that  of  health  ? 
For,  generally,  if  all  of  us  who  use  those  words  know  sutti- 

*"Tliat  Kpictetus  does  not  quite  correctly  compare  the  notion  of 
what  if  wholesome  to  the  human  body  with  the  preconceived  notion 
(anticipata  notione)  of  moral  good  and  bad,  will  be  apparent  to  those 
who  have  carefully  inquired  into  the  various  origin  uud  principles  of  our 
notions."  Schweig. 


1 68  EPICTETUS. 

ciently  each  of  them,  and  need  no  diligence  in  resolving 
(making  distinct)  the  notions  of  the  preconceptions,  why  do 
we  differ,  why  do  we  quarrel,  why  do  we  blame  one  another : 

And  why  do  I  now  allege  this  contention  with  one  another 
and  speak  of  it  ?  If  you  yourself  properly  adapt  your  pre- 
conceptions, why  are  you  unhappy,  why  are  you  hindered  ? 
Let  us  omit  at  present  the  second  topic  about  the  pursuits 
and  the  study  of  the  duties  which  relate  to  them.  Let  us 
omit  also  the  third  topic,  which  relates  to  the  assents  :  I  give 
up  to  you  these  two  topics.  Let  us  insist  upon  the  first, 
which  presents  an  almost  obvious  demonstration  that  we  do 
not  properly  adapt  the  preconceptions.*  Do  you  now  desire 
that  which  is  possible  and  that  which  is  possible  to  you  ? 
Why  then  are  you  hindered  ?  why  are  you  unhappy  ?  Do 
you  not  now  try  to  avoid  the  unavoidable  ?  Why  then  do 
you  fall  in  with  anything  which  you  would  avoid  ?  Why  are 
you  unfortunate  ?  Why,  when  you  desire  a  thing,  does  it 
not  happen,  and,  when  you  do  not  desire  it,  does  it  happen  ? 
For  this  is  the  greatest  proof  of  unhappines.s  and  misery  : 
I  wish  for  something,  and  it  does  not  happen.  Ami  what 
is  more  wretched  than  I  ;  j 

It  was  because  she  could  not  endure  this  that  Medea  came 
to  murder  her  children  :  an  act  of  a  noble  spirit  in  this  view 
at  least,  for  she  had  a  just  opinion  what  it  is  for  a  tiling  not 
to  succeed  which  a  person  wishes.  Then  she  says,  "Thus  I 
shall  be  avenged  on  him  (my  husband )  who  has  wronged  and 
insulted  me  ;  and  what  shall  I  gain  if  he  is  punished  thus  ? 
how  then  shall  it  be  done?  I  shall  kill  my  children,  but  I 
shall  punish  myself  also  :  and  what  do  1  care  ?  "f  This  is 
the  aberration  of  soul  which  possesses  great  energy.  For 

*  The  topic  of  the  desires  and  aversions.     Sec.  iii.  c.  2. 
t  Compare  i.  c.  27,  10. 

\  This  is  the  meaning  of  what  Medea  says  in  the  Medea  of  Kuripidt-s 
EpictetUS  docs  not  give  the  wolds  of  the  poet. 


Kr/CTKTl'S.  169 

she  did  not  know  wherein  lies  the  doing  of  that  which  we 
wish ;  that  you  cannot  get  this  from  without,  nor  yet  by  the 
alteration  and  new  adaptation  of  things.  Do  not  desire  the 
man  (Jason,  Medea's  husband),  and  nothing  which  you  de- 
sire will  fail  to  happen  :  do  not  obstinately  desire  that  he 
shall  live  with  you  :  do  not  desire  to  remain  in  Corinth  ;  and 
in  a  word  desire  nothing  than  that  which  God  wills.  And 
who  shall  hinder  you  ?  who  shall  compel  you  ?  No  man 
shall  compel  you  any  more  than  he  shall  compel  Zeus. 

When  you  have  such  a  guide  *  and  your  wishes  and  de- 
sires are  the  same  as  his,  why  do  you  still  feel  disappoint- 
ment ?  Give  up  your  desire  to  wealth  and  your  aversion  to 
poverty,  and  you  will  be  disappointed  in  the  one,  you  will 
fall  into  the  other.  Well  give  them  up  to  health,  and  you 
will  be  unfortunate  :  give  them  up  to  magistracies,  honors, 
country,  friends,  children,  in  a  word  to  any  of  the  things 
which  are  not  in  man's  power  (and  you  will  be  unfortunate). 
But  give  them  up  to  Zeus  and  to  the  rest  of  the 
gods ;  surrender  them  to  the  gods,  let  the  gods  govern, 
let  your  desire  and  .aversion  be  ranged  on  the  side 
of  the  gods,  and  wherein  will  you  be  any  longer  unhappy  ?  t 
But  if,  lazy  wretch,  you  envy,  and  complain,  and  are  jealous, 
and  fear,  and  never  cease  for  a  single  day  complaining  both 
of  yourself  and  of  the  gods,  why  do  you  still  speak  of 
being  educated?  What  kind  of  an  education,  man?  Do 
you  mean  that  you  have  been  employed  about  sophistical 
syllogisms  ?  T  Will  you  not,  if  it  is  possible,  unlearn  all 
these  things  and  begin  from  the  beginning,  and  see  at  the 
same  time  that  hitherto  you  have  not  even  touched  the 
matter;  and  then  commencing  from  this  foundation,  will 
you  not  build  up  all  that  comes  after,  so  that  nothing  may 

*  Compare  iv.  7,  20. 

I  "  it  you  would  subject  all  things  to  yourself,  subject  yourself  to  rea- 
son." Seneca,  Ep.  37.  t  See  i.  7,  i. 


,70  AVVr  TE  Tf.'S. 

happen  which  you  do  not  choose,  and  nothing  shall  fail  to 
happen  which  you  do  choose  ? 

Give  me  out;  young  man  who  has  come  to  the  school  with 
this  intention,  who  is  become  a  champion  for  this  matter  and 
says,  "  I  give  up  everything  els;?,  and  it  is  enough  for  me  if  it 
shall  ever  be  in  my  power  to  pass  my  life  free  from  hindrance 
and  free  from  trouble,  and  to  stretch  out  (present)  my 
neck  to  all  things  like  a  free  man,  and  to  look  up  to  heaven 
as  a  friend  of  God,  and  fear  nothing  that  can  happen."  l.--t 
any  of  you  point  out  such  a  man  that  I  may  say,  "  Come, 
young  man,  into  the  possession  of  that  which  is  your  own, 
for  it  is  your  destiny  to  adorn  philosophy  :  yours  are  these 
possessions,  yours  these  books,  yours  these  discourses." 
Then  when  he  shall  have  labored  sufficiently  and  exercised 
himself  in  this  part  of  the  matter  (rfaov},  let  him  come  to  me 
again  and  say,  "  I  desire  to  be  free  from  passion  and  free  from 
perturbation  ;  and  I  wish  as  a  pious  man  and  a  philosopher  and 
u  diligent  person  to  know  what  is  my  duty  to  the  gods,  what 
to  my  parents,  what  to  my  brothers,  what  to  my  country,  what 
to  strangers."  (I  say)  "  Come  also  to  the  second  matter 
(T&TTOV):  this  also  is  yours."  "  But  I  have  now  sufficiently 
studied  the  second  part  (riyirov)  also,  and  I  would  gladly  be 
secure  and  unshaken,  and  not  only  when  I  am  awake,  but 
also  when  I  am  asleep,  and  when  I  am  filled  with  wine,  and 
when  I  am  melancholy."  Man,  you  are  a  god,  you  have  great 
designs. 

No  :  but  I  wish  to  understand  what  Chrysippus  says  in 
his  treatise  of  the  Pseudomenos  *  (the  Liar).  Will  you 
not  hang  yourself,  wretch,  with  such  your  intention  ?  And 

*  The  Pseudomenos  was  a  treatise  by  Chrysippus  (Diog.  Laert.  vii. 
Chrysippus).  "  The  Pseudomenos  was  a  famous  problem  among  the 
Stoics,  and  it  is  this.  When  a  person  says,  I  lie  ;  doth  he  lie,  or  doth  he 
not  ?  If  he  lies,  he  speaks  truth  :  if  he  speaks  truth,  he  lies.  The 
philosophers  composed  many  books  on  this  difficulty.  Chrysippus 
wrote  six.  Philetas  wasted  himself  in  studying  to  answer  it." — Mrs. 
Carter. 


/•.we  77'  77  :\. 


71 


what  good  will  it  do  you  ?  You  will  read  the  whole  with 
sorrow,  and  you  will  speak  to  others  trembling.  Thus 
you  also  do.  "  Do  you  wish  me,  *  brother,  to  read  to 
you;  and  you  to  me?"  You  write  excellently,  my  man; 
and  you  also  excellently  in  the  style  of  Xenophon,  and  you 
in  the  style  of  Plato,  and  you  in  the  style  of  Antisthenes. 
Tl^n  having  told  your  dreams  to  one  another  you  return 
the  same  things  :  your  desires  are  the  same,  your 
aversions  the  same,  your  pursuits  are  the  same,  and  your 
designs  and  purposes,  you  wish  for  the  same  things  and 
work  for  the  same.  In  the  next  place  you  do  not  even 
seek  for  one  to  give  you  advice,  but  you  are  vexed  if  you 
hear  such  things  (as  I  say).  Then  you  say,  "  An  ill- 
natured  old  fellow :  when  I  was  going  away,  he  did  not 
weep  nor  did  he  say,  Into  what  danger  you  are  going:  if 
you  come  off  safe,  my  child,  I  will  burn  lights.f  This  is 
what  a  good-natured  man  would  do."  It  will  be  a  great 
thing  for  you  if  you  do  return  safe,  and  it  will  be  worth 
while  to  burn  lights  for  such  a  person  :  for  you  ought  to  be 
immortal  and  exempt  from  disease. 

Casting  away  then,  as  I  say,  this  conceit  of  thinking  that 
we  know  something  useful,  we  must  come  to  philosophy  as 
we  apply  to  geometry,  and  to  music  :  but  if  we  do  not,  we 
shall  not  even  approach  to  proficiency,  though  we  read  all 
the  collections  and  commentaries  of  Chrysippus  and  those  of 
Antipater  and  Archedemus.t 

*Epictetus  is  ridiculing  the  men  who  compliment  one  another  on 
their  writings. 

t  Compare  i.  19,  4. 

}  As  to  Archedemus,  see  ii.  4,  1 1  ;  and  Antipater,  iL  19,  2. 


172 


EPIC'J'ETUS. 


CHAPTER  XVIII. 

HOW   WE   SHOULD   STRUCK  ILK    AtlAIXST   APPEARANCES. 

EVKRY  habit  and  faculty*  is  maintained  and  increased  by 
the  corresponding  actions:  the  habit  of  walking  by  walk- 
ing, the  habit  of  running  by  running.  If  you  would  be  a 
good  reader,  read  ;  if  a  writer,  write.  But  when  you  shall 
not  have  read  for  thirty  days  in  succession,  but  have  done 
something  else,  you  will  know  the  consequence.  In  the 
same  way,  if  you  shall  have  lain  down  ten  days,  get  up 
and  attempt  to  make  a  long  walk,  and  you  will  see  how 
your  legs  are  weakened.  Generally  then  if  you  would  make 
anything  a  habit,  do  it ;  if  you  would  not  make  it  a  habit, 
do  not  do  it,  but  accustom  yourself  to  do  something  else  in 
place  of  it. 

So  it  is  with  respect  to  the  affections  of  the  soul  :  when 
you  have  been  angry,  you  must  know  that  not  only  has  this 
evil  befallen  you,  but  that  you  have  also  increased  the  habit, 
and  in  a  manner  thrown  fuel  upon  fire.  When  you  have 
been  overcome  in  sexual  intercourse  with  a  person,  do  not 
reckon  this  single  defeat  only,  but  reckon  that  you  have  also 
nurtured,  increased  your  incontinence.  For  it  is  impossible 
for  habits  and  faculties,  some  of  them  not  to  be  produced, 
when  they  did  not  exist  before,  and  others  not  be  increased 
and  strengthened  by  corresponding  acts. 

In  this  manner  certainly,  as  philosophers  say,  also  dis- 
eases of  the  mind  grow  up.  For  when  you  have  once  de- 
sired money,  if  reason  be  applied  to  lead  to  a  perception  of 
the  evil,  the  desire  is  stopped,  and  the  ruling  faculty  of  our 

*See  iv.  c.  12. 


173 

mind  is  restored  to  the  original  authority.  But  if  you  apply 
no  means  of  cure,  it  no  longer  returns  to  the  same  state,  but 
being  again  excited  by  the  corresponding  appearance,  it  is 
inflamed  to  desire  quicker  than  before  :  and  when  this  takes 
place  continually,  it  is  henceforth  hardened  (made  callous), 
and  the  disease  of  the  mind  confirms  the  love  of  money. 
For  he  who  has  had  a  fever,  and  has  been  relieved  from 
it.  is  not  in  the  same  state  that  he  was  before,  unless  he  has 
been  completely  cured.  Something  of  the  kind  happens 
also  in  diseases  of  the  soul.  Certain  traces  and  blisters  are 
left  in  it,  and  unless  a  man  shall  completely  efface  them, 
when  he  is  again  lashed  on  the  same  places,  the  lash  will 
produce  not  blisters  (weals)  but  sores.  If  then  you  wish  not 
to  be  of  an  angry  temper,  do  not  feed  the  habit  :  throw 
nothing  on  it  which  will  increase  it :  at  first  keep  quiet,  and 
count  the  days  on  which  you  have  not  been  angry.  I  used 
to  be  in  passion  every  day;  now  every  second  day;  then 
every  third,  then  every  fourth.  But  if  you  have  intermitted 
thirty  days,  make  a  sacrifice  to  God.  For  the  habit  at  first 
begins  to  be  weakened,  and  then  is  completely  desti 
"  I  have  not  been  ve*xed  to-day,  nor  the  clay  atu-i  n. 
on  any  succeeding  day  during  two  or  three  months  but 
I  took  care  when  some  exciting  things  happened."  Be 
assured  that  you  are  in  a  good  way.  To-day  when  I  sa\v  a 
handsome  person,  I  did  not  say  to  myself,  I  wish  I  could  lie 
with  her,  and  Happy  is  her  husband  ;  for  he  who  says  this 
says,  Happy  is  her  adulterer  also.  Nor  do  I  picture  the  rest 
to  my  mind  ;  the  woman  present,  and  stripping  herself  and 
lying  down  by  my  side.  I  stroke  my  head  and  say,  \\t-ll 
done,  Epictetus,  you  have  solved  a  fine  little  sophism,  much 
finer  than  that  which  is  called  the  masUT  sophism.  And  if 
even  the  woman  is  willing,  and  gives  signs,  and  sends  mes- 
sages, and  if  she  also  fondle  me  and  come  close  to  me,  and 
I  should  abstain  and  IK-  victorious,  that  would  be  a  sophism 
beyond  that  v.hi.  h  !.->  named  the  Liar,  and  the  Unit-scent. 


•74 


EPICTK  rns. 


Over  sucli  a  victory  as  this  a  man  may  justly  be  proud  ;  not 
for  proposing  the  master  sophism. 

How  then  shall  this  be  done?  Be  willing  at  length  to  be 
approved  by  yourself,  be  willing  to  appear  beautiful  to  God, 
desire  to  be  in  purity  with  your  own  pure  self  and  with  God. 
Then  when  any  such  appearance  visits  you,  Plato  says,* 
Have  recourse  to  expiations,  go  a  suppliant  to  the  temples 
of  the  averting  deities.  It  is  even  sufficient  if  you  resort  to 
the  society  of  noble  and  just  men,  and  compare  yourself 
with  them,  whether  you  find  one  who  is  living  or  dead.  Go 
to  Socrates  and  see  him  lying  down  with  Alcibiades,  and 
mocking  his  beauty  :  consider  what  a  victory  he  at  last 
found  that  he  had  gained  over  himself  ;  what  an  Olympian 
victory  ;  in  what  number  he  stood  from  Hercules  ;  t  so  that, 
by  the  Gods,  one  may  justly  salute  him,  Hail,  wondrous 
man,  you  who  have  conquered  not  less  these  sorry  boxers 
and  pancratiasts,  nor  yet  those  who  are  like  them,  the  gladi- 
ators. By  placing  these  objects  on  the  other  side  you  will 
conquer  the  appearance  :  you  will  not  be  drawn  away  by  it. 
But  in  the  first  place  be  not  hurried  away  by  the  rapidity  of 
the  appearance,  but  say,  Appearances,  'wait  for  me  a  li'  : 
let  me  see  who  you  are.  and  what  you  are  about  :  \  let  me 
put  you  to  the  test.  And  then  do  not  allow  the  appearance 
to  leiul  you  on  and  draw  lively  pictures  of  the  things  which 
will  follow;  for  if  you  do,  it  will  carry  you  off  wherever  it 
pleases.  But  rather  bring  in  to  oppose  it  some  other  beauti- 

*  The  passage  is  in  Plato,  Laws.  ix.  p.  S;.}.  The  conclusion  is.  "  if 
you  cannot  be  cured  of  your  (mental)  disease,  seek  death  which  is  better 
and  depart  from  life."  This  bears  some  resemblance  to  the  precept  in 
Matthew  vi.  29,  "  And  if  thy  right  eye  offend  thee,  pluck  it  out  and  cast 
it  from  thee,"  etc. 

t  Hercules  is  said  to  have  established  gymnastic  contests  and  to  have 
been  the  first  victor.  Those  who  gained  the  victory  both  in  wrestling 
and  in  the  pancratium  were  reckoned  in  the  list  of  victors  as  coming  in 
the  second  or  third  place  after  him,  and  so  on. 

t  Compare  iii.  12,  15. 


KPICTETUS.  175 

ful  and  noble  appearance  and  cast  out  this  base  appearance. 
And  if  you  are  accustomed  to  be  exercised  in  this  way,  you 
will  see  what  shoulders,  what  sinews,  what  strength  you 
have.  But  now  it  is  only  trifling  words,  and  nothing  more. 

This  is  the  true  athlete,  the  man  who  exercises  himself 
against  such  appearances.  Stay,  wretch,  do  not  be  carried 
away.  Great  is  the  combat,  divine  is  the  work ;  it  is  for 
kingship,  for  freedom,  for  happiness,  for  freedom  from  per- 
turbation. Remember  Clod  :  call  on  him  as  a  helper  and 
protector,  as  men  at  sea  call  on  the  Dioscuri  *  in  a  storm. 
For  what  is  a  greater  storm  than  that  which  comes  from 
appearances  which  are  violent  and  drive  away  the  reason  ? 
For  the  storm  itself,  what  else  is  it  but  an  appearance  ?  For 
take  away  the  fear  of  death,  and  suppose  as  many  thunders 
and  lightnings  as  you  please,  and  you  will  know  what  calm  f 
and  serenity  there  is  in  the  ruling  faculty.  But  if  you  have 
once  been  defeated  and  say  that  you  will  conquer  hereafter, 
and  then  say  the  same  again,  be  assured  that  you  will  at 
last  be  in  so  wretched  a  condition  and  so  weak  that  you  will 
not  even  know  afterward  that  you  are  doing  wrong,  but  you 
will  even  begin  to  make  apologies  (defenses)  for  your  wrong- 
doing, and  then  you  will  confirm  the  saying  of  Hesiod  \  to 
be  true, 

\Vith  constant  ills  the  dilatory  strives. 

*  Castor  and  Pollux.  Horace,  Carm.  i.  12  : 
Quorum  simul  alba  nautis 
Stella  refulsit,  etc. 

t  "  Consider  that  everything  is  opinion,  and  opinion  is  in  thy  power. 
Take  away  then,  when  thou  choosest,  thy  opinion,  and  like  a  mariner, 
who  has  doubled  the  promontory,  thou  wilt  find  calm,  everything  stable, 
and  a  waveless  pay." — Antoninu.-.,  xii.  -2. 

\  Hesiod,  Works  and  Days,  v.  411. 


176  LP1CTETUS. 


CHAPTER    XIX. 

AGAINST      THOSK      WHO     EM  BRACK      PHILOSOPHICAL      OPINIONS 
ONLY    IX    WORDS. 

THE  argument  called  the  ruling  argument  appears 
to  have  been  proposed  from  such  principles  as  these  : 
there  is  in  fact  a  common  contradiction  between  one 
another  in  these  three  positions,  each  two  being  in  con- 
tradiction to  the  third.  The  propositions  are,  that 
everything  past  must  of  necessity  be  true ;  that  an  im- 
possibility does  not  follow  a  possibility  ;  and  that  a  thing 
is  possible  which  neither  is  nor  will  be  true.  Diodorus  * 
observing  this  contradiction  employed  the  probative  force 
of  the  first  two  for  the  demonstration  of  this  proposition, 
That  nothing  is  possible  which  is  not  true  and  never  will 
be.  Now  another  will  hold  these  two  :  That  something  is 
possible,  which  is  neither  true  nor  ever  will  be  :  and  That  an 
impossibility  does  not  follow  a  possibility  But  he  vail  nor 
allow  that  everything  which  is  past  is  necessarily  true,  as  tht- 
followers  of  Cleanthes  seem  to  think,  and  Antipater  copiously 
defended  them.  But  others  maintain  the  other  two  proposi- 
tions, That  a  thing  is  possible  which  is  neither  true  nor  will 
be  true  :  and  That  everything  which  is  past  is  necessarily 
true  ;  but  then  they  will  maintain  that  an  impossibility  can 
follow  a  possibility.  I5ut  it  is  impossible  to  maintain  these 
three  propositions,  because  of  their  common  contradiction.! 

If   then   any   man  should  ask  me,  which  of   these  proposi- 

*  Diodorus,  surnamed  Cronus,  lived  at  Alexandria  in  the  time  of 
Ptolenueus  Soter.  He  was  of  the  school  named  the  Megaric,  and  dis- 
tinguished in  dialectic. 

t  If  you  assume  any  two  of  these  three,  they  must  be  in  contradiction 
to  the  third  and  destroy  it. 


/•:/'/( '  7V:  77  'S. 


'77 


lions  do  L  maintain  ?  I  will  answer  him,  that  I  do  not  know  ; 
but  1  have  received  this  story,  that  Diodorus  maintained 
one  opinion,  the  followers  of  Panthoides,  I  think  and 
Cleanthes  maintained  another  opinion,  and  those  of  Chrys- 
ippus  a  third.  What  then  is  your  opinion  ?  I  was  not 
made  for  this  purpose,  to  examine  the  appearances  that 
occur  to  me,  and  to  compare  what  others  say  and  to  form  an 
opinion  of  my  own  on  the  thing.  Therefore  I  differ  not 
at  all  from  the  grammarian.  Who  was  Hector's  father  ? 
Priam.  Who  were  his  brothers  ?  Alexander  and  Deipho- 
bus.  Who  was  their  mother  ?  Hecuba.  I  have  heard  this 
story.  From  whom  ?  From  Homer.  And  Hellanicus 
also,  I  think,  writes  about  the  same  things,  and  perhaps 
others  like  him.  And  what  further  have  I  about  the  ruling 
argument  ?  Nothing,  liut,  if  I  am  a  vain  man,  especially  at  a 
banquet  I  surprise  the  guests  by  enumerating  those  that  have 
written  on  these  matters.  Both  Chrysippus  has  written 
wonderfully  in  his  first  book  about  Possibilities,  and  Cleanthes 
has  written  specially  on  the  subject,  and  Archedemus.  An- 
tipater  also  has  written  not  only  in  his  work  about  Possibilities, 
but  also  separately  in  his  work  on  the  ruling  argument.  Have 
yl^u  not  read  the  work  ?  I  have  not  read  it.  Read.  And  what 
profit  will  a  man  have  from  it  ?  he  will  be  more  trifling  and 
impertinent  than  he  is  now  ;  for  what  else  have  you  gained 
by  reading  it  ?  What  opinion  have  you  formed  on  this 
subject  ?  none  ;  but  you  will  tell  us  of  Helen  and  Priam, 
and  the  island  of  Calypso  which  never  was  and  never  will  be. 
And  in  this  matter  indeed  it  is  of  no  great  importance  if  you 
retain  the  story,  but  have  formed  no  opinion  of  your  own. 
But  in  matters  of  morality  (Ethic)  this  happens  to  us  much 
more  than  in  these  things  of  which  we  are  speaking. 
Speak  to  me  about  good  and  evil.  Listen  : 

The  wind  from  Ilium  to  Ciconian  shores 
Brought  me.* — Odyssey,  ix.  39. 

*  "  Speak  to  me,"  eu  .,  may  be  supposed  to  he  sakl  to  Kpictetus,  who 
12 


178  KPICTETUS. 

( )f  things  some  are  good,  some  are  bad,  and  others  are  in- 
different. The  good  then  are  the  virtues  and  the  things 
which  partake  of  the  virtues  :  the  bad  are  the  vices,  and  the 
things  which  partake  of  them  :  and  the  indifferent  are  the 
things  which  lie  between  the  virtues  and  the  vices,  wealth, 
health,  life,  death,  pleasure,  pain.  Whence  do  you  know 
this  ?  Hellanicus  says  it  in  his  Egyptian  history  ;  for  what 
difference  does  it  make  to  say  this,  or  to  say  that  Diogenes 
has  it  in  his  Ethic,  or  Chrysippus  or  Cleanthes  ?  Have  you 
then  examined  any  of  these  things  and  formed  an  opinion 
of  your  own  ?  Show  how  you  are  used  to  behave  in  a 
storm  on  shipboard  ?  Do  you  remember  this  division 
(distinction  of  things),  when  the  sail  rattles  and  a  man, 
who  knows  nothing  of  times  and  seasons  stands  by  you 
when  you  are  screaming  and  says,  Tell  me,  I  ask  you  by 
the  Gods,  what  you  were  saying  just  now,  Is  it  a  vice 
to  suffer  shipwreck :  does  it  participate  in  vice  ?  Will 
you  not  take  up  a  stick  and  lay  it  on  his  head  ?  What 
have  we  to  do  with  you,  man  ?  we  are  perishing  and  you 
come  to  mock  us  ?  But  if  Gesar  sent  for  you  to  answer 
a  charge,  do  you  remember  the  distinction  ?  If  when  you 
are  going  in  pale  and  trembling,  a  person  should  come  up 
to  you  and  say,  Why  do  you  tremble  man  ?  what  is  the 
matter  about  which  you  are  engaged  ?  Does  Caesar  who  sits 
within  give  virtue  and  vice  to  those  who  go  in  to  him  ?  You 
reply,  Why  do  you  also  mock  me  and  add  to  my  present 

has  been  ridiculing  logical  subtleties  and  the  grammarians'  learning. 
\Vhen  he  is  told  to  speak  of  good  and  evil,  he  takes  a  verse  of  the 
Odyssey,  the  first  which  occurs  to  him,  and  says,  Listen.  There  is 
nothing  to  listen  to,  but  it  is  as  good  for  the  hearers  as  anything  else. 
Then  he  utters  some  philosophical  principles,  and  being  asked  where  he 
learned  them,  he  says,  from  Hellanicus,  who  was  an  historian,  not  a 
philosopher.  He  is  bantering  the  hearer:  it  makes  no  matter  from 
what  author  I  learned  them  ;  it  is  all  the  same.  The  real  question  is, 
have  you  examined  what  Good  and  Evil  are,  and  have  you  formed  an 
opinion  yourself  ? 


EPICTETUS. 


179 


sorrows  ?  Still  tell  me,  philosopher,  tell  me  why  you 
tremble  ?  Is  it  not  death  of  which  you  run  the  risk,  or  a 
prison,  or  pain  of  the  body,  or  banishment,  or  disgrace  ? 
What  else  is  there  ?  Is  there  any  vice  or  anything  which 
partakes  of  vice  ?  What  then  did  you  use  to  say  of  these 
things  ?  "  What  have  you  to  do' with  me,  man  ?  my  own 
evils  are  enough  for  me."  And  you  say  right.  Your  own 
evils  are  enough  for  you,  your  baseness,  your  cowardice, 
your  boasting  which  you  showed  when  you  sat  in  the  school. 
Why  did  you  decorate  yourself  with  what  belonged  to  others  ? 
Why  did  you  call  yourself  a  Stoic  ? 

Observe  yourselves  thus  in  your  actions,  and  you  will  find 
to  what  sect  you  belong.  You  will  find  that  most -of  you  are 
Epicureans,  a  few  Peripatetics,*  and  those  feeble.  For 
wherein  will  you  show  that  you  really  consider  virtue  equal 
to  everything  else  or  even  superior  ?  But  show  me  a  Stoic,  if 
you  can.  Where  or  how  ?  But  you  can  show  me  an  endless 
number  who  utter  small  arguments  of  the  Stoics.  For 
do  the  same  persons  repeat  the  Epicurean  opinions  any 
worse  ?  And  the  Peripatetic,  do  they  not  handle  them  also 
with  equal  accuracy  ?  who  then  is  a  Stoic  ?  As  we  call  a 
statue  Phidiac,  which  is  fashioned  according  to  the  art  of 
Phidias  ;  so  show  me  a  man  who  is  fashioned  according  to  the 
doctrines  which  he  utters.  Show  me  a  man  who  is  sick  and 
happy,  in  danger  and  happy,  dying  and  happy,  in  exile  and 
happy,  in  disgrace  and  happy.  Show  him  :  I  desire,  by  the 
gods,  to  see  a  Stoic.  You  cannot  show  me  one  fashioned  so  ; 
but  show  me  at  least  one  who  is  forming,  who  has  shown  a 
tendency  to  be  a  Stoic.  Do  me  this  favor  :  do  not  grudge  an 
old  man  seeing  a  sight  which  I  have  not  seen  yet.  Do  you 
think  that  you  must  show  me  the  Zeus  of  Phidias  or  the 
Athena,  a  work  of  ivory  and  gold  ?  t  Let  any  of  you  show 

*The  Peripatetics  allowed  many  things  to  be  good  which  contributed 
•>pylife;  but  still  they  contended   that   the  smallest  mental  ex- 
cellence was  superior  to  all  other  things.     Cicero,  De  Fin.  v.  5,  31. 
1  See  ii.  c.  8,  20. 


me  a  human  soul  ready  to  think  as  God  does,  and  not  to 
blame  *  either  God  or  man,  ready  not  to  be  disappointed 
about  anything,  not  to  consider  himself  damaged  by  any- 
thing, not  to  be  angry,  not  to  be  envious,  not  to  be  jealous  ; 
and  why  should  I  not  say  it  direct  ?  desirous  from  a  man  to 
become  a  god,  and  in  this  poor  mortal  body  thinking  of  his 
fellowship  with  Zeus.f  Show  me  the  man.  But  you  cannot. 
Why  then  do  you  delude  yourselves  and  cheat  others  ?  and 
why  do  you  put  on  a  guise  which  does  not  belong  to  you,  and 
walk  about  being  thieves  and  pilferers  of  these  names  and 
things  which  do  not  belong  to  you. 

And  now  I  am  your  teacher,  and  you  are  instructed  in  my 
school.  And  I  have  this  purpose,  to  make  you  free  from 
restraint,  compulsion,  hindrance,  to  make  you  free,  prosper- 
ous, happy,  looking  to  God  in  everything  small  and  great. 
And  you  are  here  to  learn  and  practice  these  things.  Why 
then  do  you  not  finish  the  work,  if  you  also  have  such  a 
purpose  as  you  ought  to  have,  and  if  I  in  addition  to  the 
purpose  also  have  such  qualification  as  I  ought  to  have  ? 
What  is  that  which  is  wanting  ?  When  I  see  an  artificer  and 
material  lying  by  him,  I  expect  the  work.  Here  then  is  the 
artificer,  here  the  material ;  what  is  it  that  we  want  ?  Is  not 
the  thing  one  that  can  be  taught?  It  is.  Is  it  not  then  in 
in  our  oower  ?  The  only  thing  of  all  that  is  in  our  power. 

*"To  blame  God  "  means  to  blame  the  constitution  and  order  of 
things,  for  to  do  this  appeared  to  Epictetus  to  be  absurd  and  wicked  ; 
as  absurd  as  for  the  potter's  vessel  to  blame  the  potter,  if  thr.t  can  be 
imagined,  for  making  it  liable  to  wear  out  and  to  break. 

I  "  Our  fellowship  is  with  the  Father  and  with  his  son  Jesus  Christ," 
i  John  i.  3.  The  attentive  reader  will  observe  several  passages  besides 
those  which  have  been  noticed,  in  which  there  is  a  striking  conformity 
between  Epictetus  and  the  Scriptures;  and  will  perceive  from  them, 
either  that  the  Stoics  had  learnt  a  good  deal  of  the  Christian  language 
or  that  treating  a  subject  practically  and  in  earnest  leads  men  to  such 
strong  expressions  as  we  often  find  in  Scripture  and  sometimes  i.i  the 
philosophers,  especially  Epictetus." — Mrs.  Carter. 


/•:r/C77-:TUs.  181 

Neither  wealth  is  in  our  power,  nor  health,  nor  reputation, 
nor  in  a  word  anything  else  except  the  right  usi:  of  appear- 
ances. This  (right  use)  is  by  nature  free  from  restraint, 
this  alone  is  free  from  impediment.  Why  then  do  you  not 
finish  the  work  ?  Tell  me  the  reason.  For  it  is  either 
through  my  fault  that  you  do  not  finish  it,  or  through  your 
own  fault,  or  through  the  nature  of  the  thing.  The  thing 
itself  is  possible,  and  the  only  thing  in  our  power.  It 
remains  then  that  the  fault  is  either  in  me  or  in  you,  or, 
what  is  nearer  the  truth,  in  both.  Well  then,  are  you  will- 
ing that  we  begin  at  last  to  bring  such  a  purpose  into  this 
school,  and  to  take  no  notice  of  the  past  ?  Let  us  only 
make  a  beginning.  Trust  to  me,  and  you  will  see. 


CHAPTER   XX. 

M;AI.N   i   i  in   i  fi«  LKKANS  AND  ACADEMI 

propositions  which  are  true  and  evident  are  of  neces- 
sity used  even  by  those  who  contradict  them  :  and  a  man 
might  perhaps  consider  it  to  be  the  greatest  proof  of  a  thing 
being  evident  that  it  is  found  to  be  necessary  even  for  him 
who  denies  it  to  make  use  of  it  the  same  time.  For  in- 
stance, if  a  man  should  deny  that  there  is  anything  uni- 
.versally  true,  it  is  plain  that  he  must  make  the  contra- 
dictory negation,  that  nothing  is  universally  true.  What, 
wretch,  do  you  not  admit  even  this  ?  For  what  else  is  this 
than  to  affirm  that  whatever  is  universally  affirmed  is  false? 
Again  if  a  man  should  come  forward  and  say  :  Know  that 
there  is  nothing  that  can  be  known,  but  all  things  are  in- 
capable of  sure  evidence  ;  or  if  another  say,  lielieve  me  and 
you  will  be  the  better  for  it,  that  a  man  ought  not  to  be- 


^2  Kl'ICTETUS. 

lieve  anything  ;  or  again,  if  another  should  say.  Learn  from 
me,  man,  that  it  is  not  possible  to  learn  anything;  I  tell 
you  this  and  will  teach  you,  if  you  choose?  Now  in  what 
respect  do  these  differ  from  those  ?  Whom  shall  I  name  ? 
Those  who  call  themselves  Academics  ?  "  Men,  agree  [with 
us]  that  no  man  agrees  [with  another]  :  believe  us  that  no 
man  believes  anybody." 

Thus  Epicurus  *  also,  when  he  designs  to  destroy  the 
natural  fellowship  of  mankind,  at  the  same  time  makes  use 
of  that  which  he  destroys.  For  what  does  he  say?  "Be 
not  deceived,  men,  nor  be  led  astray,  nor  be  mistaken  : 
there  is  no  natural  fellowship  among  rational  animals;  be- 
lieve me.  But  those  who  say  otherwise,  deceive  you  and 
seduce  you  by  false  reasons."  What  is  this  to  you  ?  Per- 
mit us  to  be  deceived.  Will  you  fare  worse,  if  all  the  rest  of 
us  are  persuaded  that  there  is  a  natural  fellowship  among  us, 
and  that  it  ought  by  all  means  to  be  preserved  ?  Xay,  it 
will  lj>e  much  better  and  safer  for  you  ?  Man,  why  do  you 
trouble  yourself  about  us  ?  Why  do  you  keep  awake  for  us  ? 
Why  do  you  light  your  lamp  ?  Why  do  you  rise  early  ? 
Why  do  you  write  so  many  books,  that  no  one  of  us  may  be 
deceived  about  the  gods  and  believe  that  they  take  care  of 
men  ;  or  that  no  one  may  suppose  the  nature  of  good  to  be 
other  than  pleasure  ?  For  if  this  is  so.  lie  clown  and  sleep, 
and  lead  the  life  of  a  worm,  of  which  you  judged  yourself 
worthy  :  eat  and  drink,  and  enjoy  women,  and  ease  yourself, 
and  snore. T  And  what  is  it  to  you,  how  the  rest  shall  think 

*  Cicero,  de  Kin.  ii.  30.31,  speaking  of  the  letter,  which  Epicurus 
wrote  to  Ilermarchus  when  he  was  dying,  says  "that  the  actions  of 
Epicurus  were  inconsistent  with  his  sayings,1'  and  "  his  writings  were 
confuted  by  his  proliity  and  morality." 

t  Paul  says.  i.  Cor.  xv.  32  :  "  If  after  the  manner  of  men  I  have  fought 
with  beasts  at  Kphesus,  what  advantageth  it  me,  if  the  dead  rise  not  ? 
let  us  eat  and  drink, for  to-morrow  we  die."  The  words  "let  us  eat  and 
drink,"  etc..  are  said  to  be  a  quotation  from  the  Thais  of  Menander- 


men-  .  ,S3 

about  these  things,  whether  right  or  wrong  ?  For  what  have 
we  to  do  with  you  ?  You  take  care  of  sheep  because  they 
supply  us  with  wool  and  milk,  and  last  of  all  with  their  flesh. 
Would  it  not  be  a  desirable  thing  if  men  could  be  lulled  and 
enchanted  by  the  Stoics,  and  sleep  and  present  themselves 
to  you  and  to  those  like  you  to  be  shorn  and  milked  ?  For 
this  you  ought  to  say  to  your  brother  Epicureans  :  but  ought 
you  not  to  conceal  it  from  others,  and  particularly  before 
everything  to  persuade  them,  that  we  are  by  nature  adapted 
for  fellowship,  that  temperance  is  a  good  thing  ;  in  order 
that  all  things  may  be  secured  for  you  ?  *  Or  ought  we  to 
maintain  this  fellowship  with  some  and  not  with  others  ? 
With  whom  then  ought  we  to  maintain  it  ?  With  such  as  on 
their  part  also  maintain  it,  or  with  such  as  violate  this  fellow- 
ship ?  And  who  violate  it  more  than  you  who  establish  such 
doctrines  ? 

What  then  was  it  that  waked  Epicurus  from  his  sleepi- 
ness, and  compelled  him  to  write  what  he  did  write  ?  What 
else  was  it  than  that  which  is  the  strongest  thing  in  men, 
nature,  which  draws  a  man  to  her  own  will  though  he  be 
unwilling  and  complaining  ?  For  since,  she  says,  you  think 
that  there  is  no  community  among  mankind,  write  this 
opinion  and  leave  it  for  others,  and  break  your  sleep  to  do 
this,  and  by  your  own  practice  condemn  your  own  opinions. 
Shall  we  then  say  that  Orestes  was  agitated  by  the  Erinyes 
(Furies)  and  roused  from  his  deep  sleep,  and  did  not  more 
savage  Erinyes  and  Pains  rouse  Epicurus  from  his  sleep  and 
not  allow  him  to  rest,  but  compelled  him  to  make  known  his 
own  evils,  as  madness  and  wine  did  the  Galli  (the  priests  of 

The  meaning  seems  to  be,  that  if  I  do  not  believe  in  the  resurrection  of 
the  dead,  why  should  I  not  enjoy  the  sensual  pleasures  of  life  only? 
This  is  not  the  doctrine  of  Epictetus,  as  we  see  in  the  fxt. 

*It    would  give  security  to  the  Kpiciireans,  that   they  would  enjoy  all 
that  they  value,  if  other  men  should  be  persuaded  th:il  we  are  all  made 
•  llowship,  and  th;it  tcmpr-runn-  i<  a  good  thing. 


,S.j  Kl'JCTKTl'S. 

Cybele)  ?  So  strong  and  invincible  is  man's  nature.  For 
how  can  a  vine  be  moved  not  in  the  manner  of  a  vine,  but  in 
the  manner  of  an  olive  tree  ?  or  on  the  other  hand  how  can 
an  olive  tree  be  moved  not  in  the  manner  of  an  olive  tree, 
but  in  the  manner  of  a  vine  ?  It  is  impossible  :  it  cannot  be 
conceived.  Neither  then  is  it  possible  for  a  man  completely 
to  lose  the  movements  (affects)  of  a  man  ;  and  even  those 
who  are  deprived  of  their  genital  members  are  not  able  to 
deprive  themselves  of  man's  desires.  Thus  Epicurus  also 
mutilated  all  the  offices  of  a  man,  and  of  a  father  of  a  family, 
and  of  a  citizen  and  of  a  friend,  but  he  did  not  mutilate  hu- 
man desires,  for  he  could  not ;  not  more  than  the  lazy 
Academics  can  cast  away  or  blind  their  own  senses,  though 
tiev  have  tried  with  all  their  might  to  do  it.  What  a  shame 
is  this?  when  a. man  has  received  from  nature  measures  and 
rules  for  the  knowing  of  truth,  and  does  not  strive  to  add  to 
these  measures  and  rules  and  to  improve  them,  but  just  the 
contrary,  endeavors  to  take  away  and  destroy  whatever  en- 
ables us  to  discern  the  truth  ? 

What  say  you  philosopher  ?  piety  and  sanctity,  what  do  you 
think  that  they  are  ?  If  you  like,  I  will  demonstrate  that 
they  are  good  things.  Well,  demonstrate  it,  that  our  citizens 
may  be  turned  and  honor  the  deity  and  may  no  longer  be 
negligent  about  things  of  the  highest  value.  Have  you  then 
the  demonstrations  ?  1  have,  and  I  am  thankful.  Since 
then  you  are  well  pleased  with  them,  hear  the  contrary  : 
That  there  are  no  Gods,  and,  if  there  are,  they  take  no  care 
of  men,  nor  is  there  any  fellowship  between  us  and  them ; 
and  that  this  piety  and  sanctity  which  is  talked  of  among 
most  men  is  the  lying  of  boasters  and  sophists,  or  certainly 
of  legislators  for  the  purpose  of  terrifying  and  checking 
wrong-doers.*  Well  done,  philosopher,  you  have  done  some- 

*  Polyhius  (vi.  56),  when  he  is  speaking  of  the  Roman  state,  com- 
mends the  men  of  old  time,  who  established  in  the  minds  of  the  imihi- 
tudf  tlu-  opinions  about  the  gods  and  Hades,  wherein,  he  says,  they 


EPfCTETUS.  185 

thing  for  our  citizens,  you  have  brought  back  all  the  young 
men  to  contempt  of  things  divine.  What  then,  does  not 
this  satisfy  you  ?  Learn  now,  that  justice  is  nothing,  that 
modesty  is  folly,  that  a  father  is  nothing,  a  son  nothing. 
Well  done,  philosopher,  persist,  persuade  the  young  men, 
that  we  may  have  more  with  the  same  opinions  as  you  and 
who  say  the  same  as  you.  From  such  principles  as  those 
have  grown  our  well-constituted  states  ;  by  these  was  Sparta 
founded  :  Lycurgus  fixed  these  opinions  in  the  Spartans  by 
his  laws  and  education,  that  neither  is  the  servile  condition 
more  base  than  honorable,  nor  the  condition  of  free  men 
more  honorable  than  base,  and  that  those  who  died  at  Ther- 
mopylae* died  from  these  opinions ;  and  through  what  other 
opinions  did  the  Athenians  leave  their  city  ?  f  Then  those 
who  talk  thus,  marry  and  beget  children,  and  employ  them- 
selves in  public  affairs  and  make  themselves  priests  and  in- 
terpreters. Of  whom  ?  of  gods  who  do  not  exist  :  and  they 
consult  the  Pythian  priestess  that  they  may  hear  lies,  and 
they  repeat  the  oracles  to  others.  Monstrous  impudence 
and  imposture. 

Man  what  are  you  doing  ?  \  are  you  refuting  yourself 
every  day  ;  and  will  you  not  give  up  these  frigid  attempts  ? 
When  you  eat,  where  do  you  carry  your  hand  to  ?  to  your 
mouth  or  to  your  eye  ?  when  you  wash  yourself,  what  do 
you  go  into  ?  do  you  ever  call  a  pot  a  dish,  or  a  ladle  a  spit  ? 
If  I  were  a  slave  of  any  of  these  men,  even  if  I  must  be 

acted  more  wisely  than  those  in  his  time  who  would  destroy  such 
opinions. 

*  Kpictetus  alludes  to  the  Spartans  who  fought  at  Thermopylae  M.  <! 
4«So  against  Xerxes  and  his  army. 

t  When  Xerxes  was  advancing  on  Athens,  the  Athenians  left  the  city 
and  embarked  on  their  vessels  before  the  battle  of  Salamis,  15.  C.  480. 
See  Cicero,  I)e  Officiis,  iii.  11. 

}  He  is  now  attacking  the  Academics,  who  asserted  that  we  can  know 
no  tfaing. 


,86  EPICTI-.'JTS. 

flayed  by  him  daily,  I  would  rack  him.  If  he  said,  "  Boy. 
throw  some  olive-oil  into  the  bath,"  I  would  take  pickle 
sauce  and  pour  it  down  on  his  head.  What  is  this?  he 
would  say.  An  appearance  was  presented  to  me,  I  swear 
by  your  genius,  which  could  not  be  distinguished  from  oil 
and  was  exactly  like  it.  Here  give  me  the  barley  drink 
(tisane),  he  says.  I  would  fill  and  carry  him  a  dish  of  sharp 
sauce.  Did  I  not  ask  for  the  barley  drink  ?  Yes,  master  ; 
this  is  the  barley  drink.  Take  it  and  smell ;  take  it  and 
taste.  How  do  you  know  then  if  our  senses  deceive  us  ? 
If  I  had  three  or  four  fellow-slaves  of  the  same  opinion,  I 
should  force  him  to  hang  himself  through  passion  or  to 
change  his  mind.  But  now  they  mock  us  by  using  all  the 
things  which  nature  gives,  and  in  words  destroying  them. 

Grateful  indeed  are  men  and  modest,  who,  if  they  do 
nothing  else,  are  daily  eating  bread  and  yet  are  shameless 
enough  to  say,  we  do  not  know  if  there  is  a  Demeter  or  her 
daughter  Persephone  or  a  Pluto  ;  *  not  to  mention  that  they 
are  enjoying  the  night  and  the  day,  the  seasons  of  the  year, 
and  the  stars,  and  the  sea,  and  the  land,  and  the  co-opera- 
tion of  mankind,  and  yet  they  are  not  moved  in  any  degree 
by  these  things  to  turn  their  attention  to  them  ;  but  they 
only  seek  to  belch  out  their  problem  (matter  for  discussion), 
and  when  they  have  exercised  their  stomach  to  go  off  to  the 
bath.  But  what  they  shall  say,  and  about  what  things  or  to 
what  persons,  and  what  their  hearers  shall  learn  from  this 
talk,  they  care  not  even  in  the  least  degree,  nor  do  they  care 
if  any  generous  youth  after  hearing  such  talk  should  suffer 
any  harm  from  it,  nor  after  he  has  suffered  harm  should 
lose  all  the  seeds  of  his  generous  nature  :  nor  if  we  should 
give  an  adulterer  help  toward  being  shameless  in  his  acts  ; 

*  Epictetus  is  speaking  according  to  the  popular  notions.  To  deny 
Demeter  and  to  eat  the  bread  which  she  gives  is  the  same  thing  in  the 
common  notions  of  the  Greeks,  as  it  would  be  for  Epictetus  to  deny  the 
existence  of  God  and  to  eat  the  bread  which  he  gives. 


EP1CTETUS.  187 

nor  if  a  public  peculator  should  lay  hold  of  some  cunning 
excuse  from  these  doctrines  ;  nor  if  another  who  neglects  his 
parents  should  be  confirmed  in  his  audacity  by  this  teach- 
ing. What  then  in  your  opinion  is  good  or  bad  ?  This  or 
that  ?  Why  then  should  a  man  say  any  more  in  reply  to 
such  persons  as  these,  or  give  them  any  reason  or  listen  to 
any  reasons  from  them,  or  try  to  convince  them  ?  By  Zeus 
one  might  much  sooner  expect  to  make  catamites  change 
their  minds  than  those  who  are  become  so  deaf  and  blind  to 
their  own  evils.  * 


CHAPTER    XXI. 
OF    INCONSISTENT:  v. 

SOME  things  men  readily  confess,  and  other  things  they 
do  not.  No  one  then  will  confess  that  he  is  a  fool  or  with- 
out understanding  ;  but  quite  the  contrary  you  will  hear  all 
men  saying,  I  wish  that  I  had  fortune  equal  to  my  under- 
standing. But  men  readily  confess  that  they  are  timid,  and 
they  say :  I  am  rather  timid,  I  confess  ;  but  as  to  other  re- 
spects you  vill  not  find  me  to  be  toolish.  A  man  will  not 
readily  confess  that  he  is  intemperate  ;  and  that  he  is 
unjust,  he  will  not  confess  at  all.  He  will  by  no  means  con- 
fess that  he  is  envious  or  a  busybody.  Most  men  will  con- 
fess that  they  are  compassionate.  What  then  is  the  reason  ? 

*"This  resembles  what  our  Saviour  said  to  the  Jewish  rulers  :  Verily 
I  say  unto  you,  that  the  publicans  and  the  harlots  go  into  the  kingdom 
of  God  before  you."  Matthew,  xxi.  31.  Mrs.  Carter.  To  an  Academic 
who  said  lie  comprehended  nothing,  the  Stoic  Ariston  replied,  "  Do  you 
not  ste  even  the  person  who  is  sitting  near  you?"  When  the  Aca- 
demic denied  it,  Ariston  said,  "  Who  made  you  blind  ?  who  stole  your 
power  of  sight  ?"  (Diog.  Laert.  vii.  163.  Upton.) 


,88  EMCTETL'S. 

The  chief  thing  (the  ruling  thing)  is  inconsistency  and  con- 
fusion in  the  things  which  relate  to  good  and  evil.  Hut  dif- 
ferent men  have  different  reasons  :  and  generally  what  they 
imagine  to  be  base,  they  do  not  confess  at  all.  But  they 
suppose  timidity  to  be  a  characteristic  of  a  good  disposition, 
and  compassion  also  ;  but  silliness  to  be  the  absolute  char- 
acteristic of  a  slave.  And  they  do  not  at  all  admit  (confess; 
the  things  which  are  offenses  against  society.  But  in  the 
case  of  most  errors  for  this  reason  chiefly  they  are  induced 
to  confess  them,  because  they  imagine  that  there  is  some- 
thing involuntary  in  them  as  in  timidity  and  compassion  ; 
and  if  a  man  confess  that  he  is  in  any  respect  intemperate, 
he  alleges  love  (or  passion)  as  an  excuse  for  what  is  invol- 
untary. But  men  do  not  imagine  injustice  to  be  at  all  invol- 
untary. There  is  also  in  jealousy,  as  they  suppose,  some- 
thing involuntary;  and  for  this  reason  they  confess  to  jeal- 
ousy also. 

Living  then  among  such  men,  \vho  are  so  confused,  so 
ignorant  of  what  they  say,  and  of  evils  which  they  have  or 
have  not,  and  why  they  have  them,  or  how  they  shall  be 
relieved  of  them,  I  think  it  is  worth  the  trouble  for  a  man 
to  watch  constantly  (and  to  ask)  whether  I  also  am  one  of 
them,  what  imagination  I  have  about  myself,  how  I  conduct 
myself,  whether  I  conduct  myself  as  a  prudent  man. 
whether  I  conduct  myself  as  a  temperate  man,  whether  I 
ever  say  this,  that  I  have  been  taught  to  be  prepared  for 
everything  that  may  happen.  Have  I  the  consciousness, 
which  a  man  who  knows  nothing  ought  to  have,  that  I  know- 
nothing  ?  Do  I  go  to  my  teacher  as  men  go  to  oracles,  pre- 
pared to  obey  ?  or  do  I  like  a  sniveling  boy  go  to  my 
school  to  learn  history  and  understand  the  books  which  I 
did  not  understand  before,  and,  if  it  should  happen  so,  to 
explain  them  also  to  others  ?  Man,  you  have  had  a  fight  in 
the  house  with  a  poor  slave,  you  have  turned  the  family  up- 
side down,  you  have  frightened  the  neighbors,  and  you 


/••/•/r/y.'/T.v.  1X9 

re niv  to  me  as  if  you  were  a  wise  man,  and  you  take  your 
seat  and  judge  how  I  have  explained  some  word,  and  how  I 
have  babbled  whatever  came  into  my  head.  You  come  full 
of  envy,  and  humbled,  because  you  bring  nothing  from 
home;*  and  you  sit  during  the  discussion  thinking  of  noth- 
ing else  than  how  your  father  is  disposed  toward  you  and 
your  brother.  "  What  are  they  saying  about  me  there  ?  now 
they  think  that  I  am  improving,  and  are  saying,  He  will 
return  with  all  knowledge.  I  wish  I  could  learn  everything 
before  I  return  :  but  much  labor  is  necessary,  and  no  one 
sends  me  anything,  and  the  baths  at  Xicopolis  are  dirty ; 
everything  is  bad  at  home,  and  bad  here." 

Then  they  say,  no  one  gains  any  profit  from  the  school. 
Why,  who  comes  to  the  school  ?  who  comes  for  the  purpose 
of  being  improved  ?  who  comes  to  present  his  opinions  to 
be  purified?  who.  comes  to  learn  what  he  is  in  want  of? 
Why  do  you  wonder  then  if  you  carry  back  from  the  school 
the  very  things  which  you  bring  into  it  ?  For  you  come  not 
to  lay  aside  (your  principles)  or  to  correct  them  or  to  receive 
other  principles  in  place  of  them.  By  no  means,  nor  any- 
thing like  it.  You  rather  look  to  this,  whether  you  possess 
already  that  for  which  you  come.  You  wish  to  prattle 
about  theorems  ?  What  then  ?  Do  you  not  become  greater 
triflers  ?  Do  not  your  little  theorems  give  you  some  oppoi 
tunity  of  display  ?  You  solve  sophistical  syllogisms.!  Do 
you  not  examine  the  assumptions  of  the  syllogism  named 
the  Liar?  |  Do  you  not  examine  hypothetical  syllogisms: 
Why  then  are  you  still  vexed  if  you  receive  the  things  for 
which  you  come  to  the  school  ?  Yes  ;  but  if  my  child  die  or 
my  brother,  or  if  I  must  die  or  be  racked,  what  good  will  these 
things  do  me  ?  Well,  did  you  come  for  this  ?  for  this  do  you 

*  Literally,  "  because  to  you  or  for  you  nothing  is  brought  from 
home."  Perhaps  the  meaning  is  explained  by  what  follows.  The  man 
has  no  comfort  at  home;  he  brings  nothing  by  the  thought  of  which  he 
is  comforted  ••  i.  7 


I9o  EPIC  TE  TVS. 

sit  by  my  side  ?  did  you  ever  for  this  light  your  lamp  or  keep 
awake  ?  or,  when  you  went  out  to  the  walking-place,  did  you 
ever  propose  any  appearance  that  had  been  presented  to  you 
instead  of  a  syllogism,  and  did  you  and  your  friends  discuss 
it  together  ?  Where  and  when  ?  Then  you  say,  Theorems 
are  useless.  To  whom  ?  To  such  as  make  a  bad  use  of 
them.  For  eye-salves  are  not  useless  to  those  who  use 
them  as  they  ought  and  when  they  ought.  Fomentations 
are  not  useless.  Dumb-bells  *  are  not  useless  ;  but  they  au- 
useless  to  some,  useful  to  others.  If  you  ask  me  now  if 
syllogisms  are  useful,  I  will  tell  you  that  they  are  useful, 
and  if  you  choose,  1  will  prove  it.+  How  then  will  they 
in  any  way  be  useful  to  me  ?  Man,  did  you  ask  if  they 
are  useful  to  you,  or  did  you  ask  generally?  Let  him  who 
is  .suffering  from  dysentery,  ask  me  if  vinegar  is  useful  :  ! 
will  say  that  it  is  useful,  ^"ill  it  then  be  useful  to  me?  I 
will  say,  no.  Seek  rirst  for  the  discharge  to  be  stopped 
and  the  ulcers  to  be  closed.  And  do  you,  ()  men. 
cure  the  ulcers  and  stop  the  discharge  :  be  tranquil  in  your 
mind,  bring  it  free  from  distraction  into  the  school,  and 
you  will  know  what  power  reason  has. 


CHAPTER   XX 1 1. 

0  X      F  R  I  K  X  I )  S  H  I  1'  .  \ 

\YHAT  a  man  applies  himself  to   earnestly,   that   he   natu- 
rally loves.      Do  men   then    apply    themselves    earnestly  to 

i>age  1 6,  note  on  Hal:-  r  See  ii.  ^5. 

{  "  In  this  dissertation   is   expounded  the   Stoic   pr'uicii/ic  that   friend- 
ship is  only  p«)»;i>k-  I,ci.,eu\  tin.-   good."      Scrr.veijj.      lie  also  sa;.  - 
there  was  an<-thi  !«y   F.pictetus   on  this  snbjt-i't.  in    which   he 


EPICTFTUS. 


101 


the  tilings  which  are  bad  ?  By  no  means.  Well,  do  they 
apply  themselves  to  things  which  in  no  way  concern  them- 
selves ?  Not  to  these  either.  It  remains  then  that  they 
employ  themselves  earnestly  only  about  things  which  are 
good  ;  and  if  they  are  earnestly  employed  about  things, 
they  love  such  things  also.  Whoever  then  understands 
what  is  good,  can  also  know  how  to  love  ;  but  he  who 
cannot  distinguish  good  from  bad,  and  things  which  are 
neither  good  nor  bad  from  both,  how  can  he  possess  the 
power  of  loving  ?  To  love  then  is  only  in  the  power  of  the 
wise. 

How  is  this?  a  man  may  say  ;  1  am  foolish,  and  yet  I 
love  my  child.  I  am  surprised  indeed  that  you  have 
begun  by  making  the  admission  that  you  are  foolish.  For 
what  are  you  deficient  in  ?  Can  you  not  make  use  of  your 
senses  ?  do  you  not  distinguish  appearances  ?  do  you  not  use 
food  which  is  suitable  for  your  body,  and  clothing  and 
habitation  ?  Why  then  do  you  admit  that  you  are  foolish  ? 
It  is  in  truth  because  you  are  often  disturbed  by  appearances 
aud  perplexed,  and  their  power  of  persuasion  often  conquers 
you  ;  and  sometimes  you  think  these  things  to  be  good,  and 
then  the  same  things  to  be  bad,  and  lastly  neither  good  nor 
bad  :  and  in  short  you  grieve,  fear,  envy,  are  disturbed,  you  are 
changed.  This  is  the  reason  why  you  confess  that  you  are 
foolish.  And  are  you  not  changeable  in  love  ?  But  wealth, 
and  pleasure,  and  in  a  word  things  themselves,  do  you  some- 
times think  them  to  be  good,  and  sometimes  bad  ?  and  do 
you  not  think  the  same  men  at  one  time  to  be  good,  at 
another  time  bad  ?  and  have  you  not  at  one  time  a  friendly 
toward  them,  and  at  another  time  the  feeling  of  an 


expressed  some  of  the  opinions  of  Musonius  Kufus  (i.  i,  note  12). 
Schweig.  draws  this  conclusion  from  certain  words  of  Stobzeus;  and  he 
supposes  that  this  dis>crtati  -.m  of  Kpj,  in  one  of  the  last  four 

l>ooks  of  F.pictetiis'  ilis»  our-,  •>  \\\  Arrian,  which  have  been  lost.  Cicero 
(de  Amicit.  c.  5)  says  "  nisi  in  bonis  amidtiam  esse  non  posse,"  ant!  c.  18. 


jg2  Kricri-:rrs. 

enemy  ?  and  do  you  not  at  one  time  praise  them,  and  at 
another  time  blame  them  ?  Yes  ;  I  have  these  feelings  also. 
Well  then,  do  you  think  that  he  who  has  been  deceived 
about  a  man  is  his  friend  ?  Certainly  not.  And  he  who 
has  selected  a  man  as  his  friend  and  is  of  a  changeable  dis- 
position, has  he  good-will  toward  him  ?  He  has  not.  And 
he  who  who  now  abuses  a  man,  and  afterward  admires  him  ? 
This  man  also  has  no  good-will  to  the  other.  Well  then,  did 
you  never  see  little  dogs  caressing  and  playing  with  one  an- 
other, so  that  you  might  say,  there  is  nothing  more  friendly? 
but  that  you  may  know  what  friendship  is,  throw  a  bit  of 
flesh  among  them,  and  you  will  learn.  Throw  between 
yourself  and  your  son  a  little  estate,  and  you  will  know  how 
soon  he  will  wish  to  bury  you  and  how  soon  you  wish  your 
son  to  die.  Then  you  will  change  your  tone  and  say,  what 
a  son  I  have  brought  up  !  He  has  long  been  wishing  to 
bury  me.  Throw  a  smart  girl  between  you ;  and  do  you  the 
old  man  love  her,  and  the  young  one  will  love  her  too.  If  a 
little  fame  intervene  or  dangers,  it  will  be  just  the  same. 
You  will  utter  the  words  of  the  father  of  Admetus  ! 

Life  gives  you  pleasure  :  and  why  not  your  father.* 

Do  you  think  that  Admetus  did  not  love  his  own  child  when 
he  was  little  ?  that  he  was  not  in  agony  when  the  child  had  a 
fever  ?  that  he  did  not  often  say,  I  wish  I  had  the  fever  instead 
of  the  child  ?  then  when  the  test  (the  thing)  came  and  was 
near;  see  what  words  they  utter.  Were  not  Eteocles  and  Poly- 
nices  from  the  same  mother  and  from  the  same  father  ?  Were 
they  not  brought  up  .  together,  had  they  not  lived  together, 
drunk  together,  slept  together,  and  often  kissed  one  another  ? 
So  that,  if  any  man,  I  think,  had  seen  them,  he  would  have 
ridiculed  the  philosophers  for  the  paradoxes  which  they 

*The  first  verse  is  from  the  Alcestis  of  Euripides,  v.  691.  The 
second  in  Epictetus  is  not  in  Euripides.  Schweighaeuser  thinks  that  it 
has  been  intruded  into  the  text  from  a  trivial  scholium. 


EPICTETUS.  193 

utter  about  friendship.  But  when  a  quarrel  rose  between 
them  about  the  royal  power,  as  between  dogs  about  a  bit  of 
meat,  see  what  they  say. 

Polynices.     Where  will  you  take  your  station  before  the  towers  ? 

Eteotlcs.     Why  do  you  ask  me  this  ? 

Pol.     I  will  place  myself  opposite  and  try  to  kill  you. 

Et.     I  also  wish  to  do  the  same.* 

Such  are  the  wishes  that  they  utter. 

For  universally,  be  not  deceived,  every  animal  is  attached 
to  nothing  so  much  as  to  its  own  interest.  Whatever  then 
appears  to  it  an  impediment  to  this  interest,  whether  this  be 
a  brother,  or  a  father,  or  a  child,  or  beloved,  or  lover,  it 
hates,  spurns,  curses :  for  its  nature  is  to  love  nothing  so 
much  as  its  own  interest ;  this  is  father,  and  brother  and 
kinsman,  and  country,  and  God.  When  then  the  gods 
appear  to  us  to  be  an  impediment  to  this,  we  abuse  them 
and  throw  down  their  statues  and  burn  their  temples,  as 
Alexander  ordered  the  temples  of  yEsculapius  to  be  burned 
when  his  dear  friend  died.f 

For  this  reason  if  a  man  put  in  the  same  place  his  interest, 
sanctity,  goodness,  and  country,  and  parents,  and  friends, 
all  these  are  secured  :  but  if  he  puts  in  one  place  his  interest, 
in  another  his  friends,  and  his  country  and  his  kinsman  and 
justice  itself,  all  these  give  way  being  borne  down  by  the 
weight  of  interest.  For  where  the  I  and  the  Mine  are 
placed,  to  that  place  of  necessity  the  animal  inclines  :  if  in 
the  flesh,  there  is  the  ruling  power  :  if  in  the  will,  it  is  there  : 
and  if  it  is  in  externals,  it  is  there. \  If  then  I  am  there 
where  my  will  is,  then  only  shall  I  be  a  friend  such  as  I 

*  From  the  Phoenissse  of  Euripides,  v.  723,  etc. 

t  Alexander  did  this  when  Hephaestion  died.  Arrian,  Expedition  of 
Alexander,  vii.  14. 

J  Matthew  vi.  21,  "for  where  your  treasure  is,  there  will  your  heart  be 
also." 


194 


FPICTETUS. 


ought  to  be,  and  son,  and  father  ;  for  this  will  be  my  interest 
to  maintain  the  character  of  fidelity,  of  modesty,  of  patience, 
of  abstinence,  of  active  co-operation,  of  observing  my  rela- 
tions (toward  all).  But  if  I  put  myself  in  one  place,  and 
honesty  in  another,  then  the  doctrine  of  Epicurus  becomes 
strong,  which  asserts  either  that  there  is  no  honesty  or  it  is 
that  which  opinion  holds  to  be  honest  (virtuous).* 

It  was  through  this  ignorance  that  the  Athenians  and 
the  Lacedaemonians  quarreled,  and  the  Thebans  with  both ; 
and  the  great  king  quarreled  with  Hellas,  and  the  Mace- 
donians with  both  :  and  the  Romans  with  the  Getre.f  And 
still  earlier  the  Trojan  war  happened  for  these  reasons. 
Alexander  was  the  guest  of  Menelaus  ;  and  if  any  man  had 
seen  their  friendly  disposition,  he  would  not  have  believed 
any  one  who  said  that  they  were  not  friends.  But  there 
\vas  cast  between  them  (as  between  dogs)  a  bit  of  meat, 
a  handsome  woman,  and  about  her  war  arose.  And  now 
when  you  see  brothers  to  be  friends,  appearing  to  have 
one  mind,  do  not  conclude  from  this  anything  about  their 
friendship,  not  even  if  they  say  it  and  swear  that  it  is  im- 
possible for  them  to  be  separated  from  one  another.  For 
the  ruling  principle  of  a  bad  man  cannot  be  trusted,  it  is 

*  "  By  '  self '  is  here  meant  the  proper  Good,  or,  as  Solomon  expresses 
it,  Eccl.  xii.  13,  '  the  whole  of  man.'  The  Stoic  proves  excellently  the 
inconvenience  of  placing  this  in  anything  but  a  right  choice  (a  right  dis- 
position and  behavior)  .  but  how  it  is  the  interest  of  each  Individual  in 
every  case  to  make  that  choice  in  preference  to  present  pleasure  and  in 
defiance  of  present  sufferings,  appears  only  from  the  doctrine  of  a  future 
recompense." — Mrs.  Carter. 

t  The  quarrels  of  the  Athenians  with  the  Lacedaemonians  appear 
chiefly  in  the  history  of  the  Peloponnesian  war.  (Thucydides,  i.  i.) 
The  quarrel  of  the  great  king,  the  king  of  Persia,  is  the  subject  of  the 
history  of  Herodotus  (i.  I.)  The  great  quarrel  of  the  Macedonians 
with  the  Persians  is  the  subject  of  Arrian's  Expedition  of  Alexander. 
The  Romans  were  at  war  with  the  Getae  or  Daci  in  the  time  of  Trajan, 
and  we  may  assume  that  Epictetus  was  still  living  then. 


19$ 

insecure,  has  no  certain  rule  by  which  it  is  directed,  and 
is  overpowered  at  different  times  by  different  appear- 
ances. But  examine,  not  what  other  men  examine,  if 
they  are  born  of  the  same  parents  and  brought  up  to- 
gether, and  under  the  same  pedagogue  ;  but  examine  this 
only,  wherein  they  place  their  interest,  whether  in  externals 
or  in  the  will.  If  in  externals,  do  not  name  them  friends, 
no  more  than  name  them  trustworthy  or  constant,  or 
brave  or  free:  do  not  name  them  even  men,  if  you  have 
any  judgment.  For  that  is  not  a  principle  of  human  nat- 
ure which  makes  them  bite  one  another,  and  abuse  one 
another,  and  occupy  deserted  places  or  public  places,  as 
if  they  were  mountains,*  and  in  the  courts  of  justice  dis- 
play the  acts  of  robbers  ;  nor  yet  that  which  makes  them 
intemperate  and  adulterers  and  corrupters,  nor  that  which 
makes  them  do  whatever  else  men  do  against  one  another 
through  this  one  opinion  only,  that  of  placing  themselves 
and  their  interests  in  the  things  which  are  not  within  the 
power  of  their  will.  But  if  you  hear  that  in  truth  these 
men  think  the  good  to  be  only  there,  where  will  is,  and 
where  there  is  a  right  use  of  appearances,  no  longer 
trouble  yourself  whether  they  are  father  or  son,  or  brothers, 
or  have  associated  a  long  time  and  are  companions,  but 
when  you  have  ascertained  this  only,  confidently  declare 
that  they  are  friends,  as  you  declare  that  they  are  faithful, 
that  they  are  just.  For  where  else  is  friendship  than  where 
there  is  fidelity,  and  modesty,  where  there  is  a  communion 
of  honest  things  and  of  nothing  el.- 

But  you  may  say,  such  a  one  treated  me  with  regard  so 
long  ;  and  did  he  not  love  me  ?  How  do  you  know,  slave, 
if  he  did  not  regard  you  in  the  same  way  as  he  wipes  his 
shoes  with  a  sponge,  or  as  he  takes  care  of  his  beast? 

*Schweig.  thinks  that  this  is  the  plain  meaning:  "  as  wild  beasts  in 
the  mountains  lit:  in  wait  for  men,  M>  men  lie  in  wait  for  men,  not  only 
in  deserted  place.*,  b;ii  even  in  the  forum." 


IIo\v  (to  you  knmv,  when  you  have  ceased  to  be  useful  as 

a  vessel.  lie  will  not  throw  you  away  like  a  broken  platter  ? 
I5ut  this  woman  is  my  wife,  and  we  have  lived  togeihci 
so  lor.g.  And  how  long  did  KripLyle  live  with  Amphia- 
raus,  and  was  the  mother  of  children  and  of  many? 
a  necklace  *  came  between  them  :  and  what  is  a  necklace  ': 
It  is  the  opinion  about  such  things.  That  was  the  bestial 
principle,  that  was  the  thing1  which  broke  asunder  the 
friendship  between  husband  and  wife,  that  which  did  not 
allow  the  woman  to  be  a  wife  nor  the  mother  to  be  a 
mother.  And  let  every  man  among  you  who  has  seri- 
ously resolved  either  to  be  a  friend  himself  or  to  have  an- 
other for  his  friend  cut  out  these  opinions,  hate  them, 
drive  them  from  his  soul.  And  thus  first  of  all  he  will  not 
reproach  himself,  he  will  not  be  at  variance  with  himself, 
he  will  not  change  his  mind,  he  will  not  torture  himself. 
In  the  next  place,  to  another  also,  who  is  like  himself,  he 
will  be  altogether  and  completely  a  friend.  But  he  will 
bear  with  the  man  who  is  unlike  himself,  he  will  be  kind 
to  him,  gentle,  ready  to  pardon  on  account  of  his  igno- 
rance, on  account  of  his  being  mistaken  in  things  of  the 
greatest  importance  ;  but  he  will  be  harsh  to  no  man,  be- 
ing well  convinced  of  Plato's  doctrine  that  every  mind  is 
deprived  of  truth  unwillingly.  If  you  cannot  do  this,  yet 
you  can  do  in  all  other  respects  as  friends  do,  drink  to- 
gether, and  lodge  together,  and  sail  together,  and  you 
may  be  born  of  the  same  parents ;  for  snakes  also  are: 
but  neither  will  they  be  friends  nor  you,  so  long  as  you 
retain  these  bestial  and  cursed  opinions. 

*  The  old  story  about  Eriphyle  who  betrayed  her  husband  for  a  neck- 
lace. 


Tl  A.    ,  ,97 


CHAPTER  XXIII. 

OX  THE  POWKR  OF  SPKAKIXG. 

KVK.RY  man  will  read  a  book  with  more  pleasure  or  even 
with  more  ease,  if  it  is  written  in  fairer  characters.  There- 
fore every  man  will  also  listen  more  readily  to  what  is 
spoken,  if  it  is  signified  by  appropriate  and  becoming 
words.  We  must  not  say  then  that  there  is  no  faculty  of 
expression  :  for  this  affirmation  is  the  characteristic  of  an 
impious  and  also  of  a  timid  man.  Of  an  impious  man. 
because  he  undervalues  the  gifts  which  come  from  (Jod. 
just  as  if  he  would  take  away  the  commodity  of  the  power 
of  vision,  or  of  hearing',  or  of  seeing.  Has  then  <  )od, 
given  you  eyes  to  no  purpose  ?  and  to  no  purpose  has  he 
infused  into  them  a  spirit*  so  •  strong  and  of  such  skillful 
contrivance  as  to  reach  a  long  way  and  to  fashion  the 
forms  of  things  which  are  seen  ?  What  messenger  is  so 
swift  and  vigilant  ?  And  to  no  purpose  has  he  made  the 
interjacent  atmosphere  so  efficacious  and  elastic  that  the 
vision  penetrates  through  the  atmosphere  which  is  in  a 
manner  moved?  And  to  no  purpose  has  he  made  light, 
without  the  presence  of  which  there  would  be  no  use  in 
any  other  thing  ? 

Man,  be  neither  ungrateful  for  these  gifts  nor  yet  forget 
the  things  which  are  superior  to  J;hem.  But  indeed  for  the 

*The  word  for  "spirit  "  means  a  vital  spirit,  an  animal  spirit,  a  nt.-rv- 
ous  fluid,  as  Schweighaeuser  explains  it,  or  as  I'lutarch  says  (I>e  Placit. 
Philosoph.  iv.  15),  "the  spirit  which  has  the  power  of  vision,  which  per 
meat  js  from  the  chief  faculty  of  the  mind  to  tin-  pupil  of  the  eye ;  "'  and 
in  another  passage  of  the  same  treatise  (iv.  S),  "  the  instruments  of  per- 
rjpt'.on  are  said  to  be  intelligent  spirits  which  have  a  motion  from  the 
;  li'nl  faculty  of  the  mind  to  the  organs." 


power  of  seeing  and  hearing-,  and  indeed  for  life  itself,  and 
for  the  things  which  contribute  to  support  it,  for  the  fruits 
which  are  dry,  and  for  wine  and  oil  give  thanks  to  God  : 
but  remember  that  lie  has  given  you  something  else  better 
than  all  these,  I  mean  the  power  of  using  them,  proving 
them  and  estimating  the  value  of  each.  For  what  is  that 
which  gives  information  about  each  of  these  powers,  \vhat 
each  of  them  is  worth?  *  Is  it  each  faculty  itself?  Did 
you  ever  hear  the  faculty  of  vision  saying  anything  about 
itself  ?  or  the  faculty  of  hearing?  or  wheat,  or  barley,  or  a 
horse  or  a  dog  ?  No  ;  but  they  are  appointed  as  minisU-rs 
and  slaves  to  serve  the  faculty  which  has  the  power  of 
making  use  of  the  appearances  of  things.  And  if  you  in- 
quire what  is  the  value  of  each  thing,  of  whom  do  you 
inquire  ?  who  answers  you  ?  How  then  can  any  other 
faculty  be  more  powerful  than  this,  which  uses  the  n 
ministers  and  itself  proves  each  and  pronounces  about 
them  ?  for  which  of  them  knows  what  itself  is,  and  what 
is  its  own  value?  which  of  them  knows  when  it  ought  to 
employ  itself  and  when  not?  what  faculty  is  it  which 
opens  and  closes  the  eyes,  and  turns  them  away  from  ob- 
jects to  which  it  ought  not  to  apply  them  and  does  apply 
them  to  other  objects?  Is  it  the  faculty  of  vision  ?  No  : 
but  it  is  the  faculty  of  the  will.  What  is  that  faculty 
which  closes  and  opens  the  ears  ?  what  is  that  by  which 
they  are  curious  and  inquisitive,  or  on  the  contrary  un- 
moved by  what  is  said  ?  is  it  the  faculty  of  hearing  ?  It 
is  no  other  than  the  faculty  of  the  will.  Will  this  faculty 
then,  seeing  that  it  is  amid  all  the  other  faculties  which 
are  blind  and  dumb  and  unable  to  see  anything  else  ex- 
cept the  very  acts  for  which  they  are  appointed  in  order  to 
minister  to  this  (faculty)  and  serve  it.  but  this  faculty  alone 
sees  sharp  and  sees  what  is  the  value  of  each  of  the  rest  ; 
will  this  faculty  declare  to  us  that  anything  else  is  the 

*  See  i.  1. 


EP1CTETCS. 


199 


best,  or  tliat  itself  is?  And  what  else  does  the  rye  <lo 
when  it  is  opened  than  seer  Hut  \vhctherwe  ought  to 
look  on  the  wife  of  a  certain  person,  and  in  what  manner, 
who  tells  us  ?  The  faculty  of  the  will.  And  whether  we 
ought  to  believe  what  is  said  or  not  to  believe  it,  and  it 
we  do  believe,  whether  \ve  ought  to  be  moved  by  it  or 
not,  who  tells  us  ?  Is  it  not  the  faculty  of  the  will  ?  But 
this  faculty  of  speaking-  and  of  ornamenting  words,  if  there 
is  indeed  any  such  peculiar  faculty,  what  else  does  it  do. 
when  there  happens  to  be  discourse  about  a  thing,  than  to 
ornament  the  words  and  arrange  them  as  hairdressers  do 
the  hair?  But  whether  it  is  better  to  speak  or  to  be  silent, 
and  better  to  speak  in  this  way  or  that  way,  and  whether 
this  is  becoming  or  not  becoming,  and  the  season  for  each 
and  the  use,  what  else  tells  us  than  the  faculty  of  the  will  ? 
Would  you  have  it  then  to  come  forward  and  condemn 
itself? 

What  then  ?  it  (the  will)  says,  if  the  fact  is  so,  can  that 
which  ministers  be  superior  to  that  to  which  it  ministers, 
can  the  horse  be  superior  to  the  rider,  or  the  dog  to  the 
huntsman,  or  the  instrument  to  the  musician,  or  the  serv- 
ants to  the  king  ?  What  is  that  which  makes  use  of  the 
rest?  The  will.  What  takes  care  of  all?  The  will. 
What  destroys  the  whole  man,  at  one  time  by  hunger,  at 
another  time  by  hanging,  and  at  another  time  by  a  preci- 
pice? The  will.  Then  is  anything  stronger  in  men  than 
this?  and  how  is  it  possible  that  the  thing's  which  are  sub- 
ject to  restraint  are  stronger  than  that  which  is  not  ?  What 
things  are  naturally  formed  to  hinder  the  faculty  of  vision  ? 
Both  will  and  things  which  do  not  depend  on  the  faculty 
of  the  will.  It  is  the  same  with  the  faculty  of  hearing, 
with  the  faculty  of  speaking  in  like  manner.  But  what 
has  a  natural  power  of  hindering  the  will  ?  Nothing  which 
is  independent  of  the  will  ;  but  only  the  will  itself,  when 
it  is  perverted.  Therefore  this  (the  will)  is  alone  vice  or 
alone  virtue. 


EP1CTETUS. 

Then  being  so  great  a  faculty  and  set  over  all  the  rest, 
let  it  (the  will)  come  forward  and  tell  us  that  the  most 
excellent  of  all  things  is  the  flesh.  Not  even  if  the  flesh 
itself  declared  that  it  is  the  most  excellent,  would  any 
person  bear  that  it  should  say  this.  But  what  is  it,  Kpi- 
curus,  which  pronounces  this,  which  wrote  about  the  End 
(purpose)  of  our  Being, *  which  wrote  on  the  Nature  of 
Things,  which  wrote  about  the  Canon  (rule  of  truth), 
which  led  you  to  wear  a  beard,  which  wrote  when  it  was 
dying  that  it  was  spending  the  last  and  a  happy  day  ?  f 
Was  this  the  flesh  or  the  will  ?  Then  do  you  admit  that 
you  possess  anything  superior  to  this  (the  will)  ?  and  are 
you  not  mad?  are  you  in  fact  so  blind  and  deaf? 

What  then  ?  Docs  any  man  despise  the  other  faculties? 
I  hope  not.  Does  any  man  say  that  there  is  no  use  or  ex- 
cellence in  the  speaking  faculty  ?  I  hope  not.  That 
would  be  foolish,  impious,  ungrateful  toward  God.  But 
a  man  renders  to  each  thing  its  due  value.  For  there  is 
some  use  even  in  an  ass,  but  not  so  much  as  in  an  ox  : 
there  is  also  use  in  a  dog.  but  not  so  much  as  in  a  slave  : 
there  is  also  some  use  in  a  slave,  but  not  so  much  as  in 
citizens  :  there  is  also  some  use  in  citizens,  but  not  so 
much  as  in  magistrates.  Not  indeed  because  some  things 
are  superior,  must  we  undervalue  the  use  which  other 
things  have.  There  is  a  certain  value  in  the  power  of 
speaking,  but  it  is  not  so  great  as  the  power  of  the  will. 
When  then  I  speak  thus,  let  no  man  think  that  I  ask  you 
to  neglect  the  power  of  speaking,  for  neither  do  I  ask  you 

*This  appears  to  be  the  book  which  Cicero  (Tuscul.  iii.  18)  entitles  on 
the  "supreme  good"  (de  summo  bono),  which,  as  Cicero  says,  contains 
all  the  doctrine  of  Epicurus.  The  book  on  the  Canon  or  Rule  is  men- 
tioned by  Velleius  in  Cicero  de  Nat.  Deorum  i.  c.  16,  as  "  that  celestial 
volume  of  Epicurus  on  the  Rule  and  Judgment."  See  also  De  Fin.  i.  19. 

t  This  is  said  in  a  letter  written  by  Epicurus,  when  he  was  dying  in 
great  pain  (Oiog.  Laert.  x.  2.>) ;  Cicero  (De  Fin.  ii.  c.  30)  quotes  this  letter. 


F.PlCTl-.Tl'S.  201 

to  neglect  the  eyes,  nor  the  ears  nor  the  hands  nor  the 
feet,  nor  clothing1  nor  shoes.  But  if  you  ask  me  what  then 
is  the  most  excellent  of  all  thing's,  what  must  I  say  ?  I 
cannot  say  the  power  of  speaking,  but  the  power  of  the 
will,  when  it  is  right.  For  it  is  this  which  uses  the  other 
(the  power  of  speaking),  and  all  the  other  faculties  both 
small  and  great.  For  when  this  faculty  of  the  will  is  set 
right,  a  man  who  is  not  good  becomes  good  :  but  when  it 
fails,  a  man  becomes  bad.  It  is  through  this  that  we  are 
unfortunate,  that  we  are  fortunate,  that  we  blame  one  an- 
other, are  pleased  with  one  another.  In  a  word,  it  is 
this  which  if  we  neglect  it  makes  unhappiness,  and  if  we 
carefully  look  after  it  makes  happiness. 

But  to  take  away  the  faculty  of  speaking  and  to  say 
that  there  is  no  such  faculty  in  reality,  is  the  act  not  only 
of  an  ungrateful  man  toward  those  who  gave  it,  but  also 
of  a  cowardly  man  :  for  such  a  person  seems  to  me  to 
fear,  if  there  is  any  faculty  of  this  kind,  that  we  shall  not 
be  able  to  despise  it.  Such  also  are  those  who  say  that 
there  is  no  difference  between  beauty  and  ugliness.  Then 
it  would  happen  that  a  man  would  be  affected  in  the 
same  way  if  he  saw  Thersites  and  if  he  saw  Achilles  ;  in 
the  same  way,  if  he  saw  Helen  and  any  other  woman. 
But  these  are  foolish  and  clownish  notions,  and  the  no- 
tions of  men  who  know  not  the  nature  of  each  thing,  but 
are  afraid  if  a  man  shall  see  the  difference,  that  he  shall 
immediately  be  seized  and  carried  off  vanquished.  But 
this  is  the  great  matter:  to  leave  to  each  thing  the  power 
(faculty)  which  it  has,  and  leaving  to  it  this  power  to  see 
what  is  the  worth  of  the  power,  and  to  learn  what  is  tin; 
most  excellent  of  all  things,  and  to  pursue  this  always,  to 
be  diligent  about  this,  considering  all  other  things  of 
secondary  value  compared  with  this,  but  yet,  as  far  as  we 
can,  not  neglecting  all  those  other  things.  For  we  must 
take  care  of  the  eyes  also,  not  as  if  they  were  the  most  ex- 


cellcnt  thing,  but  \ve  must  take  care  of  them  on  account 
of  the  most  excellent  thing,  because  it  will  not  be  in  its 
true  natural  condition,  if  it  does  not  rightly  use  the  other 
faculties,  and  prefer  some  things  to  others. 

What  then  is  usually  done  ?  Men  generally  act  as  a 
traveler  would  do  on  his  way  to  his  own  country,  when 
he  enters  a  good  inn,  and  being  pleased  with  it  should 
remain  there.  Man,  you  have  forgotten  your  purpose  : 
you  were  not  traveling  to  this  inn,  but  you  were  passing 
through  it.  But  this  is  a  pleasant  inn.  And  how  many 
other  inns  are  pleasant?  and  how  many  meadows  are 
pleasant  ?  yet  only  for  passing  through.  But  your  pur- 
pose is  this,  to  return  to  your  country,  to  relieve  your 
kinsmen  of  .anxiety,  to  discharge  the  duties  of  a  citizen, 
to  marry,  to  beget  children,  to  fill  the  usual  magistracies.* 
For  you  are  not  come  to  select  more  pleasant  places, 
but  to  live  in  these  where  you  were  born  and  of  which 
you  were  made  a  citizen.  Something  of  the  kind  takes 
place  in  the  matter  which  we  are  considering.  Since  by 
the  aid  of  speech  and  such  communication  as  you  receive 
here  you  must  advance  to  perfection,  and  purge  your  will 
and  correct  the  faculty  which  makes  use  of  the  appear- 
ances of  things  ;  and  since  it  is  necessary  also  for  the 
teaching  (delivery)  of  theorems  to  be  effected  by  a  certain 

*The  Stoics  taught  that  a  man  should  lead  an  active  life.  Horace 
(Ep.  i.  i,  16)  represents  himself  as  sometimes  following  the  Stoic  prin- 
ciples : 

"  Xunc  agilis  no  et  mersor  civilibus  undis." 

but  this  was  only  talk-  The  Stoic  should  discharge  all  the  duties  of  a 
citizen,  says  Epictetus  ;  he  should  even  marry  and  beget  children.  But 
the  marrying  may  be  done  without  any  sense  of  duty;  and  the  continu- 
ance of  the  human  race  is  secured  by  the  natural  love  of  the  male  and 
of  the  female  for  conjunction.  Still  it  is  good  advice,  which  the  Roman 
censor  Mettellus  gave  to  his  fellow-citizens,  that,  as  they  could  not  live 
without  women,  they  should  make  the  best  of  this  business  of  marriage. 
(Gelliu*.  i.  6.) 


j:  /y.s.  203 

mode  of  expression  and  with  a  certain  variety  and  sharp- 
ness, some  persons  captivated  by  these  very  things  abide 
in  them,  one  captivated  by  the  expression,  another  by 
syllogisms,  another  again  by  sophisms,  and  still  another 
by  some  other  inn  of  the  kind  :  and  there  they  stay  and 
waste  away  as  if  they  were  among  Sirens. 

Man,  your  purpose  (business)  was  to  make  yourself 
capable  of  using  conformably  to  nature  the  appearances 
presented  to  you,  in  your  desires  not  to  be  frustrated,  in 
your  aversion  from  things  not  to  fall  into  that  which  you 
would  avoid,  never  to  have  no  luck  (as  one  may  say), 
nor  ever  to  have  bad  luck,  to  be  free,  not  hindered,  not 
compelled,  conforming  yourself  to  the  administration  of 
Zeus,  obeying  it,  well  satisfied  with  this,  blaming  no  one, 
charging  no  one  with  fault,  able  from  your  whole  soul  to 
utter  these  verses  : 

Lead  me,  O  Zeus,  and  thou  too  Destiny.* 

Then  having  this  purpose  before  you,  if  some  little' form 
of  expression  pleases  you,  if  some  theorems  please  you, 
do  you  abide  among  them  and  choose  to  dwell  there, 
forgetting  the  things  at  home,  and  do  you  say,  These 
things  are  fine  ?  Who  says  that  they  are  not  fine  ?  but 
only  as  being  a  way  home,  as  inns  are.  For  what  hinders 
you  from  being  an  unfortunate  man,  even  if  you  speak 
like  Demosthenes  ?  and  what  prevents  you,  if  you  can 
resolve  syllogisms  like  Chrysippus,  f  from  being  wretched, 
from  sorrowing,  from  envying,  in  a  word,  from  being  dis- 
turbed, from  being  unhappy  ?  Nothing.  You  see  then 

*  The  rest  of  the  verses  are  quoted  in  the  Kncheiridion,  s.  52. 

t  Chrysippus  wrott  a  book  on  the  resolution  of  Syllogisms.  Diogenes 
Laertius  (vii.)  says  of  Chrysippus  that  he  was  so  famous  among  Dia- 
lecticians that  most  persons  thought,  if  there  was  Dialectic  among  the 
Gods,  it  \vould  not  be  any  other  than  that  of  Chrysippus.  , 


204 


EPICTETUS. 


that  these  were  inns,  worth  nothing-;  and  that  the  pur- 
pose before  you  was  something  else.  When  I  speak  thus 
to  some  persons,  they  think  that  I  am  rejecting  care 
about  speaking  or  care  about  theorems.  But  I  am  not 
rejecting  this  care,  but  I  am  rejecting  the  abiding  about 
these  things  incessantly  and  putting  our  hopes  in  them. 
If  a  man  by  this  teaching  does  harm  to  those  who  listen 
to  him,  reckon  me  too  among  those  who  do  this  harm  : 
for  I  am  not  able,  when  I  see  one  thing  which  is  most 
excellent  and  supreme,  to  say  that  another  is  so,  in  order 
to  please  you. 


CHAPTER  XXIV. 

TO    (OR   AGAINST)    A    PERSON    WHO   WAS   ONE   OF  THOSE   WHO 
WERE  NOT  VALUED  (ESTEEMED)  BY  HIM. 

A  CERTAIN  person  said  to  him  (Epictetus)  :  Frequently 
I  desired  to  hear  you  and  came  to  you,  and  you  never 
gave  me  any  answer  :  and  now,  if  it  is  possible,  I  entreat 
you  to  say  something  to  me.  Do  you  think,  said  Epic- 
tetus, that  as  there  is  an  art  in  anything  else,  so  there  is 
also  an  art  in  speaking,  and  that  he  who  has  the  art,  will 
speak  skillfully,  and  he  who  has  not,  will  speak  unskill- 
fully  ?  I  do  think  so.  He  then  who  by  speaking  receives 
benefit  himself,  and  is  able  to  benefit  others,  will  speak 
skillfully  :  but  he  who  is  rather  damaged  by  speaking  and 
does  damage  to  others,  will  he  be  unskilled  in  this  art  of 
speaking?  And  you  may  find  that  some  are  damaged 
and  others  benefited  by  speaking.  And  are  all  who  hear 
benefited  by  what  they  hear?  Or  will  you  find  that 
among  them  also  some  are  benefited  and  some  dam- 
aged ?  There  are  both  among  these  also,  he  said.  In 


F.riCTETUS.  205 

this  case  also  then  those  who  hear  skillfully  are  benefited, 
and  those  who  hear  unskillfully  are  damaged?  He  ad- 
mitted this.  Is  there  then  a  skill  in  hearing  also,  as  there 
is  in  speaking?  It  seems  so.  If  you  choose,  consider 
the  matter  in  this  way  also.  The  practice  of  music,  to 
whom  does  it  belong  ?  To  a  musician.  And  the  proper 
making  of  a  statue,  to  whom  do  you  think  that  it  belongs  ? 
To  a  statuary.  And  the  looking  at  a  statue  skillfully,  does 
this  appear  to  you  to  require  the  aid  of  no  art  ?  This  also 
requires  the  aid  of  art.  Then  if  speaking  properly  is  the 
business  of  the  skillful  man,  do  you  see  that  to  hear  also 
with  benefit  is  the  business  of  the  skillful  man  ?  Now  as 
to  speaking  and  hearing  perfectly,  and  usefully,*  let  us 
for  the  present,  if  you  please,  say  no  more,  for  both  of  us 
are  a  long  way  from  everything  of  the  kind.  But  I  think 
that  every  man  will  allow  this,  that  he  who  is  going  to 
hear  philosophers  requires  some  amount  of  practice  in 
hearing.  Is  it  not  so  ? 

Tell  me  then  about  what  I  should  talk  to  you  :  about 
what  matter  are  you  able  to  listen  ?  About  good  and  evil. 
Good  and  evil  in  what  ~J  In  a  horse  ?  No.  Well,  in  an 
l\ro.  \Vhat  then  ?  In  a  man  ?  Yes.  Do  we  know 
then  what  a  man  is,  what  the  notion  is  that  we  have  of 
him.  or  have  we  our  ears  in  any  degree  practiced  about 
this  matter?  But  do  you  understand  what  nature  is?  or 
can  you  even  in  any  degree  understand  me  when  I  say,  I 
shall  use  demonstration  to  you  ?  How  ?  Do  you  under- 
stand this  very  thing,  what  demonstration  is,  or  how  any- 
thing is  demonstrated,  or  by  \vhat  means  ;  or  what  tilings 
are  like  demonstration,  but  are  not  demonstration?  Do 

*"  That  is,  let  us  not  now  consider  whether  I  am  perfect  in  the  art  »f 
speaking,  and  you  have  a  mind  well  prepared  to  derive  real  advantagr 
from  philosophical  talk.  Let  us  consider  this  only,  whether  your  ears 
are  sufficiently  prepared  for  listening,  whether  you  can  understand  a 
philosophical  discussion." — Schweig. 


you  know  what  is  true  or  what  is  false  ?  What  is  conse- 
quent on  a  thing,  what  is  repugnant  to  a  thing,  or  not 
consistent,  or  inconsistent?  But  must  I  excite  you  to 
philosophy,  and  how?  Shall  I  show  to  you  the  repug- 
nance in  the  opinions  of  most  men,  through  which  they 
differ  about  things  good  and  evil,  and  about  things  which 
are  profitable  and  unprofitable,  when  you  know  not  this 
very  thing,  what  repugnance  (contradiction)  is  ?  Show 
me  then  what  I  shall  accomplish  by  discoursing  with 
you  ;  excite  my  inclination  to  do  this.  As  the  grass  which 
is  suitable,  when  it  is  presented  to  a  sheep,  moves  its 
inclination  to  eat,  but  if  you  present  to  it  a  stone  or  bread, 
it  will  not  be  moved  to  eat ;  so  there  are  in  us  certain 
natural  inclinations  also  to  speak,  when  the  hearer  shall 
appear  to  be  somebody,  when  he  himself  shall  excite  us  : 
but  when  he  shall  sit  by  us  like  a  stone  or  like  grass, 
how  can  he  excite  a  man's  desire  (to  speak)  ?  Does  the 
vine  say  to  the  husbandman,  Take  care  of  me?  Xo,  but 
the  vine  by  showing  in  itself  that  it  will  be  profitable  to 
the  husbandman,  if  he  does  take  care  of  it,  invites  him  to 
exercise  care.  When  children  are  attractive  and  lively, 
whom  do  tney  not  invite  to  play  with  them,  and  crawl 
with  them,  and  lisp  with  them?  But  who  is  eager  to  play 
with  an  ass  or  to  bray  with  it?  for  though  it  is  small,  it 
is  still  a  little  ass. 

Why  then  do  you  say  nothing  to  me  ?  I  can  only  say 
this  to  you,  that  he  who  knows  not  who  he  is,  and  for 
what  purpose  he  exists,  and  what  is  this  world,  and  with 
whom  he  is  associated,  and  what  things  are  the  good  and 
the  bad,  and  the  beautiful  and  the  ugly,  and  who  neither 
understands  discourse  nor  demonstration,  nor  what  is  true 
nor  what  is  false,  and  who  is  not  able  to  distinguish  them, 
will  neither  desire  according  to  nature  nor  turn  away  n'or 
move  upward,  nor  intend  (to  act),  nor  assent,  nor  dissent, 
nor  suspend  his  judgment  :  to  say  all  in  a  few  words,  he 


KPTCTF.TUS.  207 

will  go  about  dumb  and  blind,  thinking  that  he  is  some- 
body, but  being  nobody.  Is  this  so  now  for  the  first 
time?  Is  it  not  the  fact  that  ever  since  the  human  race 
existed,  all  errors  and  misfortunes  have  arisen  through 
this  ignorance?  Why  did  Agamemnon  and  Achilles 
quarrel  with  one  another?  Was  it  not  through  not  know- 
ing what  things  are  profitable  and  not  profitable?  Docs 
not  the  one  say  it  is  profitable  to  restore  Chryseis  to  her 
father,  and  does  not  the  other  say  that  it  is  not  profita- 
ble ?  does  not  the  one  say  that  he  ought  to  take  the  prize 
of  another,  and  does  not  the  other  say  that  he  ought  not? 
Did  they  not  for  these  reasons  forget,  both  who  they  were 
and  for  what  purpose  they  had  come  there?  Oh,  man, 
for  what  purpose  did  you  come  ?  to  gain  mistresses  or  to 
fight?  To  fight.  With  whom  ?  the  Trojans  or  the  Hel- 
lenes ?  With  the  Trojans.  Do  you  then  leave  Hector 
alone  and  draw  your  sword  against  your  own  king? 
And  do  you,  most  excellent  Sir,  neglect  the  duties  of  the 
king,  you  who  are  the  people's  guardian  and  have  such 
cares  :  and  are  you  quarreling  about  a  little  girl  with  the 
ni.^t  warlike  of  your  allies,  whom  you  ought  by  every 
means  to  take  care  of  and  protect  ?  and  do  you  become 
worse  than  (inferior  to)  a  well-behaved  priest  who  treats 
you  these  fine  gladiators  with  all  respect?  Do  you  see 
what  kind  of  things  ignorance  of  what  is  profitable  does? 
But  I  also  am  rich.  Are  you  then  richer  than  Agamem- 
non !  But  I  am  also  handsome.  Are  you  then  more 
handsome  than  Achilles  ?  Hut  I  have  also  beautiful  hair. 
Hut  had  not  Achilles  more  beautiful  hair  and  gold-colored  ? 
and  he  did  not  comb  it  elegantly  nor  dress  it.  But  I  am 
also  strong.  Can  you  then  lift  so  great  a  stone  as  Hector 
or  Ajax?  But  I  am  also  of  noble  birth.  Are  you  the  son 
of  a  goddess  mother  ?  are  you  the  son  of  a  father  sprung 
from  Zeus  ?  What  good  then  do  these  things  do  to  him, 
when  he  sits  and  weeps  for  a  girl  ?  But  1  am  an  orator. 


208  EJ'ICTETUS. 

And  was  he  not  ?  Do  you  not  see  how  he  handled  the  most 
skillful  of  the  Hellenes  in  oratory,  Odysseus  and  Phoenix  ? 
how  he  stopped  their  mouths  ?  * 

This  is  all  that  I  have  to  say  to  you  :  and  I  say  even 
this  not  willingly.  Why?  Because  you  have  not  roused 
me.  For  what  must  I  look  to  in  order  to  be  roused,  as 
men  who  are  expert  in  riding  are  aroused  by  generous 
horses  ?  Must  I  look  to  your  body  ?  You  treat  it  disgrace- 
fully. To  your  dress  ?  That  is  luxurious.  To  your  be- 
havior, to  your  look  ?  That  is  the  same  as  nothing. 
When  you  would  listen  to  a  philosopher,  do  not  say  to 
him,  You  tell  me  nothing  ;  but  only  show  yourself  wor- 
thy of  hearing  or  fit  for  hearing  ;  and  you  will  see  how 
you  will  move  the  speaker. 


CHAPTER    XXV. 

in/,  i     LOGIC     IS     ..FCESSARY.    \ 

WHEN  one  of  those  who  were  present  said,  Persuade  me 
that  logic  is  necessary,  he  replied,  Do  you  wish  me  to 
prove  this  to  you  ?  The  answer  was,  Yes.  Then  I  must 
use  a  demonstrative  form  of  speech.  This  was  granted. 
How  then  will  you  know  if  I  am  cheating  you  by  argu- 
ment ?  The  man  was  silent.  Do  you  see,  said  Epictetus, 
that  you  yourself  arc  admitting  that  logic  is  necessary,  if 
without  it  you  cannot  know  so  much  as  this,  whether 
logic  is  necessary  or  not  necessary? 

*  In  the  ninth  book  of  the  Iliad,  where  Achilles  answers  the  messen- 
gers sent  to  him  by  Agamemnon.  The  reply  of  Achilles  is  a  wonder- 
ful example  of  eloquence.  t  See  i.  17. 


CHAPTER  XXVI. 

WHAT  is  THK  PKOPKRTY  OK  KKKOR. 

EVF.RY  error  comprehends  contradiction :  for  since  he  who 
errs  does  not  wish  to  err,  but  to  be  right,  it  is  plain  that 
he  does  not  do  what  he  wishes.  For  what  does  the  thief 
wish  to  do?  That  which  is  for  his  own  interest.*  If  then 
the  theft  is  not  for  his  interest,  lie  does  not  do  that  which 
he  wishes.  But  every  rational  soul  is  by  nature  offended 
at  contradiction,  and  so  long  as  it  does  not  understand 
this  contradiction,  it  is  not  hindered  from  doing  contra- 
dictory things  :  but  when  it  does  understand  the  contra- 
diction, it  must  of  necessity  avoid  the  contradiction  and 
avoid  it  as  much  as  a  man  must  dissent  from  the  false 
when  he  sees  that  a  thing  is  false  ;  but  so  long  as  this 
falsehood  does  not  appear  to  him,  he  assents  to  it  as  to 
truth. 

He  then  is  strong  in  argument  and  has  the  faculty  of 
exhorting  and  confuting,  who  is  able  to  show  to  each  man 
the  contradiction  through  which  he  errs  and  clearly  to 
prove  how  he  does  not  do  that  which  he  wishes  and  does 
that  which  he  does  not  wish.  For  if  any  one  shall  show 
this,  a  man  will  himself  withdraw  from  that  which  he 
does  ;  but  so  long  as  you  do  not  show  this,  do  not  be  sur- 
prised if  a  man  persists  in  his  practice  ;  for  having  the 
appearance  of  doing  right,  he  does  what  he  does.  For 
this  reason  Socrates  also  rusting  to  this  power  used  to 
say,  I  am  used  to  call  no  other  witness  of  what  I  say,  but 
I  am  always  satisfied  with  him  with  whom  I  am  discuss- 

*  Compare  Xenophon,  Mem.  iii.  9,  4. 
'4 


2io  /•;/'/<:/ A  yr.s-. 

ing,  and  I  ask  him  to  give  his  opinion  and  call  him  as  a 
witness,  and  though  he  is  only  one,  he  is  sufficient  in  the 
place  of  all.  For  Socrates  knew  by  what  the  rational 
soul  is  moved,  just  like  a  pair  of  scales,  and  then  it  must 
incline,  whether  it  chooses  or  not.*  Show  the  rational 
governing-  faculty  a  contradiction,  and  it  will  withdraw 
from  it  ;  but  if  you  do  not  show  it,  rather  blame  yourself 
than  him  who  is  not  persuaded,  f 

*  There  is  some  deficiency  in  the  text.  Cicero  (Acad.  Priori.  12), 
"ut  enim  necesse  est  lancem  in  libra  ponderibus  impositis  deprimi;  sic 
animum  perspicuis  cedere,"  appears  to  supply  the  deficiency. 

t  M.  Antoninus,  v.  28 ;  x.  4. 


BOOK  IK, 

CHAPTER  I. 

OF      FINERY      IN      DRESS. 

A  CERTAIN  young  man  a  rhetorician  came  to  see  Epicte- 
tus,  with  his  hair  dressed  more  carefully  than  was  usual 
and  his  attire  in  an  ornamental  style  ;  whereupon  Epicte- 
tus  said,  Tell  me  if  you  do  not  think  that  some  dogs  are 
beautiful  and  some  horses,  and  so  of  all  other  animals. 
I  do  think  so,  the  youth  replied.  Are  not  then  some  men 
also  beautiful  and  others  ugly  ?  Certainly.  Do  we  then 
for  the  same  reason  call  each  of  them  in  the  same  kind 
beautiful,  or  each  beautiful  for  something  peculiar  ?  And 
you  will  judge  of  this  matter  thus.  Since  we  see  a  dog 
naturally  formed  for  one  thing,  and  a  horse  for  another, 
and  for  another  still,  as  an  example,  a  nightingale,  we 
may  generally  and  not  improperly  declare  each  of  them 
to  be  beautiful  then  when  it  is  most  excellent  according  to 
its  nature  ;  but  since  the  nature  of  each  is  different,  each 
of  them  seems  to  me  to  be  beautiful  in  a  different  way. 
Is  it  not  so?  He  admitted  that  it  was.  That  then  which 
maki-s  a  dog  beautiful,  makes  a  horse  ugly  ;  and  that 
which  makes  a  horse  beautiful,  makes  a  dog  ugly,  if  it  is 
true  that  their  natures  are  different.  It  seems  to  be  so. 
For  I  think  that  what  makes  a  Pancratiast  beautiful,  makes 
a  wrestler  to  be  not  good,  and  a  runner  to  be  most  ridicu- 

211 


2 1 2  /•/'/<'  /'/•:  ri  's. 

lous  ;  and  ho  who  is  beautiful  for  the  Pentathlon,  is  very 
ugly  for  wrestling.*  It  is  so,  said  he.  What  then  makes 
a  man  beautiful?  Is  it  that  which  in  its  kind  makes  both 
a  dog  and  a  horse  beautiful?  It  is,  he  said.  What  then 
makes  a  dog  beautiful?  The  possession  of  the  excellence 
of  a  dog.  And  what  makes  a  horse  beautiful  ?  The 
possession  of  the  excellence  of  a  horse.  What  then  makes 
a  man  beautiful  ?  Is  it  not  the  possession  of  the  excellence 
of  a  man  ?  And  do  you  then,  if  you  wish  to  be  beautiful, 
young  man,  labor  at  this,  the  acquisition  of  human 
excellence.  But  what  is  this  ?  Observe  whom  you  your- 
self praise,  when  you  praise  many  persons  without  par- 
tiality :  do  you  praise  the  just  or  the  unjust?  The  just. 
Whether  do  you  praise  the  moderate  or  the  immoderate? 
The  moderate.  And  the  temperate  or  the  intemperate  ? 
The  temperate.  If  then  you  make  yourself  such  a  person, 
you  will  know  that  you  will  make  yourself  beautiful  :  but 
so  long  as  you  neglect  these  things,  you  must  be  ugly, 
even  though  you  contrive  all  you  can  to  appear  beautiful. 
Further  I  do  not  know  what  to  say  to  you  :  for  if  I  say 
to  you  wh.it  I  think,  1  shall  offend  you,  and  you  will 
'perhaps  leave  the  school  and  not  return  to  it  :  and  if  I  do 
not  say  what  I  think,  sec  how  I  shall  be  acting,  if  you 
come  to  me  to  be  improved,  and  I  shall  not  improve  you 
at  all,  and  if  you  come  to  me  as  to  a  philosopher,  and  I 
shall  say  nothing  to  you  as  a  philosopher.  And  how  cruel 
it  is  to  you  to  leave  you  unconnected.  If  at  any  time 
afterward  your  shall  acquire  sense,  you  will  with  good 
reason  blame  me  and  say.  What  did  F.pictetus  observe 

*  A  Pancratiast  is  a  man  who  is  trained  for  the  Pancratium,  that  is, 
both  for  boxing  and  wrestling.  The  Pentathlon  comprised  rive  exer- 
cises, which  are  expressed  by  one  Greek  line. — 

Leaping,  running,  the  quoit,  throwing  the  javelin,  wrestling. 
Compare  Aristotle,  Rhet.  i.  5. 


EPIC  TEH'S.  213 

in  me  that  when  he  saw  me  in  such  a  plight  coming  to 
him  in  such  a  scandalous  condition,  he  neglected  me  and 
never  said  a  word  ?  did  he  so  much  despair  of  me?  was  I 
not  young  ?  was  I  not  able  to  listen  to  reason  ?  and  how 
many  other  young  men  at  this  age  commit  many  like 
errors?  I  hear  that  a  certain  Polemon  from  being  a  most 
dissolute  youth  underwent  such  a  great  change.  Well, 
suppose  that  he  did  not  think  that  I  should  be  a  Polemon  ;* 
yet  he  might  have  set  my  hair  right,  he  might  have 
stripped  off  my  decorations,  he  might  have  stopped  me 
from  plucking  the  hair  out  of  my  body  ;  but  when  he  saw 
me  dressed  like — what  shall  I  say  ? — he  kept  silent.  I  do 
not  say  like  what  ;  but  you  will  say  when  you  come  to 
your  senses,  and  shall  know  what  it  is,  and  what  persons 
use  such  a  dress. 

If  you  bring  this  charge  against  me  hereafter,  what 
defense  shall  I  make  ?  Why,  shall  I  say  that  the  man 
will  not  be  persuaded  by  me  ?  Was  Laius  persuaded  by- 
Apollo  ?  Did  he  not  go  away  and  get  drunk  and  show  no 
care  for  tho  oracle  ?f  Well  then  for  this  reason  did  Apollo 
refuse  to  tell  him  the  truth  ?  I  indeed  do  not  know, 

*  Comp.  Horace,  Sat.  ii.  3,  v.  253. 

Qusero,  faciasne  quod  olim 
Mutatus  Polemon  ?  etc. 

The  story  of  Polemon  is  told  by  Diogenes  Laertius.  He  was  a  dissolute 
youth.  As  he  was  passing  one  day  the  place  where  Xenocrates  was 
lecturing,  he  and  his  drunken  companions  hurst  into  the  school,  hut 
Polemon  was  so  affected  by  the  words  of  the  excellent  teacher  that  he 
came  out  quite  a  different  man,  and  ultimately  succeeded  Xenocrates  in 
the  school  of  the  Academy.  Jsee  Epict.  iv.  1 1,  30. 

t  Laius  consulted  the  oracle  at  Delphi  how  he  should  have  children. 
The  oracle  told  him  not  to  beget  children,  and  even  to  expose  them  if 
he  did.  Laius  was  so  foolish  as  to  disobey  the  god  in  both  respects, 
for  he  begot  children  and  brought  them  up.  He  did  indeed  order  his 
child  CEdipus  to  be  exposed,  but  the  boy  was  saved  and  became  the 
murderer  of  Laius. 


_•  ,  j.  /.7Y< ' 

whether  you  will  be  persuaded  by  nic  or  not  ;  but  Apollo 
knew  most  certainly  that  Laius  would  not  be  persuaded 
and  yet  he  spoke.  But  why  did  he  speak  ?  I  say  in 
reply.  But  why  is  he  Apollo,  and  why  does  he  deliver 
oracles,  and  why  has  he  fixed  himself  in  this  place  as  a 
Prophet  and  source  of  truth  and  for  the  inhabitants  of  the 
world  to  resort  to  him  ?  and  why  are  the  words  Know 
yourself  written  in  front  of  the  temple,  though-  no  person 
takes  any  notice  of  them  ? 

Did  Socrates  persuade  all  his  hearers  to  take  care  of 
themselves?  Not  the  thousandth  part.  But  however, 
after  he  had  been  placed  in  this  position  by  the  deity,  as 
he  himself  says,  he  never  left  it.  But  what  does  he  say 
even  to  his  judges  ?  "If  you  acquit  me  on  these  condi- 
tions that  I  no  longer  do  that  which  I  do  now,  I  will  not 
consent  and  I  will  not  desist  :  but  I  will  go  up  both  to 
young,  and  to  old,  and,  to  speak  plainly,  to  every  man 
whom  I  meet,  and  I  will  ask  the  questions  which  I  ask 
now ;  and  most  particularly  will  I  do  this  to  you  my 
fellow-citizens,  because  you  are  more  nearly  related  to 
me. "  *  Are  you  so  curious,  Socrates,  and  such  a  busy- 
body ?  and  how  does  it  concern  you  how  we  act  ?  and 
what  is  it  that  you  say  ?  Being  of  the  same  community 
and  of  the  same  kin,  you  neglect  yourself,  and  showr  your- 
self a  bad  citizen  to  the  state,  and  a  bad  kinsman  to  your 
kinsmen,  and  a  bad  neighbor  to  your  neighbors.  Who 
then  are  you  ?  Here  it  is  a  great  thing  to  say,  "  I  am  he 
whose  duty  it  is  to  take  care  of  men  ;  for  it  is  not  every 
little  heiter  which  dares  to  resist  a  lion  ;  but  if  the  bull 
comes  up  and  resists  him,  say  to  th^  bull,  if  you  choose, 
'  And  who  are  you,  and  what  business  have  you  here  ? ' ' 
Man,  in  every  kind  there  is  produced  something  which 
excels  ;  in  oxen,  in  dogs,  in  bees,  in  horses.  Do  not  then 
say  to  that  which  excels,  Who  then  are  you  ?  If  you  do, 
*  Plato,  Apology,  i.  9,  etc.,  and  c.  17. 


•/•/•. vr.v.  215 

it  will    find   a  voice-   in    some  way  and  say,   I  am   such  a 
thing  as  the  purpu  .rment  :  *   do  not   expect  me  to 

be  like  the  others,  or  blame   my  nature   that   it   has   made 
me  different  from  the  rest  of  men. 

\Vhat  then  ?  am  I  such  a  man  ?  Certainly  not.  And 
are  you  such  a  man  as  can  listen  to  the  truth  ?  1  wish 
you  were.  Hut  however  since  in  a  manner  I  have  been 
condemned  to  wear  a  white  beard  and  a  cloak,  and  you 
come  to  me  as  to  a  philosopher,  I  will  not  treat  you  in  a 
cruel  way  nor  yet  as  if  I  despaired  of  you,  but  I  will  say, 
Young  man,  whom  do  you  wish  to  make  beautiful?  In 
the  first  place,  know  who  you  are  and  then  adorn  yourself 
appropriately.  You  are  a  human  being  ;  and  this  is  a 
mortal  animal  which  has  the  power  of  using  appearances 
rationally.  Bui  what  is  meant  by  "rationally?"  Con- 
formably to  nature  f  and  completely.  What  then  do  you 
->s  which  is  peculiar?  Is  it  the  animal  part?  No. 
Is  it  the  condition  of  mortality?  No.  Is  it  the  power  of 
using  appearances?^  No.  You  possess  the  rational 
faculty  as  a  peculiar  thing  :  adorn  and  beautify  this  ;  but 
your  hair  to  him  who  made  it  as  he  chose.  Come, 
what  other  appellations  have  you  ?  Are  you  man  or 
woman  ?  Man.  Adorn  yourself  then  as  man,  not  as 
woman.  Woman  is  naturally  smooth  and  delicate  ;  and 
if  she  has  much  hair  (on  her  body),  she  is  a  monster  and  is 
exhibited  at  Rome  among  monsters.  And  in  a  man  it  is 
nu lustrous  not  to  have  hair  ;  and  if  he  has  no  hair  he  is  a 

*  Page  10,  note. 

t  Cicero,  de  Fin.  ii.  11  :  Horace,  Epp.  i.  10,  12.  This  was  the  great 
principle  of  Zeno,  to  live  according  to  nature.  Bishop  Butler  in  thf 
Preface  to  his  Sermons  says  of  this  philosophical  principle,  that  virtue 
consisted  in  following  nature,  that  it  is  "a  manner  of  speaking  not 
loose  and  undetcrminate,  Init  clear  :md  distinct,  strictly  just  and  true." 

}  The  bare  use  of  objects  (appearances)  belongs  to  all  animals  ;  a 
rational  use  of  th«-m  i*  |>t-i  uiiar  to  man. —  Mrs.  <  ..itrr.  hurod.  <j  7. 


2i()  KJ'JCTKTl'S. 

monster  ;  but  if  he  cuts  off  his  hairs  and  plucks  them  out, 
\vhat  shall  we  do  with  him?  where  shall  \ve  exhibit  him? 
and  under  what  name  shall  \ve  show  him  ?  I  will  exhibit 
to  you  a  man  who  chooses  to  be  a  woman  rather  than  a 
man.  \\'hat  a  terri:>le  sight  !  There  is  no  man  who  will 
not  wonder  at  such  a  notice.  Indeed  I  think  that  the 
men  who  pluck  out  their  hairs  do  what  they  do  without 
knowing  what  they  do.  Man  what  fault  have  you  to  find 
with  your  nature  ?  That  it  made  you  a  man  ?  What  then  ? 
was  it  lit  that  nature  should  make  all  human  creatures 
women?  and  what  advantage  in  that  case  would  you 
have  had  in  being;  adorned  ?  for  whom  would  you  have 
adorned  yourself,  if  all  human  creatures  were  women  ? 
"But  you  are  not  pleased  with  the  matter  :  set  to  work 
then  upon  the  whole  business.  Take  away — what  is  its 
name? — that  which  is  the  cause  of  the  hairs  :  make  your- 
self a  woman  in  all  respects,  that  we  may  not  be  mistaken  : 
do  not  make  one  half  man,  and  the  other  half  woman. 
Whom  do  you  wish  to  please  ?  The  women  ?  Please 
them  as  a  man.  Well  :  but  they  like  smooth  men.  Will 
you  not  hang-  yourself?  and  if  women  took  delight  in 
catamites,  would  you  become  one  ?  Is  this  your  business  ? 
were  you  born  for  this  purpose,  that  dissolute  women 
should  delight  in  you  ?  Shall  we  make  such  a  one  as  you 
a  citizen  of  Corinth  and  perchance  a  prefect  of  the  city,  or 
chief  of  the  youth,  or  general  or  superintendent  of  the 
games  ?  Well,  and  when  you  have  taken  a  wife,  do  you 
intend  to  have  your  hairs  plucked  out  ?  To  please  whom 
and  for  what  purpose  ?  And  when  you  have  begotten 
children,  will  you  introduce  them  also  into  the  state  with 
the  habit  of  plucking  their  hairs  ?  A  beautiful  citi/en,  and 
senator  and  rhetorician.  We  ought  to  pray  that  such 
young  men  be  born  among  us  and  brought  up. 

Do  not  so,  I  entreat  you  by  the  Gods,  young  man  :  but 
when  you  have  once  heard  these  words,  go  away  and  say 


EPICTETUS. 


217 


to  yourself,  "  Epictetus  has  not  said  this  tonic;  for  how 
could  he  ?  but  sonic  propitious  God  through  him  :  f>>r  it 
would  never  have  conic  into  his  thoughts  to  say  this,  since 
he  is  not  accustomed  to  talk  thus  with  any  person.  Come 
then  let  us  obey  God,  that  we  may  not  be  subject  to  his 
anger."  You  say.  No.  But  (I  say),  if  a  crow  by  his 
croaking  signifies  anything  to  you,  it  is  not  the  crow 
winch  signifies,  but  God  through  the  crow  ;  and  if  he 
signifies  anything  through  a  human  voice,  will  he  not 
cause  the  man  to  say  this  to  you,  that  you  may  know  the 
power  of  the  divinity,  that  he  signifies  to  some  in  this 
way,  and  to  others  in  that  way,  and  concerning  the 
greatest  things  and  the  chief  he  signifies  through  the 
noblest  messenger?  What  else  is  it  which  the  poet  says: 

For  we  ourselves  have  warned  him,  and  have  sent 
Hermes  the  careful  watcher,   Argus'  slayer, 
The  husband  not  to  kill  nor  wed  the  wife.* 

Was  Hermes  going  to  descend  from  heaven  to  say  this  to 
him  (.^Egisthus)  ?  And  now  the  Gods  say  this  to  you 
and  send  the  messenger,  the  slayer  of  Argus,  to  warn  you 
not  to  pervert  that  which  is  well  arranged,  nor  to  busy 
yourself  about  it,  but  to  allow  a  man  to  be  a  man,  and  a 
woman  to  be  a  woman,  a  beautiful  man  to  be  as  a  beau- 
tiful man,  and  an  ugly  man  as  an  ugly  man,  for  you  are 
not  flesh  and  hair,  but  you  are  will  ;  and  if  your  will  is 
beautiful,  then  you  will  be  beautiful.  But  up  to  the  present 
time  I  dare  not  tell  you  that  you  are  ugly,  for  I  think  that 
you  are  readier  to  hear  anything  than  this.  But  see  what 
Socrates  says  to  the  most  beautiful  and  blooming  of  men 
Alcibiades  :  Try  then  to  be  beautiful.  What  does  he  say 
to  him  ?  Dress  your  hair  and  pluck  the  hairs  from  your 
legs?  Nothing  of  that  kind.  But  adorn  your  will,  take 
away  bad  opinions.  Mow  with  the  body  ?  Leave  it  as 

*  From  the  Odyssey,  i.  37,  where  Zeus  is  speaking  of  /ligisthus. 


2i8  KPJCTETUS. 

it  is  by  nature.  Another  has  looked  after  these  things  : 
intrust  them  to  him.  What  then,  must  a  man  be  un- 
cleaned  ?  Certainly  not  ;  but  what  you  are  and  are  made 
by  nature,  cleanse  this.  A  man  should  be  cleanly  as  a 
man.  a  woman  as  a  woman,  a  child  as  a  child.  You  Say 
no  :  but  let  us  also  pluck  out  the  lion's  mane,  that  he  may 
not  be  uncleaned.  and  the  cock's  comb  for  he  also  ought 
to  be  cleaned.  Granted,  but  as  a  cock,  and  the  lion  as  a 
lion,  and  the  hunting  dog  as  a  hunting  dog. 


CHAPTER  II. 

IN  WHAT    A     M ,\N    OfGHT    TO    feE    EXERCISED  WHO    HAS    MADE  PRO- 
FICIENCY ;   AND  THAT  WE  NEGLECT  THE  CHIEF  THINGS. 

THERE  are  three  things  (topics)  in  which  a  man  ought 
to  exercise  himself  who  would  be  wise  and  good.  The 
first  concerns  the  desires  and  the  aversions,  that  a  man 
may  not  fail  to  get  what  he  desires,  and  that  he  may  not  fall 
into  that  which  he  does  not  desire.*  The  second  con- 
cerns the  movements  (toward  an  object)  and  the  move- 
ments from  an  object,  and  generally  in  doing  what  a  man 
ought  to  do,  that  he  may  act  according  to  order,  to  reason, 
and  not  carelessly.  The  third  thing  concerns  freedom 
from  deception  and  rashness  in  judgment,  and  generally 
it  concerns  the  assents.  Of  these  topics  the  chief  and  the 
most  urgent  is  that  which  relates  to  the  affects  (perturba- 
tions) ;  for  an  affect  is  produced  in  no  other  way  than  by 
a  failing  to  obtain  that  which  a  man  desires  or  a  falling 
into  that  which  a  man  would  wish  to  avoid.  This  is 

*  Antoninus,  xi.  37,  "as  to  sensual  desire  he  should  altogether  keep 
away  from  it ;  and  as  to  avoidance  [aversion]  he  should  not  show  it  with 
respect  to  any  of  the  things  which  are  not  in  our  power." 


KPICTETl'S.  219 

that  which  brings  in  perturbations,  disorders,  bad  fortune, 
misfortune's,  sorrows,  lamentations  and  envy  ;  that  which 
makes  men  envious  and  jealous  ;  and  by  these  causes  we 
are  unable  even  to  listen  to  the  precepts  of  reason.  The 
second  topic  concerns  the  duties  of  a  man  ;  for  I  ought 
not  to  be  free  from  affects  like  a  statue,  but  I  ought  to 
maintain  the  relations  .natural  and  acquired,  as  a  pious 
man,  as  a  son,  as  a  father,  as  a  citizen. 

The  third  topic  is  that  which  immediately  concerns 
those  who  are  making  proficiency,  that  which  concerns 
the  security  of  the  other  two,  so  that  not  even  in  sleep 
any  appearance  unexamined  may  surprise  us,  nor  in  in- 
toxication, nor  in  melancholy.  This,  it  may  be  said,  is 
above  our  power.  But  the  present  philosophers  neglect- 
ing the  first  topic  and  the  second  (the  affects  alid  duties), 
employ  themselves  on  the  third,  using  sophistical  argu- 
ments, making  conclusions  from  questioning,  employing 
hypotheses,  lying.  For  a  man  must,  as  it  is  said,  when 
employed  on  these  matters,  take  care  that  he  is  not  de- 
ceived. Who  must?  The  wise  and  good  man.  This 
then  is  all  that  is  wanting  to  you.  Have  you  successfully 
worked  out  the  rest  ?  Are  you  free  from  deception  in  the 
matter  of  money  ?  If  you  see  a  beautiful  girl,  do  you  re- 
sist the  appearance?  If  your  neighbor  obtains  an  estate 
by  will,  are  you  not  vexed?  Now  is  there  nothing  else 
wanting  to  you  except  unchangeable  firmness  of  mind? 
Wretch,  you  hear  these  very  things  with  fear  and  anxiety 
that  some  person  may  despise  you,  and  with  inquiries 
about  what  any  person  may  say  about  you.  And  if  a 
man  come  and  tell  you  that  in  a  certain  conversation  in 
which  the  question  was.  Who  is  the  best  philosopher,  a  man 
who  was  present  said  that  a  certain  person  was  the  chief 
philosopher,  your  little  soul  which  was  only  a  finger's 
length  stretches  out  to  two  cubits.  iiut  if  another  who  is 
present  says.  You  are  mistaken  :  it  is  not  worth  while  to 


220 

listen  to  a  certain  person,  for  what  does  he  know?  he  has 
only  the  first  principles,  anil  no  more?  then  you  are  con- 
founded, you  grow  pale,  you  cry  out  immediately,  I  will 
show  him  who  I  am,  that  I  am  a  great  philosopher.  It 
is  seen  by  these  very  things  :  why  do  you  wish  to  show 
it  by  others  ?  Do  you  not  know  that  Diogenes  pointed 
out  one  of  the  sophists  in  this  way  by  stretching  out  his 
middle  finger  ?  *  And  then  when  the  man  was  wild  with 
rage,  This,  he  said,  is  the  certain  person  :  I  have  pointed 
him  out  to  you.  For  a  man  is  not  shown  by  the  finger, 
as  a  stone  or  a  piece  of  wood  :  but  when  any  person 
shows  the  man's  principles,  then  he  shows  him  as  a  man. 
Let  us  look  at  your  principles  also.  For  is  it  not  plain 
that  you  value  not  at  all  your  own  will,  but  you  look  ex- 
ternally to  things  which  are  independent  of  your  will  ? 
For  instance,  what  will  a  certain  person  say  ?  and  what 
will  people  think  of  you  ?  will  you  be  considered  a  man 
of  learning  ;  have  you  read  Chrysippus  or  Antipater?  for 
if  you  have  read  Archedemus  f  also,  you  have  everything 
[that  you  can  desire].  Why  are  you  still  uneasy  lest  you 
should  not  show  us  who  you  are  ?  Would  you  let  me 
tell  you  what  manner  of  man  you  have  shown  us  that  you 
are  ?  You  have  exhibited  yourself  to  us  as  a  mean  fellow, 
querulous,  passionate,  cowardly,  finding  fault  with  every- 
thing, blaming  everybody,  never  quiet,  vain  :  this  is  what 
you  have  exhibited  to  us.  Go  away  now  and  read  Arche- 
demus ;  then  if  a  mouse  should  leap  down  and  make  a 
noise,  you  are  a  dead  man.  P'or  such  a  death  awaits  you 
as  it  did — what  was  the  man's  name  ? — Crinis  ;  \  and  he 
too  was  proud,  because  he  understood  Archedemus. 

*To  point  out  a  man  with  the  middle  finger  was  a  way  of  showing 
the  greatest  contempt  for  him.  t  As  to  Archedemus,  see  ii.  4,  n. 

*  Crinis  was  a  Stoic  philosopher  mentioned  by  Diogenes  Laertius. 
We  may  suppose  that  he  was  no  real  philosopher,  and  that  he  died  of 
fright. 


EPfCTETUS.  22  i 

Wretch,  will  you  not  dismiss  these  thing's  that  do  not 
concern  you  at  all  ?  These  things  are  suitable  to  those 
who  are  able  to  learn  them  without  perturbation,  to  those 
who  can  say:  "I  am  not  subject  to  anger,  to  grief,  to 
envy  :  I  am  not  hindered,  I  am  not  restrained.  What  re- 
mains for  me  ?  I  have  leisure,  I  am  tranquil  :  let  us  see 
how  we  must  deal  with  sophistical  arguments;*  let  us 
see  how  when  a  man  has  accepted  an  hypothesis  he  shall 
not  be  led  away  to  anything  absurd."  To  them  such 
things  belong.  To  those  who  are  happy  it  is  appropriate 
to  light  a  fire,  to  dine  ;  if  they  choose,  both  to  sing  and  to 
;lance.  But  when  the  vessel  is  sinking,  you  come  to  me 
and  hoist  the  sails,  f 


CHAPTER  III. 

WHAT  IS  THE  MATTER  ON  WHICH  A  GOOD  MAN  SHOULD  BE 
EMPLOYED,  AND  IN  WHAT  WE  OUGHT  CHIEFLY  TO  PRACTICE 
OURSELVES. 

THE  material  for  the  wise  and  good  man  is  his  own  rul- 
ing faculty  :  and  the  body  is  the  material  for  the  physician 
and  the  aliptes  (the  man  who  oils  persons)  ;  the  land  is 
the  matter  for  the  husbandman.  The  business  of  the  wise 
and  good  man  is  to  use  appearances  conformably  to  nat- 
ure :  and  as  it  is  the  nature  of  every  soul  to  assent  to  the 
truth,  to  dissent  from  the  false,  and  to  remain  in  suspense 

*  See  this  chapter  above. 

t  The  philosopher  is  represented  as  being  full  of  anxiety  about  things 
which  do  not  concern  him,  and  which  are  proper  subjects  for  those  only 
who  are  free  from  disturbing  passions  and  arc  quite  happy,  which  is  not 
the  philosopher's  condition.  He  is  compared  to  a  sinking  ship,  ami  at 
this  very  time  he  is  supposed  to  be  employed  in  the  useless  lahor  ot 
hoisting  the  sail*. 


222  KP/CTJiTUS. 

as  to  that  which  is  uncertain  ;  so  it  is  its  nature  to  be 
moved  toward  the  desire  of  the  good,  and  to  aversion 
from  the  evil  ;  and  with  respect  to  that  which  is  neither 
good  nor  bad  it  feels  indifferent.  For  as  the  money- 
changer (banker)  is  not  allowed  to  reject  Caesar's  coin, 
nor  the  seller  of  herbs,  but  if  you  show  the  coin,  whether 
he  chooses  or  not.  he  must  give  up  what  is  sold  for  the 
coin  ;  so  it  is  also  in  the  matter  of  the  soul.  When  the 
good  appears,  it  immediately  attracts  to.  itself  ;  the  evil 
repels  from  itself.  But  the  soul  will  never  reject  the  mani- 
fest appearance  of  the  good,  any  more  than  persons  will 
reject  Caesars  coin.  On  this  principle  depends  every 
movement  both  of  man  and  God.* 

For  this  reason  the  good  is  preferred  to  every  intimate 
relationship  (obligation).  There  is  no  intimate  relation- 
ship between  me  and  my  father,  but  there  is  between  me 
and  the  good.  Are  you  so  hard-hearted  ?  Yes,  for  such 
is  my  nature;  and  this  is  the  coin  which  Cod  has  given 
me.  For  this  reason  if  the  good  is  something  different 
from  the  beautiful  and  the  just,  both  father  is  gone  (neg- 
lected), and  brother  and  country,  and  everything.  But 
shall  I  overlook  my  own  good,  in  order  that  you  may 
have  it,  and  shall  I  give  it  up  to  you  ?  Why  ?  1  am  your 
father.  But  you  are  not  my  good.  I  am  your  brother. 
But  you  are  not  my  good.  But  if  we  place  the  good  in  a 
right  determination  of  the  will,  the  very  observance  of  the 
relations  of  life  is  good,  and  accordingly  he  who  gives  up 
any  external  things,  obtains  that  which  is  good.  Your 
father  takes  away  your  property.  But  he  does  not  injure 
you.  Your  brother  will  have  the  greater  part  of  the  estate 
in  land.  Let  him  have  as  much  as  he  chooses.  Will  he 
then  have  a  greater  share  of  modesty,  of  fidelity,  of  broth- 
erly affection  ?  For  who  will  eject  you  from  this  posses- 
sion ?  Not  even  Zeus,  for  neither  has  he  chosen  to  do  so  ; 

*  Comp.  i.  19,  ii. 


EFICTETUS.  223 

but  he  has  made  this  in  my  own  power,  and  he  has  given 
it  to  me  just  as  he  possessed  it  himself,  free  from  hin- 
drance, compulsion,  and  impediment.  When  then  the 
coin  which  another  uses  is  a  different  coin,  if  a  man 
presents  this  coin,  he  receives  that  which  is  sold  for  it. 
Suppose  that  there  comes  into  the  province  a  thievish  pro- 
consul, what  coin  does  he  use  ?  Silver  coin.  Show  it  to 
him,  and  carry  off  what  you  please.  Suppose  one  comes 
who  is  an  adulterer,  what  coin  does  he  use  ?  Little  girls. 
Take,  a  man  says,  the  coin,  and  sell  me  the  small  thing. 
Give,  says  the  seller,  and  buy  [what  you  want].  Another 
is  eager  to  possess  boys.  Give  him  the  coin,  and  receive 
what  you  wish.  Another  is  fond  of  hunting  :  give  him  a 
fine  nag  or  a  dog.  Though  he  groans  and  laments,  he  will 
sell  for  it  that  which  you  want.  For  another  compels  him 
from  within,  he  who  has  fixed  (determined)  this  coin.* 

Against  (or  with  respect  to)  this  kind  of  thing  chiefly  a 
man  should  exercise  himself.  As  soon  as  you  go  out  in 
the  morning,  examine  every  man  whom  you  see,  every 
man  whom  you  hear  ;  answer  as  to  a  question.  What 
have  you  seen  ?  A  handsome  man  or  woman  ?  Apply 
the  rule.  Is  this  independent  of  the  will,  or  dependent  ? 
Independent.  Take  it  away.  What  have  you  seen 

*  Mrs.  Carter  compares  the  Epistle  to  tlie  Romans,  vii.  21-23. 
Schweighaeuser  says,  the  man  either  sees  that  the  thing  which  he  is 
doing  is  bad  or  unjust,  or  for  any  other  reason  he  does  not  do  the 
thing  willingly ;  but  he  is  compelled,  and  allows  himself  to  be  car- 
ried away  by  the  passion  which  rules  him.  The  "another"  who 
lomp'jl-s  is  God,  Schweig.  .--ays,  who  has  made  the  nature  of  man  such, 
that  he  must  po-  rvthing  else  to  do  that  thing  in  which  he 

places  his  Good:  and  he  adds,  that  it  is  a  man's  fault  if  he  places  his 
good  in  that  thing,  in  which  God  has  not  placed  it.  Some  persons  will 
not  consider  this  to  be  satisfactory.  The  man  is  "compelled and  allows 
himself  to  be  carried  away,"  etc.  The  notion  of  "  compulsion  "  ii  incon- 
sistent with  the  extrci.-e  of  the  will.  The  man  is  unlurky.  He  is  like 
him  "who  sees,"  as  the  Latin  poet  says,  "the  better  things  and  ap- 
proves of  them,  but  follows  the  worse." 


man  lamenting  over  the  death  of  a  child.  Apply  the  rule. 
Death  is  a  thing  independent  of  the  will.  Take  it  away. 
lias  the  proconsul  met  you?  Apply  the  rule.  What 
kind  of  thing  is  a  proconsul's  office?  Independent  of  the 
will,  or  dependent  on  it?  Independent.  Take  this  away 
also  :  it  does  not  stand  examination  :  cast  it  away  :  it  is 
nothing  to  you. 

If  we  practiced  this  and  exercised  ourselves  in  it  daily 
form  morning  to  night,  something  indeed  would  be  done. 
But  now  we  are  forthwith  caught  half-asleep  by  every 
appearance,  and  it  is  only,  if  ever,  that  in  the  school  we 
are  roused  a  little.  Then  when  we  go  out,  if  we  see  a 
man  lamenting,  we  say,  He  is  undone.  If  we  see  a 
consul,  we  say,  He  is  happy.  If  we  see  an  exiled  man, 
we  say,  He  is  miserable.  If  we  see  a  poor  man,  we  say, 
He  is  wretched  :  he  has  nothing  to  eat. 

We  ought  then  to  eradicate  these  bad  opinions,  and  to 
this  end  we  should  direct  all  our  efforts.  For  what  is 
weeping  and  lamenting  ?  Opinion.  What  is  bad  fortune  ? 
Opinion.  What  is  civil  sedition,  what  is  divided  opinion, 
what  is  blame,  what  is  accusation,  what  is  impiety,  what 
is  trifling  ?  All  these  things  are  opinions,  and  nothing 
more,  and  opinions  about  things  independent  of  the  will, 
as  if  they  were  good  and  bad.  Let  a  man  transfer  these 
opinions  to  things  dependent  on  the  will,  and  I  engage 
for  him  that  he  will  be  firm  and  constant,  whatever  may 
be  the  state  of  things  around  him.  Such  as  is  a  dish  of 
water,  such  is  the  soul.  Such  as  is  the  ray  of  light  which 
falls  on  the  water,  such  are  the  appearances.  When  the 
water  is  moved,  the  ray  also  seems  to  be  moved,  yet  it  is 
not  moved.  And  when  then  a  man  is  seized  with  gid- 
diness, it  is  not  the  arts  and  the  virtues  which  are  con- 
founded, but  the  spirit  (the  nervous  power)  on  which 
they  are  impressed  ;  but  if  the  spirit  be  restored  to  its 
settled  state,  those  things  also  are  restored. 


EP1CTETUS.  225 


CHAPTER    IV. 

AGAINST     A     PERSON     WHO      SHOWED     HIS     PARTISANSHIP     IN 
AN  UNSEEMLY  WAY  IN   A  THEATER. 

THE  governor  of  Kpirus  having  shown  his  favor  to  an 
actor  in  an  unseemly  way  and  being  publicly  blamed  on 
this  account,  and  afterward  having  reported  to  Epictetus 
that  he  was  blamed  and  that  he  was  vexed  at  those  who 
blamed  him,  Epictetus  said,  What  harm  have  they  been 
doing  ?  These  men  also  were  acting  as  partisans,  as  you 
were  doing.  The  governor  replied,  Does  then  any  person 
show  his  partisanship  in  this  way  ?  When  they  see  you, 
said  Epictetus,  who  are  their  governor,  a  friend  of  Caesar 
and  his  deputy,  showing  partisanship  in  this  way,  was  it 
not  to  be  expected  that  they  also  should  show  their  parti- 
sanship in  the  same  way  ?  for  if  it  is  not  right  to  show 
partisanship  in  this  way,  do  not  do  so  yourself  ;  and  if  it 
is  right,  why  are  you  angry  if  they  followed  your  example  ? 
For  whom  have  the  many  to  imitate  except  you,  who 
arc  their  superiors  ?  to  whose  example  should  they  look- 
when  they  go  to  the  theater  except  yours  ?  See  how  the 
deputy  of  Caesar  looks  on  :  he  has  cried  out,  and  I  too 
then  will  cry  out.  He  springs  up  from  his  seat,  and  I 
will  spring  up.  His  slaves  sit  in  various  parts  of  the 
theater  and  call  out.  I  have  no  slaves,  but  I  will  myself 
cry  out  as  much  as  I  can  and  as  loud  as  all  of  them  to- 
gether. You  ought  then  to  know  when  you  enter  the 
theater  that  you  enter  as  a  rule  and  example  to  the  rest 
how  they  ought  to  look  at  the  acting.  Why  then  did 
they  blame  you  ?  Because  every  man  hates  that  which 


226  BP/CTS7VS. 

is  a  hindrance  to  him.  They  wished  one  person  to  be 
crowned;  you  wished  another.  They  were  a  hindrance 
to  you,  and  you  were  a  hindrance  to  them.  You  were 
found  to  be  the  stronger  ;  and  they  did  what  they  could  ; 
they  blamed  that  which  hindered  them.  What  then  would 
you  have  ?  That  you  should  do  what  you  please,  and 
they  should  not  even  say  what  they  please  ?  And  what 
is  the  wonder  ?  Do  not  the  husbandmen  abuse  Zeus 
when  they  are  hindered  by  him  ?  do  not  the  sailors  abuse 
him  ?  do  they  ever  cease  abusing  Cassar  ?  What  then  ? 
does  not  Zeus  know  ?  is  not  what  is  said  reported  to 
Csesar?  What  then  does  he  do?  he  knows  that,  if  he 
punished  all  who  abuse  him,  he  would  have  nobody  to 
rule  over.  What  then  ?  when  you  enter  the  theater,  you 
ought  to  say  not,  Let  Sophron  (some  actor)  be  crowned, 
but  you  ought  to  say  this,  Come  let  me  maintain  my  will 
in  this  matter  so  that  it  shall  be  conformable  to  nature  : 
no  man  is  dearer  to  me  than  myself.  It  would  be  ridicu- 
lous then  for  me  to  be  hurt  (injured)  in  order  that  another 
who  is  an  actor  may  be  crowned.  Whom  then  do  I  wish 
to  gain  the  prize  ?  Why  the  actor  who  does  gain  the 
prize  ;  and  so  he  will  always  gain  the  prize  whom  I  wish 
to  gain  it.  But  I  wish  Sophron  to  be  crowned.  Celebrate 
as  many  games  as  you  choose  in  your  own  house.  Ne- 
mean,  Pythian,  Isthmian,  Olympian,  and  proclaim  him 
victor.  But  in  public  do  not  claim  more  than  your  due, 
nor  attempt  to  appropriate  to  yourself  what  belongs  to 
all.  If  you  do  not  consent  to  this,  bear  being  abused  : 
for  when  you  do  the  same  as  the  many,  you  put  yourself 
on  the  same  level  with  thsm. 


EPICTETUS.  22? 


CHAPTER  V. 

AGAINST    THOSE    WHO    ON    ACCOUNT    OF    SICKNESS    GO    AWAY 
HOMK. 

I  AM  sick  here,  said  one  of  the  pupils,  and  I  wish  to 
return  home.  At  home,  I  suppose,  you  were  free  from 
sickness.  Do  you  not  consider  whether  you  are  doing; 
anything  here  which  may  be  useful  to  the  exercise  of 
your  will,  that  it  may  be  corrected  ?  For  if  you  are  doing 
nothing  toward  this  end,  it  was  to  no  purpose  that  you 
came.  Go  away.  Look  after  your  affairs  at  home.  For 
if  your  ruling  power  cannot  be  maintained  in  a  state  con- 
formable to  nature,  it  is  possible  that  your  land  can,  that 
you  will  be  able  to  increase  your  money,  you  will  take 
care  of  your  father  in  his  old  age,  frequent  the  public 
place,  hold  magisterial  office  :  being  bad  you  will  do 
badly  anything  else  that  you  have  to  do.  But  if  you  un- 
derstand yourself,  and  know  that  you  are  casting  away 
certain  bad  opinions  and  adopting  others  in  their  place, 
and  if  you  have  changed  your  state  of  life  from  things 
which  are  not  within  your  will  to  things  which  are  within 
your  will,  and  if  you  ever  say,  Alas  !  you  are  not  saying 
what  you  say  on  account  of  your  father,  or  your  brother, 
but  on  account  of  yourself,  do  you  still  allege  your  sick- 
ness ?  Do  you  not  know  that  both  disease  and  death  must 
surprise  us  while  we  are  doing  something?  the  husband- 
man while  he  is  tilling  the  ground,  the  sailor  while  he  is  on 
his  voyage?  what  would  you  be  doing  when  death  sur- 
prises you,  for  you  must  be  surprised  when  you  are  doing 
something  ?  If  you  can  be  doing  anything  better  than  this 


\vhcn  you  arc  surprised,  do  it.  For  I  wish  to  be  surprised 
by  disease  or  death  when  I  am  looking  after  nothing  else 
than  my  own  will,  that  I  may  be  free  from  perturbation, 
that  I  may  be  free  from  hindrance,  free  from  compulsion, 
and  in  a  state  of  liberty.  I  wish  to  be  found  practicing 
these  things  that  I  may  be  able  to  say  to  God,  Have  I  in 
any  respect  trangressed  thy  commands  ?  have  I  in  any 
respect  wrongly  used  the  powers  which  thou  gavest  me  ? 
have  I  misused  my  perceptions  or  my  preconceptions  ?  * 
have  I  ever  blamed  thee  ?  have  I  ever  found  fault  with  thy 
administration  ?  I  have  been  sick,  because  it  was  thy 
will,  and  so  have  others,  but  I  was  content  to  be  sick.  I 
have  been  poor  because  it  was  thy  will,  but  I  was  content 
also.  I  have  not  filled  a  magisterial  office,  because  it  was 
not  thy  pleasure  that  I  should  :  I  have  never  desired  it. 
Hast  thou  ever  seen  me  for  this  reason  discontented  ?  have 
I  not  always  approached  thee  with  a  cheerful  counte- 
nance, ready  to  do  thy  commands  and  to  obey  thy  signals? 
Is  it  now  thy  will  that  I  should  depart  from  the  assem- 
blage of  men  ?  I  depart.  I  give  thee  all  thanks  that  thou 
hast  allowed  me  to  join  in  this  thy  assemblage  of  men 
and  to  see  thy  works,  and  to  comprehend  this  thy  ad- 
ministration. May  death  surprise  me  while  I  am  think- 
ing of  these  things,  while  I  am  thus  writing  and  reading. 

But  my  mother  will  not  hold  my  head  when  I  am  sick. 
Go  to  your  mother  then  ;  for  you  are  a  fit  person  to  have 
your  head  held  when  you  are  sick.  But  at  home  I  used 
to  lie  down  on  a  delicious  bed.  Go  away  to  your  bed  : 
indeed  you  are  fit  to  lie  on  such  a  bed  even  when  you 
are  in  health  :  do  not  then  lose  what  you  can  do  there 
(at  home). 

But  what  does  Socrates  say  ?  f     As  one  man,  he  says, 

•On  "preconceptions,"  see  i.  2. 

t  Xenophon  (Memorab.  i.  6,  14);  but  Epictetus  does  not  quote  the 
words,  he  only  gives  the  meaning.  Antoninus  (vjii.  43)  say.-,,  "  Different 


El'/CTKTl'S. 


229 


is  pleased  with  improving  his  land,  another  with  improv- 
ing his  horse,  so  I  am  daily  pleased  in  observing;  that  I 
am  growing  better.  Better  in  what  ?  in  using  nice  little 
words  ?  Man,  do  not  say  that.  In  little  matters  of 
speculation  ?  what  are  you  saying  ?  And  indeed  I  do  not 
see  what  else  there  is  on  which  philosophers  employ  their 
time.  Does  it  seem  nothing  to  you  to  have  never  found 
fault  with  any  person,  neither  with  God  nor  man  ?  to  have 
blamed  nobody  ?  to  carry  the  same  face  always  in  going 
out  and  coming  in  ?  This  is  what  Socrates  knew,  and 
yet  he  never  said  that  he  knew  anything  or  taught  any- 
thing. *  But  if  any  man  asked  for  nice  little  words  or  lit- 
tle speculations,  he  would  carry  him  to  Protagoras  or  to 
Hippias  ;  and  if  any  man  came  to  ask  for  pot-herbs,  he 
would  carry  him  to  the  gardener.  Who  then  among  you 
has  this  purpose  (motive  to  action)  ?  for  if  indeed  you  had 
it,  you  would  both  be  content  in  sickness,  and  in  hunger, 
and  in  death.  If  any  among  you  has  been  in  love  with  a 
charming  girl,  he  knows  that  I  say  what  is  true,  f 

things  delight  different  people.  But  it  is  my  delight  to  keep  the  ruling 
faculty  sound  without  turning  away  either  from  any  man  or  from  any 
of  the  thing?,  which  happen  to  men,  but  looking  at  and  receiving  all  with 
welcome  eyes,  and  using  everything  according  to  its  value." 

*  Socrates  never  professed  to  teach  virtue,  but  by  showing  himself  to 
be  a  virtuous  man  he  expected  to  make  his  companions  virtuous  l>y 
imitating  his  example.  (Xenophon,  Memorab.  i.  2,3.) 

t  Upton  explains  this  passage  thus :  "He  who  loves  knows  what  it  is 
to  endure  all  things  for  love.  If  any  man  then  being  captivated  with 
love  for  a  girl  would  for  her  sake  endure  dangers,  and  even  death,  what 
would  he  not  endure  if  he  possessed  the  love  of  God,  the  Universal,  the 
chief  of  beautiful  things? " 


230 


EP1CTETUS. 


CHAPTER  VI. 

MISCELLANEOUS. 

WHEN  some  person  asked  him  how  it  happened  that 
since  reason  has  been  more  cultivated  by  the  men  of  the 
present  age,  the  progress  made  in  former  times  was  greater. 
In  what  respect,  he  answered,  has  it  been  more  cultivated 
now,  and  in  what  respect  was  the  progress  greater  then  ? 
For  in  that  in  which  it  has  now  been  more  cultivated,  in 
that  also  the  progress  will  now  be  found.  At  present  it 
has  been  cultivated  for  the  purpose  of  resolving  syllo- 
gisms, and  progress  is  made.  But  in  former  times  it  was 
cultivated  for  the  purpose  of  maintaining  the  governing 
faculty  in  a  condition  conformable  to  nature,  and  progress 
was  made.  Do  not  then  mix  things  which  are  different, 
and  do  not  expect  when  you  are  laboring  at  one  thing  to 
make  progress  in  another.  But  see  if  any  man  among  us 
when  he  is  intent  upon  this,  the  keeping  himself  in  a  state 
conformable  to  nature  and  living  so  always,  does  not 
make  progress.  For  you  will  not  find  such  a  man. 

The  good  man  is  invincible,  for  he  does  not  enter  the 
contest  where  he  is  not  stronger.  If  you  (his  adversary) 
want  to  have  his  land  and  all  that  is  on  it.  take  the  land  ; 
take  his  slaves,  take  his  magisterial  office,  take  his  poor 
body.  But  you  will  not  make  his  desire  fail  in  that  which 
it  seeks,  nor  his  aversion  fall  into  that  which  he  would 
avoid.  The  only  contest  into  which  he  enters  is  that 
about  things  which  are  within  the  power  of  his  will  ;  how 
then  will  he  not  be  invincible  ? 

Some  person  having  asked  him  what  is  Common  sense, 


231 

:etus  replied.  As  that  may  be  called  a  certain  Common 
hearing  which  only  distinguishes  vocal  sounds,  and  that 
which  distinguishes  musical  sounds  is  not  Common,  but 
artificial  ;  so  there  are  certain  things  which  men,  who  are 
not  altogether  perverted,  see  by  the  common  notions 
which  all  possess.  Such  a  constitution  of  the  mind  is 
named  Common  sense. 

It  is  not  easy  to  exhort  weak  young  men  ;  for  neither 
is  it  easy  to  hold  (soft)  cheese  with  a  hook.  *  But  those 
who  have  a  good  natural  disposition,  even  if  you  try  to 
turn  them  aside,  cling  still  more  to  reason.  Wherefore 
Rufus  f  generally  attempted  to  discourage  (his  pupils), 
and  he  used  this  method  as  a  test  of  those  who  had  a  good 
natural  disposition  and  those  who  had  not.  For  it  was 
his  habit  to  say,  as  a  stone,  if  you  cast  it  upward,  will  be 
brought  down  to  the  earth  by  its  own  nature,  so  the  man 
whose  mind  is  naturally  good,  the  more  you  repel  him, 
the  more  he  turns  toward  that  to  which  he  is  naturally 
inclined. 


CHAPTER  VII. 

TO     T1IK     ADMINISTRATOR     OF     THE      FKEK     CITIES    WHO    WAS     AN 
EPICUREAN. 

\YHF.N  the  administrator  \  came  to  visit  him.  and  the 
man  was  an  Epicurean,  Epictetus  said,  It  is  proper  for  us 
who  are  not  philosophers  to  inquire  of  you  who  are  phi- 

*  This  was  a  proverb  used  by  Bion,  as  Diogenes  Laertius  says.  Th*» 
cheese  was  new  and  soft,  as  the  ancients  used  it. 

t  Rufus  is  mentioned  page  7,  note. 

\  The  Latin  word  is  Corrector,  which  occurs  in  inscriptions,  and  else 
where. 


232 


EPICTETUS. 


losophers,  *  as  those  who  come  to  a  strange  city  inquire 
of  the  citizens  and  those  who  are  acquainted  with  it,  what 
is  the  best  thing  in  the  world,  in  order  that  we  also  after 
inquiry  may  go  in  quest  of  that  which  is  best  and  look  at 
it,  as  strangers  do  with  the  things  in  cities.  For  that 
there  are  three  things  which  relate  to  man,  soul,  body, 
and  things  external,  scarcely  any  man  denies.  It  remains 
for  you  philosophers  to  answer  what  is  the  best.  What 
shall  we  say  to  men?  Is  the  flesh  the  best?  and  was  it 
for  this  that  Maxim  us  f  sailed  as  far  as  Cassiope  in  winter 
(or  bad  weather)  with  his  son,  and  accompanied  him  that 
he  might  be  gratified  in  the  flesh  ?  When  the  man  said 
that  it  was  not,  and  added,  Far  be  that  from  him.  Is  it 
not  fit  then,  Epictetus  said,  to  be  actively  employed  about 
the  best  ?  It  is  certainly  of  all  things  the  most  fit.  What 
then  do  we  possess  which  is  better  than  the  flesh  ?  The 
soul,  he  replied.  And  the  good  things  of  the  best,  are 
they  better,  or  the  good  things  of  the  worse  ?  The  good 
things  of  the  best.  And  are  the  good  things  of  the  best 
within  the  power  of  the  will  or  not  within  the  pou  <  i  oi 
the  will  '  They  are  within  the  power  of  the  will  1-. 
then  the  pleasure  of  the  soul  a  thing  within  the  pou 
the  will  ?  It  is,  he  replied.  And  on  what  shall  this 
pleasure  depend?  On  itself?  But  that  cannot  be  con- 
ceived :  for  there  must  first  exist  a  certain  substance  or 
nature  of  good,  by  obtaining  which  we  shall  have  pleas- 
ure in  the  soul.  Pie  assented  to  this  also.  On  what  then 
shall  we  depend  for  this  pleasure  of  the  soul  ?  for  if  it 

*  The  Epicureans  are  ironically  named  Philosophers,  for  most  of  them 
were  arrogant  men.  See  what  is  said  of  them  in  Cicero's  De  Nuturu 
Deorum,  i.  8.  Schweig. 

t  Maximus  was  appointed  by  Trajan  to  conduct  a  campaign  against 
the  Parthians,  in  which  he  lost  his  life.  Dion  Cassius,  ii.  1 108,  iu(>, 
Reimarus.  Cassiope  or  Cassope  is  a  city  in  Epirus,  near  the  sea,  and 
between  Pandosia  and  Nicopolis,  where  Epictetus  lived. 


KPJCTKTl'S. 


233 


shall  depend  on  things  of  the  soul,  the  substance  (nature) 
of  the  good  is  discovered  ;  for  good  cannot  be  one  thing, 
and  that  at  which  \ve  are  rationally  delighted  another 
thing  ;  nor  if  that  which  precedes  is  not  good,  can  that 
which  comes  after  be  good,  for  in  order  that  the  thing 
which  comes  after  may  be  good,  that  which  precedes 
must  be  good.  But  you  would  not  affirm  this,  if  you  are 
in  your  right  mind,  for  you  would  then  say  what  is  incon- 
sistent both  with  Epicurus  and  the  rest  of  your  doctrines. 
It  remains  then  that  the  pleasure  of  the  soul  is  in  the 
pleasure  from  things  of  the  body  :  and  again  that  those 
bodily  things  must  be  the  things  which  precede  and  the 
substance  (nature)  of  the  good. 

For  this  reason  Maximus  acted  foolishly  if  he  made  the 
voyage  for  any  other  reason  than  for  the  sake  of  the  flesh, 
that  is,  for  the  sake  of  the  best.  And  also  a  man  acts 
foolishly  if  he  abstains  from  that  which  belongs  to  others, 
when  he  is  a  judge  and  able  to  take  it.  But,  if  you  please, 
let  us  consider  this  only,  how  this  thing  may  be  done 
secretly,  and  safely,  and  so  that  no  man  will  know  it. 
For  not  even  does  Epicurus  himself  declare  stealing  to  be 
bad.*  but  he  admits  that  detection  is  ;  and  because  it  is 
impossible  to  have  security  against  detection,  for  this 
reason  he  says,  Do  not  steal.  But  I  say  to  you  that  if 
stealing  is  done  cleverly  and  cautiously,  we  shall  not  be 
detected  :  further  also  we  have  powerful  friends  in  Rome 
both  men  and  women,  and  the  Hellenes  (Greeks)  are 
weak,  and  no  man  will  venture  to  go  up  to  Rome  for  the 
purpose  (of  complaining).  Why  do  you  refrain  from  your 
own  good?  This  is  senseless,  foolish.  But  even  if  you 
tell  me  that  you  do  refrain,  I  will  not  believe  you.  For 
as  it  is  impossible  to  assent  to  that  which  appears  false, 

*  Diogenes  I.aertius  (x.  151),  quoted  by  Upton.  "Injustice,"  says 
Epicurus,  "  is  not  an  evil  in  itself,  but  the  evil  is  in  the  fear  which  there 
is  on  account  of  suspicion." 


234 


//. , 


and  to  turn  away  from  that  which  is  true,  M>  it  is  impos- 
sible to  abstain  from  that  which  appears  good.  But 
wealth  is  a  good  thing,  and  certainly  most  efficient  in 
producing  pleasure.  Why  will  you  not  acquire  wealth  • 
And  why  should  we  not  corrupt  our  neighbor's  wife,  if  we 
can  do  it  without  detection  ?  and  if  the  husband  foolishly 
prates  about  the  matter,  why  not  pitch  him  out  of  the 
house  ?  If  you  would  be  a  philosopher  such  as  you  ought 
to  be,  if  a  perfect  philosopher,  if  consistent  with  your  own 
doctrines  [you  must  act  thus].  If  you  would  not.  you 
will  not  differ  at  all  from  us  who  are  called  Stoics  ;  for 
we  also  say  one  thing,  but  we  do  another  :  we  talk  of  the 
things  which  are  beautiful  (good),  but  we  do  what  is  base. 
But  you  will  be  perverse  in  the  contrary  way,  teaching 
what  is  bad,  practicing  what  is  good. 

In  the  name  of  God,*  are  you  thinking  of  a  city  of 
Epicurean.^  ?  [<  >ne  man  says],  '•  I  do  not  marry."  "Xor 
I,  for  a  man  ought  not  to  marry  ;  nor  ought  we  to  beget 
children,  nor  engage  in  public  matters. "  What  then  will 
happen?  whence  will  the  citizens  come  ?  who  will  bring 
them  up  ?  who  will  be  governor  of  the  youth,  who  preside 
over  gymnastic  exercises  ?  and  in  what  also  will  the 
teacher  instruct  them  ?  will  he  teach  them  what  the  Lace- 
daemonians were  taught,  or  what  the  Athenians  were 
taught  ?  Come  take  a  young  man,  bring  him  up  accord- 
ing to  your  doctrines.  The  doctrines  are  bad,  subversive 
of  a  state,  pernicious  to  families,  and  not  becoming  to 
women.  Dismiss  them,  man.  You  live  in  a  chief  city  : 
it  is  your  duty  to  be  a  magistrate,  to  judge  justly,  to 
abstain  from  that  which  belongs  to  others  ;  no  woman 
ought  to  seem  beautiful  to  you  except  your  own  wife,  and 
110  youth,  no  vessel  of  silver,  no  vessel  of  gold  (except 

*  Upton  compares  the  passage  (v.  333)  in  the  Cyclops  of  Euripides, 
who  speaks  like  an  Epicurean.  Not  to  marry  and  not  to  engage  in 
public  affairs  were  Epicurean  doctrines.  See  Epictetus,  i.  23,  3  and  6. 


/•:/ v  (•/•/••  /  Y '.v.  235 

your  own).  Seek  for  doctrines  which  are  consistent  with 
what  I  say,  and  by  making  them  your  guide  you  will 
with  pleasure  abstain  from  things  which  have  such  per- 
suasive power  to  lead  us  and  overpower  us.  But  if  to  the 
persuasive  power  of  these  things,  we  also  devise  such  a 
philosophy  as  this  which  helps  to  push  us  on  toward  them 
and  strengthens  us  to  this  end,  what  will  be  the  conse- 
quence? In  a  piece  of  toreutic*  art  which  is  the  In-si 
part  ?  the  silver  or  the  workmanship  ?  The  substance  of 
and  is  the  flesh  :  but  the  work  of  the  hand  is  the 
p.aicipal  part  (that  which  precedes  and  leads  the  rest). 
The  duties  then  are  also  three  :  those  which  are  directed 
toward  the  existence  of  a  thing ;  those  which  are  directed 
toward  its  existence  in  a  particular  kind ;  and  third,  the 
chief  or  leading  things  themselves.  So  also  in  man  we 
ought  not  to  value  the  material,  the  poor  flesh,  but  the 
principal  (leading  things).  What  are  these?  Engaging 
in  public  business,  marrying,  begetting  children,  vener- 
ating God,  taking  care  of  parents,  and  generally,  having 
desires,  aversions,  pursuits  of  things  and  avoidances,  in 
the  way  in  which  we  ought  to  do  these  things,  and  ac- 
cording to  our  nature.  And  how  are  we  constituted  by 
nature  ?  Free,  noble,  modest  :  for  what  other  animal 
blushes  ?  what  other  is  capable  of  receiving  the  appear- 
ance (the  impression)  of  shame  ?  and  we  are  so  con- 
stituted by  nature  as  to  subject  pleasure  to  these  things, 
as  a  minister,  a  servant,  in  order  that  it  may  call  forth  our 
activity,  in  order  that  it  may  keep  us  constant  in  cicLn 
which  are  conformable  to  nature. 

But  I  am  rich  and  I  want  nothing.  Why  then  do  you 
pretend  to  be  a  philosopher?  Your  golden  and  your  sil- 
ver vessels  are  enough  for  you.  What  need  have  you  of 
principles  (opinions)  ?  But  I  am  also  a  judge  of  the 

*  The  toreutic  art  is  the  art  of  working  in  metal,  stone,  or  wood,  and 
of  making  figures  on  them  in  relief  or  by  cutting  into  the  material. 


23'') 


EPICTETUS. 


(irt-i'ks.  Do  you  know  ho\v  to  judge  ?  Who  taught  you 
to  know  ?  Ca;sar  wrote  to  me  a  codicil.*  Let  him  write 
and  give  you  a  commission  to  judge  of  music  ;  and  what 
will  be  the  use  of  it  to  you  ?  Still  how  did  you  become  a 
judge  ?  whose  hand  did  you  kiss  ?  the  hand  of  Symphorus 
or  Xumenius?  Before  whose  bedchamber  have  you 
slept  ?  t  To  whom  have  you  sent  gifts  ?  Then  do  you 
not  see  that  to  be  a  judge  is  just  of  the  same  value  as 
Xumenius  is?  But  1  can  throw  into  prison  any  man 
whom  I  please.  So  you  can  do  with  a  stone.  But  I  can 
beat  with  sticks  whom  I  please.  So  you  may  an  ass. 
This  is  not  a  governing  of  men.  Govern  us  as  rational 
animals  :  show  us  what  is  profitable  to  us,  and  we  will 
follow  it  :  show  us  what  is  unprofitable,  and  we  will  turn 
away  from  it.  Make  us  imitators  of  yourself,  as  Socrates 
made  men  imitators  of  himself.  For  he  was  like  a  gov- 
ernor of  men,  who  made  them  subject  to  him  their  desires, 
their  aversion,  their  movements  toward  an  object  and 
their  turning  away  from  it.  Do  this  :  do  not  do  this  :  if 
you  do  not  obey,  I  will  throw  you  into  prison.  This  is 
not  governing  men  like  rational  animals.  But  I  (say)  : 
As  Zeus  has  ordained,  so  act  :  if  you  do  not  act  so,  you 

*A  "  codicillus  *'  is  a  small  "codex,"  and  the  original  sense  of 
"  codex  "  is  a  strong  stem  or  stump.  Lastly,  it  was  used  for  a  book,  and 
even  for  a  will.  "Codicilli"  were  small  writing-tablets,  covered  with 
wax,  on  which  men  wrote  with  a  stylus  or  pointed  metal.  Lastly,  codi- 
cillus is  a  book  or  writing  generally ;  and  a  writing  or  letter  by  which 
the  emperor  conferred  any  office.  Our  word  codicil  has  only  one  sense, 
which  is  a  small  writing  added  or  subjoined  to  a  will  or  testament;  but 
this  sense  is  also  derived  from  the  Roman  use  of  the  word.  (Dig.  29, 
tit.  7,  de  jure  codicillorum.) 

t  Upton  supposes  this  to  mean,  whose  bedchamber  man  are  you  ?  and 
he  compares  i.  19.  But  Schweig.  says  that  this  is  not  the  meaning  here, 
and  that  the  meaning  is  this :  He  who  before  daybreak  is  waiting  at  the 
door  of  a  rich  man,  whose  favor  he  seeks,  is  said  in  a  derisive  way  to  be 
passing  the  night  before  a  man's  chamber. 


EPICTETUS.  337 

will  feel  the  penalty,  you  will  be  punished.  What  will  be 
the  punishment  ?  Nothing  else  than  not  having  done 
your  duty  :  you  will  lose  the  character  of  fidelity,  mod- 
esty, propr  ty.  Do  not  look  for  greater  penalties  than 
these. 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

HOW  WK    MTST    EXERCISE    OURSELVES    AGAINST  APPEARANCES. 

As  WE  exercise  ourselves  against  sophistical  questions, 
so  we  ought  to  exercise  ourselves  daily  against  appear- 
ances ;  for  these  appearances  also  propose  questions  to 
us.  A  certain  person's  son  is  dead.  Answer  ;  the  thing 
is  not  within  the  power  of  the  will  :  it  is  not  an  evil.  A 
father  has  disinherited  a  certain  son.  What  do  you  think 
of  it  ?  It  is  a  thing  beyond  the  power  of  the  will,  not  an 
evil  Caesar  has  condemned  a  person.  It  is  a  thiiif  !•<• 
yond  the  power  of  the  will,  not  ui.  evil  'i  !•'  man  is 
afflicted  at  this.  Affliction  is  a  thing  which  depends  on 
the  will  :  it  is  an  evil.  He  has  borne  the  condemnation 
bravely.  That  is  a  thing  within  the  power  of  the  will  :  it 
is  a  good.  If  we  train  ourselves  in  this  manner,  we  shall 
make  progress  ;  for  we  shall  never  assent  to  anything  of 
which  there  is  not  an  appearance  capable  of  being  com- 
prehended. Vour  son  is  dead.  What  lias  happened  - 
Your  son  is  dead.  Nothing  more  ?  Nothing.  Your  ship 
is  lost.  What  has  happened.-  Your  ship  is  lost.  A  man 
has  been  led  to  prison.  What  has  happened  ?  He  has 
lieeii  led  to  prison.  lint  that  herein  he  has  fared  badly. 
every  man  adds  from  h!^  own  opinion.  Hut  Zeus,  vou 
say,  does  not  do  ri^ht  in  these  matters.  Why  •  lieeau-e 
he  lias  made  Vou  capable  of  endurance:  l>ivau>e  he  has 


EPJCTETUS. 

:n:ul.'  you  magnanimous?  Because  he  has  taken  from  that 
which  befalls  you  the  power  of  being  evils  ?  because  it  is 
in  your  power  to  be  happy  while  you  arc  suffering-  what 
you  suffer  ;  because  he  has  opened  the  door  to  you,  when 
things  do  not  please  you?  Man,  go  out  and  do  not  com- 
plain. 

Hear  how  the  Romans  feel  toward  philosophers,  if  you 
would  like  to  know.  Italicus,  who  was  the  most  in 
repute  of  the  philosophers,  once  when  I  was  present  being 
vexed  with  his  own  friends  and  as  if  he  was  suffering 
something'  intolerable  said,  "  I  cannot  bear  it,  you  are 
killing  me  :  you  will  make  me  such  as  that  man  is ;  " 
pointing  to  me. 


CHAPTER  JX. 

TO    A    CERTAIN     RHETORICIAN    WHO     WAS    GOING    UP    TO    ROME    ON 

A    SUIT. 

WHKN  a  certain  person  came  to  him,  who  was  going  up 
to  Rome  on  account  of  a  suit  which  had  regard  to  his 
rank.  Epictetus  inquired  the  reason  of  his  going  to  Rome, 
and  the  man  then  asked  what  he  thought  about  the  mat- 
ter. Epictetus  replied,  If  you  ask  me  what  you  will  do 
in  Rome,  whether  you  will  succeed  or  fail,  I  have  no  rule 
about  this.  But  if  you  ask  me  how  you  will  fare,  I  can 
tell  you  :  if  you  have  right  opinions,  you  will  fare  well  : 
if  they  are  false,  you  will  fare  ill.  For  to  every  man  the 
cause  of  his  acting  is  opinion.  For  what  is  the  reason 
why  you  desired  to  be  elected  gov  ernor  of  the  Cnossians  ? 
Your  opinion.  What  is  the  reason  that  you  are  now 
going  up  to  Rome?  Your  opinion.  And  going  in  win- 
ter, and  with  danger  and  expense,  i  must  go.  What 


EPICTETUS.  ^39 

you  this  ?  Your  opinion.  Then  if  opinio; 
causes  of  all  actions,  and  a  man  has  bad  opinions,  such 
as  the  cause  may  be,  such  also  is  the  effect.  Have  we 
then  ail  sound  opinions,  both  you  and  your  adver- 
sary ?  And  how  do  you  differ  ?  But  have  you  sounder 
opinions  than  your  adversary  ?  Why  ?  You  think 
so.  And  so  does  he  think  that  his  opinions  are  better  : 
and  so  do  madmen.  This  is  a  bad  criterion.  But 
show  to  me  that  you  have  made  some  inquiry  into  your 
opinions  and  have  taken  some  pains  about  them.  And  as 
now  you  are  sailing  to  Rome  in  order  to  become  governor 
of  the  Cnossians,  and  you  are  not  content  to  stay  at  home 
with  the  honors  which  you  had,  but  you  desire  something 
greater  and  more  conspicuous,  so  when  did  you  ever  make 
a  voyage  for  the  purpose  of  examining  your  own  opinions, 
and  casting  them  out,  if  you  have  any  that  are  bad? 
Whom  have  you  approached  for  this  purpose  ?  What  time 
have  you  fixed  for  it?  What  age  ?  Go  over  the  times  of 
your  life  by  yourself,  if  you  are  ashamed  of  me  (knowing 
the  fact)  when  you  were  a  boy,  did  you  examine  your  own 
opinions  ?  and  did  you  not  then,  as  you  do  all  things  now. 
do  as  you  did  do  ?  and  when  you  were  become  a  youth 
and  attended  the  rhetoricians,  and  yourself  practiced  rhet- 
oric, what  did  you  imagine  that  you  were  deficient  in? 
And  when  you  were  a  young  man  and  engaged  in  public 
matters,  and  pleaded  causes  yourself,  and  were  gaining 
reputation,  who  then  seemed  your  equal?  And  when 
would  you  have  submitted  to  any  man  examining  and 
showing  that  your  opinions  cire  bad  ?  What  then  do  you 
wish  me  to  say  to  you?  Help  me  in  this  matter.  I  have 
no  theorem  (rule)  for  this.  Nor  have  you,  if  you  come  to 
me  for  this  purpose,  come  to  me  as  a  philosopher,  but  as 
to  a  seller  of  vegetables  or  a  shoemaker.  For  what  pur- 
pose then  have  philosophers  theorems  ?  For  this  purpose, 
that  whatever  may  happen,  our  ruling  faculty  may  be  and 


240 

continue  to  be  conformable  to  nature.  Docs  this  seem  to 
you  a  small  thing?  No;  but  the  greatest.  What  then? 
does  it  need  only  a  short  time  ?  and  is  it  possible  to  seize 
it  as  you  pass  by  ?  If  you  can.  seize  it. 

Then  you  will  say,  I  met  with  Epictetus  as  I  should 
meet  with  a  stone  or  a  statue :  for  you  saw  me,  and  noth- 
ing more.  But  he  meets  with  a  man  as  a  man,  who  learns 
his  opinions,  and  in  his  turn  shows  his  own.  Learn  my 
opinions  :  show  me  yours  ;  and  then  say  that  you  have 
visited  me.  Let  us  examine  one  another  :  if  I  have  any 
bad  opinion,  take  it  away  ;  if  you  have  any,  .show  it. 
This  is  the  meaning  of  meeting  with  a  philosopher.  Not 
so  (you  say)  :  but  this  is  only  a  passing  visit,  and  while 
we  are  hiring  the  vessel,  we  can  also  see  Epictetus.  Let  us 
see  what  he  says.  Then  you  go  away  and  say  :  Epictetus 
was  nothing:  he  used  solecisms  and  spoke  in  a  barbarous 
way.  For  of  what  else  do  you  come  as  judges  ?  Well, 
but  a  man  may  say  to  me,  if  I  attend  to  such  matters  (as 
you  do),  I  shall  have  no  land,  as  you  have  none  ;  I  shall 
have  no  silver  cups  as  you  have  none,  nor  fine  beasts  as 
you  have  none  In  answer  to  this  it  is  perhaps  sufficient 
to  say  :  I  have  no  need  of  such  things  :  but  if  you  possess 
many  things,  you  have  need  of  others  :  whether  you 
choose  or  not,  you  are  poorer  than  I  am.  What  then  have 
1  need  of?  Of  that  which  you  have  not :  of  firmness,  of  a 
mind  which  is  conformable  to  nature,  of  being  free  from 
perturbation.  Whether  I  have  a  patron  *  or  not,  what  is 
that  to  me  ?  but  it  is  something  to  you.  I  am  richer  than 
you  :  I  am  not  anxious  what  Caesar  will  think  of  me  :  for 
this  reason.  I  flatter  no  man.  This  is  what  I  possess 
instead  of  vessels  of  silver  and  gold.  You  have  utensils 
of  gold  ;  but  your  discourse,  your  opinions,  your  assents, 
your  movements  (pursuits),  your  desires  are  of  earthen 

*  The  Roman  word  "patronus,"  which  at  that  time  had  the  sense  of 
a  protector. 


Kl'IC  77-:  7T.V.  241 

ware.  But  when  I  have  these  things  conformable  to 
nature,  why  should  I  not  employ  my  studies  also  upon 
reason  ?  for  I  have  leisure :  my  mind  is  not  distracted. 
What  shall  I  do,  since  I  have  no  distraction  ?  What  more 
suitable  to  a  man  have  I  than  this  ?  When  you  have 
nothing;  to  do,  you  are  disturbed,  you  go  to  the  theater  or 
you  wander  about  without  a  purpose.  Why  should  not 
the  philosopher  labor  to  improve  his  reason  ?  You  em- 
ploy yourself  about  crystal  vessels:  I  employ  myself 
about  the  syllogism  named  the  lying  :  *  you  about  myr- 
rhine  f  vessels  ;  I  employ  myself  about  the  syllogism 
named  the  denying.  To  you  everything  appears  small 
that  you  possess :  to  me  all  that  I  have  appears  great. 
Your  desire  is  insatiable  :  mine  is  satisfied.  To  (children) 
who  put  their  hand  into  a  narrow-necked  earthen  vessel 
and  bring  out  figs  and  nuts,  this  happens  ;  if  they  fill  the 
hand,  they  cannot  take  it  out,  and  then  they  cry.  Drop 
a  few  of  them  and  you  will  draw  things  out.  And  do  you 
part  with  your  desires  :  do  not  desire  many  things  and 
you  will  have  what  you  want. 

*  On  the  syllogism  named  "lying"  see  Epict.  ii.  17,  34. 

t  "Murrhina  vasa"  were  reckoned  very  precious  by  the  Romans,  and 
they  gave  great  prices  for  them.  It  is  not  certain  of  what  material  they 
were  made.  Pliny  (xxxvii.  c.  2)  has  something  about  them. 

16 


242  KPICTETUS. 


CHAPTER  X. 

IN    WHAT  MANNER    WE    OUGHT    TO    BKAR    SICKNKSS. 

WHEN  the  need  of  each  opinion  comes,  we  ought  to 
have  it  in  readiness  :  *  on  the  occasion  of  breakfast,  such 
opinions  as  relate  to  breakfast  ;  in  the  bath,  those  that 
concern  the  bath  ;  in  bed,  those  that  concern  bed. 

Let  sleep  not  come  upon  thy  languid  eyes 
Before  each  daily  action  thou  hast  scann'd ; 
What's  done  amiss,  what  done,  what  left  undone; 
From  first  to  last  examine  all,  and  then 
Blame  what  is  wrong,  in  what  is  right  rejoice.t 

And  we  ought  to  retain  these  verses  in  such  way  that 
we  may  use  them,  not  that  we  may  utter  them  aloud,  as 
when  we  exclaim  ':  Paean  Apollo.  "J  Again  in  fever  we 
should  have  ready  such  opinions  as  concern  a  fever  ;  and 
we  ought  not,  as  soon  as  the  fever  begins,  to  lose  and 
forget  all.  (A  man  who  has  a  fever)  may  say  :  If  I 
philosophize  any  longer,  may  I  be  hanged  :  wherever  I 

*  M.  Antoninus,  iii.  13.  "As  physicians  have  always  their  instru- 
ments and  knives  ready  for  cases  which  suddenly  require  their  skill,  so 
do  thou  have  principles  ready  for  the  understanding  of  things  divine  and 
human,  and  for  doing  everything,  even  the  smallest,  with  a  recollection 
of  the  bond  which  unites  the  divine  and  human  to  one  another.  For 
neither  wilt  thou  do  anything  well  which  pertains  to  man  without  at  the 
same  time  having  a  reference  to  things  divine ;  nor  the  contrary." 

I  These  verses  are  from  the  Golden  verses  attributed  to  Pythagoras. 
See  iv.  6,  32. 

\  The  beginning  of  a  form  of  prayer,  as  in  Macrobius,  Sat.  i.  17  : 
"  namque  Vestales  Virgines  ita  indigitant :  Apollo  Maedice,  Apollo 
Paean." 


243 

go,  I  must  take  care  of  the  pour  bod}',  that  a  fever  may 
not  come.  But  what  is  philosophizing?  Is  it  not  a 
preparation  against  events  which  may  happen  .:  Do  you 
not  understand  that  you  are  saying  something  of  thi.: 
kind?  "If  I  shall  still  prepare  myself  to  bear  with 
patience  what  happens,  may  I  be  hanged."  But  this  is 
just  as  if  a  man  after  receiving  blows  should  give  up  the 
Pancratium.  In  the  Pancratium  it  is  in  our  power  to 
desist  and  not  to  receive  blows.  But  in  the  other  matter 
if  we  give  up  philosophy,  what  shall  we  gain  ?  What 
then  should  a  man  say  on  the  occasion  of  each  painful 
thing  ?  It  was  for  this  that  I  exercised  myself,  for  this  I 
disciplined  myself.  God  says  to  you.  (me  me  a  proof 
that  you  have  duly  practiced  athletics,  that  you  have 
eaten  what  you  ought,  that  you  have  been  exercised, 
that  you  have  obeyed  the  aliptes  (the  oiler  and  rubber). 
Then  do  you  show  yourself  weak  when  the  time  for  action 
comes  ?  Now  is  the  time  for  the  fever.  Let  it  be  borne 
well.  Now  is  the  time  for  thirst,  bear  it  well  :  now  is  the 
time  for  hunger,  bear  it  well.  Is  it  not  in  your  power? 
who  shall  hinder  you  ?  The  physician  will  hinder  you 
from  drinking  ;  but  he  cannot  prevent  you  from  bearing 
thirst  well  :  and  he  will  hinder  you  from  eating  ;  but  he 
cannot  prevent  you  from  bearing  hunger  well. 

But  I  cannot  attend  to  my  philosophical  studies.  And 
for  what  purpose  do  you  follow  them  ?  Slave,  is  it  not 
that  you  may  be  happy,  that  you  may  be  constant,  is  it 
not  that  you  may  be  in  a  state  conformable  to  nature  and 
live  so?  What  hinders  you  when  you  have  a  fever  from 
having  your  ruling  faculty  conformable  to  nature  ?  Here 
is  the  proof  of  the  thing,  here  is  the  test  of  the  philosopher. 
For  this  also  is  a  part  of  life,  like  walking,  like  sailing,  like 
journeying  by  land,  so  also  is  fever.  Do  you  read  when 
you  are  walking  ?  No.  Nor  do  you  when  you  have  a 
fever.  But  if  you  walk  about  well,  you  have  ail  that  be- 


244 

longs  to  a  man  who  walks.  If  you  bear  fever  well,  you 
have  all  that  belongs  to  a  man  in  a  fever.  What  is  it  to 
bear  a  fever  well  ?  Not  to  blame  God  or  man  ;  not  to  be 
afflicted  at  that  which  happens,  to  expect  death  well  and 
nobly,  to  do  what  must  be  done  :  when  the  physician 
comes  in,  not  to  be  frightened  at  what  he  says  ;  nor  if  he 
says,  "you  are  doing  well,"*  to  be  overjoyed.  For 
what  good  has  he  told  you?  and  when  you  were  in  health, 
what  good  was  that  to  you  ?  And  even  if  he  says,  "  you 
are  in  a  bad  way,"  do  not  despond.  For  what  is  it  to  be 
ill  ?  is  it  that  you  are  near  the  severance  of  the  soul  and 
the  body?  what  harm  is  there  in  this?  If  you  are  not 
near  now,  will  you  not  afterward  be  near?  Is  the  world 
going  to  be  turned  upside  down  when  you  are  dead? 
Why  then  do  you  flatter  the  physician  ?  f  Why  do  you 
say  if  you  please,  master,  I  shall  be  well  ?  J  Why  do  you 
give  him  an  opportunity  of  raising  his  eyebrows  (being 
proud  ;  or  showing  his  importance)  ?  Do  you  not  value 
a  physician,  as  you  do  a  shoemaker  when  he  is  measuring 
your  foot,  or  a  carpenter  when  he  is  building  your  house, 
and  so  treat  the  physician  as  to  the  body  which  is  not 
yours,  but  by  nature  dead  ?  He  who  has  a  fever  has  an 
opportunity  of  doing  this  :  if  he  does  these  things,  he  has 
what  belongs  to  him.  For  it  is  not  the  business  of  a 
philosopher  to  look  after  these  externals,  neither  his  wine 
nor  his  oil  nor  his  poor  body,  but  his  own  ruling  power. 
But  as  to  externals  how  must  he  act  ?  so  far  as  not  to  be 
careless  about  them.  Where  then  is  there  reason  for 
fear  ?  where  is  there  then  still  reason  for  anger,  and  of 
fear  about  what  belongs  to  others,  about  things  which  are 

*  See  ii.  18,  14. 

t  Et  quid  opus  Cratero  magnos  promittere  monies  ?  Persius,  iii.  65. 
Craterus  was  a  physician. 

J  Upton  compares  Matthew,  viii.  2.  "  Lord,  if  thou  wilt,  thou  canst 
make  me  clean." 


i-.iTs.  245 

of  no  value?  For  \vc  ought  to  have  these  t\vo  principles 
in  readiness,  that  except  the  will  nothing  is  good  nor  bad  : 
and  that  \ve  ought  not  to  lead  events,  but  to  follow 
them.*  My  brother  ought  not  to  have  behaved  thus  to 
me.  No  ;  but  he  will  see  to  that  :  and,  however  he  may 
behave,  I  will  conduct  myself  toward  him  as  I  ought. 
For  this  is  my  own  business:  that  belongs  to  another; 
no  man  can  prevent  this,  the  other  thing  can  be  hindered. 


CHAPTER  XI. 

CERTAIN    MISCELLANEOUS    MATTERS. 

THERE  are  certain  penalties  fixed  as  by  law  for  those 
who  disobey  the  divine  administration. f  Whoever  thinks 
any  other  thing  to  be  good  except  those  things  which  de- 
pend on  the  will,  let  him  envy,  let  him  desire,  let  him 
flatter,  let  him  be  perturbed  :  whoever  considers  anything 
else  to  bo  evil,  let  him  grieve,  let  him  lament,  let  him 
weep  let  him  be  unhappy.  And  yet,  thoiu;  .  erely 

punished,  we  cannot  desist. 

Remember  what  the  poet  f  says  about  the  stranger  : 

Stranger,  I  must  not,  e'en  if  a  worse  man  come. 

*  To  this  Stoic  precept  Horace  (Epict.  i.  i,  19)  opposes  that  of  Aris- 
tippus. 

Kt  mila  res,  non  me  rebus,  subjungere  conor. 

both  wisely  said,  if  they  are  rightly  taken. 

t  "  As  to  the  divine  law,  see  iii.  24,  32,  and  Xenophon's  Memorabilia, 
iv.  4.  21,"  etc. — Upton. 

}  The  poet  is  Homer.  The  complete  passage  is  in  the  Odyssey,  xiv. 
v.  55,  etc. 

Stranger,  I  must  not,  e'en  if  a  worse  man  torn* 
I'll  treat  a  stranger,  for  all  come  from  Zeus, 
Stranger*  and  poor. 


246 

This  then  may  be  applied  even  to  a  father  :  I  must  not. 
even  if  a  worse  man  than  you  should  come,  treat  a  father 
unworthily  :  for  all  are  from  paternal  Zeus.  And  (let  the 
same  be  said)  of  a  brother,  for  all  are  from  the  Zeus  who 
presides  over  kindred.  And  so  in  the  other  relations  of 
life  we  shall  find  Zeus  to  be  an  inspector. 


CHAPTER  XII. 

ABOUT      E  X  K  R  C  I  S  K. 

WK  ought  not  to  make  our  exercises  consist  in  means 
contrary  to  nature  and  adapted  to  cause  admiration,  for  if 
we  do  so,  we  who  call  ourselves  philosophers,  shall  not 
differ  at  all  from  jugglers.  For  it  is  difficult  even  to  walk 
on  a  rope  ;  and  not  only  difficult,  but  it  is  also  dangerous. 
Ought  we  for  this  reason  to  practice  walking  on  a  rope, 
or  setting  up  a  palm  tree.*  or  embracing  statues  ?  By  no 
means.  Everything  which  is  difficult  and  dangerous  is 
not  suitable  for  practice  :  but  that  is  suitable  which  con- 
duces to  the  working  out  of  that  which  is  proposed  to  us 

*  •'  To  set  up  a  palm  tree."  He  does  not  mean  a  real  palm  tree,  but 
something  high  and  upright.  The  climbers  of  palm  trees  are  mentioned 
by  I.ucian,  de  Dea  .Syria  (c.  29).  Schweig.  has  given  the  true  inter- 
pretation when  he  says  that  on  certain  feast  days  in  the  country  a  high 
piei-e  of  \\ood  is  fixed  in  the  earth  and  climbed  by  the  most  active  youths 
by  using  only  their  hands  and  feet.  In  England  we  know  what  this  is. 
It  is  said  that  Diogenes  used  to  embrace  statues  when  they  were  covered 
with  snow  for  the  purpose  of  exercising  himself.  I  suppose  bronze 
statues,  not  marble,  which  might  be  easily  broken.  The  man  would  not 
remain  long  in  the  embrace  of  a  metal  statue  in  winter.  But  perhaps 
the  story  is  not  true.  I  have  heard  of  a  general,  not  an  English  general, 
setting  a  soldier  on  a  cold  cannon;  but  it  was  a.-  a  punishment. 


/•:/•/('  /7-yrs. 

as  a  thin;^  to  be  worked  out.  To  live  with  desire  and 
aversion  (avoidance  of  certain  things)  free  from  restraint. 
And  what  is  this  ?  Neither  to  be  disappointed  in  that 
which  you  desire,  nor  to  fall  into  anything  which  you 
would  avoid.  Toward  this  object  then  exercise  (practice) 
ought  to  tend.  For  since  it  is  not  possible  to  have  your 
desire  not  disappointed  and  your  aversion  free  from  fall- 
ing into  that  which  you  would  avoid,  without  great  and 
constant  practice,  you  must  know  that  if  you  allow  your 
desire  and  aversion  to  turn  to  things  which  are  not  within 
the  power  of  the  will,  you  will  neither  have  your  desire 
capable  of  attaining  your  object,  nor  your  aversion  free 
from  the  power  of  avoiding  that  which  you  would  avoid. 
And  since  strong  habit  leads  (prevails),  and  we  are  accus- 
tomed to  employ  desire  and  aversion  only  to  things  which 
are  not  within  the  power  of  our  will,  we  ought  to  oppose 
to  this  habit  a  contrary  habit,  and  where  there  is  great 
slipperiness  in  the  appearances,  there  to  oppose  the  habit 
of  exercise. 

I  am  rather  inclined  to  pleasure  :  I  will  incline  to  the 
contrary  side  above  measure  for  the  sake  of  exercise.  I 
am  averse  to  pain  :  I  will  rub  and  exercise  against  this  the 
appearances  which  are  presented  to  me  for  the  purpose  of 
withdrawing  my  aversion  from  every  such  thing.  For  who 
is  a  practitioner  in  exercise?  He  who  practices  not  using 
his  desire,  and  applies  his  aversion  only  to  things  which 
are  within  the  power  of  his  will,  and  practices  most  in  the 
things  which  are  difficult  to  conquer.  For  this  reason  one 
man  must  practice  himself  more  against  one  thing  and  an- 
other against  another  thing.  What  then  is  it  to  the  pur- 
pose to  set  up  a  palm  tree,  or  to  carry  about  a  tent  of 
skins,  or  a  mortar  and  a  pestle  ?  Practice,  man,  if  you  are 
irritable,  to  endure  if  you  are  abused,  not  to  be  vexed  if 
you  are  treated  with  dishonor.  Then  you  will  make  so 
much  progress  that,  even  if  a  man  strikes  you  you  will 


.»4S  EPICTETUS. 

say  to  yourself,  Imagine  that  you  have  embraced  a  statue  : 
then  also  exercise  yourself  to  use  wine  properly  so  as  not 
to  drink  much,  for  in  this  also  there  are  men  who  foolishly 
practice  themselves  ;  but  first  of  all  you  should  abstain 
from  it,  and  abstain  from  a  young  girl  and  dainty  cakes. 
Then  at  last,  if  occasion  presents  itself,  for  the  purpose  of 
trying  yourself  at  a  proper  time  you  will  descend  into  the 
arena  to  know  if  appearances  overpower  you  as  they  did 
formerly.  But  at  first  fly  far  from  that  which  is  stronger 
than  yourself:  the  contest  is  unequal  between  a  charm- 
ing young  girl  and  a  beginner  in  philosophy.  The  earthen 
pitcher,  as  the  saying  is,  and  the  rock  do  not  agree.* 

After  the  desire  and  the  aversion  comes  the  second  topic 
(matter)  of  the  movements  toward  action  and  the  with- 
drawals from  it  ;  that  you  may  be  obedient  to  reason,  that 
you  do  nothing  out  of  season  or  place,  or  contrary  to  any 
propriety  of  the  kind.  The  third  topic  concerns  the  assents, 
which  is  related  to  the  things  which  are  persuasive  and 
attractive.  For  as  Socrates  said,  we  ought  not  to  live  a 
life  without  examination,  f  so  we  ought  not  to  accept  an 
appearance  without  examination,  but  we  should  say, 
Wait,  let  me  see  what  you  are  and  whence  you  come  ; 
like  the  watch  at  night  (who  says)  Show  me  the  pass  (the 
Roman  tessera).  Have  you  the  signal  from  nature  which 
the  appearance  that  may  be  accepted  ought  to  have  ?  And 
finally  whatever  means  are  applied  to  the  body  by  those 
who  exercise  it,  if  they  tend  in  any  way  toward  desire  and 
aversion,  they  also  may  be  fit  means  of  exercise  ;  but  if 
they  are  for  display,  they  are  the  indications  of  one  who 
has  turned  himself  toward  something  external  and  who  is 
hunting  for  something  else  and  who  looks  for  spectators 
who  will  say,  Oh  the  great  man.  For  this  reason,  Apol- 

*  There  is  a  like  fable  in  .flisop  of  the  earthen  pitcher  and  the  brazen. 
—Upton. 

*  See  i.  26,  18,  and  iii.  2,  5. 


/.  TIC  7'/;/T.V.  219 

lonius  said  well,  When  you  intend  to  exercise  yourself  for 
your  own  advantage,  and  you  are  thirsty  from  heat,  take  in 
a  mouthful  of  cold  water,  and  spit  it  out  and  tell  nobody.* 


CHAPTER  XIII. 

WHAT     SOLITUDE    IS,     AND     WHAT     KIND     OF    PERSON    A    SOLITARY 

MAN    IS. 

SOLITUDE  is  a  certain  condition  of  a  helpless  man.  For 
Itecause  a  man  is  alone,  he  is  not  for  that  reason  also  soli- 
tary ;  just  as  though  a  man  is  among  numbers,  he  is  not 
therefore  not  solitary.  When  then  we  have  lost  either  a 
brother,  or  a  son,  or  a  friend  on  whom  we  were  accustomed 
to  repose,  we  say  that  we  arc  left  solitary,  though  we  are 
often  in  Rome,  though  such  a  crowd  meet  us,  though  so 
many  live  in  the  same  place,  and  sometimes  we  have  a 
great  number  of  slaves.  For  the  man  who  is  solitary, 
as  it  is  conceived,  is  considered  to  be  a  helpless  person 
and  exposed  to  those  who  wish  to  harm  him.  For  this 
reason  when  we  travel,  then  especially  do  we  say  that  we 
are  lonely  when  we  fall  among  robbers,  for  it  is  not  the 
sight  of  a  human  creature  which  removes  us  from  solitude, 
but  the  sight  of  one  who  is  faithful  and  modest  and  helpful 
to  us.  For  if  being  alone  is  enough  to  make  solitude,  you 
may  say  that  even  Zeus  is  solitary  in  the  conflagration  * 

*  Schweighaeuser  refers  to  Arrian's  Expedition  of  Alexander  (vi.  26) 
for  such  an  instance  of  Alexander's  abstinence.  There  was  an  Apollo- 
nius  of  Tyana.  whose  life  was  written  by  Philostratus  :  but  it  may  be 
that  this  is  not  the  man  who  is  mentioned  here. 

t  This  was  the  doctrine  of  Heraclitus,  "  that  all  things  were  composed 
from  (had  their  origin  in)  fire,  and  were  resolved  into  it,"  an  opinion  after- 
ward adopted  by  the  Stoics.  It  is  not  so  extravagant,  as  it  may  appear 


and  bewails  himself  saying,  Unhappy  that  I  am  who  have 
neither  Hera,  nor  Athena,  nor  Apollo,  nor  brother,  nor 
son.  nor  descendant,  nor  kinsman.  This  is  what  some  say 
that  he  does  when  he  is  alone  at  the  conflagration.*  For 
they  do  not  understand  how  a  man  passes  his  life  when 
ho  is  alone,  because  they  set  out  from  a  certain  natural 
principle,  from  the  natural  desire  of  community  and 
mutual  love  and  from  the  pleasure  of  conversation  among 
men.  But  none  the  less  a  man  ought  to  be  prepared  in  a 
manner  for  this  also  (being  alone),  to  be  able  to  be  suffi- 
cient for  himself  and  to  be  his  own  companion.  For  as 
Zeus  dwells  with  himself,  and  is  tranquil  by  himself,  and 
thinks  of  his  own  administration  and  of  its  nature,  and  is 
employed  in  thoughts  suitable  to  himself:  so  ought  we 
also  to  be  able  to  talk  with  ourselves,  not  to  feel  the  want 
of  others  also,  not  to  be  unprovided  with  the  means  of 
passing  our  time;  to  observe  the  divine  administration, 
and  the  relation  of  ourselves  to  everything  else  :  to  con- 
sider how  we  formerly  were  affected  toward  things  that 
happen  and  how  at  present  ;  what  are  still  the  things 
which  give  us  pain  ;  how  these  also  can  be  cured  and  how 

to  some  persons,  to  suppose  that  the  earth  had  a  beginning,  is  in  a  state 
of  continual  change,  and  will  finally  be  destroyed  in  some  way,  and  have 
a  new  beginning.  See  Seneca,  Ep.  9 :  "  cum  resolute  mundo,  diis  in  unum 
confusis,  paulisper  cessante  natura,  adquiescit  sibi  Jupiter,  cogitationibus 
suis  traditus.'' 

*  The  Latin  translation  is :  "  hoc  etiam  nonnulli  facturum  eum  in 
conflagratione  inundi  ....  aiunt."  But  the  word  here  may  mean 
that  the  conflagration  has  happened,  and  will  happen  again.  The  Greek 
philosophers  in  their  speculations  were  not  troubled  with  the  considera- 
tion of  time.  Even  Herodotus  (ii.  11),  in  his  speculations  on  the  gulf, 
which  he  supposes  that  the  Nile  valley  was  once,  speaks  of  the  possibility 
of  it  being  filled  up  in  20,000  years,  or  less.  Modern  speculators  have 
only  recently  become  bold  enough  to  throw  aside  the  notion  of  the  earth 
and  the  other  bodies  in  space  being  limited  by  time,  as  the  ignorant 
have  conceived  it. 


EFICTETUS.  ^51 

removed  :  if  any  things  require  improvement,  to  improve 
them  according  to  reason. 

For  you  see  thatCrcsar  appears  to  furnish  vis  with  great 
peace,  that  there  are  no  longer  enemies  nor  battles  nor 
great  associations  of  robbers  nor  of  pirates,  but  we  can 
travel  at  every  hour  and  sail  from  east  to  west.  But  can 
'  give  us  security  from  fever  also,  can  he  from  ship- 
wreck, from  fire,  from  earthquake  or  from  lightning?  well, 
I  will  say,  can  he  give  us  security  against  love  ?  He  cannot. 
From  sorrow?  He  cannot.  From  envy?  lie  cannot. 
In  a  word  then  he  cannot  protect  us  from  any  of  these 
things.  But  the  doctrine  of  philosophers  promises  to  give 
us  security  (peace)  even  against  these  things.  And  what 
does  it  say?  Men,  if  you  will  attend  to  me,  wherever 
you  are,  whatever  you  are  doing,  you  will  not  feel  sor- 
row, nor  anger,  nor  compulsion,  nor  hindrance,  but  you 
will  pass  your  time  without  perturbations  and  free  from 
everything.  When  a/man  has  this  peace,  not  proclaimed 
by  Ccesar  (for  how  should  he  be  able  to  proclaim  it  ?),  but 
by  God  through  reason,  is  he  not  content  when  he  is 
alone  ?  when  he  sees  and  reflects,  Now  no  evil  can  hap- 
pen to  me  ;  for  me  there  is  no  robber,  no  earthquake, 
everything  is  full  of  peace,  full  of  tranquillity  :  every  way, 
every  city,  every  meeting,  neighbor,  companion  is  harm- 
less. One  person  whose  business  it  is,  supplies  me  with 
food  ;  *  another  with  raiment  :  another  with  perceptions, 
and  preconceptions  (irpoX^ns).  And  if  he  does  not  supply 
what  is  necessary,  he  (God)  gives  the  signal  for  retreat, 
opens  the  door,  and  says  to  you,  Go.  Go  whither?  To 
nothing  terrible,  but  to  the  place  from  which  you  came. 
t<>  your  friends  and  kinsmen,  to  the  elements  :f  what 

*  See  iii.  i,  43. 

t  "What  a  melancholy  description  of  ^eath  and  how  gloomy  the  ideas 
in  this  cctiso/a/t'ry  chapter !  All  beiifgs  reduced  to  mere  elements  in 
successive  conflagrations !  A  noble  contrast  to  the  Stoic  notions  ou 


2-'  EPICTETUS. 

<J 

there  was  in  you  of  fire  g-oes  to  tire  ;  of  earth,  to  enrth  ;  of 
air  (spirit),  to  air;  of  water,  to  water:  no  Hades,  nor 
Acheron,  nor  Cocytus,  nor  Pyriphlegethon,  but  all  is  full  of 
Gods  and  Demons.  When  a  man  has  such  things  to  think 
on,  and  sees  the  sun,  the  moon  and  stars,  and  enjoys 
earth  and  sea,  he  is  not  solitary  nor  even  helpless.  Well 
then,  if  some  man  should  come  upon  me  when  I  am  alone 
and  murder  me  ?  Fool,  not  murder  You,  but  your  poor 
body. 

What  kind  of  solitude  then  remains  ?  what  want  ?  why 
do  we  make  ourselves  worse  than  children  ?  and  what  do 
children  do  when  they  are  left  alone  ?  They  take  up  shells 
and  ashes,  and  they  build  something,  then  pull  it  down, 
and  build  something  else,  and  so  they  never  want  the 
means  of  passing  the  time.  Shall  I  then,  if  you  sail  away, 
sit  down  and  weep,  because  I  have  been  left  alone  and 
solitary  ?  Shall  I  then  have  no  shells,  no  ashes  ?  But 
children  do  what  they  do  through  want  of  thought  (or 
deficiency  in  knowledge),  and  we  through  knowledge  are 
unhappy. 

Every  great  power  (faculty)  is  dangerous  to  beginners. 

this  subject  may  be  produced  from  several  passages  in  the  Scripture — 
'Then  shall  the  dust  return  to  the  earth,  as  it  was;  and  the  spirit  shall 
return  to  God  who  gave  it,'  Eccles.  xii.  7." — Mrs.  Carter ;  who  also 
refers  to  I  Thess.  iv.  14;  John  vi.  39,  40;  xi.  25,  26;  I  Cor.  vi.  14;  xv. 
53;  2  Cor.  v.  14,  etc.  Schweighaeuser  observes  that  here  was  the 
opportunity  for  Epictetus  to  say  something  of  the  immortality  of  the 
soul,  if  he  had  anything  to  say.  But  he  says  nothing  unless  he  means 
to  say  that  the  soul,  the  spirit,  "  returns  to  God  who  gave  it,"  as  the 
preacher  says.  There  is  a  passage  (iii.  24,  94)  which  appears  to  mean 
that  the  soul  of  man  after  death  will  be  changed  into  something  else, 
which  the  universe  will  require  for  some  use  or  purpose.  It  is  strange, 
observes  Schweig.,  that  Epictetus,  who  studied  the  philosophy  of 
Socrates,  and  speaks  so  eloquently  of  man's  capacity  and  his  duty  to 
God,  should  say  no  more :  but  the  explanation  may  be  that  he  had  no 
doctrine  of  man's  immortality,  in  the  sense  in  which  that  word  is  now 
used. 


Avvr/y.  /y.s.  253 

You  must  then  bear  such  things  as  you  are  able,  but  con- 
formably to  nature  :  but  not  .  .  .  Practice  sometimes 
a  way  of  living-  like  a  person  out  of  health  that  you  may  at 
some  time  live  like  a  man  in  health.  Abstain  from  food, 
drink  water,  abstain  sometimes  altogether  from  desire,  in 
order  that  you  may  some  time  desire  consistently  with 
reason  ;  and  if  consistently  with  reason,  when  you  have 
anything  good  in  you,  you  will  desire  well.  Not  so  ;  but 
we  wish  to  live  like  wise  men  immediately  and  to  be  useful 
to  men.  Useful  how  ?  what  are  you  doing  ?  have  you 
been  useful  to  yourself?  But,  I  suppose,  you  wish  to  ex- 
hort them.  You  exhort  them  !  You  wish  to  be  useful 
to  them.  Show  to  them  in  your  own  example  what  kind 
of  men  philosophy  makes,  and  don't  trifle.  When  you 
are  eating,  do  good  to  those  who  eat  with  you  ;  when  you 
are  drinking,  to  those  who  are  drinking  with  you  ;  by 
yielding  to  all,  giving  way,  bearing  with  them,  thus  do 
them  good,  and  do  not  spit  on  them  your  phlegm  (bad 
humors). 


CHAPTER    XIV. 

CERTAIN    MISCELLANEOUS    MATTERS. 

As  bad  tragic  actors  cannot  sing  alone,  but  in  company 
with  many  :  so  some  persons  cannot  walk  about  alone. 
Man,  if  you  are  anything,  both  walk  alone  and  talk  to 
yourself,  and  do  not  hide  yourself  in  the  chorus.  Examine 
a  little  at  last,  look  around,  stir  yourself  up,  that  you  may 
know  who  you  are. 

When  a  man  drinks  water,  or  does  anything  for  tin- 
sake  of  practice  (discipline),  whenever  there  is  an  oppor- 
tunity lu-  tolls  it  to  all;  "I  drink  water. "  Is  it  for  this 


254  EP1CTETUS. 

that  you  drink  water,  for  the  purpose  of  drinking  water? 
Man,  if  it  is  good  for  you  to  drink,  drink  ;  but  if  not,  you 
arc  acting  ridiculously.  But  if  it  is  good  for  you  and  you 
do  drink,  say  nothing  about  it  to  those  who  are  displeased 
with  water-drinkers.  What  then,  do  you  wish  to  please 
these  very  men  ? 

Of  things  that  are  done  some  are  done  with  a  final  pur- 
pose, some  according  to  occasion,  others  with  a  certain 
reference  to  circumstances,  others  for  the  purpose  of  com- 
plying with  others  and  some  according  to  a  fixed  scheme 
of  life. 

You  must  root  out  of  men  these  two  things,  arrogance 
(pride)  and  distrust.  Arrogance  then  is  the  opinion  that 
you  want  nothing  (are  deficient  in  nothing):  but  distrust 
is  the  opinion  that  you  cannot  be  happy  when  so  man}' 
circumstances  surround  you.  Arrogance-  is  removed  by 
confutation  ;  and  Socrates  was  the  first  who  practiced  this. 
And  (to  know)  that  the  thing  is  not  impossible  inquire  and 
seek.  This  search  will  do  you  no  harm  ;  and  in  a  manner 
this  is  philosophizing,  to  seek  how  it  is  possible  to  employ 
desire  and  aversion  without  impediment. 

I  am  superior  to  you,  for  my  father  is  a  man  of  consular 
rank.  Another  says.  I  have  been  a  tribune,  but  you  have 
not.  If  we  were  horses,  would  you  say,  My  father  was 
swifter  ?  I  have  much  barley  and  fodder,  or  elegant  neck 
ornaments.  If  then  while  you  were  saying  this,  I  said, 
Be  it  so  :  let  us  run  then.  Well,  is  there  nothing  in  a  man 
such  as  running  in  a  horse,  by  which  it  will  be  known 
which  is  superior  and  inferior.-'  Is  there  not  modesty, 
fidelity,  justice  ?  Show  yourself  superior  in  these,  that 
you  may  be  superior  as  a  man.  If  you  tell  me  that  you 
can  kick  violently,  I  also  will  say  to  you.  that  you  arc 
proud  of  that  which  is  the  act  of  an  ass. 


A/V 


CHAPTER  XV 

THAT    WF    OniHT    TI>    I'KOCKKI)    WITIf    rlKCC.MSPKCTION'    TO 
EVERYTHING.* 

I.\  every  act  consider  what  precedes  and  what  follows, 
and  then  proceed  to  the  act.  If  you  do  not  consider,  you 
will  at  first  begin  with  spirit,  since  you  have  not  thought 
at  ail  of  the  things  which  follow  :  but  afterward  when 
some  consequences  have  shown  tnemselves,  you  will 
basely  desist  Itrom  that  which  you  have  begun).  I  wish 
to  conquer  at  the  <  Hympic  games.  [And  I  too,  by  the 
gods  :  for  it  is  a  fine  thing.]  But  consider  here  what  pre- 
and  what  follows  :  and  then,  if  it  is  for  your  good, 
undertake  the  thing.  You  must  act  according  to  rules, 
follow  strict  diet,  abstain  from  delicacies,  exercise  yourself 
by  compulsion  at  fixed  times,  in  heat,  in  cold  :  drink 
'Id  water,  nor  wine,  when  there  is  opportunity  of 
drinking  it. t  in  a  word  you  must  surrender  yourself  to 

mpaiv  Kncheiriclion  29.  "  This  chapter  has  a  great  conformity 
to  Luke  xiv.  28.  rir.  Hut  it  is  to  lie  observed  that  Epictetus,  both  here 
and  elsewhere,  supposes  some  persons  incapable  of  being  philosophers; 
that  is,  virtuous  and  pious  men  :  but  Christianity  requires  and  enables 
all  to  be  such." — Mrs.  Carter.  The  passage  in  Luke  contain*  ;i  pr.n  ;i..il 
.  and  so  far  is  the  same  as  the  teaching  of  Kpictetus  :  but  the  con- 
clusion in  v.  33  does  not  appear  to  1»;  lu-lped  by  what  immediately  pre- 
cedes v.  21^-32.  The  remark  that  Christianity  "enables  all  to  be  such  " 
is  not  true,  unless  Mrs.  Carter  gives  to  the  word  "enables"  a  meanini; 
which  I  do  not 

t  The    commentators    refer    us    t,.    Paul,    i    Cor.  c.  0,25.     Compare 
Horace,  Ari  Poetica. 

te  diu  quid  fenr  recusent, 
Ouicl  valiant  luuneri. 


the  trainer,  as  you  do  to  a  physician.  Next  in  the  contest, 
you  must  be  covered  with  sand,  sometimes  dislocate  a 
hand,  sprain  an  ankle,  swallow  a  quantity  of  dust,  be 
scourged  with  the  whip  ;  and  after  undergoing  all  this, 
you  must  sometimes  be  conquered  After  reckoning  all 
these  things,  if  you  have  still  an  inclination,  go  to  the 
athletic  practice.  If  you  do  not  reckon  them,  observe  you 
will  behave  like  children  who  at  one  time  play  as  wres- 
tlers, then  as  gladiators,  then  blow  a  trumpet,  then  act  a 
tragedy,  when  they  have  seen  and  admired  such  things. 
So  you  also  do  :  you  are  at  one  time  a  wrestler  (athlete), 
then  a  gladiator,  then  a  philosopher,  then  a  rhetorician  ; 
but  with  your  whole  soul  you  are  nothing  :  like  the  ape 
you  imitate  all  that  you  see  ;  and  always  one  thing 
after  another  pleases  you,  but  that  which  becomes  familiar 
displeases  you.  For  you  have  never  undertaken  anything 
after  consideration,  nor  after  having  explored  the  whole 
matter  and  put  it  to  a  strict  examination  ;  but  you 
have  undertaken  it  at  hazard  and  with  a  cold  desire. 
Thus  some  persons  having  seen  a  philosopher  and  having 
heard  one  speak  like  Euphrates  * — and  yet  who  can  speak 
like  him  ? — wish  to  be  philosophers  themselves. 

Man,  consider  first  what  the  matter  is  (which  you  pro- 
pose to  do),  then  your  own  nature  also,  what  it  is  able  to 
bear.  If  you  are  a  wrestler,  look  at  your  shoulders,  your 
thighs,  your  loins  :  for  different  men  are  naturally  formed 
for  different  things.  Do  you  think  that,  if  you  do  (what 
you  are  doing  daily),  you  can  be  a  philosopher  ?  Do  you 
think  that  you  can  eat  as  you  do  now,  drink  as  you  do  now, 
and  in  the  same  way  be  angry  and  out  of  humor  ?  You 
must  watch,  labor,  conquer  certain  desires,  you  must  de- 
part from  your  kinsmen,  be  despised  by  your  slave, 

*  The  younger  Pliny  (i.  Ep.  10)  speaks  in  high  terms  of  the  merits  and 
attractive  eloquence  of  this  Syrian  philosopher  Euphrates,  who  is  men- 
tioned by  M.  Antoninus  (x.  31)  and  by  others, 


KP/CTKTUS. 


-'57 


laughed  at  by  those  who  meet  you,  in  everything  you 
must  be  in  an  inferior  condition,  as  to  magisterial  office, 
in  honors,  in  courts  of  justice.  When  you  have  considered 
all  these  things  completely,  then,  if  you  think  proper, 
approach  to  philosophy,  if  you  would  gain  in  exchange 
for  these  things  freedom  from  perturbations,  liberty,  tran- 
quillity. If  you  have  not  considered  these  things,  do  not 
approach  philosophy  :  do  not  act  like  children,  at  one 
time  a  philosopher,  then  a  tax  collector,  then  a  rhetori- 
cian, then  a  procurator  (officer)  of  Ca-sar.  These  things 
are  not  consistent.  You  must  be  one  man  either  good  or 
bad  :  you  must  either  labor  at  your  own  ruling  faculty  or  at 
external  things  :  you  must  either  labor  at  things  within, 
or  at  external  things  :  that  is,  you  must  either  occupy  the 
place  of  a  philosopher  or  that  of  one  of  the  vulgar. 

A  person  said  to  Rufus  *  when  Galba  was  murdered,  Is 
the  world  now  governed  by  Providence  ?  But  Rufus  re- 
plied, Did  I  ever  incidentally  form  an  argument  from 
Galba  that  the  world  is  governed  by  Providence  ? 

*  Rufus  was  a  philosopher.  See  i.  i,  i.  9.  Galba  is  the  emperor 
<  ialha,  who  was  murdered.  The  meaning  of  the  passage  is  rather 
obscure,  and  it  is  evident  that  it  does  not  belong  to  this  chapter.  Lord 
Shaftesbury  remarks  that  this  passage  perhaps  belongs  to  chapter  1 1  or 
14,  or  perhaps  to  the  end  of  chapter  17. 
17 


258  EP1CT&TUS. 


CHAPTER  XVI. 

THAT    WE    OUGHT   WITH    CAUTION    TO    ENTER    INTO    FAMILIAR 
INTERCOURSE    WITH     MEN. 

IF  a  man  has  frequent  intercourse  with  others  either  for 
talk,  or  drinking  together,  or  generally  for  social  purposes, 
he  must  either  become  like  them,  or  change  them  to  his 
own  fashion.  For  if  a  man  places  a  piece  of  quenched 
charcoal  close  to  a  piece  that  is  burning,  either  the 
quenched  charcoal  will  quench  the  other,  or  the  burning 
charcoal  will  light  that  which  is  quenched.  Since  then  the 
danger  is  so  great,  we  must  cautiously  enter  into  such  inti- 
macies with  those  of  the  common  sort,  and  remember  that  it 
is  impossible  that  a  man  can  keep  company  with  one  who  is 
covered  with  soot  without  being  partaker  of  the  soot  himself. 
For  what  will  you  do  if  a  man  speaks  about  gladiators,  about 
horses,  about  athletes,  or  what  is  worse  about  men  ?  Such 
a  person  is  bad,  such  a  person  is  good  :  this  was  well  done, 
this  was  done  badly.  Further,  if  he  scoff,  or  ridicule,  or 
show  an  ill-natured  disposition  ?  Is  any  man  among  us  pre- 
pared like  a  lute-player  when  he  takes  a  lute,  so  that  as  soon 
as  he  has  touched  the  strings,  he  discovers  which  are  discord- 
ant, and  tunes  the  instrument  ?  such  a  power  as  Socrates  had 
who  in  all  his  social  intercourse  could  lead  his  companions 
to  his  own  purpose  ?  How  should  you  have  this  power  ?  It 
is  therefore  a  necessary  consequence  that  you  are  carried 
about  by  the  common  kind  of  people. 

Why  then  are  they  more  powerful  than  you  ?  Because 
they  utter  these  useless  words  from  their  real  opinions  : 
but  you  utter  your  elegant  words  only  from  your  lips  ;  for 


A/'/f  2trt 

this  reason  they  are  without  strength  and  dead,  and  it  is 
nauseous  to  listen  to  your  exhortations  and  your  miserable 
virtue,  which  is  talked  of  everywhere  (up  and  down).  In 
this  way  the  vulgar  have  the  advantage  over  you  :  for  every 
opinion  is  strong  and  invincible.  Until  then  the  good 
sentiments  are  fixed  in  you,  and  you  shall  have  acquired  a 
certain  power  for  your  security,  I  advise  you  to  be  careful 
in  your  association  with  common  persons :  if  you  are  not, 
every  day  like  wax  in  the  sun  there  will  be  melted  away 
whatever  you  inscribe  on  your  minds  in  the  school.  With- 
draw then  yourselves  far  from  the  sun  so  long  as  you  have 
these  waxen  sentiments.  For  this  reason  also  philosophers 
advise  men  to  leave  their  native  country,  because  ancient 
habits  distract  them  and  do  not  allow  a  beginning  to  be 
made  of  a  different  habit ;  nor  can  \ve  tolerate  those  who 
meet  us  and  say  :  See  such  a  one  is  now  a  philosopher, 
who  was  once  so  and  so.  Thus  also  physicians  send 
those  who  have  lingering  diseases  to  a  different  country 
and  a  different  air  ;  and  they  do  right.  Do  you  also 
introduce  other  habits  than  those  which  you  have  :  fix 
your  opinions  and  exercise  yourselves  in  them.  But  you 
do  not  so  :  you  go  hence  to  a  spectacle,  to  a  show  of 
gladiators,  to  a  place  of  exercise,  to  a  circus  ;  then  you 
come  back  hither,  and  again  from  this  place  you  go  to 
those  places,  and  still  the  same  persons.  And  there  is  no 
pleasing  (good)  habit,  nor  attention,  nor  care  about  self 
and  observation  of  this  kind.  Mow  shall  I  use  the  appear- 
ances presented  to  me  ?  according  to  nature,  or  contrary 
to  nature  ?  how  do  I  answer  to  them  ?  as  I  ought,  or  as  I 
ought  not?  Do  I  say  to  (hose  things  which  are  independ- 
ent of  the  will,  that  they  do  not  concern  me?  For  if 
you  are  not  yet  in  this  state,  tly  from  your  former  habits, 
fly  from  the  common  sort,  if  you  intend  ever  to  begin  to 
be  something. 


260  EPICTETUS. 


CHAPTER  XVII. 

ON     PROVIDENCE. 

WHKN  you  make  any  charge  against  Providence,  con- 
sider, and  you  will  learn  that  the  thing  has  happened  ac- 
cording to  reason.  Yes,  but  the  unjust  man  has  the 
advantage.  In  what  ?  In  money.  Yes,  for  he  is  su- 
perior to  you*  in  this,  that  he  flatters,  is  free  from  shame, 
and  is  watchful.  What  is  the  wonder  ?  But  see  if  he  has 
the  advantage  over  you  in  being  faithful,  in  being  modest  : 
for  you  will  not  find  it  to  be  so  :  but  wherein  you  are 
superior,  there  you  will  find  that  you  have  the  advantage. 
And  I  once  said  to  a  man  who  was  vexed  because  Philos- 
torgus  was  fortunate  :  Would  you  choose  to  lie  with 
Sura  ?  *  May  it  never  happen,  he  replied,  that  this  day 
should  come  ?  Why  then  are  you  vexed,  if  he  receives 
something  in  return  for  that  which  he  sells  ;  or  how  can 
you  consider  him  happy  who  acquires  those  things  by 
such  means  as  you  abominate  ;  or  what  wrong  does 
Providence,  if  he  gives  the  better  things  to  the  better 
men  ?  Is  it  not  better  to  be  modest  than  to  be  rich  ?  He 
admitted  this.  Why  are  you  vexed  then,  man,  when  you 
possess  the  better  thing?  Remember  then  always  and 
have  in  readiness  the  truth,  that  this  is  a  law  of  nature, 
that  the  superior  has  an  advantage  over  the  inferior 
in  that  in  which  he  is  superior  ;  and  you  will  never  be 
vexed. 

But  my  wife  treats  me  badly.      Well,   if  any   man   asks 

"."pton  suggests  that   Sura  may  be   Palfurius  (Juvenal,  iv.  53),  or 
Palfurius  Sura  (Suetonius,  Domitian,  c.  13). 


EPICTETUS. 

you  what  this  is,  say.  my  wife  treats  me  badly.  Is  there 
then  nothing  more?  Nothing-.  My  father  gives  me  noth- 
ing [What  is  this  ?  my  father  gives  me  nothing.  Is  there 
nothing  else  then  ?  Nothing]  :  but  to  say  that  this  is  an 
evil  is  something  which  must  be  added  to  it  externally, 
and  falsely  added.  For  this  reason  \vc  must  not  get  rid 
of  poverty,  but  of  the  opinion  about  poverty,  and  then 
we  shall  be  happy. 


CHAPTER  XVIII. 

THAT  -WE    OUGHT    NOT    TO    BE    DISTURBED    BY    ANY    NEWS. 

WHEN  anything  shall  be  reported  to  you  which  is  of  a 
nature  to  disturb,  have  this  principle  in  readiness,  that  the 
news  is  about  nothing  which  is  within  the  power  of  your 
will.  Can  any  man  report  to  you  that  you  have  formed 
a  bad  opinion,  or  had  a  bad  desire  ?  By  no  means.  But 
perhaps  he  will  report  that  some  person  is  dead.  What 
then  is  that  to  you  ?  He  may  report  that  some  person 
speaks  ill  of  you.  What  then  is  that  to  you  ?  Or  that 
your  father  is  planning  something  or  other.  Against 
whom  ?  Against  your  will  ?  How  can  he  ?  But  is  it 
against  your  poor  body,  against  your  little  property  ? 
You  are  quite  safe  :  it  is  not  against  you.  But  the  judge 
declares  that  you  have  committed  an  act  of  impiety. 
And  did  not  the  judges  make  the  same  declaration 
against  Socrates?  Does  it  concern  you  that  the  judge 
has  made  this  declaration  ?  No.  Why  then  do  you 
trouble  yourself  any  longer  about  it?  Your  father  has  a 
certain  duty,  and  if  he  shall  not  fulfill  it.  he  loses  the 
character  of  a  father,  of  a  man  of  natural  affection,  of 
gentleness.  Do  not  wish  him  to  lose  anything  else  on 


262 

this  account.  For  never  does  a  man  do  wrong  in  our 
thing,  and  suffer  in  another.  On  the  other  side  it  is  your 
duty  to  make  your  defense  firmly,  modestly,  without 
anger  :  but  if  you  do  not,  you  also  lose  the  character  of 
a  son,  of  a  maai  of  modest  behavior,  of  generous  character. 
Well  then,  is  the  judge  free  from  danger  ?  No  ;  but  lie 
also  is  in  equal  danger.  Why  then  are  you  still  afraid  of 
his  decision  ?  What  have  you  to  do  with  that  which  is 
another  man's  evil?  It  is  your  own  evil  to  make  a  bad 
defense  :  be  on  your  guard  against  this  only.  But  to  be 
condemned  or  not  to  be  condemned,  as  that  is  the  act  of 
another  person,  so  it  is  the  evil  of  another  person.  A 
certain  person  threatens  you.  Me  ?  No.  He  blames 
you.  Let  him  see  how  he  manages  his  own  affairs.  lie 
is  going  to  condemn  you  unjustly.  He  is  a  wretched 
man. 


CHAPTER  XIX. 

WHAT    IS  THE    CONDITION'    OF  A  COMMON    KIND    OF    MAN    AND    OF  A 
PHILOSOPHER. 

THE  first  difference  between  a  common  person  and  a 
philosopher  is  this  :  the  common  person  says,  Woe  to  me 
for  my  little  child,  for  my  brother,  for  my  father.*  The 
philosopher,  if  he  shall  ever  be  compelled  to  say.  Woe 
tome,  stops  and  says,  "but  for  myself."  For  nothing 
which  is  independent  of  the  will  can  hinder  or  damage 
the  will,  and  the  will  can  only  hinder  or  damage  itself. 
If  then  we  ourselves  incline  in  this  direction,  so  as,  when 
.re  unlucky,  to  blame  ourselves  and  to  remember  that 
nothing  else  is  the  cause  of  perturbation  or  loss  of  tran- 

*  Compare  iii.  5,  4. 


EPfCTETUS.  263 

quillity  except  our  o\vn  opinion,  I  swear  to  you  l>y  ail  the 
gods  that  we  have  made  progress.  But  in  the  pi 
state  of  affairs  we  have  gone  another  way  from  the  be- 
ginning. For  example,  while  we  were  still  children,  the 
nurse,  if  we  ever  stumbled  through  want  of  care,  did  not 
chide  us,  but  would  beat  the  stone.  But  what  did  the  stone 
do  ?  Ought  the  stone  to  have  moved  on  account  of  your 
child's  folly  ?  Again,  if  we  find  nothing  to  eat  on  coming 
out  of  the  bath,  the  pedagogue  never  checks  our  appetite, 
but  he  flogs  the  cook.  Man,  did  we  make  you  the  ped- 
agogue of  the  cook  and  not  of  the  child  ?  Correct  the 
child,  ^improve  him.  In  this  way  even  when  we  are 
grown  up  we  are  like  children.  For  he  who  is  unmusi- 
cal is  a  child  in  music  ;  he  who  is  without  letters  is  a  child 
in  learning  :  he  who  is  untaught,  is  a  child  in  life. 


CHAPTER  XX. 

THAT     WF,     CAN     DF.RIVK     ADVAXT.UJK      FROM     AI.I,    KXTF.RXA1, 
THINGS. 

IN  the  case  of  appearances  which  are  objects  of  the 
vision,  nearly  all  have  allowed  the  good  and  the  evil  to  be 
in  ourselves,  and  not  in  externals.  Xo  one  gives  the  name 
of  good  to  the  fact  that  it  is  day,  nor  bad  to  the  fact  that 
it  is  night,  nor  the  name  of  the  greatest  evil  to  the  opinion 
that  three  are  four.  But  what  do  men  say  :  They  say 
that  knowledge  is  good,  and  that  error  is  bad  ;  so  that  even 
in  respect  to  falsehood  itself  ther  •  >od  result,  the 

knowledge  that  it  is  falsehood.  So  it  ought  to  be  in  life 
also.  Is  health  a  good  thing,  and  is  sickness  a  bad  thing? 
No,  man.  .But  what  is  it .'  To  be  healthy,  and  healthy  in 


264.  KPICTETUS. 

a  right  way.  is  good  :  to  be  healthy  in  a  bad  way  is  bad  ; 
so  that  it  is  possible  to  gain  advantage  even  from  sickness, 
I  declare.  For  is  it  not  possible  to  gain  advantage  even 
from  death,  and  is  it  not  possible  to  gain  advantage  from 
mutilation  ?  Do  you  think  that  Menceceus  gained  little 
by  death?  *  Could  a  man  who  says  so,  gain  so  much  as 
Menoeceus  gained?  Come,  man,  did  he  not  maintain  the 
character  of  being  a  lover  of  his  country,  a  man  of  great 
mind,  faithful,  generous  ?  And  if  he  had  continued  to 
live,  would  he  not  have  lost  all  these  things  ?  would  he 
not  have  gained  the  opposite  ?  would  he  not  have  gained 
the  name  of  coward,  ignoble,  a  hater  of  his  country,  a 
man  who  feared  death  ?  Well,  do  you  think  that  he  gained 
little  by  dying  ?  I  suppose  not.  But  did  the  father  of 
Admetus  t  gain  much  by  prolonging  his  life  so  rgnobly  and 
miserably?  Did  he  not  die  afterward?  Cease,  I  adjure 
you  by  the  gods,  to  admire  material  things.  Cease  to 
make  yourselves  slaves,  first  of  things,  then  on  account  of 
things  slaves  of  those  who  are  able  to  give  them  or  take 
them  away. 

n  advantage  then  be  derived  from  these  things  ? 
From  ail  ;  and  from  him  who  abuses  you.  Wherein  does 
the  man  who  exercises  before  the  combat  profit  the 
athlete  ?  Very  greatly.  This  man  becomes  my  exerciser 
before  the  combat  :  he  exercises  me  in  endurance,  in  keep- 
ing my  temper,  in  mildness.  You  say  no  :  but  he,  who 
lays  hold  of  my  neck  and  disciplines  my  loins  and  shoul- 
ders, does  me  good  ;  and  the  exercise  master  (the  aliptes, 

*  Menoeceus,  the  son  of  Creon,  gave  up  his  life  by  which  he  would 
save  his  country,  as  it  was  declared  by  an  oracle.  (Cicero,  Tuscul.  i 
c.  48.)  Juvenal  (Sat.  xiv.  238)  says 

Quarum  Amor  in  te 

Quantus  erat  patriz  Deciorum  in  pectore ;  quantum 
Dilexit  Thebas,  si  Gnccia,  vera,  Menoeceus. 

Euripides,  Phoenissa,  v.  913. 

t  The  father  of  Admetus  was  Pheres  (Euripides,  Alcestis). 


or  oiler)  does  right  when  he  says  :  Raise  him  up  with  both 
hands,  and  the  heavier  he  is,  so  much  the  more  is  my  ad- 
vantage. But  if  a  man  exercises  me  in  keeping  my  tem- 
per, does  he  not  do  me  good  ?  This  is  not  knowing  how 
to  gain  an  advantage  from  men.  Is  my  neighbor  bad  ? 
Bad  to  himself,  but  good  to  me  :  he  exercises  my  good 
disposition,  my  moderation.  Is  my  father  bad  ?  Bad  to 
himself,  but  to  me  good.  This  is  the  rod  of  Hermes  : 
touch  with  it  what  you  please,  as  the  saying  is.  and  it  will 
be  of  gold.  I  say  not  so  :  but  bring  what  you  please,  and 
I  will  make  it  good.*  Bring  disease,  bring  death,  bring 
poverty,  bring  abuse,  bring  trial  on  capital  charges  :  all 
these  things  through  the  rod  of  Hermes  shall  be  made 
profitable.  What  will  you  do  with  death  ?  Why,  what 
else  than  that  it  shall  do  you  honor,  or  that  it  shall  show 
you  by  act  through  it,  what  a  man  is  who  follows  the  will 
of  nature  ?  What  will  you  do  with  disease?  I  will  show 
its  nature,  I  will  be  conspicuous  in  it,  I  will  be  firm,  I  will 
be  happy,  1  will  not  flatter  the  physician,  I  will  not  wish 
to  die.  What  else  do  you  seek  ?  Whatever  you  shall 
give  me,  I  will  make  it  happy,  fortunate,  honored,  a  thing 
which  a  man  shall  seek. 

You  say  No  :  but  take  care  that  you  do  not  fall  sick  :  it 
is  a  bad  thing.  This  is  the  same  as  if  you  should  say, 
Take  care  that  you  never  receive  the  impression  (appear- 
ance) that  three  are  four  :  that  is  bad.  Man,  how  is  it  bad? 
If  I  think  about  it  as  I  ought,  how  shall  it  then  dome  any 
damage  ?  and  shall  it  not  even  do  me  good  ?  If  then  I  think 
about  poverty  as  I  ought  to  do,  about  disease,  about  not 
having  oflice,  is  not  that  enough  for  me?  will  it  not  be  an 
advantage  ?  I  low  then  ought  I  any  longer  to  look  to  seek 

*  Mrs.  Carter  quotes  the  epistle  to  the  Romans  (viii.  28):  "And  we 
know  that  all  things  work  together  for  good  to  them  that  love  God  ;  " 
but  she  quotes  only  the  first  part  of  the  verse  ami  omits  the  conclusion, 
"  to  them  who  are  the  called  according  to  his  purpose." 


266 

evil  and  good  in  externals?  What  happens?  these  doc- 
trines arc  maintained  here,  but  no  man  carries  them  away 
home  ;  but  immediately  every  one  is  at  war  with  his 
slave,  with  his  neighbors,  with  those  who  have  sneered  at 
him,  with  those  who  have  ridiculed  him.  Good  luck  to 
Lcsbius,*  who  daily  proves  that  I  know  nothing. 


CHAPTER  XXI. 

AtiAINST     THOSK     WHO     READILY     COME     TO     THE     PROFESSION    OF 
SOPHISTS. 

THEY  who  have  taken  up  bare  theorems  immediately 
wish  to  vomit  them  forth,  as  persons  whose  stomach  is 
diseased  do  with  food.  First  digest  the  thing,  then  do  not 
vomit  it  up  thus  :  if  you  do  not  digest  it,  the  thirig  be- 
comes truly  an  emetic,  a  crude  food  and  unfit  to  eat.  But 
after  digestion  show  us  some  change  in  your  ruling  fac- 
ulty, as  athletes  show  in  their  shoulders  by  what  they 
have  been  exercised  and  what  they  have  eaten  ;  as  those 
who  have  taken  up  certain  arts  show  by  what  they  have 
learned.  The  carpenter  does  not  come  and  say,  Hear  me 
talk  about  the  carpenter's  art  :  but  having  undertaken  to 
build  a  house,  he  makes  it,  and  proves  that  he  knows  the 
art.  You  also  ought  to  do  something  of  the  kind  ;  eat 
like  a  man,  drink  like  a  man,  dress,  marry,  beget  children, 
do  the  office  of  a  citizen,  endure  abuse,  bear  with  an  un- 
reasonable brother,  bear  with  your  father,  bear  .with  your 

*  Some  abusive  fellow,  known  to  some  of  the  hearers  of  Epictetus. 
We  ought  perhaps  to  understand  the  words  as  if  it  were  said,  "  each  of 
you  ought  to  say  to  himself,  Good  luck  to  Lesbius,"  etc.  Schweig.'s 
note. 


267 

son,  neighbor,  companion.*  Show  us  these  things  that 
we  may  see  that  you  have  in  truth  learned  something 
from  the  philosophers.  You  say,  No  ;  but  come  and  hear 
me  read  (philosophical)  commentaries.  Go  away,  and 
seek  somebody  to  vomit  them  on.  (He  replies')  And  in- 
deed I  will  expound  to  you  the  writings  of  Chrysippus 
as  no  other  man  can  :  1  will  explain  his  text  more  clearly  : 
I  will  add  also,  if  I  can,  the  vehemence  of  . \ntipater  and 
Archedemus.  t 

Is  it  then  for  this  that  young  men  shall  leave  their 
country  and  their  parents,  that  they  may  come  to  this 
place,  and  hear  you  explain  words?  Ought  they  not  to 
return  with  a  capacity  to  endure,  to  be  active  in  associa- 
tion with  others,  free  from  passions,  free  from  perturbation, 
with  such  a  provision  for  the  journey  of  life  with  which 
they  shall  be  able  to  bear  well  the  things  that  happen  and 
derive  honor  from  them  :  i  And  how  can  you  give  them 

*  The  practical  teaching  of  the  Stoics  is  contained  in  iii.  c.  7,  and  it  is 
good  and  wise.  A  modern  writer  says  of  modern  practice  :  "  If  we  open 
our  eyes  and  if  we  will  honestly  acknowledge  to  ourselves  what  we 
discover,  we  shall  be  compelled  to  confess  that  all  the  life  and  efforts  of 
the  civilized  people  of  our  times  is  founded  on  a  view  of  the  world, 
which  is  directly  opposed  to  the  view  of  the  world  which  Jesus  had  " 
(Strauss,  Der  alte  und  der  neue  Glaube,  p.  74.) 

t  Cicero  (Academ.  Prior,  ii.  47)  names  Antipater  and  Archidemus 
(Archedemus)  the  chief  of  dialecticians,  and  also  "  opiniosissimi  homines." 

t  This  passage  is  one  of  those  which  show  the  great  good  sense  of 
Epictetus  in  the  matter  of  education  ;  and  some  other  remarks  to  the 
same  effect  follow  in  this  chapter.  A  man  might  justly  say  that  we  have 
no  clear  notion  of  the  purpose  of  education.  A  modern  writer,  who 
seems  to  belong  to  the  school  of  Epictetus  says  :  "  It  cannot  be  denied 
thru  in  all  schools  of  all  kinds  it  ought  to  be  the  first  and  the  chief  object 
to  make  children  healthy,  good,  honest,  and,  if  possible,  sensible  men  and 
women  ;  and  if  this  is  not  done  in  a  reasonable  degree,  I  maintain  that 
the  education  of  these  schools  is  good  for  nothing.  I  do  not  propose  to 
make  children  good  and  honest  and  wise  by  precepts  and  dogmas  and 
preaching,  as  you  will  see.  They  must  be  made  good  and  wise  by  a 


2r,s  i-:nc  TK  ITS. 

any  of  these  things  which  you  Jo  not  possess  ?  Have 
you  done  from  the  beginning-  anything  else  than  employ 
yourself  about  the  resolution  of  Syllogisms,  of  sophistical 
arguments  (Oi  jwTaTMrroi>T«),  and  in  those  which  work  by 
questions  ?  But  such  a  man  has  a  school ;  why  should 
not  I  also  have  a  school  ?  These  things  are  not  done, 
man,  in  a  careless  way,  nor  just  as  it  may  happen  ;  but 
there  must  be  a  (fit)  age  and  life  and  God  as  a  guide. 
You  say,  No.  But  no  man  sails  from  a  port  without 
having  sacrificed  to  the  Gods  and  invoked  their  help  ;  nor 
do  men  sow  without  having  called  on  Demeter  ;  and 
shall  a  man  who  has  undertaken  so  great  a  work  under- 
take it  safely  without  the  Gods?  and  shall  they  who  un- 
dertake this  work  come  to  it  with  success  ?  What  else 
are  you  doing,  man,  than  divulging  the  mysteries  ?  You 
say,  there  is  a  temple  at  Eleusis,  and  one  here  also. 
There  is  an  Hierophant  at  Eleusis,*  and  I  also  will  make 
an  Hierophant :  there  is  a  herald,  and  I  will  establish  a 
herald  ;  there  is  a  torch-bearer  at  Eleusis,  and  I  also  will 
establish  a  torch-bearer  ;  there  are  torches  at  Eleusis,  and 
I  will  have  torches  here.  The  words  are  the  same  :  how 
do  the  things  done  here  differ  from  those  done  there? 
Most  impious  man,  is  there  no  difference  ?  these  things  are 
done  both  in  due  place  and  in  due  time  ;  and  when 

cultivation  of  the  understanding,  by  the  practice  of  the  discipline  nec- 
essary for  that  purpose,  and  by  the  example  of  him  who  governs,  direct 
and  instructs."  Further,  "  my  men  and  women  teachers  have  something 
which  the  others  have  not :  they  have  a  purpose,  an  end  in  their  system 
of  education ;  and  what  is  education  ?  What  is  human  life  without 
some  purpose  or  end  which  may  be  attained  by  industry,  order  and  the 
exercise  of  moderate  abilities  ?  Great  abilities  are  rare,  and  they  are 
often  accompanied  by  qualities  which  make  the  abilities  useless  to  him 
who  has  them,  and  even  injurious  to  society." 

*  There  was  a  great  temple  of  Demeter  (Ceres)  at  Eleusis  in  Attica, 
and  solemn  mysteries,  and  an  Hierophant  or  conductor  of  the  cere- 
monies. 


EPICTETUS.  269 

accompanied  with  sacrifice  and  prayers,  when  a  man  is 
first  purified,  and  when  he  is  disposed  in  his  mind  to  the 
thought  that  he  is  going  to  approach  sacred  rites  and  an- 
cient rites.  In  this  way  the  mysteries  are  useful,  in  this 
way  we  come  to  the  notion  that  all  these  things  were 
established  by  the  ancients  for  the  instruction  and  cor- 
rection of  life.  But  you  publish  and  divulge  them  out  of 
time,  out  of  place,  without  sacrifices,  without  purity  ;  you 
have  not  the  garments  which  the  hierophant  ought  to 
have,  nor  the  hair,  nor  the  head-dress,  nor  the  voice,  nor 
the  age  ;  nor  have  you  purified  yourself  as  he  has  :  but 
you  have  committed  to  memory  the  words  only  and  you 
say  :  Sacred  are  the  words  by  themselves.* 

You  ought  to  approach  these  matters  in  another  way, 
the  thing  is  great,  it  is  mystical,  not  a  common  thing,  nor 
is  it  given  to  every  man.  But  not  even  wisdom  f  perhaps 

*  The  reader,  who  has  an  inclination  to  compare  religious  forms  an- 
cient and  modern,  may  find  something  in  modern  practice  to  which  the 
words  of  Epictetus  are  applicable. 

t  This  is  a  view  of  the  fitness  ot  a  te^chei  which,  as  lai  as  I  know,  t~ 

.iw;  and  it  is  also  true      Perhaps  the;  ue  notion  ot 

...d  in  modem  Europe  at  the  time  when   teachers  of  youths  were 

only  priests,  and  when  it  was  supposed  that  their  fitness  for  the  office  of 

teacher  was  secured   by  their  fitness  for   the  office  of  priest.     In  the 

;i  "Ordering  of  Deaion-  "  in  the  Church  of   England,  the  person, 

.vho  is  proposed  as  a  fit  person  to  be  a  deacon,  is  asked   the  following 

[iiestion  by  the  bishop:  "  Do  you  trust  that  you  are  inwardly  moved  by 

.he  Holy  Ghost  to  take  upon  you  this  office  and  ministration  to  serve 

» iod  for  the  promotion  of  his  glory  and  the  edifying  of  his  people"'" 

"In   the   ordering   of    Priests"    this  question  is  omitted,  and   another 

question  only  is  put,  which  is  used  also  in  the  ordering  of  Deacons  : 

"  Do  you  think  in  your  heart  that  you  be  truly  called,  according  to  th»- 

\vill  of  our  Lord  Jesus  Christ,"  etc.     The  teacher  ought  to  have  God  t-> 

him  to  occupy  the  office  of  teacher,  as  Epictetus  says.     He  dot  - 

not   say  how  God   will  advise:  perhaps   he   supposed   that   this  ;ul\n,- 

might  be  given  in  the  way  in   which    Socrates  said   that   he  received  ii. 

•  Wi.-dom   perhaps  is  not  enough  "  to   enable  a  man   to    take  < 

youths.      \Yhatever  "  wisdom  "  may  mean,  it  is  true  that  .1  t<:urhcr  -Jiuuld 


2 -jo  EPICTETL'S. 

is  enough  to  enable  a  man  to  take  care  of  youths  :  a  man 
must  have  also  a  certain  readiness  and  fitness  for  this  pur- 
pose, and  a  certain  quality  of  body,  and  above  all 
things  he  must  have  God  to  advise  him  to  occupy  this 
office,  as  God  advised  Socrates  to  occupy  the  place  of  one 
who  confutes  error,  Diogenes  the  office  of  royalty  and 
reproof,  and  the  office  of  teaching  precepts.  But  you 
open  a  doctor's  shop,  though  you  have  nothing  except 
physic  :  but  where  and  how  they  should  be  applied,  you 
know  not  nor  have  you  taken  any  trouble  about  it.  See, 
that  man  says,  I  too  have  salves  for  the  eyes.  Have  you 
also  the  power  of  using  them  ?  Do  you  know  both  when 
and  how  they  will  do  good,  and  to  whom  they  will  do 
good  ?  Why  then  do  you  act  at  hazard  in  things  of  the 
greatest  importance  ?  why  are  you  careless  ?  why  do  you 
undertake  a  thing  that  is  in  no  way  fit  for  you  ?  Leave  it 
to  those  who  are  able  to  do  it,  and  to  do  it  well.  Do  not  your- 
self bring  disgrace  on  philosophy  through  your  own  acts, 
and  be  not  one  of  those  who  load  it  with  a  bad  reputation. 
But  if  theorems  please  you.  sit  still,  and  turn  them  over 
by  yourself ;  but  never  say  that  you  are  a  philosopher, 
nor  allow  another  to  say  it  ;  but  say  :  He  is  mistaken, 
for  neither  arc  my  desires  different  from  what  they  were 
before,  nor  is  my  activity  directed  to  other  objects,  nor  do 
I  assent  to  other  things,  nor  in  the  use  of  appearances 
have  I  altered  at  all  from  my  former  condition.  This 

have  a  fitness  and  liking  for  the  business.  If  he  has  not,  he  will  find  it 
disagreeable,  and  he  will  not  do  it  well.  He  may  and  ought  to  gain  a 
reasonable  living  by  his  labor :  if  he  seeks  only  money  and  wealth,  he  i> 
on  the  wrong  track,  and  he  is  only  like  a  common  dealer  in  buying  and 
selling,  a  butcher,  or  a  shoemaker,  or  a  tailor,  all  useful  members  of 
society  and  all  of  them  necessary  in  their  several  kinds.  Hut  the  teacher 
has  a  priestly  office,  the  making,  as  far  as  it  is  possible,  children  into 
good  men  and  women.  Should  he  be  "  ordered  "  like  a  Deacon  or  a 
Priest,  for  his  office  is  even  more  useful  than  that  of  Priest  or  Deacon  ? 
Some  will  say  that  this  is  ridiculous.  Perhaps  the  wise  will  not  think  so. 


EPTCTETUS. 


you  must  think  and  say  about  yourself,  it"  you  would  think 
as  you  ought  :  if  not  act  at  hazard,  and  do  what  you  are 
doing  ;  for  it  becomes  you. 


CHAPTER  XXII. 

ABOUT     CYXISM. 

WHEN  one  of  his  pupils  inquired  of  Epictetus,  and  he 
was  a  person  who  appeared  to  be  inclined  to  Cynism,  what 
kind  of  person  a  Cynic  ought  to  be  and  what  was  the 
notion  of  the  thing,  we  will  inquire,  said  Kpictetus.  at 
leisure  :  but  1  have  so  much  to  say  to  you  that  he  who 
without  <  n>d  attempts  so  great  a  matter,  is  hateful  to  God, 
and  lias  no  other  purpose  than  to  act  indecently  in  public. 
For  in  any  well-managed  house  no  man  comes  forward, 
and  says  to  himself,  1  ought  to  be  manager  of  the  house. 
If  he  does  BO,  the  master  turns  round,  and  seeing  him  in- 
solently giving  orders,  drags  him  forth  and  flogs  him. 
So  it  is  also  in  this  great  city  (the  world)  :  for  here  also 
there  is  a  master  of  the  house  who  orders  everything. 
(He  says)  You  are  the  sun;  you  can  by  going  round 
make,  the  year  ami  seasons,  and  make  the  fruits  grow  and 
nourish  them,  and  stir  the  winds  and  make  them  remit, 
and  warm  the  bodies  of  men  properly  :  go,  travel  round, 
and  so  administer  things  from  the  greatest  to  the  least. 
You  are  a  calf:  when  a  lion  shall  appear,  do  your  proper 
business  (/.  c.  run  away):  if  you  do  not,  you  will  suffer. 
You  are  a  bull  ;  advance  and  light,  for  this  is  your  busi- 
and  becomes  you,  and  you  can  do  it.  You  can  lead 
the  army  against  Ilium  ;  be  Agamemnon.  You  can  light 
in  single  combat  against  Hector;  be  Achilles.  But  if 


272  I-.P/CTKTUS. 

Thersites  *  came  forward  and  claimed  the  command,  he? 
\vould  either  not  have  obtained  it  ;  or  if  he  did  obtain 
it,  he  would  have  disgraced  himself  before  many  wit- 
nesses. 

Do  you  also  think  about  the  matter  carefully  :  it  is  not 
Avhat  it  seems  to  you.  (You  say)  I  wear  a  cloak  now  and 
I  shall  wear  it  then  :  I  sleep  hard  now,  and  I  shall  sleep 
hard  then  :  I  will  take  in  addition  a  little  bag  now  and  a 
staff,  and  I  will  go  about  and  begin  to  beg  and  to  abuse 
those  whom  I  meet ;  and  if  I  see  any  man  plucking  the 
hair  out  of  his  body,  I  will  rebuke  him,  or  if  he  has  dressed 
his  hair,  or  if  he  walks  about  in  purple.  If  you  imagine 
the  thing  to  be  such  as  this,  keep  far  away  from  it :  do  not 
approach  it  :  it  is  not  at  all  for  you.  But  if  you  imagine 
it  to  be  what  it  is,  and  do  not  think  yourself  to  be  unfit  for 
it,  consider  what  a  great  thing  you  undertake. 

In  the  first  place  in  the  things  which  relate  to  yourself, 
you  must  not  be  in  any  respect  like  what  you  do  now  :  you 
must  not  blame  God  or  man  :  you  must  take  away  desire 
altogether,  you  must  transfer  avoidance  only  to  the  things 
u'hi.:h  are  within  the  power  of  the  will:  you  must  not  feel 
ang-er  nor  resentment  nor  envy  nor  pity;  a  girl  must  not 
appear  handsome  to  you,  nor  must  you  love  a  little  reputa- 
tion, nor  be  pleased  with  a  boy  or  a  cake.  For  you  ought 
to  know  that  the  rest  of  men  throw  walks  around  them  and 
houses  and  darkness  when  they  do  any  such  things,  and 
they  have  many  means  of  concealment.  A  man  shuts  the 
door,  he  sets  somebody  before  the  chamber  :  if  a  person 
comes,  say  that  he  is  out,  he  is  not  at  leisure.  But  the 
Cynic  instead  of  all  these  things  must  use  modesty  as  his 
protection  :  if  he  does  not,  he  will  be  indecent  in  his  naked- 
ness and  under  the  open  sky.  This  is  his  house,  his  door  : 
this  is  the  slave  before  his  bedchamber  :  this  is  his  dark- 
ness. For  he  ought  not  to  wish  to  hide  anything  that  he 

*  See  the  description  of  Thersites  in  the  Iliad,  ii.  i\2. 


:loes  :  and  if  In-  (iocs,  lit-  is  gone,  he  has  lost  the  character 
of  a  Cynic,  of  a  man  who  lives  under  the  open  sky,  of  a 
free  man  :  he  has  begun  io  fear  some  external  thing-,  he- 
has  begun  to  have  need  of  concealment,  nor  can  he  get 
concealment  when  he  chooses.  For  where  shall  lie  hide 
himself  and  how  ?  And  if  by  chance  this  public  instructor 
shall  be  detected,  this  pedagogue,  what  kind  of  things  will 
he  be  compelled  to  suffer?  when  then  a  man  fears  these 
things,  is  it  possible  for  him  to  be  bold  with  his  whole 
soul  to  superintend  men  ?  It  cannot  be  :  it  is  impossible. 

In  the  first  place  then  you  must  make  your  ruling  faculty 
pure,  and  this  mode  of  life  also.  Now  (you  should  say), 
to  me  the  matter  to  work  on  is  my  understanding,  as 
wood  is  to  the  carpenter,  as  hides  to  the  shoemaker  ;  and 
my  business  is  the  right  use  of  appearances.  But  the  body 
is  nothing  to  me:  the  parts  of  it  are  nothing  to  me. 
Death  ?  Let  it  come  when  it  chooses,  either  death  of  the 
whole  or  of  a  part.  Fly,  you  say.  And  whither  ;  can  any 
man  eject  me  out  of  the  world  ?  He  cannot.  But  wher- 
ever I  go,  there  is  the  sun,  there  is  the  moon,  there  are 
the  stars,  dreams,  omens,  and  the  conversation  with 
<  iods. 

Then,  if  he  is  thus  prepared,  the  true  Cynic  cannot  be 
satisfied  with  this  ;  but  he  must  know  that  he  is  sent  a 
messenger  from  Zeus  to  men  about  good  and  bad  things,* 
to  show  them  that  they  have  wandered  and  are  seeking 
the  substance  of  good  and  evil  where  it  is  not,  but  where  it 
is.  they  never  think  ;  and  that  he  is  a  spy,  as  Diogenes  f 
was  carried  off  to  Philip  after  the  battle  of  Choeroneia  as 
a  spy.  For  in  fact  a  Cynic  is  a  spy  of  the  things  which 
are  good  for  men  and  which  are  evil,  and  it  is  his  duty  to 
examine  carefully  and  to  come  and  report  truly,  and  not 
to  be  struck  with  terror  so  as  to  point  out  as  enemies 

*  The  office  which  in  our  times  correspond*  to  this  description  of  the 
Cynic,  is  the  office  of  a  teacher  of  religion.  !  See  page  77,  note. 

18 


274  AV/r/y- /TX 

those  who  ctre  not  enemies,  nor  in   any  other  way  to  be 
perturbed  by  appearance's  nor  confounded. 

It  is  his  duty  then  to  be  able  with  a  loud  voice,  if  the 
occasion  should  arise,  and  appearing'  on  the  tragic  stage 
to  say  like  Socrates:  Men,  whither  are  you  hurrying, 
what  are  you  doing,  wretches  ?  like  blind  people  you  are 
wandering  up  and  down  :  you  are  going  by  another  road, 
and  have  left  the  true  road  :  you  seek  for  prosperity  and 
happiness  where  they  are  not.  and  if  another  shows  you 
where  they  are.  you  do  not  believe  him.  Why  do  you 
seek  it  without  ?  *  In  the  body  ?  It  is  not  there.  If  you 
doubt,  look  at  Myro,  look  at  Ophellius.f  In  possessions? 
It  is  not  there.  But  if  you  do  not  believe  me,  look  at 
Crossus  :  look  at  those  who  are  now  rich,  with  what 
lamentations  their  life  is  filled.  In  power  ?  It  is  not  there. 
If  it  is,  those  must  be  happy  who  have  been  twice  and 
thrice  consuls  ;  but-  they  are  not.  Whom  shall  we  believe 
in  these  matters?  You  who  from  without  see  their  affairs 
and  are  dazzled  by  an  appearance,  or  the  men  themselves  ? 
What  do  they  say  ?  Hear  them  when  they  groan,  when 
they  grieve,  when  on  account  of  these  very  consulships 
and  glory  and  splendor  they  think  that  they  are  more 
wretched  and  in  greater  clanger.  Is  it  in  royal  power  ? 
It  is  not  :  if  it  were,  Nero  would  have  been  happy,  and 
Sardanapalus.  But  neither  was  Agamemnon  happy, 

*  Quod  petis  hie  est, 
Kst  Ulubris.  animus  si  te  non  deficit  ajquus. 

Horace,  Ep.  i.  1 1 .  30. 

Willst  du  immer  weiter  schweifen  ? 
Sieh,  das  Gute  liegt  so  nah. 
Lerne  nur  das  Gliick  ergreifen, 
J  )enn  das  Gliick  ist  immer  da. 

Goethe,  Gedichte. 

I  These  men  are  supposed  to  have  been  strong  gladiators.     Crcesu.s  is 
the  rich  king  of  Lydki,  who  was  taken  prisoner  by  Cyrus  the  Persian. 


EPh  275 

though  he  was  a  better  man  than  Sardanapalus  and  Xero  ; 
but  while  others  are  snoring,  what  is  he  doing? 

Much  from  his  head  he  tore  his  rooted  hair. 

Iliad,  x.  15. 

And  what  does  he  say  himself? 

"  I  am  perplexed,"  he  says,  "  and 
Disturb'd  I  am,"  and  "my  heart  out  of  my  bosom 
Is  leaping." 

Iliad,  \.  oi. 

\Vrctch,  which  of  your  affairs  goes  badly?  Your  posses- 
sions ?  No.  Your  body  ?  No.  But  you  are  rich  in  gold 
and  copper.  What  then  is  the  matter  with  you  ?  That 
part  of  you.  whatever  it  is.  has  been  neglected  by  you 
and  is  corrupted,  the  part  with  which  we  desire,  with 
which  we  avoid,  with  which  we  move  toward  and  move 
from  things.  How  neglected  ?  He  knows  not  the  nature 
of  good  for  which  he  is  made  by  nature  and  the  nature 
of  evil  ;  and  what  is  his  own,  and  what  belongs  to  an- 
other ;  and  when  anything  that  belongs  to  others  goes 
badly,  he  says,  Wo  to  me,  for  the  Hellenes  are  in  danger, 
Wretched  is  his  ruling  faculty,  and  alone  neglected  and 
uncared  for.  The  Hellenes  are  going  to  die  destroyed  by 
the  Trojans.  And  if  the  Trojans  do  not  kill  them,  will 
they  not  die  ?  Yes  :  but  not  all  at  once.  What  difference 
then  does  it  make  ?  For  if  death  is  an  evil,  whether  men 
die  altogether,  or  if  they  die  singly,  it  is  equally  an  evil. 
Is  anything  else  then  going  to  happen  than  the  separation 
of  the  soul  and  the  body  ?*  Nothing.  And  if  the  Hel- 
lenes perish,  is  the  door  closed,  and  is  it  not  in  your 
power  to  die?  It  is.  Why  then  do  you  lament  (and  say) 

11  then  is  supposed  to  consist  of  a  soul  and  a  body.  It  may  be 
useful  to  remember  this  when  we  are  examining  other  passages  in 
Kpictetus. 


276  F.PICTETUS. 

Oli,  you  who  are  a  king  and  have  the  scepter  of  Zeus  ? 
An  unhappy  king  does  not  exist  more  than  an  unhappy 
god.  What  then  art  thou  ?  In  truth  a  shepherd  :  for  you 
weep  as  shepherds  do,  when  a  wolf  has  carried  off  OIK- 
of  their  sheep  :  and  these  who  are  governed  by  you  are 
sheep.  And  why  did  you  come  hither?  Was  your  desire 
in  any  danger?  was  your  aversion  (^oryum)  ?  was  your 
movement  (pursuits)?  was  your  avoidance  of  things: 
He  replies.  No;  but  the  wife  of  my  brother  was  carried 
off.  Was  it  not  then  a  great  gain  to  be  deprived  of  an 
adulterous  wife?  Shall  we  be  despised  then  by  the  Tro- 
jans? What  kind  of  people  are  the  Trojans,  wise  or 
foolish?  If  they  are  wise,  why  do  you  fight  with  them? 
If  they  are  fools,  why  do  you  care  about  them. 

In  what  then  is  the  good,  since  it  is  not  in  these  things? 
Tell  us,  you  who  are  lord,  messenger  and  spy.  Where 
you  do  not  think  that  it  is,  nor  choose  to  seek  it  :  for  if 
you  chose  to  seek  it,  you  would  have  found  it  to  be  in 
yourselves  ;  nor  would  you  be  wandering  out  of  the  way, 
nor  seeking  what  belongs  to  others  as  if  it  were  your  own. 
Turn  your  thoughts  into  yourselves  :  observe  the  precon- 
ceptions which  you  have.  What  kind  of  a  thing  do  you 
imagine  the  good  to  be  ?  That  which  flows  easily,  that 
which  is  happy,  that  which  is  not  impeded.  Come,  and 
<!o  you  not  naturally  imagine  it  to  be  great,  do  you  not 
imagine  it  to  be  valuable?  do  you  not  imagine  it  to  he 
free  from  harm  ?  In  what  material  then  ought  you  to 
seek  for  that  which  flows  easily,  for  that  which  is  not 
impeded?  in  that  which  serves  or  in  that  which  is  fr«.v  ? 
In  that  which  is  free.  Do  you  possess  the  body  then  free 
or  is  it  in  servile  condition  ?  We  do  not  know.  Do  you 
not  know  that  it  is  the  slave  of  fever,  of  gout,  ophthalmia, 
dysentery,  of  a  tyrant,  of  fire,  of  iron,  of  everything 
wliieh  is  stronger?  Yes.  it  is  a  slave.  Plow  then  is  it 
possible  that  anything  which  belongs  to  the  body  can  be 


EPICTETUS. 


277 


free  from  hindrance?  and  how  is  a  thing  great  or  valuable 
which  is  naturally  dead,  or  earth,  or  mud  ?  Well  then, 
do  you  possess  nothing  which  is  free  ?  Perhaps  nothing. 
And  who  is  able  to  compel  you  to  assent  to  that  which 
appears  false?  No  man.  And  who  can  compel  you  not 
to  assent  to  that  which  appears  true  ?  No  man.  By  this 
then  you  see  that  there  is  something  in  you  naturally  free- 
But  to  desire  or  to  be  averse  from,  or  to  move  toward  an 
object  or  to  move  from  it,  or  to  prepare  yourself,  or  to 
propose  to  do  anything,  which  of  you  can  do  this,  unless 
he  has  received  an  impression  of  the  appearance  of  that 
which  is  profitable  or  a  duty  ?  No  man.  You  have  then 
in  these  things  also  something  which  is  not  hindered  and 
is  free.  Wretched  man,  work  out  this,  take  care  of  this, 
seek  for  good  here. 

And  how  is  it  possible  that  a  man  who  has  nothing, 
who  is  naked,  houseless,  without  a  hearth,  squalid,  with- 
out a  slave,  without  a  city,  can  pass  a  life  that  flows 
easily  ?  See,  God  has  sent  you  a  man  to  show  you  that 
it  is  possible.*  Look  at  me,  who  am  without  a  ciu 
without  a  house,  without  possessions,  without  a  -lave  • 
1  sleep  on  the  ground  ;  I  have  no  wife,  no  children,  no 
]>ra  torium,  but  only  the  earth  and  heavens,  and  one  poor 
cloak.  And  what  do  I  want  ?  Am  I  not  without  sorrow  ? 
am  I  not  without  fear?  Am  I  not  free?  \Vhen  did  any 

*  "  It  is  observable  that  Epictetus  seems  to  think  it  a  necessary  quali 
fication  in  a  teacher  sent  from  God  for  the  instruction  of  mankind  to  !>.- 
destitute  of  all  external  advantages  and  a  suffering  character.  Thus 
doth  this  excellent  man,  who  had  carried  human  reason  to  so  great  a 
height,  bear  testimony  to  the  propriety  of  that  method  which  the  divine- 
wisdom  hath  thought  fit  to  follow  in  the  scheme  of  the  Cospel;  whose 
great  author  had  not  -uherc  to  lay  Ins  lieaJ;  and  whirh  some  in  lat> 
have  inconsiderately  urged  as  an  argument  against  the  ( 'hristian  religion. 
The  infinite  disparity  between  the  proposal  of  the  example  of  Diogenes 
in  Kpictetus  and  of  our  Redeemer  in  the  New  Testament  is  too  obvious 
to  need  anv  enlargement."  —  M>  • 


of  you  see  me  failing  in  the  object  of  ray  desire  ?  or 
falling  into  that  which  I  would  avoid?  did  I  ever  blame 
God  or  man  ?  *  did  I  ever  accuse  any  man  ?  did  any  of 
you  ever  see  me  with  sorrowful  countenance?  And  how 
do  I  meet  with  those  whom  you  are  afraid  of  and  admire? 
Do  not  I  treat  them  like  slaves?  Who,  when  he  sees  me, 
does  not  think  that  he  sees  his  king  and  master  ? 

This  is  the  language  of  the  Cynics,   this  their  character, 

*  Some  of  the  ancients,  who  called  themselves  philosophers,  did  blame 
God  and  his  administration  of  the  world ;  and  there  are  men  who  do  the 
same  now.  If  a  man  is  dissatisfied  with  the  condition  of  the  world,  he 
has- the  power  of  going  out  of  it,  as  Epictetus  often  says;  and  if  be 
knows,  as  he  must  know,  that  he  cannot  alter  the  nature  of  mail  and  the 
conditions  of  human  life,  he  may  think  it  wise  to  withdraw  from  a  state 
of  things  with  which  he  is  not  satisfied.  If  he  believes  that  there  is  no 
God,  he  is  at  liberty  to  do  what  he  thinks  best  for  himself;  and  if  he 
does  believe  that  there  is  a  God,  he  may  still  think  that  his  power  of 
quitting  the  world  is  a  power  which  he  may  exercise  when  he  chooses. 
Many  persons  commit  suicide,  not  because  they  are  dissatisfied  with  the 
state  of  the  world,  but  for  other  reasons.  I  have  not  yet  heard  of  a 
modern  philosopher  who  found  fault  with  the  condition  of  human  things, 
and  voluntarily  retired  from  life.  Our  philosophers  live  as  long  a*  they 
can,  and  some  of  them  take  care,  of  themselves  and  of  all  that  they 
possess ;  they  even  provide  well  for  the  comfort  of  those  whom  they 
leave  behind  them.  The  conclusion  seems  to  be  that  they  prefer  living 
in  this  world  to  lea /ing  it,  that  their  complaints  are  idle  talk;  and  that 
being  men  of  weak  minds,  and  great  vanity  they  assume  the  philosopher's 
name,  and  while  they  try  to  make  others  as  dissatisfied  as  they  profess 
themselves  to  be,  they  are  really  enjoying  themselves  after  their  fashion 
as  much  as  they  can.  These  men,  though  they  may  have  the  means  of 
living  with  as  much  comfort  as  the  conditions  of  human  life  permit,  are 
dissatisfied,  and  they  would,  if  they  could,  make  as  dissatisfied  as  tliem- 
srlvt-s  those  who  have  less  means  of  making  life  tolerable-  These 
grumblers  are  not  the  men  who  give  their  money  or  their  labor  or  their 
lives  for  increasing  the  happiness  of  mankind  and  diminishing  the  un- 
avoidable sufferings  of  human  life  ;  but  they  find  it  easier  to  blame  God, 
when  they  believe  in  him  ;  or  to  find  fault  with  things  as  they  are,  which 
is  more  absurd,  when  they  do  not  believe  in  God,  and  when  they  ought 
to  make  the  best  that  they  can  of  the  conditions  under  which  we  live. 


FPfCTF.TUS. 


279 


this  is  their  purpose.  You  say  Xo  :  but  their  charac- 
teristic is  the  little  wallet,  and  staff,  and  great  jaws  :  the 
devouring  of  all  that  you  give  them,  or  storing  it  up,  or 
the  abusing  unreasonably  all  whom  they  meet,  or  dis- 
playing their  shoulder  as  a  fine  thing.  Do  you  see  how 
you  are  going  to  undertake  so  great  a  business  ?  First 
take  a  mirror  :  look  at  your  shoulders  ;  observe  your  loins, 
your  thighs.  You  are  going,  my  man,  to  be  enrolled  as 
a  combatant  in  the  Olympic  games,  no  frigid  and  miser- 
able contest.  In  the  Olympic  games  a  man  is  not  per- 
mitted to  be  conquered  only  and  to  take  his  departure  : 
but  first  he  must  be  disgraced  in  the  sight  of  all  the  world, 
not  in  the  sight  of  Athenians  only,  or  of  Lacedaemonians 
or  of  Xicopolitans  ;  next  he  must  be  whipped  also  if  he 
has  entered  into  the  contests  rashly  :  and  before  being 
whipped,  he  must  suffer  thirst  and  heat,  and  swallow 
much  dust. 

Reflect  more  carefully,  know  thyself,*  consult  the 
divinity,  without  God  attempt  nothing  ;  for  if  he  shall 
advise  you  (to  do  this  or  anything),  be  assured  that  he 
intends  you  to  become'  great  or  to  receive  many  blows. 
For  this  very  amusing  quality  is  conjoined  to  a  C'ynic  : 
he  must  be  flogged  like  an  ass,  and  when  he  is  flogged, 
he  must  love  those  who  rlog  him,  as  if  he  were  the  father 
of  all,  and  the  brother  of  all.  f  Vou  say  no  :  but  if  a  man 

'  The  expression  "  Know  thyself"    is  attributed  to  several  persons, 

and  to  Socrates  among  them.     Self-knowledge  is  one  of  the  most  difficult 

kinds  of  knowledge ;  and  no  man    has   it   completely.      Men  either  esti- 

: eir  powers  too  highly,  and  this    is   named   vanity,  self-conceit  or 

arrogance  ;   or  they  think  too  meanly  of  their  powers  and  do  not  . 

plish  what  they  might  acconipii-di,  if  they  had  reasonable  seif-confidem v. 

iiHpan-  'his  \\\\\  :;d  love 

to  enemies,  Matthew    v.  .7 (-44.     The    reader    will    observe    that    Christ 

'I    provoi  ation-.  doth  ;    and 

requires  of  a// his  fpllowers,  whai  only  as  ilu-  duty 


280  EPICTETUS. 

flogs  you,  stand  in  the  public  place  and  call  out,  "  Caesar, 
what  do  I  suffer  in  this  state  of  peace  under  thy  protec- 
tion ?  ''  Let  us  bring  the  offender  before  the  proconsul. 
But  what  is  Ca-sar  to  a  Cynic,  or  what  is  a  proconsul,  or 
what  is  any  other  except  him  who  sent  the  Cynic  down 
hither,  and  whom  he  serves,  namely  Zeus  ?  Does  he  call 
upon  any  other  than  Zeus  ?  Is  he  not  convinced  that 
whatever  he  suffers,  it  is  Zeus  who  is  exercising  him  ? 
Hercules,  when  he  was  exercised  by  Eurystheus  did  not 
think  that  he  was  wretched,  but  without  hesitation  he  at- 
tempted to  execute  all  that  he  had  in  hand.  And  is  he 
who  is  trained  to  the  contest  and  exercised  by  Zeus  going 
to  call  out  and  to  be  vexed,  he  who  is  worthy  to  bear  the 
scepter  of  Diogenes  ?  Hear  what  Diogenes  says  to  the 
passers-by  when  he  is  in  a  fever,  Miserable  wretches, 
will  you  not  stay  ?  but  are  you  going  so  long  a  journey 
to  Olympia  to  see  the  destruction  or  the  fight  of  athletes  ; 
and  will  you  not  choose  to  see  the  combat  between  a 
fever  and  a  man  ?  Would  such  a  man  accuse  God  who 
sent  him  down  as  if  God  were  treating  him  unworthily,  a 
man  who  gloried  in  his  circumstances,  and  claimed  to 
be  an  example  to  those  who  were  passing  by  ?  For  what 
shall  he  accuse  him  of?  because  he  maintains  a  decency 
of  behavior,  because  he  displays  his  virtue  more  conspic- 
uously ?  Well,  and  what  does  he  say  of  poverty,  about 
death,  about  pain  ?  How  did  he  compare  his  own  hap- 
piness with  that  of  the  great  king  (the  king  of  Persia)  ?  or 
rather  he  thought  that  there  was  no  comparison  between 
them.  For  where  there  are  perturbations,  and  griefs,  and 
fears,  and  desires  not  satisfied,  and  aversions  of  things 
which  you  cannot  avoid,  and  envies  and  jealousies,  how 
is  there  a  road  to  happiness  there  ?  But  where  there 
are  corrupt  principles,  there  these  things  must  of  neces- 
sity be. 

When    the   young  man  asked,  if  when  a  Cynic   is  sick, 


KP/CTKTL'S.  281 

and  a  friend  asks  him  to  come  to  his  house  and  be  taken 
care  of  in  his  sickness,  shall  the  Cynic  accept  the  invita- 
tion, he  replied.  And  where  shall  you  find,  I  ask,  a  Cynic's 
friend?  For  the  man  who  invites  ought  to  be  such  an- 
other as  the  Cynic  that  he  may  be  worthy  of  being  reck- 
oned the  Cynic's  friend.  He  ought  to  be  a  partner  in  the 
Cynic's  scepter  and  his  royalty,  and  a  worthy  minister,  if 
he  intends  to  be  considered  worthy  of  a  Cynic's  friend- 
ship, as  Diogenes  was  a  friend  of  Antisthenes.  as  Crates 
was  a  friend  of  Diogenes.  Do  you  think  that  if  a  man 
comes  to  a  Cynic  and  salutes  him,  that  he  is  the  Cynrc's 
friend,  and  that  the  Cynic  will  think  him  worthy  of 
receiving  a  Cynic  into  his  house  ?  So  that  if  you  please, 
reflect  on  this  also  :  rather  look  round  for  some  conven- 
ient dunghill  on  which  you  shall  bear  your  fever  and 
which  will  shelter  you  from  the  north  wind  that  you  may 
not  be  chilled.  Rut  you  seem  to  me  to  wish  to  go  into 
some  man's  house  and  to  be  well  fed  there  for  a  time. 
Why  then  do  you  think  of  attempting  so  great  a  thing  (as 
the  life  of  a  Cynic)  ? 

But,  said  the  young  man,  shall  marriage  and  the  pro- 
creation of  children  as  a  chief  duty  be  undertaken  by  the 
Cynic  ?  *  If  you  grant  me  a  community  of  wise  men, 
Epictetus  replies,  perhaps  no  man  will  readily  apply  him- 
self to  the  Cynic  practice.  For  on  whose  account  should 
he  undertake  this  manner  of  life  ?  However  if  we  sup- 
pose that  he  does,  nothing  will  prevent  him  from  marry- 
ing and  begetting  children  ;  for  his  wife  will  be  another 
like  himself,  and  his  father-in-law  another  like  himself, 
and  his  children  will  be  brought  up  like  himself.  But  in 
the  present  state  of  things  which  is  like  that  of  an  army 
placed  in  battle  order,  is  it  not  fit  that  the  Cynic  should 
without  any  distraction  be  employed  only  on  the  minis- 

*  The  Stoics  recommended  marriage,  the  procreation  of  children,  the 
discharge  of  magisterial  offices,  and  the  duties  of  social  life  generally. 


tration  of  God,*  able  to  go  about  among  m^n,  not  tied 
down  to  the  common  duties  of  mankind,  nor  entangled 
in  the  ordinary  relations  of  life,  which  if  he  neglects,  he 
will  not  maintain  the  character  of  an  honorable  and  good 
man  ?  and  if  he  observes  them  he  will  lose  the  character 
of  the  messenger,  and  spy  and  herald  of  God.  For  con- 
sider that  it  is  his  duty  to  do  something  toward  his  father-in- 
law,  something  to  the  other  kinsfolk  of  his  wife,  something 
to  his  wife  also  (if  he  has  one).  He  is  also  excluded  by 
being  a  Cynic  from  looking  after  the  sickness  of  his  own 
family,  and  from  providing  for  their  support.  And  to  say 
nothing  of  the  rest,  he  must  have  a  vessel  for  heating 
water  for  the  child  that  he  may  wash  it  in  the  bath  ;  wool 
for  his  wife  when  she  is  delivered  of  a  child,  oil,  a  bed,  a 

*  "It  is  remarkable  that  Epictetus  here  uses  the  same  word  with  St. 
Paul,  i  Cor.  vii.  35,  and  urges  the  same  consideration,  of  applying  wholly 
to  the  service  of  God,  to  dissuade  from  marriage.  From  this  and  many 
other  passages  of  Epictetus  one  would  be  inclined  to  think  that  he  was 
not  acquainted  with  St.  Paul's  Epistles  or  that  he  had  heard  something 
of  the  Christian  doctrine." — Mrs.  Carter.  I  do  not  find  any  evidence  of 
Kpictetus  being  acquainted  with  the  Epistle  of  Paul.  It  is  possible  that 
he  had  heard  something  of  the  Christian  doctrine,  but  I  have  not  ob- 
served any  evidence  of  the  fact.  Epictetus  and  Paul  have  not  the  same 
opinion  about  marriage,  for  Paul  says  that  "if  they  cannot  contain,  let 
them  marry  :  for  it  is  better  to  marry  than  to  burn.''  Accordingly  his 
doctrine  is  "  to  avoid  fornication  let  every  man  have  his  own  wife,  and 
let  every  woman  have  her  own  husband."  He  does  not  directly  say 
what  a  man  should  do  when  he  is  not  able  to  maintain  a  wife;  but  the 
inference  is  plain  what  he  will  do  (i  Cor.  vii.  2).  Paul's  view  of  mar- 
riage differs  from  that  of  Epictetus,  who  recommends  marriage.  Paul 
does  not :  he  writes,  "  I  say  therefore  to  the  unmarried  and  widows,  It 
is  good  for  them  if  they  abide  even  as  I."  He  does  not  acknowledge 
marriage  and  the  begetting  of  children  as  a  duty;  which  Epictetus  did. 
In  the  present  condition  of  the  world  Epictetus  says  that  the  "  minister 
of  God  "  should  not  marry,  because  the  cares  of  a  family  would  distract 
him  and  make  him  unable  to  discharge  his  duties.  There  is  sound  sense 
in  this.  A  "  minister  of  God  "  should  not  lie  distracted  by  the  cares  of 
a  family,  especially  if  he  is  poor. 


EPICTKTCS.  283 

tup  :  so  the  furniture  of  the  house  is  increased.  1  say 
nothing  of  his  other  occupations,  and  of  his  distraction. 
Where  then  now  is  that  king,  he  who  devotes  himself  to 
the  public  interests, 

The  people's  guardian  and  so  full  of  cares. 

Homer,  Iliad,  ii.  25. 

whose  duty  it  is  to  look  after  others,  the  married  and  those 
who  have  children  ;  to  see  who  uses  his  wife  well,  who 
uses  her  badly :  who  quarrels  ;  what  family  is  well 
administered,  what  is  not ;  going  about  as  a  physician 
Joes  and  feels  pulses  ?  He  says  to  one,  you  have  a  fever, 
to  another  you  have  a  headache,  or  the  gout  :  he  says  to 
one,  abstain  from  food  ;  to  another  he  says,  eat ;  or  do 
not  use  the  bath  :  to  another,  you  require  the  knife,  or 
the  cautery.  How  can  he  have  time  for  this  who  is  tied 
to  the  duties  of  common  life  ?  is  it  not  his  duty  to  supply 
clothing  to  his  children,  and  to  send  them  to  the  school- 
master with  writing  tablets,  and  styles  (for  writing). 
Besides  must  he  not  supply  them  with  beds?  for  they 
cannot  be  genuine  Cynics  as  soon  as  they  are  born.  If 
he  does  not  do  this,  it  would  be  better  to  expose  the  chil- 
dren as  soon  as  they  are  born  than  to  kill  them  in  this 
way.  Consider  what  we  are  bringing  the  Cynic  down  to, 
how  we  are  taking  his  royalty  from  him.  Yes,  but  Crates 
took  a  wife.  You  are  speaking  of  a  circumstance  which 
arose  from  love  and  of  a  woman  who  was  another  Crates.* 
But  we  are  inquiring  about  ordinary  marriages  and  those 
which  are  free  from  distractions,  and  making  this  inquiry 
we  do  not  find  the  affair  of  marriage  in  thi-  of  the 

world  a  thing  which  is  especially  suited  to  the  Cynic. 
How  then  shall  a  man  maintain  the  existence  of  society  ? 

*  The  wife  of  Crates  was  Hipparchia,  who  persisted  against  all  advice 
in  marrying  Crates  anil  lived  with  him  exactly  as  he  lived.  Diogenes 
Laertius,  vi.  <;6.  Upton. 


In  the  name  oHiod,  are  those  men  greater  benefactors  to 
society  who  introduce  into  the  world  to  occupy  their  own 
places  two  or  three  grunting  children,  or  those  who  super- 
intend as  far  as  they  can  all  mankind,  and  see  what  they 
do.  how  they  live,  what  they  attend  to,  what  they  neglect 
contrary  to  their  duty?  Did  they  who  left  little  children 
to  the  Thebans  do  them  more  good  than  Epaminondas 
who  died  childless  ?  And  did  Priamus  who  begat  fifty 
worthless  sons  or  Danaus  or  .rKolus  contribute  more  to 
the  community  than  Homer?  then  shall  the  duty  of  a 
general  or  the  business  of  a  writer  exclude  a  man  from 
marriage  or  the  begetting  of  children,  and  such  a  man 
shall  not  be  judged  to  have  accepted  the  condition  of 
childlessness  for  nothing  :  and  shall  not  the  royalty  of  a 
Cynic  be  considered  an  equivalent  for  the  want  of  chil- 
dren ?  Do  we  not  perceive  his  grandeur  and  do  we  not 
justly  contemplate  the  character  of  Diogenes  ;  and  do  we 
instead  of  this  turn  our  eyes  to  the  present  Cynics  who  are 
dogs  that  wait  at  tables,  and  in  no  respect  imitate  the 
Cynics  of  old  except  perchance  in  breaking  wind,  but  in 
nothing  else?  For  such  matters  would  not  have  moved 
us  at  all  nor  should  we  have  wondered  if  a  Cynic  should 
not  marry  or  beget  children.  Man,  the  Cynic  is  the  father 
of  all  men  ;  the  men  are  his  sons,  the  women  are  his 
daughters  :  he  so  carefully  visits  all,  so  well  does  he  care 
for  all.  Do  you  think  that  it  is  from  idle  impertinence 
that  he  rebukes  those  whom  he  meets  ?  He  does  it  as  a 
father,  as  a  brother,  and  as  the  minister  of  the  father  of 
all,  the  minister  of  Zeus. 

If  you  please,  ask  me  also  if  a  Cynic  shall  engage  in  the 
administration  of  the  state.  Fool,  do  you  seek  a  greater 
form  of  administration  than  that  in  which  he  is  engaged  ? 
Do  you  ask  if  he  shall  appear  among  the  Athenians  and 
say  something  about  the  revenues  and  the  supplies,  he 
who  must  talk  with  all  men,  alike  with  Athenians,  alike 


i-:ricTi-:rrs.  285 

with  Corinthians,  alike  with  Romans,  not  about  supplies. 
nor  yet  about  revenues,  nor  about  peace  or  war,  but  about 
happiness  and  unhappiness,  about  good  fortune  and  bad 
fortune,  about  slavery  and  freedom  ?  When  a  man  has 
undertaken  the  administration  of  such  a  state,  do  you  ask 
me  if  he  shall  engage  in  the  administration  of  a  state? 
ask  me  also  if  he  shall  govern  (hold  a  magisterial  office)  : 
again  I  will  say  to  you,  Fool,  what  greater  government 
shall  he  exercise  than  that  which  he  exercises  now  ? 

It  is  necessary  also  for  such  a  man  (the  Cynic)  to  have 
a  certain  habit  of  body  :  for  if  he  appears  to  be  consump- 
tive, thin  and  pale,  his  testimony  has  not  then  the  same 
weight.  For  he  must  not  only  by  showing  the  qualities  of 
the  soul  prove  to  the  vulgar  that  it  is  in  his  power' inde- 
pendent of  the  things  which  they  admire  to  be  a  good 
man,  but  he  must  also  show  by  his  body  that  his  simple 
and  frugal  way  of  living  in  the  open  air  does  not  injure 
even  the  body.  See,  he  says,  I  am  a  proof  of  this,  and 
my  own  body  also  is.  So  Diogenes  used  to  do,  for  he 
used  to  go  about  fresh-looking,  and  he  attracted  the  no- 
tice of  the  many  by  his  personal  appearance.  But  if  a 
Cynic  is  an  object  of  compassion,  he  seems  to  be  a  beggar  : 
all  persons  turn  away  from  him,  all  are  offended  with 
him  ;  for  neither  ought  he  to  appear  dirty  so  that  he  shall 
not  also  in  this  respect  drive  away  men  ;  but  his  very 
roughness  ought  to  be  clean  and  attractive. 

There  ought  also  to  belong  to  the  Cynic  much  natural 
grace  and  sharpness  ;  and  if  this  is  not  so,  he  is  a  stupid 
fellow,  and  nothing  else ;  and  he  must  have  these  quali- 
ties that  he  may  be  able  readily  and  fitly  to  be  a  match 
for  all  circumstances  that  may  happen.  So  Diogenes  iv- 
plied  to  one  who  said.  Are  you  the  Diogenes  who  does 
not  believe  that  there  are  gods?  And,  how,  replied 
Diogenes,  can  this  be  when  I  think  that  you  are  odious  to 
the  gods  ?  On  another  occasion  in  reply  to  Alexander, 


286  EPICTETUS. 

who  stood  by  him  when  he  was  sleeping,  and  quoted 
Homer's  line  (Iliad,  ii.  24) 

A  man  a  councilor  should  not  sleep  all  night, 

he  answered,  when  he  was  half-asleep, 

The  people's  guardian  and  so  full  of  cares. 

But  before  all  the  Cynic's  ruling  faculty  must  be  purer 
than  the  sun  ;  and  if  it  is  not,  he  must  necessarily  be  a 
cunning  knave  and  a  fellow  of  no  principle,  since  while- 
he  himself  is  entangled  in  some  vice  he  will  reprove 
others.*  'For  see  how  the  matter  stands  :  to  these  kings 
and  tyrants  their  guards  and  arms,  give  the  power  of  re- 
proving some  persons,  and  of  being  able  even  to  punish 
those  who  do  wrong  though  they  are  themselves  bad  ; 
but  to  a  Cynic  instead  of  arms  and  guards  it  is  conscience 
which  gives  this  power.  When  he  knows  that  he  has 
watched  and  labored  for  mankind,  and  has  slept  pure, 
and  sleep  has  left  him  still  purer,  and  that  he  thought 
whatever  he  has  thought  as  a  friend  of  the  gods,  as  a 
minister,  as  a  participator  of  the  power  of  Zeus,  and  that 
on  all  occasions  he  is  ready  to  sax- 
Lead  me,  O  Zeus,  and  thou,  O  Destiny  ; 

and  also,  If  so  it  pleases  the  gods,  so  let  it  be  ;  why  should 
he  not  have  confidence  to  speak  freely  to  his  own  brothers, 
to  his  children,  in  a  word  to  his  kinsmen  ?  For  this  reason 
he  is  neither  overcurious  nor  a,  .busybody  when  he  is  in 
this  state  of  mind  ;  for  he  is  not  a  meddler  with  the  affairs 
of  others  when  he  is  superintending  human  affairs,  but  he 
is  looking  after  his  own  affairs.  If  that  is  not  so,  you  may 

*  The  Cynic  is  in  Epictetus  the  minister  of  religion.  He  must  In- 
pure,  for  otherwise  how  can  he  reprove  vice  ?  This  is  a  useful  lesson  to 
those  whose  business  it  is  to  correct  the  vices  of  mankind. 


l-.'lTS.  2.S; 

rtlso  say  that  the  general  is  a  bus}  body,  when  he  inspects 
his  soldiers,  and  examines  them  and  watches  them  and 
punishes  the  disorderly.  But  if  while  you  have  a  cake 
under  your  arm,  you  rebuke  others,  1  will  say  to  you,  Will 
you  not  rather  go  away  into  a  corner  and  eat  that  which 
you  have  stolen  ;  what  have  you  to  do  with  the  a  flairs 
of  others  ?  For  who  are  you  ?  are  you  the  bull  of  the  herd, 
or  the  queen  of  the  bees?  Show  me  the  tokens  of  your 
supremacy,  such  as  they  have  from  nature.  But  if  you 
are  a  drone  claiming  the  sovereignty  over  the  bees,  do 
you  not  suppose  that  your  fellow-citizens  will  put  you 
down  as  the  bees  do  the  drones  ? 

The  Cynic  also  oug-ht  to  have  such  power  of  endurance 
as  to  seem  insensible  to  the  common  sort  and  a  stone  :  no 
man  reviles  him,  no  man  strikes  him,  no  man  insults 
him,  but  he  gives  his  body  that  any  man  who  chooses 
may  do  with  it  what  he  likes.  For  he  bears  in  mind  that 
the  inferior  must  b  •  overpowered  by  the  superior  in  that 
in  which  it  is  inferior  ;  and  the  body  is  inferior  to  tin- 
many,  the  weaker  to.  the  stronger.  He  never  then  de- 
is  into  such  a  contest  in  which  he  can  be  over- 
powered ;  but  he  immediately  withdraws  from  things 
which  belong  to  others,  he  claims  not  the  things  which 
are  servile.  But  where  there  is  will  and  the  use  of  ap- 
pearances, there  you  will  set-  how  many  eyes  lie  has 
so  that  you  may  say.  Argus  was  blind  compared  with 
him.  Is  his  assent  ever  hasty,  his  movement  (toward  an 
object)  rash,  does  his  desire  ever  fail  in  its  object,  does 
that  which  he  would  avoid  befall  him,  is  his  purpose  un- 
.uvomplished.  dors  he  ev«  find  fault,  is  he  ever  humili- 
ated, is  he  ever  envious  ?  To  these  lie  directs  all  his 
attention  and  energy  :  but  as  to  evervthing  <-Ne  he  snores 
supine.  All  is  peace  :  then-  is  no  roliber  who  takes  away 
his  will,  no  tyrant.  Hut  what  say  you  as  to  his  body?  I 
say  there  is.  And  as  to  magistracies  and  honors?  What 


288  EPICTETUS. 

does  he  care  for  them  ?  When  then  any  person  would 
frighten  him  through  them,  he  says  to  him,  Begone,  look 
for  children  :  masks  are  formidable  to  them  ;  but  I  know 
that  they  are  made  of  shell,  and  they  have  nothing  in- 
side. 

About  such  a  matter  as  this  you  are  deliberating. 
Therefore,  if  you  please,  I  urge  you  in  God's  name,  defer 
the  matter,  and  first  consider  your  preparation  for  it.  For 
see  what  Hector  says  to  Andromache,  Retire  rather,  he 
says,  into  the  house  and  weave  : 

War  is  the  work  of  men — 
Of  all  indeed,  but  specially  'tis  mine. 

II.  vi.  490. 

So  he  was  conscious  of  his  own  qualification,  and  knew 
her  weakness. 


CHAPTER  XXIII. 

TO    THOSE    WHO    READ     AND     DISCUSS     KOK     THE    SAKE    OK    OSTEN- 
TATION. * 

FIRST  say  to  yourself  Who  you  wish  to  be  :  then  do  ac- 
cordingly what  you  are  doing  ;  for  in  nearly  all  other 
things  we  see  this  to  be  so.  Those  who  follow  athletic 
exercises  first  determine  what  they  wish  to  be,  then  do 
accordingly  what  follows.  If  a  man  is  a  runner  in  the 
long  course,  there  is  a  certain  kind  of  diet,  of  walking, 

*  Epictetus  in  an  amusing  manner  touches  on  the  practice  of  Sophists, 
Rhetoricians,  and  others,  who  made  addresses  only  to  get  praise.  This 
practice  of  reciting  prose  or  verse  compositions  was  common  in  the  time 
of  Epictetus,  as  we  may  learn  from  the  letters  of  the  younger  1'liny, 
Juvenal,  Martial,  and  the  author  of  the  treatise  de  Causis  corrupt* 
eloquently. — Upton. 


E/'ICTETUS.  289 

rubbing  and  exercise  :  if  a  man  is  a  runner  in  the  stadium, 
all  these  things  are  different ;  if  he  is  a  Pentathletc,  they 
are  still  more  different.  So  you  will  find  it  also  in  the 
arts.  If  you  are  a  carpenter,  you  will  have  such  and  such 
things:  if  a  worker  in  metal,  such  things.  For  everything 
that  we  do.  if  we  refer  it  to  no  end,  we  shall  do  it  to  no 
purpose  ;  and  if  we  refer  it  to  the  wrong  end,  we  shall 
miss  the  mark.  Further,  there  is  a  general  end  or  pur- 
pose, and  a  particular  purpose.  First  of  all,  we  must  act 
as  a  man.  What  is  comprehended  in  this  ?  We  must  not 
be  like  a  sheep,  though  gentle  ;  nor  mischievous,  like  a 
wild  beast.  But  the  particular  end  has  reference  to  each 
person's  mode  of  life  and  his  will.  The  lute-player  acts 
as  a  lute-player,  the  carpenter  as  a  carpenter,  the  philoso- 
pher as  a  philosopher,  the  rhetorician  as  a  rhetorician. 
When  then  you  say,  Come  and  hear  me  read  to  you  :  take 
care  first  of  all  that  you  are  not  doing  this  without  a  pur- 
pose ;  then  if  you  have  discovered  that  you  are  doing  this 
with  reference  to  a  purpose,  consider  if  it  is  the  right  pur- 
pose. Do  you  wish  to  do  good  or  to  be  praised?  Im- 
mediately you  hear  him  saying,  To  me  what  is  the  value 
of  praise  from  the  many  ?  and  he  says  well,  for  it  is  of  no 
value  to  a  musician,  so  far  as  he  is  a  musician,  nor  to  a 
geometrician.  Do  you  then  wish  to  be  useful  ?  in  what  ? 
tell  us  that  we  may  run  to  your  audience-room.  Now 
can  a  man  do  anything  useful  to  others,  who  has  not 
received  something  useful  himself?  No,  for  neither  can 
a  man  do  anything  useful  in  the  carpenter's  art,  unless  he 
is  a  carpenter ;  nor  in  the  shoemaker's  art,  unless  he  is  a 
shoemaker. 

Do  you  wish  to  know  then  if  you  have  received  any 
advantage  ?  Produce  your  opinions,  philosopher.  What 
is  the  thing  which  desire  promises?  Not  to  fail  in  the 
object.  What  does  aversion  promise  ?  Not  to  fall  into 
that  which  you  would  avoid.  Well ;  do  we  fulfill  their 
'9 


*9o  EPICTETVS. 

promise?  Tell  me  the  truth:  but  if  you  lie,  I  will  tell 
you.  Lately  when  your  hearers  came  together  rather 
coldly,  and  did  not  give  you  applause,  you  went  away 
humbled.  Lately  again  when  you  had  been  praised, 
you  went  about  and  said  to  all,  What  did  you  think  of 
me  ?  Wonderful,  master,  I  swear  by  all  that  is  dear  to 
me.  But  how  did  I  treat  of  that  particular  matter? 
Which  ?  The  passage  in  which  I  described  Pan  and  the 
nymphs?*  Excellently.  Then  do  you  tell  me  that  in 
desire  and  in  aversion  you  are  acting  according  to  nature? 
Begone  ;  try  to  persuade  somebody  else.  Did  you  not 
praise  a  certain  person  contrary  to  your  opinion  ?  and 
did  you  not  flatter  a  certain  person  who  was  the  son  of  a 
senator?  Would  you  wish  your  own  children  to  be  such 
persons  ?  I  hope  not.  Why  then  did  you  praise  and 
Ilatterhim?  He  is  an  ingenuous  youth  and  listens  well 
to  discourses.  How  is  this  ?  He  admires  me.  You  have 
stated  your  proof.  Then  what  do  you  think  ?  do  not 
these  very  people  secretly  despise  you  ?  When  then  a 
man  who  is  conscious  that  he  has  neither  done  any  good 
nor  ever  thinks  of  it,  finds  a  philosopher  who  says,  You 
have  a  great  natural  talent,  and  you  have  a  candid  and 
good  disposition,  what  else  do  you  think  that  he  says  ex- 
cept this,  This  man  has  some  need  of  me  ?  Or  tell  me 
what  act  that  indicates  a  great  mind  has  he  shown  ? 
Observe  ;  he  has  been  in  your  company  a  long  time  ;  he 
has  listened  to  your  discourses,  he  has  heard  you  reading  ; 
has  he  become  more  modest  ?  has  he  been  turned  to  re- 
flect on  himself?  has  he  perceived  in  what  a  bad  state  he 
is  ?  has  he  cast  away  self-conceit  ?  does  he  look  for  a 
person  to  teach  him  ?  He  does.  A  man  who  will  teach 
him  to  live  ?  No,  fool,  but  how  to  talk  !  for  it  is  for  this 
that  he  admires  you  also.  Listen  and  hear  what  he 

*  Such  were  the  subjects  which  the  literary  men  of  the  day  delighted 
in. 

\ 


/.7Vr/7-  /T.s.  49i 

says  :  This  man  writes  \vith  perfect  art,  much  better  than 
Dion.*  This  is  altogether  another  thing-.  Does  he  say, 
This  man  is  modest,  faithful,  free  from  perturbations? 
and  even  if  he  did  say  it,  I  >hould  say  to  him,  Since  this 
man  is  faithful,  tell  me  what  this  faithful  man  is.  And  if 
he  could  not  tell  me,  I  should  add  this,  First  understand 
what  you  say,  then  speak. 

You  then,  who  are  in  a  wretched  plight  and  gap'ing 
.after  applause  and  counting  your  auditors,  do  you  intend 
to  be  useful  to  others?  To-day  many  more  attended  my 
discourse.  Yes,  many  ;  we  suppose  five  hundred.  That 
is  nothing  ;  suppose  that  there  were  a  thousand.  Dion 
never  had  so  many  hearers.  II ow  could  he  ?  And  they 
understand  what  is  said  beautifully.  What  is  tine,  master, 
can  move  even  a  stone.  See,  these  are  the  words  of  a 
philosopher.  This  is  the  disposition  of  a  man  who  will  do 
good  to  others  ;  here  is  a  man  who  has  listened  to  dis- 
courses, who  has  read  what  is  written  about  Socrates  as 
Socratic,  not  as  the  compositions  of  Lysias  and  Isocrates. 
"  I  have  often  wondered  by  what  arguments."  f  Not  so, 
but  "by  what  argument  :"  this  is  more  exact  than  that. 
What,  have  you  read  the  words  at  all  in  a  different  way 
from  that  in  which  you  read  little  odes?  For  if  you  read 
them  as  you  ought,  you  would  not  have  been  attending  to 
such  matters,  but  you  would  rather  have  been  looking  to 
these  words  :  "  Anytus  and  Melitus  are  able  to  kill  me, 
but  they  cannot  harm  me  :  "  "  and  I  am  always  of  such  a 
disposition  as  to  pay  regard  to  nothing  of  my  own  except 


on  of  I'rnsa  in  Uithynia  \v.is  named  <  'hrysostomus  (golden- 
mouthed)  because  of  his  eloquence.  He  was  a  rhetorician  and  sophist, 
;is  the  term  was  then  understood,  and  was  living  at  the  same  time  as 
Epictetus.  Eighty  of  his  orations  written  in  ('/reek  are  slill  extant,  and 
some  fragments  of  fifteen. 

| These  words  are  the  beginning  of  Xenuphon's  Memorabilia,  i.  i. 


292  I-.r/CTE'JTS. 

to  the  reason  which  on  inquiry  seems  to  me  the  best. "  * 
Hence  who  ever  heard  Socrates  say,  "  1  know  something 
and  F  teach  :  "  but  he  used  to  send  different  people  to 
different  teachers.  Therefore  they  used  to  come  to  him 
and  ask  to  be  introduced  to  philosophers  by  him  ;  and  he- 
would  take  them  and  recommend  them.  Not  so  ;  but  as 
he  accompanied  them  he  would  say.  Hear  me  to-day  dis- 
coursing- in  the  house  of  Quadratus.  f  Why  should  I  hear 
you  ?  Do  you  wish  to  show  me  that  you  put  words  to- 
g-ether cleverly  ?  You  put  them  together,  man  ;  and  what 
good  will  it  do  you  ?  But  only  praise  me.  What  do  you 
mean  by  praising  ?  Say  to  me,  admirable,  wonderful. 
Well,  I  say  so.  But  if  that  is  praise  whatever  it  is  which 
philosophers  mean  by  the  name  of  good,  what  have  I  to 
praise  in  you  ?  If  it  is  good  to  speak  well,  teach  me,  and 
1  will  praise  you.  What  then  ?  ought  a  man  to  listen  to 
such  things  without  pleasure  ?  I  hope  not.  For  my  part 
1  do  not  listen  even  to  a  lute-player  without  pleasure. 
Must  I  then  for  this  reason  stand  and  play  the  lute?  Hear 
what  Socrates  says,  Nor  would  it  be  seemly  for  a  man  of 
my  age,  like  a  young  man  composing  addresses,  to  appear 
before  you.  \  Like  a  young  man,  he  says.  For  in  truth 
this  small  art  is  an  elegant  thing,  to  select  words,  and  to 
put  them  together,  and  to  come  forward  and  gracefully  to 

*  From  the  Crito  of  Plato,  c.  6. 

t  The  rich,  says  Upton,  used  to  lend  their  houses  for  recitations,  as 
we  learn  from  Pliny,  Ep.  viii.  12  and  Juvenal,  vii.  40. 

Si  dulcedine  famas 
Succensus  recites,  maculosas  commodat  aedes. 

Quadratus  is  a  Roman  name.  There  appears  to  be  a  confusion  between 
Socrates  and  Quadratus.  The  man  says,  No.  Socrates  would  not  do 
so:  but  he  would  do,  as  a  man  might  do  now.  He  would  say  on  the 
road;  I  hope  you  will  come  to  hear  me.  I  don't  find  anything  in  the 
notes  on  this  passage;  but  it  requires  explanation. 

J  From  Plato's  Apology  of  Socrates. 


read  them  or  to  speak,  and  while  he  is  reading  to  say, 
There  are  not  many  who  can  do  these  tilings,  1  swear  l.y 
all  that  you  value. 

Does  a  philosopher  invite  people  to  hear  him  ?  As  the 
sun  himself  draws  men  to  him,  or  as  food  does,  does  not 
the  philosopher  also  draw  to  him  those  who  will  receive 
benefit  ?  What  physician  invites  a  man  to  be  treated  by 
him  ?  Indeed  I  now  hear  that  even  the  physicians  in 
Rome  do  invite  patients,  but  when  I  lived  there,  the 
physicians  were  invited.  1  invite  you  to  come  and  hear 
that  things  are  in  a  bad  way  for  you,  and  that  you  are 
taking  care  of  everything  except  that  of  which  you  ought 
to  take  care,  and  that  you  are  ignorant  of  the  good  and  tin- 
bad  and  are  unfortunate  and  unhappy.  A  fine  kind  of  in- 
vitation ;  and  yet  if  the  words  of  the  philosopher  do  not 
produce  this  effect  on  you,  he  is  dead,  and  so  is  the 
speaker.  Rufus  was  used  to  say  :  If  you  have  leisure  to 
praise  me,  I  am  speaking  to  no  purpose.*  Accordingly 
he  used  to  speak  in  such  a  way  that  every  one  of  us  who 
were  sitting  there  supposed  that  some  one  had  accused 
him  before  Rufus  :  he  so  touched  on  what  was  doing,  lie- 
so  placed  before  the  eyes  every  man's  faults. 

The  philosopher's  school,  ye  men,  is  a  surgery  :  you 
ought  not  to  go  out  of  it  with  pleasure,  but  with  pain. 
For  you  are  not  in  sound  health  when  you  enter  :  one  has 
dislocated  his  shoulder,  another  has  an  abscess,  a  third  a 
fistula,  and  a  fourth  a  headache.  Then  do  I  sit  and  utter 
to  you  little  thoughts  and  exclamations  that  you  may 
praise  me  and  go  away,  one  with  his  shoulder  in  the  same 
condition  in  which  he  entered,  another  with  his  head  still 
aching,  and  a  third  with  his  fistula  or  his  abscess  just  as 
they  were  ?  Is  it  for  this  then  that  young  men  shall  quit 
home  and  leave  their  parents  and  their  friends  and  kins- 
men and  property,  that  they  may  say  to  you.  Wonderful  ! 

*  Aulus  Gellius,  v.  i.     Seneca,  Kp.  5.'.      Upton. 


294 


r.ric  /•/•:  77  '.v 


when  you  are  uttering  your  exclamations.      Did  Socrates 
do  this,  or  Zeno,  or  ('leanthesr 

What  then  ?  is  there  not  the  hortatory  style  ?  Who 
denies  it  ?  as  there  is  the  style  of  refutation,  and  the 
didactic  style.  Who  then  ever  reckoned  a  fourth  style 
with  these,  the  style  of  display  ':  What  is  the  hortatory 
style?  To  be  able  to  show  both  to  one  person  and  to 
many  the  struggle  in  which  they  are  engaged,  and  that 
they  think  more  about  anything  than  about  what  they 
really  wish.  For  they  wish  the  things  which  lead  to  hap- 
piness, but  they  look  for  them  in  the  wrong  place.  In 
order  that  this  may  be  done,  a  thousand  seats  must  be 
placed  and  men  must  be  invited  to  listen,  and  you  must 
ascend  the  pulpit  in  a  fine  robe  or  cloak  and  describe  the 
death  of  Achilles.  Cease,  I  entreat  you  by  the  gods,  to 
spoil  good  words  and  good  acts  as  much  as  you  can. 
Nothing  can  have  more  power  in  exhortation  than  when 
the  speaker  shows  to  the  hearers  that  he  has  need  of  them. 
But  tell  me  who  when  he  hears  you  reading  or  discoursing 
is  anxious  about  himself  or  turns  to  reflect  on  himself?  or 
when  he  has  gone  out  says,  The  philosopher  hit  me  well  : 
I  must  no  longer  do  these  things.  But  does  he  not,  even 
if  you  have  a  great  reputation,  say  to  some  person  ?  He 
spoke  finely  about  Xerxes  ;  *  and  another  says,  No,  but 
about  the  battle  of  Thermopyla-.  Is  this  listening  to  a 
philosopher  ? 

*  Cicero,  de  Officiis,  i.  18 :  "  Qtiae  magno  animo  et  fortiter  excel- 
lenterque  gesta  stint,  ea  nescio  quomodo  pleniore  ore  laudamus.  Mine 
Khetorum  campus  de  Marathone,  Salamine,  Plata-is,  Thermopyli*, 
Leuctris." 


EPICTETUS. 


295 


CHAPTER  XXIV. 
THAT  vrr.    oronT    NOT  TO    BE    MOVED    BY  A  DESIRE  OF  THOSE 

THINGS    WHICH    ARE    NOT    IX    OUR    POWER. 

LET  not  that  which  in  another  is  contrary  to  nature  be 
an  evil  to  you  :  for  you  are  not  formed  by  nature  to  be 
depressed  with  others  nor  to  be  unhappy  with  others,  but 
to  be  happy  with  them.  If  a  man  is  unhappy,  remember 
that  his  unluippiness  is  his  own  fault  :  for  (iod  has  made 
all  men  to  be  happy,  to  be  free  from  perturbations.  For 
this  purpose  he  has  given  means  to  them,  some  things  to 
each  person  as  his  own,  and  other  things  not  as  his  own  : 
some  things  subject  to  hindrance  and  compulsion  and  de- 
privation ;  and  these  things  are  not  a  man 'sown  :  but  the 
things  which  are  not  subject  to  hindrances,  are  his  own  : 
and  the  nature  of  good  and  evil,  as  it  was  fit  to-be  done 
by  him  who  takes  care  of  us  and  protects  us  like  a  father, 
he  has  made  our  own.  But  you  say.  I  have  parted  from 
a  certain  person,  and  he  is  grieved.  Why  did  he  consider 
as  his  own  that  which  belongs  to  another?  why.  when 
lie  looked  on  you  and  was  rejoiced,  did  he  not  also  reckon 
that  you  are  mortal,  that  it  is  natural  for  you  to  part  from 
him  for  a  foreign  country?  Therefore  he  suffers  the  con- 
sequences of  his  own  folly.  Hut  why  do  you  or  for  what 
purpose  bewail  yourself?  Is  it  that  you  also  have  not 
thought  of  these  things?  but  like  poor  women  who  arc- 
good  for  nothing,  you  have  enjoyed  all  things  in  which 
you  took  pleasure,  as  if  you  would  always  enjoy  them, 
both  places  and  men  and  conversation  ;  and  now  you  bit 


KPfCTETL'S, 


and  weep  because  you  do  not  see  the  same  persons  and 
do  not  live  in  the  same  places.  Indeed  you  deserve  this, 
to  be  more  wretched  than  crows  and  ravens  who  have 
the  power  of  Hying1  where  they  please  and  changing  their 
nests  for  others,  and  crossing  the  seas  without  lamenting 
or  regretting  their  former  condition.  Yes,  but  this  happens 
to  them  because  they  are  irrational  creatures.  Was  reason 
then  given  to  us  by  the  gods  for  the  purpose  of  unhap- 
piness  ami  misery,  that  we  may  pass  our  lives  in  wretch- 
edness and  lamentation  ?  Must  all  persons  be  immortal 
and  must  no  man  go  abroad,  and  must  we  ourselves  not 
go  abroad,  but  remain  rooted  like  plants  ;  and  if  any  of 
our  familiar  friends  go  abroad,  must  we  sit  and  weep  ; 
and  on  the  contrary,  when  he  returns,  must  we  dance 
and  clap  our  hands  like  children  ? 

Shall  we  not  now  wean  ourselves  and  remember  what 
we  have  heard  from  the  philosophers?  if  we  did  not  listen 
to  them  as  if  they  were  jugglers  :  they  tell  us  that  this 
world  is  one  city,*  and  the  substance  out  of  which  it  has 
been  formed  is  one,  and  that  there  must  be  a  certain 
period,  and  that  some  things  must  give  way  to  others, 
that  some  must  be  dissolved,  and  others  come  in  their 
place  ;  some  to  remain  in  the  same  place,  and  others  to 
be  moved  ;  and  that  all  things  are  full  of  friendship,  first 
of  the  gods.f  and  then  of  men  who  by  nature  are  made 
to  be  of  one  family  ;  and  some  must  be  with  one  another, 
and  others  must  be  separated,  rejoicing  in  those  who  are 
with  them,  and  not  grieving  for  those  who  are  removed 
from  them  ;  and  man  in  addition  to  being  by  nature  of  a 
noble  temper  and  having  a  contempt  of  all  things  which 
are  not  in  the  power  of  his  will,  also  possesses  this  pro- 
perty not  to  be  rooted  nor  to  be  naturally  ilxed  to  the 
earth,  but  to  go  at  different  times  to  different  places, 

*  See  ii.  5,  26.  t  See  iii.  13,  15. 


-- 77'.9. 


297 


sometimes  from  the  urgency  of  certain  occasions,  and  at 
others  merely  for  the  sake  of  seeing.  So  it  was  with 
Ulysses,  who  saw 

'  >f  many  men  the  states,  and  learned  their  ways.* 

And  still  earlier  it  was  the  fortune  of  Hercules  to  visit 
all  the  inhabited  world 

Seeing  men's  lawless  deeds  and  their  good  rules  of  law :  t 

casting  out  and  clearing  away  their  lawlessness  and  intro- 
ducing in  their  place  good  rules  of  law.  And  yet  how  many 
friends  do  you  think  that  he  had  in  Thebes,  how  many  in 
Argos,  how  many  in  Athens?  and  how  many  do  you  think 
that  he  gained  by  going  about  ?  And  he  married  also, 
when  it  seemed  to  him  a  proper  occasion,  and  begot 
children,  and  left  them  without  lamenting  or  regretting  or 
leaving  them  as  orphans  :  for  he  knew  that  no  man  is  an 
orphan  ;  but  it  is  the  father  who  takes  care  of  all  men  al- 
ways and  continuously.  For  it  was  not  as  mere  report 
that  he  had  heard  that  Xeus  is  the  father  of  men,  for  he 
thought  that  Zeus  was  his  own  father,  and  he  called  him  so, 
and  to  him  he  looked  when  he  was  doing  what  he  did. 
Therefore  he  was  enabled  to  live  happily  in  all  places. 
And  it  is  never  possible  for  happiness  and  desire  of  what  is 
not  present  to  come  together.  For  that  which  is  happy 
must  have  all  J  that  it  desires,  must  resemble  a  person  who 
is  filled  with  food,  and  must  have  neither  thirst  nor  hunger. 
But  Ulysses  felt  a  desire  for  his  wife  and  wept  as  he  sat  on 
a  rock.  Do  you  attend  to  Homer  and  his  stories  in  every- 
thing? Or  if  l.'lysses  really  wept,  what  was  lie  else-  than 
an  unhappy  man  ':  and  what  good  man  is  unhappy?  In 

*  Homer,  Odys>cy,  i.  3. 

t  Oclyss»:y,  xvii.  487. 

{  See  iii.  z,  ij.      Paul  to  the  Phi'.ippi.ms,  i'. .  iS. 


298  /-.v/r: '/•/•: /Y '.s-. 

truth  the  whole  is  badly  administered,  if  Zei^ 
take  care  of  his  own  citizens  that  they  may  be  happy  like 
himself.  But  these  things  are  not  lawful  nor  right  to 
think  of:  and  if  Ulysses  did  weep  and  lament,  he  wa* 
not  a  good  man.  For  who  is  good  if  he  knows  not  who 
he'  is  ?  and  who  knows  what  he  is.  if  he  forgets  that  things 
which  have  been  made  are  perishable,  and  that  it  is  not 
possible  for  one  human  being  to  be  with  another  always  ? 
To  desire  then  things  which  are  impossible  is  to  have'  a 
slavish  character,  and  is  foolish  :  it  is  the  part  of  a 
stranger,  of  a  man  who  fights  against  God  in  the  only 
way  that  he  can,  by  his  opinions. 

But  my  mother  laments  when  she  does  not  see  me. 
Why  has  she  not  learned  these  principles?  and  I  do  not 
say  this,  that  we  should  not  take  care  that  she  may  not 
lament,  but  I  say  that  we  ought  not  to  desire  in  every  way 
what  is  not  our  own.  And  the  sorrow  of  another  is  an- 
other's sorrow  :  but  my  sorrow  is  my  own.  I  then  will 
stop  my  own  sorrow  by  every  means,  for  it  is  in  my 
power  :  and  the  sorrow  of  another  I  will  endeavor  to  stop 
as  far  as  I  can  ;  but  I  will  not  attempt  to  do  it  by  t-verv 
means  :  for  if  I  do,  I  shallbe  fighting  against  God,  I  shall 
be  opposing  Zeus  and  shall  be  placing  myself  against  him 
in  the  administration  of  the  universe  ;  and  the  reward  (the 
punishment)  of  this  fighting  against  God  and  of  this  dis- 
obedience not  only  will  the  children  of  my  children  pay, 
but  I  also  shall  myself,  both  by  day  and  by  night,  startled 
by  dreams,  perturbed,  trembling  at  every  piece  of  news, 
and  having  my  tranquillity  depending  on  the  letters  of 
others.  Some  person  has  arrived  from  Rome.  I  only  hope 
that  there  is  no  harm.  But  what  harm  can  happen  to 
you.  where  you  are  not  ?  From  Hellas  (Greece)  some 
one  is  come  :  1  hope  that  there  is  no  harm.  In  this  way 
every  place  may  be  the  cause  of  misfortune  to  you.  Is  it 
not  enough  for  you  to  be  unfortunate  there  where  you  are, 


299 

and  must  you  be  so  even  beyond  sea.  and  by  the  report 
of  letters  ?  Is  this  the  way  in  which  your  affairs  are  in  a 
state  of  security  ?  Well  then  suppose  that  my  friends  have 
died  in  the  places  which  are  far  from  me.  What  elsehave 
they  suffered  than  that  which  is  the  condition  of  mortals  ? 
Or  how  are  you  desirous  at  the  same  time  to  live  to  old 
age.  and  at  the  same  time  not  to  see  the  death  of  any  per- 
son whom  you  love  ?  Know  you  not  that  in  the  course 
of  a  long  time  many  and  various  kinds  of  things  must 
happen  ;  that  a  fever  shall  overpower  one,  a  robber  an- 
other, and  a  third  a  tyrant  ?  Such  is  the  condition  of 
things  around  us,  such  are  those  who  live  with  us  in  the 
world:  cold  and  heat,  and  unsuitable  ways  of  living,  and 
journeys  by  land,  and  voyages  by  sea,  and  winds,  and 
various  circumstances  which  surround  us,  destroy  one 
man,  and  banish  another,  and  throw  one  upon  an  embassy 
and  another  into  an  army.  Sit  down  then  in  a  flutter  at 
all  these  things,  lamenting,  unhappy,  unfortunate,  depend- 
ent on  another,  and  dependent  not  on  one  or  two.  but  on 
ten  thousands  upon  ten  thousands. 

Did  you  hear  this  when  you  were  with  the  philoso- 
phers ?  did  you  learn  this  ?  do  you  not  know  that  human 
life  is  a  warfare?  that  one  man  must  keep  watch,  another 
must  go  out  as  a  spy.  and  a  third  must  light  ':  and  it  is  not 
possible  that  all  should  be  in  one  place,  nor  is  it  better 
that  it  should  be  so.  But  you  neglecting  to  do  the  com- 
mands of  the  general  complain  when  anything  more  hard 
than  usual  is  imposed  on  you,  and  you  do  not  observe 
what  you  make  the  army  become  as  far  as  it  is  in  your 
power  ;  that  if  all  imitate  you,  no  man  will  dig  a  trench, 
no  man  will  put  a  rampart  round,  nor  keep  watch,  nor  ex- 
pose himself  to  danger,  but  will  appear  to  be  useless  for 
the  purposes  of  an  army.  Again,  in  a  vessel  if  you 
a  sailor,  keep  to  one  place  and  stick  to  it.  And  if  you  are 
ordered  i<>  climb  the  mast,  retusc  :  if  to  run  to  the  head 


300  EriCTKTL'S. 

of  the  ship,  refuse  ;  and  what  master  of  a  ship  will  endure 
you  ?  and  will  he  not  pitch  you  overboard  as  a  useless 
thing,  an  impediment  only  and  bad  example  to  the  other 
sailors  ?  And  so  it  is  here  also  :  every  man's  life  is  a 
kind  of  warfare,  and  it  is  long  and  diversified.  You  must 
observe  the  duty  of  a  soldier  and  do  everything  at  the 
nod  of  the  general  ;  if  it  is  possible,  divining  what  his 
wishes  are :  for  there  is  no  resemblance  between  that 
general  and  this,  neither  in  strength  nor  in  superiority  of 
character.  You  are  placed  in  a  great  office  of  command 
and  not  in  any  mean  place  ;  but  you  are  always  a  senator. 
Do  you  not  know  that  such  a  man  must  give  little  time 
to  the  affairs  of  his  household,  but  be  often  away  from 
home,  either  as  a  governor  or  one  who  is  governed,  or 
discharging  some  office,  or  serving  in  war  or  acting  as  a 
judge  ?  Then  do  you  tell  me  that  you  wish,  as  a  plant, 
to  be  fixed  to  the  same  places  and  to  be  rooted  ?  Yes, 
for  it  is  pleasant.  Who  says  that  it  is  not  ?  but  a  soup  is 
pleasant,  and  a  handsome  woman  is  pleasant.  What  else 
do  those  say  who  make  pleasure  their  end  ?  Do  you  not 
see  of  what  men  you  have  uttered  the  language  ?  that  it 
is  the  language  of  Epicureans  and  catamites  ?  Next  while 
you  are  doing  what  they  do  and  holding  their  opinions, 
do  you  speak  to  us  the  words  of  Zeno  and  of  Socrates  ? 
Will  you  not  throw  away  as  far  as  you  can  the  things 
belonging  to  others  with  which  you  decorate  yourself, 
though  they  do  not  fit  you  at  all  ?  For  what  else  do  they 
desire  than  to  sleep  without  hindrance  and  free  from  com- 
pulsion, and  when  they  have  risen  to  yawn  at  their  leisure, 
and  to  wash  the  face,  then  write  and  read  what  they 
choose,  and  then  talk  about  some  trifling  matter  being 
praised  by  their  friends  whatever  they  may  say,  then  to 
go  forth  for  a  walk,  and  having  walked  about  a  little  to 
bathe,  and  then  eat  and  sleep,  such  sleep  as  is  the  fashion 
of  such  men  ?  why  need  we  say  how  ?  for  one  can  easily 


EPICTETUS.  301 

conjecture.  Come,  do  you  also  tell  your  own  way  of  pass- 
ing the  time  which  you  desire,  you  who  are  an  admirer 
of  truth  and  of  Socrates  and  Diogenes.  What  do  you 
wish  to  do  in  Athens  ?  the  same  (that  others  do),  or  some- 
thing else?  Why  then  od  you  call  yourself  a  Stoic? 
Well,  but  they  who  falsely  call  themselves  Roman  citi- 
zens* are  severely  punished;  and  should  those,  who 
falsely  claim  so  great  and  reverend  a  thing  and  name,  get 
off  unpunished?  or  is  this  not  possible,  but  the  law  divine 
and  strong  and  inevitable  is  this,  which  exacts  the  sever- 
est punishments  from  those  who  commit  the  greatest 
crimes  ?  For  what  does  this  law  say  ?  Let  him  who 
pretends  to  things  which  do  not  belong  to  him  be  a 
boaster,  a  vainglorious  man  :  f  let  him  who  disobeys  the 
divine  administration  be  base,  and  a  slave  ;  let  him  suffer 
grief,  let  him  be  envious,  let  him  pity  ;  \  and  in  a  word 
let  him  be  unhappy  and  lament. 

Well  then  ;  do  you  wish  me  to  pay  court  to  a  certain 
person?  to  go  to  his  doors?  §  If  reason  requires  this  to 
be  done  for  the  sake  of  country,  for  the  sake  of  kinsmen, 
for  the  sake  of  mankind,  why  should  you  not  go?  You 
are  not  ashamed  to  go  to  the  door  of  a  shoemaker,  when 
you  are  in  want  of  shoes,  nor  to  the  door  of  a  gardener, 

*  Suetonius  (Claudius,  25)  says:  "  Peregrinz  conditionis  homines 
•  etuit  usurpare  Romana  nomina,  duntaxat  gentilia.  Civitatem  Ro- 
inanam  usurpantes  in  campo  Esquilino  securi  percussit." — Upton. 

t  This  is  a  denunciation  of  the  hypocrite. 

}  "  Pity  "  perhaps  means  that  he  will  suffer  the  perturbation  of  pity, 
when  he  ought  not  to  feel  it.  I  am  not  sure  about  the  exact  meaning 

§'•  What  follows  hath  no  connection  with  what  immediately  preceded  ; 
but  belongs  to  the  general  subject  of  the  chapter. "—Mrs.  Carter.  "  Tin- 
person  with  whom  Epictetus  chiefly  held  this  discourse,  seems  to  h.uc 
been  instructed  by  his  friends  to  pay  his  respects  to  some  great  man  at 
Nicopolis  (perhaps  the  procurator,  Hi.  4,  i)  and  to  visit  his  \\<>r. 
Schweig. 


$02  F.PJCTETl'S. 

when  you  want  lettuces  ;  and  are  you  ashamed  to 
the  doors  of  the  rich  when  you  want  anything  ?  YL 
I  have  no  awe  of  a  shoemaker.  Don't  feel  any  awe  of  the 
rich.  Nor  will  I  flatter  the  gardener.  And  do  not  flatter 
the  rich.  How  then  shall  I  get  what  I  want  ?  Do  I  say 
to  you,  go  as  if  you  were  certain  to  get  what  you  want? 
And  do  not  I  only  tell  you,  that  you  may  do  what  is  be- 
coming to  yourself?  Why  then  should  I  still  go?  That 
you  may  have  gone,  that  you  may  have  discharged  the 
duty  of  a  citizen,  of  a  brother,  of  a  friend.  And  further 
remember  that  you  have  gone  to  the  shoemaker,  to  the 
seller  of  vegetables,  who  have  no  power  in  anything  great 
or  noble,  though  he  may  sell  dear.  You  go  to  buy  let- 
tuces :  they  cost  an  obolus  (penny),  but  not  a  talent.  So 
it  is  here  also.  The  matter  is  worth  going  for  to  the  rich 
man's  door.  Well,  I  will  go.  It  is  worth  talking  about. 
Let  it  be  so  ;  I  will  talk  with  him.  But  you  must  also 
kiss  his  hand  and  flatter  him  with  praise.  Away  with 
that,  it  is  a  talent's  worth  :  it  is  not  profitable  to  me,  nor 
to  the  state  nor  to  my  friends,  to  have  done  that  which 
spoils  a  good  citizen  and  a  friend.  But  you  will  seem  not 
to  have  been  eager  about  the  matter,  if  you  do  not  suc- 
ceed. Have  you  again  forgotten  why  you  went  ?  Know 
you  not  that  a  good  man  does  nothing  for  the  sake  of  ap- 
pearance, but  for  the  sake  of  doing  right  ?  What  advan- 
tage is  it  then  to  him  to  have  done  right.  And  what 
advantage  is  it  to  a  man  who  writes  the  name  of  Dion  to 
write  it  as  he  ought?  The  advantage  is  to  have  written 
it.  Is  there  no  reward  then?*  Do  you  seek  a  reward 

*  The  reward  of  virtue  is  in  the  acts  of  virtue.  The  Stoics  taught 
that  virtue  is  its  own  reward.  When  I  was  a  boy  I  have  written  this  in 
copies,  but  I  did  not  know  what  it  meant.  I  know  now  that  few  people 
believe  it;  and  like  the  man  here,  they  inquire  what  reward  they  shall 
have  for  doing  as  they  ought  to  do.  A  man  of  common  sense  would 
give  no  other  answer  than  what  Epictetus  gives.  But  that  will  not 
satisfy  all.  The  heathens  must  give  the  answer  :  "  For  what  mort  dos' 


KPrCTETUS. 


3°3 


for  a  good  man  greater  than  doing  what  is  good  and  just? 
At  Olympin  yon  wish  for  nothing  more,  but  it  seems 
to  you  enough  to  be  crowned  at  the  games.  Does 
it  seem  to  you  so  small  and  worthless  a  thing  to  be 
good  and  happy?  For  these  purposes  being  introduced 
by  the  gods  into  this  city  (the  world),  and  it  being  now 
your  duty  to  undertake  the  work  of  a  man.  do  you  still 
want  nurses  also  and  a  mamma,  and  do  foolish  women 
by  their  weeping  move  you  and  make  you  effeminate  ? 
Will  you  thus  never  cease  to  be  a  foolish  child?  know 
you  not  that  he  who  does  the  acts  of  u  child,  the  older  he 
is,  the  more  ridiculous  he  is  ? 

In  Athens  did  you  see  no  one  by  going  to  his  house?  I 
visited  any  man  that  I  pleased.  Here  also  be  ready  to 
see.  and  you  will  see  whom  you  please  :  only  let  it  be 
without  meanness,  neither  with  desire  nor  with  aversion, 
and  your  affairs  will  be  well  managed.  But  this  result 
does  not  depend  on  going  nor  on  standing  at  the  doors, 
but  it  depends  on  what  is  within,  on  your  opinions. 
When  you  have  learned  not  to  value  things  which  are  ex- 
ternal and  not  dependent  on  the  will,  and  to  consider 
that  not  one  of  them  is  your  own,  but  that  these  things 
only  are  your  own,  to  exercise  the  judgment  well,  to  form 
opinions,  t<>  move  toward  an  object,  to  desire,  to  turn 
from  a  thing,  where  is  there  any  longer  room  for  flattery, 
where  for  meanness?  why  do  you  still  long  for  the  quiet 
there  (at  Athens),  and  for  the  places  to  which  you  are  ac- 
customed? Wait  a  little  and  you  will  again  find  these 
places  familiar  :  then,  if  you  are  of  so  ignoble  a  nature, 
again  if  you  leave  these  also,  weep  and  lament. 

thou  want  when  thou  hast  done  a  man  a  service  ?  Art  thou  not  content 
that  thou  hast  done  something  conformable  to  thy  nature,  and  dost  thou 
seek  to  he  paid  for  it  ?  just  as  if  the  eye  demanded  a  recompense  fcr 
seeing  <>r  th<-  feet  for  walking." — M.  Antoninus,  ix. .}.-.  Compare  Sen«ca, 
de  Vita  Leata,  c.  y. 


EPICTETUS. 

How  then  shall  I  become  of  an  affectionate  temper? 
By  being  of  a  noble  disposition,  and  happy.  For  it  is  not 
reasonable  to  be  mean-spirited  nor  to  lament  yourself,  nor 
to  depend  on  another,  nor  even  to  blame  God  or  man.  I 
entreat  you,  become  an  affectionate  person  in  this  way, 
by  observing  these  rules.  But  if  through  this  affection, 
as  you  name  it,  you  are  going  to  be  a  slave  and  wretched, 
there  is  no  profit  in  being  affectionate.  And  what  pre- 
vents you  from  loving  another  as  a  person  subject  to 
mortality,  as  one  who  may  go  away  from  you.  Did  not 
Socrates  love  his  own  children  ?  He  did ;  but  it  was  as 
a  free  man,  as  one  who  remembered  that  he  must  first  be 
a  friend  to  the  gods.  For  this  reason  he  violated  nothing 
which  was  becoming  to  a  good  man,  neither  in  making 
his  defense  nor  by  fixing  a  penalty  on  himself,*  nor  even 
in  the  former  part  of  his  life  when  he  was  a  senator  or 
when  he  was  a  soldier.  But  we  are  fully  supplied  with 
every  pretext  for  being  of  ignoble  temper,  some  for  the 
sake  of  a  child,  some  for  a  mother,  and  others  for  breth- 
ren's sake.  But  it  is  not  fit  for  us  to  be  unhappy  on 
account  of  any  person,  but  to  be  happy  on  account  of  all, 
l.ut  ,'hiefly  on  account  of  God  who  has  made  us  for  this 
end.  Well,  did  Diogenes  f  love  nobody,  who  was  so  kind 
and  so  much  a  lover  of  all  that  for  mankind  in  general  he 
willingly  undertook  so  much  labor  and  bodily  sufferings? 
He  did  love  mankind,  but  how?  As  became  a  minister 

*  It  was  the  custom  at  Athens  when  the  court  (the  dicasts)  had  de- 
termined to  convict  an  accused  person,  in  some  cases  at  least,  to  ask 
him  what  penalty  he  proposed  to  be  inflicted  on  himself;  but  Socrates 
refused  to  do  this  or  to  allow  his  friends  to  do  it,  for  he  said  that  to 
name  the  penalty  was  the  same  as  admitting  his  guilt  (Xenophon,  Apo- 
logia, 23).  Socrates  said  that  if  he  did  name  a  proper  penalty  for  him- 
self, it  would  be  that  he  should  daily  be  allowed  to  dine  in  the  Prytaneium 
(Plato,  Apology,  c.  26;  Cicero,  De  Oratore,  i.  5-1). 

t  The  character  of  Diogenes  is  described  very  differently  by  Epictetus 
from  that  which  we  read  in  common  books. 


of  God,  at  the  same  time  caring  for  men,  and  being  also 
subject  to  God.  For  this  ivason  all  the  earth  \vas  liis 
country,  and  no  particular  place  ;  and  when  he  was  taken 
prisoner  he  did  not  regret  Athens  nor  his  associates  and 
friends  there,  but  even  he  became  familiar  with  the  pirates 
and  tried  to  improve  them  :  and  being  sold  afterward  he 
lived  in  Corinth  as  before  at  Athens  :  and  he  would  have 
behaved  the  same,  if  he  had  gone  to  the  country  of  the 
Perrhoebi.  *  Thus  is  freedom  acquired.  For  this  reason 
lie  used  to  say,  Ever  since  Antisthenes  made  me  free,  I 
have  not  been  a  slave.  How  did  Antisthenes  make  him 
free?  Hear  what  he  says  :  Antisthenes  taught  me  what 
is  my  own,  and  what  is  not  my  own  ;  possessions  are 
not  my  own,  nor  kinsmen,  domestics,  friends,  nor  repu- 
tation, nor  places  familiar,  nor  mode  of  life  ;  all  these 
belong  to  others.  What  then  is  your  own  ?  The  use  of 
appearances.  This  he  showed  to  me,  that  I  possess  it 
free  from  hindrance,  and  from  compulsion,  no  person  can 
put  an  obstacle  in  my  way,  no  person  can  force  me  to  use 
appearances  otherwise  than  I  wish.  Who  then  has  any 
power  over  me  ?  Philip  or  Alexander,  or  Pcrdiccas  or  the 
great  king  ?  How  have  they  this  power?  For  if  a  man 
is  going  to  be  overpowered  by  a  man,  he  must  long  be- 
fore be  overpowered  by  tilings.  If  then  pleasure  is  not 
able  to  subdue  a  man,  nor  pain,  nor  fame,  nor  wealth, 
but  he  is  able,  when  he  chooses,  to  spit  out  all  his  poor 
body  in  a  man's  face  and  depart  from  life,  whose  slave 
can  he  still  be  ?  But  if  he  dwelt  with  pleasure  in  Athens, 
and  was  overpowered  by  this  manner  of  life,  his  affairs 
would  have  been  at  every  man's  command  :  the  stronger 
would  have  had  the  power  of  grieving  him.  How  do  you 
think  that  Diogenes  would  have  flattered  the-  pirates  that 
they  might  sell  him  to  some  Athenian,  that  some  time  he 

*  A  people  in  Thessaly  between  the  river  I'rneius  and  Mount  '  Hympus. 
It  is  the  same  as  if  Epictetus  had  said  to  any  remote  country. 
2O  " 


306  /•:/•/(•  77  77 '.v. 

might  see  that  beautiful  Piraeus,  ami  the  Long  Walls  and 
the  Acropolis  ?  In  what  condition  would  you  see  them  ? 
As  a  captive,  a  slave  and  mean  :  and  what  would  be  the 
use  of  it  for  you  ?  Not  so  :  but  I  should  see  them  as  a 
free  man.  Show  me,  how  you  would  be  free.  Observe, 
some  person  has  caught  you,  who  leads  you  away  from 
your  accustomed  place  of  abode  and  says,  You  arc  my 
slave,  for  it  is  in  my  power  to  hinder  you  from  living  as 
you  please,  it  is  in  my  power  to  treat  you  gently,  and  to 
humble  -you  :  when  I  choose,  on  the  contrary  you  are 
cheerful  and  go  elated  to  Athens.  What  do  you  say  to 
him  who  treats  you  as  a  slave  ?  What  means  have  you 
of  rinding  one  who  will  rescue  you  from  slavery  ?  Or 
cannot  you  even  look  him  in  the  face,  but  without  saying 
more  do  you  entreat  to  be  set  free  ?  Man,  you  ought  to 
go  gladly  to  prison,  hastening,  going  before  those  who 
lead  you  there.  Then,  I  ask  you,  are  you  unwilling  to 
live  in  Rome  and  desire  to  live  in  Hellas  (Greece)  ?  And 
when  you  must  die,  will  you  then  also  fill  us  with  your 
lamentations,  because  you  will  not  see  Athens  nor  walk 
about  in  the  Lyceion  ?  Have  you  gone  abroad  for  this? 
was  it  for  this  reason  you  have  sought  to  find  some  per- 
son from  whom  you  might  receive  benefit  ?  What  bene- 
fit ?  That  you  may  solve  syllogisms  more  readily,  or 
handle  hypothetical  arguments  ?  and  for  this  reason  did 
you  leave  brother,  country,  friends,  your  family,  that  you 
might  return  when  you  had  learned  these  things 
you  did  not  go  abroad  to  obtain  constancy  of  mind,  nor 
freedom  from  perturbation,  nor  in  order  that  being  secure 
from  harm  you  may  never  complain  of  any  person,  accuse 
no  person,  and  no  man  may  wrong  you,  and  thus  you 
may  maintain  your  relative  position  without  impediment? 
This  is  a  fine  traffic  that  you  have  gone  abroad  for  in 
syllogisms  and  sophistical  arguments  and  hypothetical  : 
if  you  like,  take  your  place  in  the  agora  (market  or  public 


/7V  < 


3°7 


place)  and  proclaim  them  for  sale  like  dealers  in  physic.*" 
Will  you  not  deny  even  all  that  you  have  learned  that  you 
may  not  bring  a  had  name  on  your  theorems  as  useless  : 
What  harm  has  philosophy  done  you?  Wherein  has 
Chrysippus  injured  you  thai  you  should  prove  by  your 
acts  that  his  labors  are  useless  ?  Were  the  evils  that  you 
had  there  (at  home)  not  enough,  those  which  were  the 
Cause  of  your  pain  and  lamentation,  even  if  you  had  not 
gone  abroad  ?  Have  you  added  nj  Ore  to  the  list?  And 
if  you  again  have  other  acquaintances  and  friends,  you 
will  have  more  causes  for  lamentation  :  and  the  same  also 
.  take  an  affection  for  another  country.  Why  then 
do  you  live  to  surround  yourself  with  other  sorrows  upon 
sorrows  through  which  you  are  unhappy  ?  Then.  I  ask 
you,  do  you  call  this  affection  ?  What  affection,  man  ! 
If  it  is  a  good  thing,  it  is  the  cause  of  no  evil  :  if  it  is  bad. 
1  have  nothing  to  do  with  it.  I  am  formed  by  nature  for 
my  own  good  :  1  am  not  formed  for  my  own  evil. 

What  then  is  the  discipline  for  this  purpose?  First  of 
all  the  highest  and  the  principal,  and  that  which  stands  as 
it  were  at  the  entrance,  is  this  ;  when  you  are  delighted 
with  anything,  be  delighted  as  with  a  thing  which  is  not 
one  of  those  which  cannot  be  taken  away,  but  as  with 
something  of  such  a  kind,  as  an  earthen  pot  is,  or  a  glass 
cup.  that  when  it  has  been  broken,  you  may  remember 
what  it  was,  and  may  not  be  troubled.  So  in  this  matte1: 
also  :  if  you  kiss  your  own  child,  or  your  brother  or  friend, 
give  full  license  to  the  appearance,  and  allow  not 

*  This  is  an  old  practice,  to  go  about  and  sell  physic  to  people.  ' 
(1'ro  Cluentio,  c.  14)  speaks  of  such  a  quack  (pharmacopeia),  who  would 
do  a  poisoning  job  for  a  proper  sum  of  money.  1  IKUC  seen  a  traveling 
doctor  in  France  who  went  about  in  a  cart,  and  rang  a  bell,  at  the  sound 
of  which  people  came  round  him.  Some  who  were  deaf  had  stnif  puun-il 
into  their  ears,  paid  their  money,  and  made  way  for  other.-,  who  h:id 
other  complaints. 


308  /•:/'/(' '/'/•:  rrs. 

your  pleasure  to  go  as  far  as  it  chooses  :  but  check  it,  and 
curb  it  as  those  who  stand  behind  men  in  their  triumphs 
and  remind  them  that  they  are  mortal.*  Do  you  also  re- 
mind yourself  in  like  manner,  that  he  whom  you  love  i- 
mortal,  and  that  what  you  love  is  nothing  of  your  own  : 
it  has  been  given  to  you  for  the  present,  not  that  it  should 
not  be  taken  from  you,  nor  has  it  been  given  to  you  for 
all  time,  but  as  a  fig  is  given  to  you  or  a  bunch  of  grapes 
at  the  appointed  season  of  the  year.  But  if  you  wish  for 
these  things  in  winter,  you  are  a  fool.  So  if  you  wish  for 
your  son  or  friend  when  it  is  not  allowed  to  you,  you 
must  know  that  you  are  wishing  for  a  fig  in  winter.  Fo: 
such  as  winter  is  to  a  fig,  such  is  every  event  which  hap- 
pens from  the  universe  to  the  things  which  are  taken 
away  according  to  its  nature.  And  further,  at  the  times 
when  you  are  delighted  with  a  thing,  place  before  yourself 
the  contrary  appearances.  What  harm  is  it  while  you  are 
kissing  your  child  to  say  with  a  lisping  voice,  To-morrow 
you  will  die  ;  and  to  a  friend  also,  To-morrow  you  will 
go  away  or  I  shall,  and  never  shall  we  see  one  another 
again  ?  But  these  are  words  of  bad  omen.  And  some 
incantations  also  are  of  bad  omen  :  but  because  they  are 
useful,  I  don't  care  for  this  ;  only  let  them  be  useful. 
But  do  you  call  things  to  be  of  bad  omen  except  those 
which  are  significant  of  some  evil  ?  Cowardice  is  a  word 
of  bad  omen,  and  meanness  of  spirit,  and  sorrow,  and 
and  shamelessness.  These  words  are  of  bad  omen  :  and 
yet  we  ought  not  to  hesitate  to  utter  them  in  order  to  pro- 
tect ourselves  against  the  things.  Do  you  tell  me  that  a 
name  which  is  significant  of  any  natural  thing  is  of  evil 
omen  ?  say  that  even  for  the  ears  of  corn  to  be  reaped  is 
of  bad  omen,  for  it  signifies  the  destruction  of  the  ears, 

*  It  was  the  custom  in  Roman  triumphs  for  a  sla\'e  to  stand  behind 
the  triumph LIIH  general  in  his  chariot  and  to  remind  him  that  he  was 
still  mortal.  Juvenal,  x.  41. 


KPICTETl'S.  309 

but  not  of  the  world.  Say  that  the  falling  of  the  loaves 
also  is  ot'  bad  omen,  and  for  the  dried  fig  to  take  the  place 
of  the  green  fig.  and  for  raisins  to  be  made  from  the  grapes. 
For  all  these  things  are  changes  from  a  former  state  into 
other  states  :  not  a  destruction,  but  a  certain  fixed  econo- 
my and  administration.  Such  is  going  a\vay  from  home 
and  a  small  change  :  such  is  death,  a  greater  change,  not 
from  the  state  which  now  is  to  that  which  is  not,  but  to 
that  which  is  not  now.*  Shall  I  then  no  longer  exist  ? 
You  will  not  exist,  but  you  will  be  something  else,  of 
which  the  world  now  has  need  :  for  you  also  came  into 
existence  not  when  you  chose,  but  when  the  world  had 
need  of  you.  + 

*  Marcus  Antoninus,  xi.  35.     Compare  Epict.  iii.  13,  14,  and  iv.  7,  75. 

t  I  am  not  sure  if  Epictetus  ever  uses  <c6o>oj  in  the  sense  of  "  Uni- 
verse," the  "  universum  "  of  philosophers.  I  think  he  sometimes  uses  it 
in  the  common  sense  of  the  world,  the  earth  and  all  that  is  on  it.  Epic- 
tetus appears  to  teach  that  when  a  man  dies,  his  existence  is  terminated. 
The  body  is  resolved  into  the  elements  of  which  it  is  formed,  and  these 
elements  are  employed  for  other  purposes.  Consistently  with  this  doc 
trine  he  may  have  supposed  that  the  powers,  which  we  call  ratioi. 
intellectual,  exist  in  man  by  virtue  only  of  the  organization  of  his  brail., 
which  is  superior  to  that  of  all  other  animals ;  and  that  what  we  name 
the  soul  has  no  existence  independent  of  the  body.  It  was  an  old  Greek 
hypothesis  that  at  death  the  body  returned  to  earth  from  which  it  came. 
and  the  soul  returned  to  the  regions  above,  from  which  it  came. 
I  cannot  discover  any  passage  in  Epictetus  in  which  the  doctrine  is 
taught  that  the  soul  has  an  existence  independent  of  the  body.  The 
opinions  of  Marcus  Antoninus  on  this  matter  are  contained  in  his  book, 
iv.  14,  21,  and  perhaps  elsewhere  :  but  they  are  rather  obscure.  A  recent 
writer  has  attempted  to  settle  the  question  of  the  existence  of  departed 
souls  by  affirming  that  we  can  find  no  place  for  them  either  in  heaven  or 
in  hell ;  for  the  modem  scientific  notion,  as  I  suppose  that  it  must  be 
named,  does  not  admit  the  conception  of  a  place  heaven  m  ;i  place  hell 
(Strauss,  Der  Alte  und  der  Neue  Glaube,  p.  129).  \\  <•  may  name 
Paul  a  contemporary  of  Epictetus,  for  though  Epictrtus  may  have 
been  the  younger,  he  was  living  at  Rome  during  N.-n.'s  reign 
(A.  D.  54-o.Si  :  and  it  is  affirmed,  whether  roriectly  or  not,  I  do  not 


EPICTEJVS. 

*J 

\Yherefore  the  wise  and  good  man,  remembering  who 
he  is  and  whence  lie  came,  and  by  whom  he  was  pro- 
duced, is  attentive  only  to  this,  how  he  may  fill  his  place 
with  due  regularity  and  obediently  to  God.  Dost  thou 
still  wish  me  to  exist  (live)  ?  I  will  continue  to  exist  as 
free,  as  noble  in  nature,  as  thou  hast  wished  me  to  exist  : 
for  thou  hast  made  me  free  from  hindrance  in  that  which 
is  my  own.  But  hast  thou  no  further  need  of  me?  I 
thank  thee  :  and  so  far  I  have  remained  for  thy  sake,  and 
for  the  sake  of  no  other  person,  and  now  in  obedience  to 
thee  I  depart.  How  dost  thou  depart  ?  Again,  I  say,  as 
thoxi  hast  pleased,  as  free,  as  thy  servant,  as  one  who  has 
known  thy  commands  and  thy  prohibitions.  And  so 
long  as  I  shall  stay  in  thy  service,  whom  dost  thou  will 
me  to  K-  ?  A  prince  or  a  private  man,  a  senator  or  a 
common  person,  a  soldier  or  a  general,  a  teacher  or  a 
master  of  a  family  ?  whatever  place  and  position  thou 
mayest  assign  to  me,  as  Socrates  says,  I  will  die  ten 
thousand  times  rather  than  desert  them.  And  where  dost 
thou  will  me  to  be?  in  Rome  or  Athens,  or  Thebes  or 
Gyara.  Only  remember  me  there  where  I  am.  If  thou 

undertake  to  say,  that  Paul  wrote  from  Ephesus  his  first  epistle  to  the 
Corinthians  (Cor.  i.  16,  S)  in  the  beginning  of  A.  D.  56.  Epictetus. 
it  is  said,  lived  in  Rome  till  the  time  of  the  expulsion  of  the  philosophers 
by  Domitian,  when  he  retired  to  Xicopolis  an  old  man,  and  taught  there. 
Paul's  first  epistle  to  the  Corinthians  (c.  15)  contains  his  doctrine  of  the 
resurrection,  which  is  accepted,  I  believe,  by  all,  or  nearly  all,  if  there  are 
any  exceptions,  who  profess  the  Christian  faith  :  but  it  is  not  under- 
stood by  all  in  the  same  way.  Paul  teaches  that  Christ  died  for  our 
sins,  that  he  was  buried  and  rose  again  on  the  third  day ;  and  that  after 
his  resurrection  he  was  seen  by  many  persons.  Then  he  asks,  if  Christ 
rose  from  the  dead,  how  can  some  say  that  there  is  no  resurrection  of 
the  dead  ?  "  But  if  there  be  no  resurrection  of  the  dead,  then  is  Christ 
not  risen  **  (v.  13)  ;  and  (v.  19),  "if  in  this  life  only  we  have  hope  in 
Christ,  we  are  of  all  men  most  miserable."  But  he  affirms  again  (v.  20) 
that  "Christ  is  risen  and  become  the  first  fruits  of  them  that  slept."  In 
v.  32,  he  asks  what  advantages  he  has  from  his  struggles  in  Ephesus, 


RPrCTRTUS. 


3ir 


sendest  me  to  a  place  where  there  are  no  means  fur  men 
living  according  to  nature,  I  shall  not  depart  (from  life)  in 
disobedience  to  thee,  but  as  if  thou  wast  giving  nu.  the 
signal  to  retrea?  :  I  do  not  leave  thee,  let  this  be  far  from 
my  intention,  but  I  perceive  that  thou  hast  no  need  of  me. 
If  means  of  living  according  to  nature  be  allowed  me,  I 
will  seek  no  other  place  than  that  in  which  I  am,  or  other 
men  than  those  among  whom  I  am. 

Let  these  thoughts  be  ready  to  hand  by  night  and  by 
day  :  these  you  should  write,  these  you  should  read  : 
about  these  you  should  talk  to  yourself,  and  to  others. 
Ask  a  man,  ("an  you  help  me  at  all  for  this  purpose?  and 
further,  go  to  another  and  to  another.  Then  if  anything 
that  is  said  be  contrary  to  your  wish,  this  reflection  first 
will  immediately  relieve  you.  that  it  is  not  unexpected. 
For  it  is  a  great  thing  in  all  cases  to  say.  I  knew  that  I 
begot  a  son  who  is  mortal.  For  so  you  also  will  say,  I 
knew  that  I  am  mortal,  I  knew  that  I  may  leave  my 
home,  I  knew  that  1  may  be  ejected  from  it,  I  knew  that 
/  may  be  led  to  prison.  Then  if  you  turn  round  and  look 
to  yourself,  and  seek  the  place  from  which  comes  that 

"  if  the  dead  rise  not  :  let  us  eat  and  drink,  for  to-morrow  we  die."  He 
seems  not  to  admit  the  value  of  life,  if  there  is  no  resurrection  of  the 
dead ;  and  he  seems  to  say  that  we  shall  seek  or  ought  to  seek  only  the 
pleasures  of  sense,  because  life  is  short,  if  we  do  not  believe  in  a  resur- 
rection of  the  dead.  It  may  be  added  that  there  is  not  any  direct  asser- 
tion in  this  chapter  that  Christ  ascended  to  heaven  in  a  bodily  form,  or 
that  he  ascended  to  heaven  in  anyway.  lie  then  says  (v.  35),  "But 
some  man  will  say.  How  are  the  dead  raised  up  ?  and  with  what  body 
do  they  comu  .- "  He  answers  this  question  (v.  36),  "Thou  fool,  that 
which  thou  sowest  is  not  quickened  except  it  die:  "  and  he  adds  that 
"  Ciod  giveth  it  (the  seed)  a  body  as  it  hath  pleased  him,  and  to  every 
seed  his  own  body.''  We  all  know  that  the  body,  which  is  produced 
from  the  seed,  is  not  the  body  "  that  shall  be  : "  and  we  also  know  that 
the  seed  which  is  ;ul  that  if  the  seed  died,  no  body 

would  be  produced  from  su<  1>    x«_<  d.      His  conclusion  is  that   tht 

.MI  a  natural  body;   it  i-  rai-.-i!  ;i    spiritual  1,< :><!••."     1    believe  thai 


312  f'J'ICTKTUS. 

which  has  happened,  you  will  forthwith  recollect  that  it 
comes  from  the  place  of  things  which  are  out  of  the  power 
of  the  will,  and  of  things  which  are  not  my  own.  What 
then  is  it  to  me  ?  Then,  you  will  ask.  and  this  is  the  chief 
thing  :  And  who  is  it  that  sent  it  ?  The  leader,  or  the 
general,  the  state,  the  law  of  the  state.  Give  it  me  then, 
for  I  must  always  obey  the  law  in  everything.  Then, 
when  the  appearance  (of  things)  pains  you,  for  it  is  not 
in  your  power  to  prevent  this,  contend  against  it  by  the 
aid  of  reason,  conquer  it  :  do  not  allow  it  to  gain  strength 
nor  to  lead  you  to  the  consequences  by  raising  images 
such  as  it  pleases  and  as  it  pleases.  If  you  be  in  Gyara, 
do  not  imagine  the  mode  of  living  at  Rome,  and  how 
many  pleasures  there  were  for  him  who  lived  there,  and 
how  many  there  would  be  for  him  who  returned  to  Rome  : 
but  fix  your  mind  on  this  matter,  how  a  man  who  lives  in 
Gyara  ought  to  live  in  Gyara  like  a  man  of  courage.  And 
if  you  be  in  Rome,  do  not  imagine  what  the  life  in  Athens 
is,  but  think  only  of  the  life  in  Rome. 

Then  in  the  place  of  all  other  delights  substitute  this, 
that  of  being  conscious  that  you  are  obeying  God,  that 
not  in  word,  but  in  deed  you  are  performing  the  acts  of  a 

the  commentators  do  not  agree  about  this  "  spiritual  body  :  "  but  it  seems 
plain  that  Paul  did  not  teach  that  the  body  which  will  rise  will  be  the 
same  as  the  body  which  is  buried.  He  says  (v.  50)  that  "  flesh  and  blood 
cannot  inherit  the  kingdom  of  God.''  Yet  in  the  Apostles'  Creed  we 
pronounce  our  belief  in  the  "  resurrection  of  the  body :  "  but  in  the 
Nicene  Creed  it  is  said  \ve  look  "  for  the  resurrection  of  the  dead,"  which 
is  a  different  thing  or  may  have  a  different  meaning  from  "  the  resurrec- 
tion of  the  body."  In  the  ministration  of  baptism  to  such  as  are  of 
riper  years,  the  person  to  be  baptized  is  asked  "  Dost  thou  believe  in  God 
the  Father  Almighty,"  etc.,  in  the  terms  of  the  Church  Creeds,  but  in 
place  of  the  resurrection  of  the  body  or  of  the  dead,  he  is  asked  if  he  be- 
lieves "  in  the  resurrection  of  the  flesh."  The  various  opinions  of  divines 
of  the  English  church  on  the  resurrection  of  the  body  are  stated  by  A. 
Clissold  in  the  "  Practical  Nature  of  the  Theological  Writings  of  E. 
JSwedenborg  in  a  letter  to  Whately,  Archbishop  of  Dublin,  1859,  2d  ed." 


KPICTETUS.  3^ 

wise  and  good  man.  P'or  what  a  thing  it  is  for  a  man  In 
be  able  to  say  to  himself.  Now  whatever  the  rest  may  say 
in  solemn  manner  in  the  schools  and  may  be  judged  to 
be  saying  in  a  way  contrary  to  common  opinion  i  or  in  a 
strange  way),  this  I  am  doing  ;  and  they  are  sitting  and 
are  discoursing  of  my  virtues  and  inquiring  about  me  and 
praising  me  ;  and  of  this  Zeus  has  willed  that  I  shall  re- 
ceive from  myself  a  demonstration,  and  shall  myself 
know  if  he  has  a  soldier  such  as  he  ought  to  have,  a 
citizen  such  as  he  ought  to  have,  and  if  he  has  chosen  to 
produce  me  to  the  rest  of  mankind  as  a  witness  of  the 
things  which  are  independent  of  the  will  :  See  that  you 
fear  without  reason,  that  you  foolishly  desire  what  you 
do  desire  :  seek  not  the  good  in  things  external  ;  seek  it 
in  yourselves  :  if  you  do  not,  you  will  not  find  it.  For 
this  purpose  he  leads  me  at  one  time  hither,  at  another 
time  sends  me  thither,  shows  me  to  men  as  poor,  without 
authority,  and  sick  ;  sends  me  to  Gyara,  leads  me  into 
prison,  not  because  he  hates  me,  far  from  him  be  such  a 
meaning,  for  who  hates  the  best  of  his  servants  ?  nor  yet 
because  he  cares  not  for  me,  for  he  does  not  neglect  any 
even  of  the  smallest  things  ;  *  but  he  does  this  for  the 
purpose  of  exercising  me  and  making  use  of  me  as  a 
witness  to  others.  Being  appointed  to  such  a  service,  do 
1  still  care  about  the  place  in  which  I  am,  or  with  whom 
I  am,  or  what  men  say  about  me  ?  and  do  1  not  entirely 
direct  my  thoughts  to  God  and  to  his  instructions  and 
commands  ? 

Having  these  things  (or  thoughts)  always  in  hand,  and 
exercising  them  by  yourself,  and  keeping  them  in  readi- 
ness, you  will  never  be  in  want  of  one  to  comfort  you  and 
strengthen  you.  For  it  is  not  shameful  to  be  without 

*  Compare  i.  12,  2,  ii.  14,  ri,  iii.  26,  28.  "Compare  this  with  the  de- 
scription of  the  universal  care  of  Providence,  Matthew,  x.  29,  30,  and  the 
occasion  on  which  is  was  produced."  —  Mrs.  Carter. 


314  EPICTL  . 

something  to  eat.  but  not  t:>  have  ivason  sufficient  for 
keeping  away  fear  and  sorrow.  Pmt  if  once  you  have 
gained  exemption  from  sorrow  and  fear,  will  there  any 
longer  be  a  tyrant  for  you,  or  a  tyrant's  guard,  or  attend- 
ants on  Cai'sar  ?  *  Or  shall  any  appointment  to  offices  at 
court  cause  you  pain,  or  shall  those  who  sacrifice  in  the 
Capitol  on  the  occasion  of  being  named  to  certain  func- 
tions, cause  pain  to  you  who  have  received  so  great 
authority  from  Zeus  ?  Only  do  not  make  a  proud  display 
of  it,  nor  boast  of  it  :  but  show  it  by  your  acts  ;  and  if  no 
man  perceives  it,  be  satisfied  that  you  are  yourself  in  a 
healthy  state  and  happy. 


CHAPTER  XXV. 

TO    THOSK    Wild    FAI.I,    OFF   (l)KSIST)   FROM    THEIR    PfRl'OSK. 

CONSIDKR  as  to  the  things  which  you  proposed  to  yourself 
at  first,  which  you  have  secured,  and  which  you  have  not ; 
and  how  you  are  pleased  when  you  recall  to  memory  the 
one,  and  are  pained  about  the  other  :  and  if  it  is  possible, 
recover  the  things  wherein  you  failed.  For  we  must  not 
shrink  when  we  are  engaged  in  the  greatest  combat,  but 
we  must  even  take  blows,  t  For  the  combat  before  us  is 
not  in  wrestling  and  the  Pancration.  in  which  both  the 
successful  and  the  unsuccessful  may  have  the  greatest 
merit,  or  may  have  little,  and  in  truth  may  be  very  fortu- 
nate or  very  unfortunate  ;  but  the  combat  is  for  good  fort- 
une and  happiness  themselves.  Well.  then,  even  if  we 
have  renounced  the  contest  in  this  matter  (for  good  fortune 

*  See  i.  19,  u). 

t  Compare  iii.  15.  4. 


3'S 

and  happiness),  no  man  hinders  us  from  rencwii. 
combat  again,  and  \ve  are  not  compelled  to  wail  for 
another  four  years  that  the  games  at  Olympia  may  come 
again  ;  *  but  as  soon  as  you  have  recovered  and  restored 
yourself,  and  employ  the  same  xeal.  you  may  renew  the 
combat  again  :  and  if  again  you  renounce  it,  you  may 
again  renew  it  :  and  if  you  once  gain  the  victory,  you  are 
like  him  who  has  never  renounced  the  combat.  Only  do 
not  through  a  habit  of  doing  the  same  thing  (renouncing 
the  combat)  begin  to  do  it  with  pleasure,  and  then  like  a 
bad  athlete  go  about  after  being  conquered  in  all  the 
circuit  of  the  games  like  quails  who  have  run  away.  | 

The  sight  of  a  beautiful  young  girl  overpowers  me. 
Well,  have  I  not  been  overpowered  before?  An  inclina- 
tion arises  in  me  to  rind  fault  with  a  person  ;  for  have  I  not 
found  fault  with  him  before  ?  You  speak  to  us  as  if  you 
had  come  off  (from  these  things)  free  from  harm,  just  as  if 
a  man  should  say  to  his  physician  who  forbids  him  to 
bathe,  Have  I  not  bathed  before  ?  If  then  the  physician 
can  say  to  him.  Well,  and  what  then  happened  to  you  after 
the  bath?  Had  you  not  a  fever,  had  you  not  a  headache  ? 
And  when  you  found  fault  with  a  person  lately,  did  you 
not  do  the  act  of  a  malignant  person,  of  a  trifling  babbler  ? 
did  you  not  cherish  this  habit  in  you  by  adding  to  it  the 
corresponding  acts  ?  And  when  you  were  overpowered  by 
the  young  girl,  did  you  come  off  unharmed?  Why  then 

*  These  games  were  <  elebrated  once  in  four  year-. 

\llthecircuitofthe  games"  means  the  circuit  of  tl.e  Pythian, 
Isthmian,  \emean,  and  Olympic  games.  A  man  who  had  contended  in 
these  four  games  victoriously  was  named  IVriodoiii(  68,  or  Periodeutes. — 
Upton.  Th  Lsed  to  put  quails  in  a  cockpit,  as  (hose  who  are 

old  enough  may  remember  that  we  used  to  put  gam£-cocks  to  fight  with 
one  another.  Schweighaeuser  describes  a  way  of  trying  the  courage  of 
these  quails  from  Pollux  (ix.  109)  ;  but  1  suppose  that  the  birds  fought 
also  with  oue  another. 


316  EPJCTETUS. 

do  you  talk  of  \vhat  you  did  before  ?  You  ought,  I  think, 
remembering-  what  you  did,  as  slaves  remember  the  blows 
which  they  have  received,  to  abstain  from  the  same  faults. 
But  the  one  case  is  not  like  the  other  ;  for  in  the  case  of 
slaves  the  pain  causes  the  remembrance  :  but  in  the  case 
of  your  faults,  what  is  the  pain,  what  is  the  punishment  ; 
for  when  have  you  been  accustomed  to  fly  from  evil  acts  ? 
Sufferings  then  of  the  trying  character  are  useful  to  us, 
whether  we  choose  or  not. 


CHAPTER  XXVI. 

TO    THOSE    WHO    FEAR    WANT.* 

ARE  you  not  ashamed  at  being  more  cowardly  and  more 
mean  than  fugitive  slaves  ?  How  do  they  when  they  run 
away  leave  their  masters  ?  on  what  estates  do  they  de- 
pend, and  what  domestics  do  they  rely  on  ?  Do  they  not 
after  stealing  a  little  which  is  enough  for  the  first  days, 
then  afterward  move  on  through  land  or  through  sea,  con- 
triving one  method  after  another  for  maintaining  their 
lives.  And  what  fugitive  slave  ever  died  of  hunger  ?  f 
But  you  are  afraid  lest  necessary  things  should  fail  you, 
and  are  sleepless  by  night.  Wretch,  are  you  so  blind,  and 
don't  you  see  the  road  to  which  the  want  of  necessaries 

*"  Compare  this  chapter  with  the  beautiful  and  affecting  discourses  of 
our  -Saviour  on  the  same  subject,  Matthew  vi.  25-34;  Luke xii.  22-30." — 
Mrs.  Carter.  The  first  verse  of  Matthew  begins,  "  Take  no  thought  for 
your  life,  what  ye  shall  eat  or  what  ye  shall  drink,"  etc.  Xo  Christian 
literally  follows  the  advice  of  this  and  the  following  verses,  and  he 
would  be  condemneft  by  the  judgment  of  all  men  if  he  did. 

t  It  is  very  absurd  to  suppose  that  no  fugitive  slave  ever  died  of  hun- 
ger. How  could  Epictetus  know  that? 


J:  res. 


3'7 


leads?  Well,  where  does  it  lead?  To  the  same  place  to 
which  a  fever  leads,  or  a  stone  that  falls  on  you,  to 
death.  Have  you  not  often  said  this  yourself  to  your 
companions  ?  have  you  not  read  much  of  this  kind,  and 
written  much  ?  and  how  often  have  you  boasted  that  you 
were  easy  as  to  death  ? 

Yes  :  but  my  wife  and  children  also  suffer  hunger.  *  Well 
then,  does  their  hunger  lead  to  any  other  place  ?  Is  there 
not  the  same  descent  to  some  place  for  them  also  ?  Is 
not  there  the  same  state  below  for  them  ?  Do  you  not 
choose  then  to  look  to  that  place  full  of  boldness  against 
every  want  and  deficiency,  to  that  place  to  which  both 
the  richest  and  those  who  have  held  the  highest  offices, 
and  kings  themselves  and  tyrants  must  descend?  or  to 
which  you  will  descend  hungry,  if  it  should  so  happen, 
but  they  burst  by  indigestion  and  drunkenness.  What 
beggar  did  you  hardly  ever  see  who  was  not  an  old  man, 
and  even  of  extreme  old  age  ?  But  chilled  with  cold  day 
and  night,  and  lying  on  the  ground,  and  eating  only  what 
is  absolutely  necessary  they  approach  near  to  the  im- 
possibility of  dying,  f  Cannot  you  write  ?  Cannot  you 
teach  (take  care  of)  children  ?  Cannot  you  he  a  watch- 

*  He  supposes  that  the  man  who  is  dying  of  hunger  has  also  wife  and 
children,  who  will  suffer  the  same  dreadful  end.  The  consolation,  if  it 
is  any,  is  that  the  rich  and  luxurious  and  kings  will  also  die.  The  fact  is 
true.  Death  is  the  lot  of  all.  Kut  a  painful  death  by  hunger  cannot  l>e 
alleviated  by  a  man  knowing  that  all  must  die  in  some  way.  It  seems 
as  if  the  philosopher  expected  that  even  women  and  children  should  be 
philosophers,  and  that  the  husband  in  his  philosophy  should  calmly  con- 
template the  death  of  wife  and  children  by  starvation.  This  is  an  ex- 
ample of  the  absurdity  to  which  even  a  wise  man  carried  his  philosophy  ; 
and  it  is  unworthy  of  the  teacher's  general  good  sen.-.-. 

I  We  see  many  old  beggars  who  endure  what  others  could  not  endure  ; 
but  they  all  die  at  last,  and  would  have  died  earlier  if  their  beggar  life 
had  begun  sooner.  The  living  in  the  open  air  and  wandering  about 
help  them  to  last  longer;  but  the  exposure  to  cold  and  wet  and  to  the 


318  /•./vr/y-./r.v. 

man  at  another  person's  door?  But  it  is  shameful  to 
come  to  such  a  necessity.  Learn  then  first  what  are  the 
things  which  are  shameful,  and  then  tell  us  that  you  are 
a  philosopher:  but  at  piesent  do  not.  even  if  any  other 
man  call  you  so,  allow  it. 

Is  that  shameful  to  you  which  is  not  your  own  act,  that 
of  which  you  are  not  the  cause,  that  which  has  come  to  you 
by  accident,  as  a  headache,  as  a  fever?  If  your  parents 
were  poor,  and  left  their  property  to  others,  and  if  while 
they  live,  they  do  not  help  you  at  all,  is  this  shameful  to 
you?  Is  this  what  you  learned  with  the  philosophers? 
Did  you  never  hear  that  the  thing  \vhich  is  shameful 
ought  to  be  blamed,  and  that  which  is  blamable  is  worthy 
of  blame  ?  Whom  do  you  blame  for  an  act  which  is  not  his 
own,  which  he  did  not  do  himself?  Did  you  then  make 
your  father  such  as  he  is,  or  is  it  in  your  power  to  improve 
him?  Is  this  power  given  to  you?  Well  then,  ought  you 
to  wish  the  things  which  are  not  given  to  you.  or  to  be 
ashamed  if  you  do  not  obtain  them  ?  And  have  you  also 
been  accustomed  while  you  were  studying  philosophy  to 
look  to  others  and  to  hope  for  nothing  from  yourself? 
Lament  then  and  groan  and  eat  with  fear  that  you  may 
not  have  food  to-morrow.  Tremble  about  your  poor 
slaves  lest  they  steal,  lest  they  run  away,  lest  they  die. 
So  live,  and  continue  to  live,  you  who  in  name  only  have 
approached  philosophy,  and  have  disgraced  its  theorems 
as  far  as  you  can  by  showing  them  to  be  useless  and 
unprofitable  to  those  who  take  them  up  ;  you  who  have 
never  sought  constancy,  freedom  from  perturbation,  and 
from  passions  :  you  who  have  not  sought  any  person  for 
the  sake  of  this  object,  but  many  for  the  sake  of  syllo- 
gisms ;  you  who  have  never  thoroughly  examined  any  of 

want  of  food  hastens  their  end.  The  life  of  a  poor  old  beggar  Is  neither 
so  long  nor  so  comfortable  as  that  of  a  man,  who  has  a  good  home  and 
sufficient  food,  and  lives  with  moderation. 


F.PTCTETUS. 


3»9 


these  appearances  by  yourself,  Am  I  able  to  bear,  or  am  I 
not  able  to  bear  ?  What  remains  tor  me  to  do  ?  But  as  if 
all  your  affairs  were  well  and  secure,  you  have  been 
resting  on  the  third  topic,*  that  of  things  being  un- 
changed, in  order  that  you  may  posse.--.*  unchanged — 
what?  cowardice,  mean  spirit,  the  admiration  of  the  rich, 
desire  without  attaining  any  end,  and  avoidance  (fcdcXtou-) 
which  fails  in  the  attempt  ':  About  security  in  these  things 
you  have  been  anxious. 

Ought  you  not  to  have  gained  something  in  addition  from 
reason,  and  then  to  have  protected  this  with  security?  And 
whom  did  you  ever  see  building  a  battlement  all  round 
and  not  encircling  it  with  a  wall  ?  f  And  what  door- 
keeper is  placed  with  no  door  to  watch  ?  But  you  practice 
in  order  to  be  able  to  prove — what  ?  Vou  practice  that 
you  may  not  be  tossed  as  on  the  sea  through  soph: 
and  tossed  about  from  what  ?  .Show  me  first  what  you 
hold,  what  you  measure,  or  what  you  weigh  ;  and  show 
me  the  scales  or  the  mcdimnus  (the  measure) ;  or  how  long 
will  you  go  on  measuring  the  dust  ?  \  Ought  you  not  to 
demonstrate  those  things  which  make  men  happy,  which 
make  things  go  on  for  them  in  the  way  as  they  wish,  and 
why  we  ought  to  blame  no  man,  accuse  no  man,  and  ac- 
quiesce in  the  administration  of  the  universe?  Show  me 
these.  "See.  I  show  them  :  I  will  resolve  syllogisi: 
you/'  This  is  the  measure',  slave  :  but  it  is  not  the  thing 
measured.  Therefore  you  are  now  paying  the  penalty 
for  what  you  neglected,  philosophy:  you  tremble,  you  lie 
awake,  you  advise  with  all  persons  :  and  if  your  delihera- 

*  See  iii.  c.  2. 

t  "  Plato  using  the  same  simile  teaches  that  last  of  all  disciplines  dia- 
lectic ought  to  be  learned." — Schweighaeuser. 

\  This  is  good  advice.     When  you  propose  to  timate 

things,  you  should  first  tell  us  what  the  thin.  >npt  to 

fL     .ieir  value  ;  and  what  is  the  measure  or  scales  that  you 


320  j'.r/cTi-'.rrs. 

tions  are  not  likely  to  please  all,  you  think  that  you  have 
deliberated  ill.  Then  you  fear  hunger,  as  you  suppose  : 
but  it  is  not  hunger  that  you  fear,  but  you  are  afraid  that 
you  will  not  have  a  cook,  that  you  will  not  have  another 
to  purchase  provisions  for  the  table,  a  third  to  take  off 
your  shoes,  a  fourth  to  dress  you,  others  to  rub  you,  and 
to  follow  you,  in  order  that  in  the  bath,  when  you  have 
taken  off  your  clothes  and  stretched  yourself  out  like  those 
who  are  crucified  you  may  be  rubbed  on  this  side  and  on 
that,  and  then  the  aliptes  (rubber)  may  say  (to  the  slave), 
Change  his  position,  present  the  side,  take  hold  of  his 
head,  show  the  shoulder  :  and  then  when  you  have  left 
the  bath  and  gone  home,  you  may  call  out,  Does  no  one 
bring  something  to  eat  ?  And  then,  Take  away  the  tables, 
sponge  them  :  you  are  afraid  of  this,  that  you  may  not  be 
able  to  lead  the  life  of  a  sick  man.  But  learn  the  life  of 
those  who  are  in  health,  how  slaves  live,  how  laborers, 
how  those  live  who  are  genuine  philosophers  ;  how  Soc- 
rates lived,  who  had  a  wife  and  children  ;  how  Diogenes 
lived,  and  how  Cleanthes,  *  who  attended  to  the  school 
and  drew  water.  If  you  choose  to  have  these  things,  you 
will  have  them  everywhere,  and  you  will  live  in  full  con- 
fidence. Confiding  in  what?  In  that  alone  in  which  a 
man  can  confide,  in  that  which  is  secure,  in  that  which  is 
not  subject  to  hindrance,  in  that  which  cannot  be  taken 
away,  that  is,  in  your  own  will.  And  why  have  you  made 
yourself  so  useless  and  good  for  nothing  that  no  man  will 
choose  to  receive  you  into  his  house,  no  man  to  take  care 
of  you  ?  but  if  a  utensil  entire  and  useful  were  cast  abroad, 
every  man  who  found  it  would  take  it  up  and  think  it  a 

*  Cleanthes,  the  successor  of  Zeno  in  his  school,  was  a  great  example 
of  the  pursuit  of  knowledge  under  difficulties  :  during  the  nigh  the  used 
to  draw  water  from  the  wells  for  the  use  of  the  gardens :  during  the  day 
he  employed  himself  in  his  studies.  He  was  the  author  of  a  noble  hywn 
to  Zeus,  which  is  extant. 


/•./'/(•/•/•,/y.v.  ^r 

gain  :  but  no  man  will  take  you  up.  and  every  man  will 
consider  you  a  loss.  So  cannot  you  discharge  the  office 
even  of  a  dog,  or  of  a  cock?  Why  then  do  you  choose  to 
live  any  longer,  when  you  are  what  you  are  ? 

Does  any  good  man  fear  that  he  shall  fail  to  have  food? 
To  the  blind  it  does  not  fail,  to  the  lame  it  does  not  :  shall 
it  fail  to  a  good  man  ?  And  to  a  good  soldier  there  does 
not  fail  to  be  one  who  gives  him  pay,  nor  to  a  laborer, 
nor  to  a  shoemaker  :  and  to  the  good  man  shall  there  be 
wanting  such  a  person  ?  *  Does  God  thus  neglect  the 
things  that  he  has  established,  his  ministers,  his  witnesses, 
whom  alone  he  employs  as  examples  to  the  uninstructed, 
both  that  he  exists,  and  administers  well  the  whole,  and 
does  not  neglect  human  affairs,  and  that  to  a  good  man 
there  is  no  evil  either  when  he  is  living  or  when  he  is 
dead  ?  What  then  when  he  does  not  supply  him  with  food  ? 
What  else  does  he  do  than  f  like  a  good  general  he  has 
given  me  the  signal  to  retreat  ?  I  obey,  I  follow,  assenting 
to  the  words  of  the  commander,  praising  his  acts  :  for  I 
came  when  it  pleased  him,  and  I  will  also  go  away  when 
it  pleases  him  :  and  while  I  lived,  it  was  my  duty  to  praise 
God  both  by  myself,  and  to  each  person  severally  and  to 
many. |  He  does  not  supply  me  with  many  things,  nor 
with  abundance,  he  does  not  will  me  to  live  luxuriously; 
for  neither  did  he  supply  Hercules  who  was  his  own  son; 
but  another  (Kurystheus)  was  king  of  Argos  and  Mycenae, 
and  Hercules  obeyed  orders,  and  labored,  and  was  ex- 
ercised. And  Eurystheus  was  what  he  was.  neither  king 
of  Argos  nor  of  Mycenae,  for  he  was  not  even  king  of  him- 
self; but  Hercules  was  ruler  and  leader  of  the  whole  earth 

*  It  seems  strange  that  Kpictetus  should  make  such  assertions  when 
we  know  that  they  are  not  true.  Shortly  after  he  himself  speaks  even 
of  the  good  man  not  being  supplied  with  food  by  God. 

t  See  i.  29,  29.  }  See  i.  16,  15. 

21 


322  KP1CTETUS. 

and  sea,  who  purged  away  lawlessness,  and  introduced 
justice  and  holiness  ;  *  and  he  did  these  things  both  n 
and  alone.  And  when  Ulysses  was  cast  out  shipwrecked, 
did  want  humiliate  him,  did  it  break  his  spirit  ?  but  how 
did  he  go  off  to  the  virgins  to  ask  for  necessaries,  to  beg 
which  is  considered  most  shameful  ?  f 

As  a  lion  bred  in  the  mountains  trusting  in  his  strength. 

Od.  vi.  130. 

Relying  on  what  ?  Not  on  reputation  nor  on  wealth 
nor  on  the  power  of  a  magistrate,  but  on  his  own  strength, 
that  is,  on  his  opinions  about  the  things  which  are  in  our 
power  and  those  which  are  not.  For  these  are  the  only 
things  which  make  men  free,  which  make  them  escape 
from  hindrance,  which  raise  the  head  (neck)  of  those  who 
are  depressed,  which  make  them  look  with  steady  eyes 
on  the  rich  and  on  tyrants.  And  this  was  (is)  the  gift 
given  to  the  philosopher.  But  you  will  not  come  forth 
bold,  but  trembling  about  your  trifling  garments  and 
silver  vessels.  Unhappy  man,  have  you  thus  wasted  your 
time  till  now  ? 

What  then,  if  I  shall  be  sick?  You  will  be  sick  in  such 
a  way  as  you  ought  to  be.  Who  will  take  care  of  me  ? 
God  ;  your  friends.  I  shall  lie  down  on  a  hard  bed.  But 
you  will  lie  down  like  a  man.  I  shall  not  have  a  con- 
venient chamber.  You  will  be  sick  in  an  inconvenient 
chamber.  Who  will  provide  for  me  the  necessary  food  ? 
Those  who  provide  for  others  also.  You  will  be  sick  like 

*  Compare  Hebrews  xi.  and  xii.,  in  which  the  Apostle  and  Philosopher 
reason  in  nearly  the  same  manner  and  even  use  the  same  terms ;  but 
how  superior  is  the  example  urged  by  the  Apostle  to  Hercules  and 
Ulysses !  "—Mrs.  Carter. 

t  The  story  of  Ulysses  asking  Nausicaa  and  her  maids  for  help  when 
he  was  cast  naked  on  the  land  is  in  the  Odyssey,  vi.  127. 


EPICTETUS.  323 

Manes.*  And  what  also  will  be  the  end  of  the  sickness  ? 
Any  other  than  death  ?  Do  you  then  consider  that  this 
the  chief  of  all  evils  to  man  and  the  chief  mark  of  mean 
spirit  and  of  cowardice  is  not  death,  but  rather  the  fear  of 
death?  Against  this  fear  then  I  advise  you  to  exercise 
yourself:  to  this  let  all  your  reasoning  tend,  your  exer- 
cises, and  reading  ;  and  you  will  know  that  thus  only  are 
men  made  free. 

*  Manes  is  a  slave's  name.  Diogenes  had  a  slave  named  Manes,  his 
only  slave,  who  ran  away,  and  though  Diogenes  was  informed  where 
the  slave  was,  he  did  not  think  it  worth  while  to  have  him  brought  back. 
He  said,  it  would  be  a  .shame  if  Manes  could  live  without  Diogenes,  and 
Diogenes  could  not  live  without  Manes. 


BOOK    IV- 

CHAPTER  I. 

ABOTT     FREEDOM. 

HE  is  free  who  lives  as  he  wishes  to  live  :  *  who  is 
neither  subject  to  compulsion  nor  to  hindrance,  nor  to 
force  ;  whose  movements  to  action  are  not  impeded, 
whose  desires  attain  their  purpose,  and  who  does  not  fall 
into  that  which  he  would  avoid.  Who  then  chooses  to 
live  in  error?  No  man.  Who  chooses  to  live  deceived, 
liable  to  mistake,  unjust,  unrestrained,  discontented, 
mean  ?  No  man.  Not  one  then  of  the  bad  lives  as  he 
wishes  ;  nor  is  he  then  free.  And  who  chooses  to  live  in 
sorrow,  fear,  envy,  pity,  desiring  and  failing  in  his  desires, 
attempting  to  avoid  something  and  falling  into  it?  Not 
one.  Do  we  then  find  any  of  the  bad  free  from  sorrow, 
free  from  fear,  who  does  not  fall  into  that  which  he  would 
avoid,  and  does  not  obtain  that  which  he  wishes?  Not 
one  ;  nor  then  do  we  find  any  bad  man  free.f 

If  then  a  man  who  has  been  twice  consul  should  hear 
this,  if  you  add,  But  you  are  a  wise  man  ;  this  is  nothing 
to  you  :  he  will  pardon  you.  But  if  you  tell  him  the  truth, 

*  Cicero,  Paradox,  v.  "  Quid  est  enim  libertas  ?  Potestas  vivendi  ut 
velis.  Quis  igitur  vivit  ut  vult,  nisi  qui  recta  sequitur,"  etc. 

t  "  Whoever  committeth  sin,  is  the  servant  of  sin,"  John  viii.  34. — Mrs 
Carter 

325 


326  I-.r/CTETl'S. 

and  say,  You  differ  not  at  all  from  those  who  have  been 
thrice  sold  as  to  being  yourself  not  a  slave,  what  else 
ought  you  to  expect  than  blows  ?  For  he  says,  What.  I 
a  slave,  I  whose  father  was  free,  whose  mother  was  free, 
I  whom  no  man  can  purchase  :  I  am  also  of  senatorial 
rank,  and  a  friend  of  Csesar,  and  I  have  been  a  consul, 
and  I  own  many  slaves.  In  the  first  place,  most  excel- 
lent senatorial  man,  perhaps  your  father  also  was  a  slave 
in  the  same  kind  of  servitude,  and  your  mother,  and  your 
grandfather  and  all  your  ancestors  in  an  ascending  series. 
But  even  if  they  were  as  free  as  it  is  possible,  what  is  this 
to  you  ?  What  if  they  were  of  a  noble  nature,  and  you  of 
a  mean  nature  ;  if  they  were  fearless,  and  you  a  coward  : 
if  they  had  the  power  of  self-restraint,  and  you  arc  not 
abl«  to  exercise  it. 

And  what,  you  may  say,  has  this  to  do  with  being  a 
slave?  Does  it  seem  to  you  to  be  nothing  to  do  a  thing 
unwillingly,  with  compulsion,  with  groans,  has  this  noth- 
ing to  do  with  being  a  slave  ?  It  is  something,  you  say  : 
but  who  is  able  to  compel  me,  except  the  lord  of  all, 
Csesar?  Then  even  you  yourself  have  admitted  that  you 
have  one  master.  But  that  he  is  the  common  master  of 
all,  as  you  say,  let  not  this  console  you  at  all  :  but  know 
that  you  are  a  slave  in  a  great  family.  So  also  the  people 
of  Nicopolis  are  used  to  exclaim,  By  the  fortune  of  Csesar.  * 
we  are  free. 

However,  if  you  please,  let  us  not  speak  of  Caesar  at 
present.  But  tell  me  this  :  did  you  never  love  any  per- 
son, a  young  girl,  or  slave,  or  free  ?  What  then  is  this 
with  respect  to  being  a  slave  or  free  ?  Were  you  never 
commanded  by  the  person  beloved  to  do  something  which 

*A  usual  form  of  oath.  See  ii.  20,  29.  Upton  compares  the  Roman 
expression  "  Per  Genium,"  as  in  Horace  Epp.  i.  7,  94 : 

Quod  to  per  Genium,  clextramque,  Deosque  Penates 
Obsecro  et  obtestor. 


A/V( 

you  did  not  wish  tu  do?  have  you  never  fluttered  your 
little  slave?  have  you  never  kissed  her  feet?  And  yet  it' 
any  man  compelled  you  to  kiss  CeCSar's  feet,  you  would 
think  it  an  insult  and  excessive  tyranny.  What  else  then 
is  slavery  ?  Did  you  never  go  out  by  night  to  some  place 
whither  you  did  not  Avish  to  go.  did  you  not  expend  what 
you  did  not  wish  to  expend,  did  you  not  utter  words  with 
sighs  and  groans,  did  you  not  submit  to  abuse  and  to  be 
excluded  ?  *  But  if  you  are  ashamed  to  confess  your  own 
acts,  see  Avhat  Thrasonidesf  says  and  does,  who  having 
seen  so  much  military  service  as  perhaps  not  even  you 
have,  first  of  all  went  out  by  night,  when  Cieta  (a  slave) 
does  not  venture  out,  but  if  he  were  compelled  by  his 
master,  would  haA'c  cried  out  much  and  would  have  gone 
out  lamenting  his  bitter  slavery.  Next,  what  does  Thra- 
sonides  say  ?  A  worthless  girl  has  enslaved  me,  me  whom 
no  enemy  ever  did.  Unhappy  man,  who  are  the  slave 
even  of  a  giri,  and  a  worthless  girl.  Why  then  do  you 
still  call  yourself  free?  and  why  do  you  talk  of  your  serv- 
ice in  the  army  ?  Then  he  calls  for  a  sword  and  is  angry 
Avith  him  who  out  of  kindness  refuses  it  ;  and  he  sends 
presents  to  her  who  hates  him,  and  entreats  and  \\  • 
and  on  the  other  hand  having  had  a  little  success  he  is 
elated.  But  even  then  how  ?  was  he  free  enough  neither 
lo  desire  nor  to  fear? 

Now  consider  in  the  case  of  animals,  how  we  employ 

.otion  of  liberty.      Men   keep  tame  lions  shut  up,  and 

feed  them,  and  some  take  them  about  :    and  who  will  say 

*  A  lover's  exclusion  by  his  mistress  \v,is  a  common   topic,  and  a  seri- 
ous cause  of  complaint  (Lucretius,  iv.  117^): 

At  l.tcriiiians  extln-iiis  amat!;r  lini'iaa 
Kloribus  ct  fertis  operit. 

See  also  Horace,  Udes,  i.  25. 

t  Thrasonides  was  a  charact.-r   in  <>uc  of   Mciuuuler's  plays,  entitled 
"  The  Hated." 


328  EP1CTETUS. 

that  this  lion  is  free  ?  *  Is  it  not  the  fact  that  the  more  he 
lives  at  his  ease,  so  much  the  more  he  is  in  a  slavish. 
condition  ?  and  who  if  he  had  perception  and  reason  would 
wish  to  be  one  of  these  lions?  Well,  these  birds  when 
they  are  caught  and  are  kept  shut  up,  how  much  do  they 
suffer  in  their  attempts  to  escape  ?  f  and  some  of  them  die 
of  hunger  rather  than  submit  to  such  a  kind  of  life.  And 
as  many  of  them  as  live,  hardiy  live  and  with  suffering 
pine  away  ;  and  if  they  ever  find  any  opening,  they  make 
their  escape.  So  much  do  they  desire  their  natural  lib- 
erty, and  to  be  independent  and  free  from  hindrance.  And 
what  harm  is  there  to  you  in  this  ?  What  do  you  say  ?  I 
am  formed  by  nature  to  fly  where  I  choose,  to  live  in  the 
open  air,  to  sing  when  I  choose  :  you  deprive  me  of  all 
this,  and  say.  what  harm  is  it  to  you  ?  For  this  reason  we 
shall  say  that  those  animals  only  are  free,  which  cannot 
endure  capture,  but  as  soon  as  they  are  caught,  escape 
from  captivity  by  death.  So  Diogenes  also  somewhere 
says  that  there  is  one  way  to  freedom,  and  that  is  to  die 
content  :  and  he  writes  to  the  Persian  king-,  You  cannot 
enslave  the  Athenian  state  any  more  than  you  ca 
fishes.  How  is  that?  cannot  I  catch  them  ?  If  you  r.urh 
them,  says  Diogenes,  they  will  immediately  leave  yr. 
fishes  do  ;  for  if  you  catch  a  fish,  it  dies- ;  and  if  these  men 
that  are  caught  shall  die,  of  what  use  to  you  is  the  prep- 
aration for  war?  These  are  the  words  of  a  free  man  who 
had  carefully  examined  the  thing,  and,  as  was  natural,  had 
discovered  it.  But  if  you  look  for  it  in  a  different  place 
from  where  it  is,  what  wonder  if  you  never  find  it  ? 

The  slave  wishes  to  be  set  free   immediately.      Why  ? 

*lt  must  have  been  rather  difficult  to  manage  a  tame  lion;  but  we 
read  of  such  things  among  the  Romans.  Seneca,  Epp.  41. 

I  The  keeping  of  birds  in  cages,  parrots  and  others,  was  also  common 
among  the  Romans.  Ovid  (Amor.  ii.  6)  has  written  a  beautiful  elegy  on 
the  death  of  a  favorite  parrot. 


Do  you  think  that  he  wishes  to  pay  money  to  the  collect- 
ors of  twentieths  ?*  No;  but  because  lie  imagines  that 
hitherto  through  not  having  obtained  this,  he  is  hindered 
arid  unfortunate.  If  I  shall  be  set  free,  immediately  it  is 
all  happiness,  I  care  for  no  man,  I  speak  to  all  as  an  equal 
and  like  to  them,  I  go  where  I  choose,  I  come  from  any 
place  I  choose,  and  go  where  I  choose.  Then  he  is  si-t 
free  ;  and  forthwith  having  no  place  where  he  can  eat.  he 
looks  for  some  man  to  flatter,  some  one  with  whom  he 
shall  sup  :  then  he  either  works  with  his  body  and  en- 
dures the  most  dreadful  things  ;  f  and  if  he  can  obtain  a 
manger,  he  falls  into  a  slavery  much  worse  than  his  former 
slavery  ;  or  even  if  he  is  become  rich,  being  a  man  with- 
out any  knowledge  of  what  is  good,  he  loves  some  little 
girl,  and  in  his  happiness  laments  and  desires  to  l>e  a 
slave  again.  He  says,  what  evil  did  I  suffer  in  my  state 
of  slavery  ?  Another  clothed  me,  another  supplied  me 
with  shoes,  another  fed  me,  another  looked  after  me  in 
sickness  ;  and  I  did  only  a  few  services  for  him.  But 
now  a  wretched  man,  what  things  I  suffer,  being  a  slave 
of  many  instead  of  to  one.  But  however,  he  says,  iflshall 
acquire  rings,  J  then  I  shall  live  most  prosperously  and 
happily.  First,  in  order  to  acquire  these  rings,  he  submits 
to  that  which  he  is  worthy  of;  then  when  he  has  acquired 
them,  it  is  again  all  the  same.  Then  he  says,  if  I  shall  be 
engaged  in  military  service,  I  am  free  from  all  evils.  lie 
obtains  military  service.  He  suffers  as  much  as  a  fie 
slave,  and  nevertheless  he  asks  for  a  second  service  and  a 

*  See  ii.  i,  26.  The  Publicani  were  men  who  farmed  this  and  other 
taxes.  A  tax  of  a  twentieth  of  the  value  of  a  slave  when  manumitted 
was  established  at  an  early  time  (Livy,  %-ii.  if>K  It  appears  from  this 
passage  that  the  manumitted  slave  paid  the  tax  out  of  his  savings  (pecu- 
lium).  See  ii.  I,  note  7. 

t  The  reader  may  guess  the  meaning. 

t  A  £o\d  riuj;  was  worn  by  the  Kquites  ;  anil  accordingly  to  desirt-  tin- 
gold  ring  is  the  same  a.s  to  desire  to  be  raised  to  the  Equestrian  class. 


33° 


EPICTRTUS. 


third.  After  this,  when  he  has  put  the  finishing  strok? 
(the  colophon)  *  to  his  career,  and  is  become  a  senator, 
then  he  becomes  a  slave  by  entering  inti.  tlv_  assembly, 
then  he  serves  the  finer  and  most  splendid  slavery — not  to 
be  a  fool,  but  to  learn  what  Social;  taught,  what  is  the 
nature  of  each  thing  lhi-.t  exists,  a:.d  thai  a  maa  should 
not  rashly  adapt  preconception.  t->  the  scv:ral  things 
which  arc.  f  For  this  is  the  cause  to  m~n  of  •.  '1  'heir  evils, 
the  not  being  able  to  adapt  the  gen  .ral  preconceptions  to 
the  several  things.  But  we  have  different  opinions  (about 
the  cause  of  our  evils).  One  man  Ihriks  that  he  is  sick  : 
not  so  however,  but  the  fact  is  that  he  does  not  adapt  his 
preconceptions  right.  Another  thinks  that  he  is  poor; 
another  that  he  has  a  severe  father  :  mother  ;  and  another 
again  that  C'a'sar  is  not  favorahl.,  Lo  him.  But  all  this  is 
one  and  only  one  thing,  the  not  knowing  how  to  adapt 
the  preconceptions.  For  who  ..a^  no;  a  preconception  of 
that  which  is  bad,  that  it  in  hurtful,  that  it  ought  to  be 
avoided,  that  it  ought  in  every  way  to  be  guarded  against  ? 
One  preconception  is  not  repugnant  to  another,  J  only 
where  it  comes  to  the  matter  of  adaptation.  What  then 
is  this  evil,  which  is  both  hurtful,  and  a  thing  to  be 
avoided  ?  He  answers  not  to  be  Qesar's  friend.  He  is 
gone  far  from  the  mark,  he  has  missed  the  adaptation,  he 
is  embarrassed,  he  seeks  the  things  which  are  not  at  all 
pertinent  to  the  matter  ;  for  when  he  has  succeeded  in 
being  Caesar's  friend,  nevertheless  he  has  failed  in  finding 
what  he  sought.  For  what  ij  that  which  every  man 
seeks  ?  To  live  secure,  to  be  happy,  to  do  everything  as 
he  wishes,  not  to  be  hindered,  nor  compelled.  When 
then  he  is  become  the  friend  of  Caesar,  is  he  free  from 
hindrance  ?  free  from  compulsion,  is  he  tranquil,  is  he 

*  The  Colophon.  See  page  1 54,  note.  After  the  words  "  most 
splended  slavery"  it  is  probable  that  some  \vordshaveaccidentallybeen 
omitted  in  the  MSS.  I  Compare  i.  2,  6.  \  Compare  i.  22. 


EPh 


33' 


happy?     Of  whom  shall  we  inquire  ?     What  more  trust- 
worthy witness  have  we  than  this  very  man  who  is  become 
Caesar's  friend?     Come  forward  and  tell  us  when  did 
sleep  more  quietly,  now  or  before  you  became  Ceesur'h 
friend?     Immediately  you  hear  the  answer,  Stop,  I  entreat 

and  do  not  mock  me  :  you  know  not  what  mi.- 
i  .  after,  and  sleep  doe.s  not  come  to  me  ;  but  one  comes 
and  says,  Ca>sar  is  already  awake,  he  is  now  going  forth  : 
then  come  troubles  .ml  fires.  Well,  when  did  you  sup 
with  more  pleasure,  now  or  before?  Hear  what  he  says 
about  this  also.  He  says  that  if  he  is  not  invited,  he  is 
pained  :  and  if  he  is  invited,  he  sups  like  a  slave  with  his 
master,  all  the  w.iilo  being  anxious  that  he  >t  say 

or  do  anything  foolish.  And  what  -lo  you  suppose  that 
he  is  afraid  of ;  lest  h ;  should  be  lashed  like  a  slave  ? 
How  can  he  expe--'  ,-  ny*hin^  so  good?  No,  but  as  bjfits 
so  great  a  man,  Caesar's  iri^nd,  he  is  afraid  that  he  may 
lose  his  head.  And  when  did  you  bathe  more  free 
trouble,  and  take  your  gymnastic,  exercise  more  quietly? 
In  line,  which  kind  of  life  did  you  prefer?  your  presenior 
your  former  life  ?  I  can  swear  that  no  man  is  so  stupid 
or  so  ignorant  of  truth  as  not  to  bewail  his  own  mis- 
fortunes the  nearer  he  is  in  friendship  to  Ca- 

Since  then  neither  those  who  are  called  kings  live  as 
they  choose,  nor  the  friends  of  kings,  who  finally  are  those 
who  are  free  ?  Seek,  and  you  will  find  ;  for  you  have  aids 
from  nature  for  the  discovery  of  truth.  But  if  you  are  not 
able  yourself  by  going  along  these  ways  only  to  discover 
that  which  follows,  listen  to  those  who  have  made  the  in- 
quiry. What  do  they  say  ?  Does  freedom  seem  to  you  a 
good  thing?  The  greatest  good.  I.  it  possible  then  that 
he  who  obtains  the  greatest  '*ood  can  be  unhappy  or  fare 
badly?  No.  Whomsoever  then  you  shall  see  unhappy, 
unfortunate,  lamenting,  confidently  declare  that  they  are 
not  free.  I  do  declare  it.  We  have  now  then  got  away 


332  /-.wr  •/•/•: 

from  buying  and  selling  and  from  such  arrangements 
about  matters  of  property  ;  for  if  you  have  rightly  assented 
to  these  matters,  if  the  great  king  (the  Persian  king)  is 
unhappy,  he  cannot  be  free,  nor  can  a  little  king,  nor  a 
man  of  consular  rank,  nor  one  who  has  been  twice  con 
sul.  Be  it  so. 

Further  then  answer  me  this  question  also,  does  freedom 
seem  to  you  to  be  something  great  and  noble  and  valuable  ? 
How  should  it  not  seem  so  ?  Is  it  possible  then  when 
a  man  obtains  anything  so  great  and  valuable  and  noble 
to  be  mean  ?  It  is  not  possible.  When  then  you  see  any 
man  subject  to  another  or  flattering  him  contrary  to  his 
own  opinion,  confidently  affirm  that  this  man  also  is  not 
free  ;  ;.nd  not  only  if  he  do  this  for  a  bit  of  supper,  but 
also  if  he  does  it  for  a  government  (province)  or  a  consul- 
ship :  and  call  these  men  little  slaves  vho  for  the  sake  of  lit- 
tle matters  do  these  things,  and  those  who  do  so  for  the  sake 
of  great  things  call  great  slaves,  as  they  deserve  to  be. 
This  is  admitted  also.  Do  you  think  that  freedom  is  a 
thing  independent  and  self-governing  ?  Certainly.  Whom- 
soever then  it  is  in  the  power  of  another  to  hinder  and 
compel,  declare  that  he  is  not  free.  And  do  not  look,  I 
entreat  you,  after  his  grandfathers  and  great-grandfathers, 
or  inquire  about  his  being  bought  or  sold  ;  but  if  you 
hear  him  saying  from  his  heart  and  with  feeling,  "  Mas- 
ter," even  if  the  twelve  fasces  precede  him  (as  consul), 
call  him  a  slave.  And  if  you  hear  him  say,  "Wretch 
that  I  am,  how  much  I  suffer,"  call  him  a  slave.  If  finally 
you  see  him  lamenting,  complaining-,  unhappy,  call  him  a 
slave  though  he  wears  a  praetexta.  *  If  then  he  is  doing 
nothing  of  this  kind,  do  not  yet  say  that  he  is  free,  but 
learn  his  opinions,  whether  they  are  subject  to  compul- 
sion, or  may  produce  hindrance,  or  to  bad  fortune  ;  and 

*Sic  praetextatos  referunt  Artaxata  mores. — Juv.  ii.  170. 
See  page  10,  note. 


EPICTETUS.  333 

if  you  find  him  such,  call  him  a  slave  who  has  a  holiday 
in  the  Saturnalia  :  *  say  that  his  master  is  from  home  : 
lie  will  return  soon,  and  you  will  know  what  he  suffers. 
Who  will  return  ?  Whoever  has  in  himself  the  power 
over  anything  which  is  desired  by  the  man,  either  to  give 
it  to  him  or  to  take  it  away  ?  Thus  then  have  we 
many  masters?  We  have:  for  we  have  circumstances 
as  masters  prior  to  our  present  masters  ;  and  these  cir- 
cumstances are  many.  Therefore  it  must  of  necessity  be 
that  those  who  have  the  power  over  any  of  these  circum- 
stances must  be  our  masters.  For  no  man  fears  Caesar 
himself,  hut  he  fears  death,  banishment,  deprivation  of 
his  property,  prison,  and  disgrace.  Nor  does  any  man 
love  Caesar,  unless  Caesar  is  a  person  of  great  merit,  but 
he  loves  wealth,  the  office  of  tribune,  praetor  or  consul. 
When  we  love,  and  hate  and  fear  these  things,  it  must  be 
that  those  who  have  the  power  over  them  must  be  our 
masters.  Therefore  we  adore  them  even  as  gods  ;  for 
we  think  that  what  possesses  the  power  of  conferring  the 
gieatest  advantage  on  us  is  di'  ;>.<  1  h«-n  we  \n> 
assume  that  a  certain  person  has  the  power  ot  cent- 
the  greater-!  advantages  ;  therefore  lit-  is  something  divine. 
For  if  we  wrongly  assume  that  a  certain  person  ha 
power  of  conferring  the  greatest  advantages,  it  '.  a  nec- 
essary consequence  that  the  conclusion  trom  those 
premises  must  be  false. 

What  then  is  that  which  makes  a  man  iree  from  hin- 
drance and  makes  him  his  own  master?  For  wealth  does 
not  do  it,  nor  consulship,  nor  provincial  government,  nor 
royal  power;  but  something  else  iiuiht  be  diM  mrered. 

turnalia.     See    ]>age    81,    note.      At    iliis  season    the    slaves    h.ul 
lilfcrty  to  enjoy  thriu-.-lvr  -  and  to  t.ilk  lu-cly  with  ilit-ir  masters.      Hem  r 

yi   ^  i'     '•''•-  " 

;!>c!Ulc  JJciembri, 
I  .  ita  mujurvs  voluerum,    utere. 


334  EPICTETUS. 

What  then  is  that  which  \vhen  we  write  makes  us  free  fro n\ 
hindrance  and  unimpeded?  The  knowledge  of  the  art  of 
writing.  What  then  is  it  in  playing-  the  lute  ?  The  science 
of  playing-  the  lute.  Therefore  in  life  also  it  is  the  science 
of  life.  You  have  then  heard  in  a  general  way  :  but  ex- 
amine the  thing  also  in  the  several  parts.  Is  it  possible 
that  he  who  desires  any  of  the  things  which  depend  on 
others  can  be  free  from  hindrance  ?  No.  Is  it  possible 
for  him  to  be  unimpeded  ?  No.  Therefore  he  cannot  be 
free.  Consider  then  :  whether  we  have  nothing  which  is 
in  our  own  power  only,  or  whether  we  have  all  things,  or 
whether  some  things  are  in  our  own  power,  and  others  in 
the  power  of  others.  What  do  you  mean  ?  When  you 
wish  the  body  to  be  entire  (sound),  is  it  in  your  power  or 
not?  It  is  not  in  my  power.  When  you  wish  it  to  be 
healthy  ?  Neither  is  this  in  my  power.  When  you  wish 
it  to  be  handsome?  Nor  is  this.  Life  or  death?  Neither 
is  this  in  my  power.  Your  body  then  is  another's,  sub- 
ject to  every  man  who  is  stronger  than  yourself?  It 
is.  But  your  estate,  is  it  in  your  power  to  have  it  when 
you  please,  and  as  long  as  you  please,  and  such  as  you 
please?  No.  And  your  slaves  ?  No.  And  your  cloth-- '- ? 
Xo.  And  your  house  ?  No.  And  your  horses?  Not  one 
of  these  things.  And  if  you  wish  by  all  means  your 
children  to  live,  or  your  wife,  or  your  brother,  or  your 
friends,  is  it  in  your  power  ?  This  also  is  not  in  my 
power. 

Whether  then  have  you  nothing  which  is  in  your  own 
power,  which  depends  on  yourself  only  and  cannot  be 
taken  from  you,  or  have  you  anything  of  the  kind?  I 
know  not.  Look  at  the  thing  then  thus,  and  examine  it. 
Is  any  man  able  to  make  you  assent  to  that  which  is 
false  ?  *  No  man.  In  the  matter  of  assent  then  you  are  free 

*  He  means  that  which  seems  to  you  to  be  false.  See  iii  22,  .\2. 
"  In  the  matter  of  assent  then,"  this  is  the  third  "  locus  "  or  division  in 


A/V 


335 


from  hindrance  and  obstruction.  Granted.  Well  :  and 
can  a  man  force  you  to  desire  to  move  toward  that  to 
which  you  do  not  choose?  He  can,  for  when  he  threatens 
me  with  death  or  bonds,  he  compels  me  to  desire  to  move 
toward  it.  If  then,  you  despise  death  ami  bonds,  do  you 
still  pay  any  regard  to  him  ?  X<>.  Is  tlu-n  the  despising 
of  death  an  act  of  your  own  or  is  it  not  yours?  It  is  my 
act.  It  is  your  own  act  then  also  to  desire  to  move  toward 
a  thing  :  or  is  it  not  so?  It  is  my  own  act.  But  to  desire 
to  move  away  from  a  thing,  whose  act  is  that  ?  This  also 
is  your  act.  What  then  if  I  have  attempted  to  walk,  sup- 
pose another  should  hinder  me.  What  part  of  you  does  he 
hinder?  does  he  hinder  the  faculty  of  assent?  No  :  but 
my  poor  body.  Yes,  as  he  would  do  with  a  stone. 
Granted  :  but  I  no  longer  walk.  And  who  told  you  that 
walking  is  your  act  free  from  hindrance?  for  I  said  that 
this  only  was  tree  from  hindrance,  to  desire  to  move  :  but 
where  there  is  need  of  body  and  its  co-operation,  you  have 
heard  long  ago  that  nothing  is  your  own.  Granted  this 

philosophy  (iii.  2.  1-5).  As  to  the  Will,  compare  i.  17,  note  10. 
Kpictetus  affirms  that  a  man  cannot  be  compelled  to  assent,  that  is  to 
admit,  to  allow,  or,  to  use  another  word,  to  believe  in  that  which 
to  him  to  be  false,  or,  to  use  the  same  word  again,  to  believe  in  that  in 
which  he  does  not  believe.  When  the  Christian  uses  the  two  creeds, 
which  begin  with  the  words,  "  I  believe,"  etc.,  he  knows  or  he  ought  to 
know,  that  he  cannot  compel  an  unbeliever  to  accept  the  same  belief. 
He  may  by  pains  and  penalties  of  various  kinds  compel  some  persons  to 
or  to  f.\nrc-s  the  same  belief:  but  as  no  pains  or  penalties  could 
compel  some  Christians  to  deny  their  belief,  so  I  suppose  that  perhaps 
there  are  men  who  could  not  be  compelled  to  express  their  belief  when 
they  have-  it  not.  The  ca>e  of  the  believer  and  the  unbeliever  however 
are  not  the  same.  The  believer  may  V-  strengthened  in  his  belief  by 
the  belief  that  he  will  in  sonic  way  be  punished  by  God,  if  he  denies  that 
which  he  ]>•  i'he  unbeliever  will  not  have  the  same  mot 

reason  for  not  expressing  his  assent  to  that  which  he  does  not  believe. 
He  believes  that  it  is  and  will  be  all  the  same  to  him  with  respect  to 
God,  whether  he  gives  his  absent  to  that  which  he  does  not  believe  or 


336  EPICTETl'S. 

also.  And  who  can  compel  you  to  desire  what  you  do  not 
wish?  No  man.  And  to  propose  or  intend,  or  in  short  to 
make  use  of  the  appearances  which  present  themselves, 
can  any  man  corhpel  you  ?'  He  cannot  do  this  :  but  he 
will  hinder  me  when  I  desire  from  obtaining'  what  I  de- 
sire. If  you  desire  anything  which  is  your  own,  and  one 
of  the  thing-s  which  cannot  be  hindered,  how  will  he  hin- 
der you  ?  He  cannot  in  any  way.  Who  then  tells  you 
that  he  who  desires  the  things  that  belong  to  another  is 
free  from  hindrance  ? 

Must  I  then  not  desire  health  ?  By  no  means,  nor  any- 
thing else  that  belongs  to  another  :  for  what  is  not  in  your 
power  to  acquire  or  to  keep  when  you  please,  this  belongs 
to  another.  Keep  then  far  from  it  not  only  your  hands, 
but  more  than  that,  even  your  desires.  If  you  do  not,  you 
have  surrendered  yourself  as  a  slave  ;  you  have  subjected 
your  neck,  if  you  admire  anything  not  your  own,  to  every- 
thing that  is  dependent  on  the  power  of  others  and  perish- 
able, to  which  you  have  conceived  a  liking.  Is  not  my 


hi-  A,-,-tnt  1  here  remains  nothing  then  t...  u&ubie  lain  it  he 
expresses  his  asseni  to  that  which  he  does  not  believe,  except  the 
the  opinion  of  those  who  know  that  he  does  not  believe,  or  his  own 
reflections  on  expressing  his  assent  to  that  which  he  does  not  believe  ; 
oi  in  other  words  his  publication  of  a  lie,  which  may  probably  do  no 
harm  to  any  man  or  in  any  way.  I  believe  that  some  men  are  strong 
enough,  under  some  circumstances  at  least,  to  refuse  their  assent  to 
anything  which  they  do  not  believe;  but  I  do  not  affirm  that  they  would 
do  this  under  all  circumstances.  To  return  to  the  matter  under  con- 
sideration, a  man  cannot  be  compelled  by  any  power  to  accept  volun- 
tarily a  thing  as  true,  when  he  believes  that  it  is  not  true;  and  tliU  .u  t 
of  his  is  quite  independent  of  the  matter  whether  his  unbelief  is  well 
founded  or  not.  He  does  not  believe  because  he  cannot  believe.  Vet 
it  is  said  (Mark  xvi.  16)  in  the  received  text,  as  it  now  stands,  "  He  that 
believeth  and  is  baptized  shall  be  saved;  but  he  that  believeth  not,  shall 
be  damned  "  (condemned).  The  cause,  as  it  is  called,  of  this  unbelief  is 
explained  by  some  theologians  ;  but  all  men  do  not  admit  the  expla- 
nation to  be  sufficient  ;  and  it  does  not  concern  the  present  subject. 


•  77:  77 -.V. 


337 


hand  my  own  •  It  is  a  part  of  your  o\vn  body  ;  but  it  is 
by  nature  earth,  subject  to  hindrance,  compulsion,  and  the 
slave  of  everything  which  is  stronger.  And  why  do  I  say 
your  hand  ?  You  ought  to  possess  your  whole  body  as  a 
poor  ass  loaded,  as  long  as  it  is  possible,  as  long  as  you 
are  allowed.  But  if  there  be  a  press,*  and  a  soldier  should 
lay  hold  of  it,  let  it  go,  do  not  resist,  nor  murmur  ;  if  you 
do,  you  will  receive  blows,  and  nevertheless  you  will  also 
lose  the  ass.  But  when  you  ought  to  feel  thus  with  re- 
spect to  the  body,  consider  what  remains  to  be  done  about 
all  the  rest,  which  is  provided  for  the  sake  of  the  body. 
When  the  body  is  an  ass,  all  the  other  things  are  bits  be- 
longing to  the  ass,  pack-saddles,  shoes, f  barley,  fodder. 
Let  these  also  go  :  get  rid  of  them  quicker  and  more  read- 
ily than  of  the  ass. 

When  you  have  made  this  preparation,  and  have  prac- 
ticed this  discipline,  to  distinguish  that  which  belongs  to 
another  from  that  which  is  your  own,  the  things  which  are 
subject  to  hindrance  from  those  which  are  not,  to  consider 
the  things  free  from  hindrance  to  concern  yourself,  and 
those  which  are  not  free  not  to  concern  yourself,  to  keep 
your  desire  steadily  fixed  to  the  things  which  do  concern 
yourself,  and  turned  from  the  things  which  do  not  concern 
yourself;  do  you  still  fear  any  man  ?  No  one.  For  about 
what  will  you  be  afraid?  about  the  things  which  are  your 
own,  in  which  consists  the  nature  of  good  and  evil  ?  and 
who  has  power  over  these  things  ?  who  can  take  them 
away  ?  who  can  impede  them  ?  No  man  can,  no  more 
than  he  can  impede  God.  But  will  you  be  afraid  about 

*The  Greek  word  is  of  1'ersian  origin  (Herodotus,  viii.  98).  Il 
means  here  the  seizure  of  animals  for  military  purposes  when  it  is 
necessary. 

t  Here  he  speaks  of  asses  being  shod.     The  Latin  translation  of  the 
Word  in  Epictetus  is  "  fern-it  taK :e-."     I  <uppose  tlu-y  could  use  nothing 
but  iron. 
22 


33$  i-'.rrcTF.rrs. 

your  body  and  your  possessions,  about  things  which  are 
not  yours,  about  things  which  in  no  way  concern  you  ? 
and  what  else  have  you  been  studying  from  the  beginning 
than  to  distinguish  between  your  own  and  not  your  own. 
the  things  which  are  in  your  power  and  not  in  your 
power,  the  things  subject  to  hindrance  and  not  subject? 
and  why  have  you  come  to  the  philosophers  ?  was  it  that 
you  may  nevertheless  be  unfortunate  and  unhappy?  You 
will  then  in  this  way,  as  I  have  supposed  you  to  have 
done,  be  without  fear  and  disturbance.  And  what  is  grief 
to  you  ?  for  fear  comes  from  what  you  expect,  but  grief 
from  that  which  is  present.  But  what  further  will  you 
desire  ?  For  of  the  things  which  are  within  the  power  of 
the  will,  as  being  good  and  present,  you  have  a  proper 
and  regulated  desire  :  but  of  the  things  which  are  not  in 
the  power  of  the  will  you  do  not  desire  any  one,  and  so 
you  do  not  allow  anyplace  to  that  which  is  irrational,  and 
impatient,  and  above  measure  hasty. 

When  then  you  are  thus  affected  toward  things,  what 
man  can  any  longer  be  formidable  to  you  ?  For  what  has 
a  man  which  is  formidable  to  another,  either  when  you  see 
him  or  speak  to  him  or  finally  are  conversant  with  him  ? 
Not  more  than  one  horse  has  with  respect  to  another,  or 
one  dog  to  another,  or  one  bee  to  another  bee.  Things 
indeed  are  formidable  to  every  man  ;  and  when  any  man  is 
able  to  confer. these  things  on  another  or  to  take  them 
away,  then  he  too  becomes  formidable.  How  then  is  an 
acropolis  (a  stronghold  or  fortress,  the  seat  of  tyranny) 
demolished  ?  Not  by  the  sword,  not  by  fire,  but  by  opinion. 
For  if  we  abolish  the  acropolis  which  is  in  the  city,  can  we 
abolish  also  that  of  fever,  and  :ha;  of  beautiful  women  ? 
Can  we  in  a  word  abolish  the  acropolis  which  is  in  us  and 
cast  out  the  tyrants  within  us,  whom  we  have  daily  over 
us,  sometimes  the  same  tyrants,  at  other  times  different 
t3rranis  ?  But  with  this  we  must  begin,  and  with  this  we 


330 


must  demolish  the  acropolis  ;n  the  tyrnn: 

ing  up  the  body,  the  parts  of  it.  the  faculties  of  it,  the 
ssions,  the  reputation,  magisterial  oflices,  honors, 
children,  brothers,  friends,  by  considering  all  these  things 
as  belonging  to  others.  And  if  tyrants  have  been  rieeted 
from  us,  why  do  I  still  shut  in  the  acropolis  by  a  wall  of 
circumvallation,*  at  least  on  my  account  ;  for  if  it  still 
stands,  what  does  it  do  to  me?  why  do  1  still  eject  (the 
tyrant's)  guards  ?  For  where  do  I  perceive  them?  against 
others  they  have  their  fasces,  and  their  spears  and  their 
swords.  But  I  have  never  been  hindered  in  my  will,  nor 
compelled  when  1  did  not  will.  And  how  is  this  possible  ? 
1  have  placed  my  movements  toward  action  in  obedience 
to  (iod.f  Is  it  his  will  that  I  shall  have  fever?  It  is  my 
will  also.  Is  it  his  will  that  I  should  move  toward  any- 
thing? It  is  my  will  also.  Is  it  his  will  that  I  should 
obtain  anything?  It  is  my  wish  also.  Does  he  not  will? 
I  do  not  wish.  Is  it  his  will  that  1  die-,  is  it  his  will  that 
I  be  put  to  the  rack?  It  is  my  will  then  to  die  :  it  is  my 
will  then  to  be  put  to  the  rack.  Who  then  is  still  able  to 
hinder  me  contrary  to  my  own  judgment,  or  to  compel 
No  more  than  he  can  hinder  or  compel  Xeus. 

.•.•  purpose  of  circumvallation  \va-  to  Mke  and  sometimes    also    to 
,  a  fortress.     Schweig.     translates  the  word  by    '•  destruam,"  and 
-  perhaps  not  contrary  to  the  meaning  of  the  text  ;  but  it   is    not 
x.ict  meaning  of  the  word. 


t  In  this  passage  and  in  what  follows  we  find  the  emphatic  affirmation 
of  the  duty  of  conformity  and  of  the  subjection  of  man's  will  to  the  will 
of  Ciod.     The  words  are  conclusive  evidence  of  the  doctrine  of  Kpictetus 
that   a  man  ought  to  subject  himself  in  all  things  to  the  wil' 
to   that  which  he  belit  \io  will  of  (i.-nl.     Xo  Christian    martyr 

tvi-r  proclaimed  a  more  solemn  olx:dience  to  God's  will.  The  Christian 
martyr  indeed  has  given  perfect  proof  of  his  sincerity  by  enduring  tor- 
ments and  death  :  the  heathen  philosopln.-r  xv.is  not  put  to  the  same 
ii  we  cannot  therefore  say  that  he  would  have  been  able  to  bear 
it. 


340 

Thus  the  more  cautious  of  travelers  also  act.  A  trav- 
eler has  heard  that  the  road  is  infested  by  robbers  ;  he 
does  not  venture  to  enter  on  it  alone,  but  he  waits  for  the 
companionship  on  the  road  either  of  an  ambassador,  or  of 
a  quaestor,  or  of  a  proconsul,  and  when  he  has  attached 
himself  to  such  persons  he  goes  along  the  road  safely. 
So  in  the  world  the  wise  man  acts.  There  are  many  com- 
panies of  robbers,  tyrants,  storms,  difficulties,  losses  of 
that  which  is  dearest.  Where  is  there  any  place  of  refuge  ? 
how  shall  he  pass  along  without  being  attacked  by  rob- 
bers ?  what  company  shall  he  wait  for  that  he  may  pass 
along  in  safety?  to  whom  shall  he  attach  himself ?  To 
what  person  generally  ?  to  the  rich  man,  to  the  man  of 
consular  rank  ?  and  what  is  the  use  of  that  to  me  ?  Such 
a  man  is  stripped  himself,  groans  and  laments.  But  what 
if  the  fellow-companion  himself  turns  against  me  and 
becomes  my  robber,  what  shall  I  do?  I  will  be  a  friend 
of  Caesar  :  when  I  am  Caesar's  companion  no  man  will 
wrong  me.  In  the  first  place,  that  I  may  become  illustri- 
ous, what  things  must  I  endure  and  suffer?  how  often 
and  by  how  many  must  I  be  robbed  ?  Then,  if  I  become 
Caesar's  friend,  he  also  is  mortal.  And  if  Caesar  from  any 
circumstance  becomes  my  enemy,  where  is  it  best  for  me 
to  retire  ?  Into  a  desert  ?  Well,  does  fever  not  come 
there  ?  What  shall  be  done  then  ?  Is  it  not  possible  to 
find  a  safe  fellow-traveler,  a  faithful  one,  strong,  secure 
against  all  surprises  ?  Thus  he  considers  and  perceives 
that  if  he  attaches  himself  to  God,  he  will  make  his  jour- 
ney in  safety. 

How  do  you  understand  "  attaching  yourself  to  God  ?  " 
In  this  sense,  that  whatever  God  wills,  a  man  also  shall 
will :  and  what  God  does  not  will,  a  man  also  shall  not 
will.  How  then  shall  this  be  done  ?  In  what  other  way 
than  by  examining  the  movements  of  God  and  his  admin- 
istration ?  What  has  he  given  to  me  as  my  own  and  in 


my  own  power?  what  has  he  reserved  to  himself?  He 
has  given  to  me  the  things  which  are  in  the  power  of  the 
will  :  he  has  put  them  in  my  power  free  from  impediment 
and  hindrance.  How  was  he  able  to  make  the  earthly 
body  free  from  hindrance?  [He  could  not],  and  accord- 
ingly he  has  subjected  to  the  revolution  of  the  whole  pos- 
sessions, household  things,  house,  children,  wife.  Why 
then  do  I  fight  against  God?  why  do  I  will  what  does  not 
depend  on  the  will  ?  why  do  I  will  to  have  absolutely 
what  is  not  granted  to  me?  But  how  ought  I  to  will  to 
have  things?  In  the  way  in  which  they  are  given  and 
as  long  as  they  are  given.  But  he  who  has  given  takes 
away.*  Why  then  do  I  resist?  I  do  not  say  that  I  shall 
be  a  fool  if  I  use  force  to  one  who  is  stronger,  but  I  shall 
first  be  unjust.  For  whence  had  I  things  when  I  came 
into  the  world  ?  My  father  gave  them  to  me.  And  who  , 
gave  them  to  him  ?  and  who  made  the  sun  ?  and  who 
made  the  fruits  of  the  earth  ?  and  who  the  seasons  ?  and 
who  made  the  connection  of  men  with  one  another  and 
their  fellowship  ? 

Then  after  receiving  everything  from  another  and  even 
yourself,  are  you  angry  and  do  you  blame  the  giver  if  tie 
take.-,  anything  from  you?  Who  are  you,  and  tor  what 
purpose  did  you  come  into  the  world  ?  Did  not  he  (God) 
introduce  you  here,  did  he  not  show  you  the  light,  did  he 
not  give  you  fellow-workers,  and  perception  and  reason  ? 
and  as  whom  did  he  introduce  you  here  ?  did  he  not  intro- 
duce you  as  subject  to  death,  and  as  one  to  live  on  the 
earth  with  a  little  flesh,  and  to  observe  his  administration, 
and  to  join  with  him  in  the  spectacle  and  the  festival  for 
a  short  time?  Will  you  not  then  as  long  as  you  have 
been  permitted,  after  seeing  the  spectacle  and  the  solem- 
nity, when  he  leads  you  out.  go  with  adoration  of  him 

*  "  The  Lord  gave  and  the  Lord  hath  t.ik.-n  aw.iy.  Job  i.  ji." — Mrs. 
Carter. 


34-' 


EriCTKTUS. 


and  thanks  for  what  you  have  boon  and  heard  ?  Xo  ;  hut 
I  would  still  enjoy  the  feast.  The  initiated  too  would 
wish  to  be  longer  in  the  initiation  :*  and  perhaps  also 
those  at  Olympia  to  see  other  athletes  :  but  the  solemnity 
is  ended  :  go  away  like  a  grateful  and  modest  man  :  make 
room  for  others  :  others  also  must  be  born,  as  you  were, 
and  being  born  they  must  have  a  place,  and  houses  and 
necessary  things.  And  if  the  first  do  not  retire,  what  re- 
mains ?  Why  are  you  insatiable?  Why  are  you  not  con- 
tent? why  do  you  contract  the  world?  Yes,  but  I  would 
have  my  little  children  with  me  and  my  wife.  What,  are 
they  yours  ?  do  they  not  belong  to  the  giver,  and  to  him 
who  made  you  ?  then  will  you  not  give  up  what  belongs 
to  others  ?  will  you  not  give  way  to  him  who  is  superior? 
Why  then  did  he  introduce  me  into  the  world  on  these 
conditions?  And  if  the  conditions  do  not  suit  you. 
depart,  t  He  has  110  need  of  a  spectator  who  is  not  satis- 
fied. He  wants  those  who  join  in  the  festival,  those  who 
take  part  in  the  chorus,  that  they  may  rather  applaud, 
admire,  and  celebrate  with  hymns  the  solemnity.  But 
those  who  can  bear  no  trouble,  and  the  cowardly  he  will 
not  unwillingly  see  absent  from  the  great  assembly;  for 

*The  initiated  are  tho.se  who  were  introduced  with  solemn  ceremonies 
into  some  great  religious  body.  These  ceremonies  are  described  by 
Dion  Prus.  Oral,  xii.,  quoted  by  Upton. 

t  He  is  addressing  men  who  were  not  Christians,  but  were,  as  he  as- 
sumes, believers  in  God  or  in  the  Gods,  and  his  argument  is  that  a  man 
ought  to  be  contented  with  things  as  they  are,  because  they  are  from 
God.  If  he  cannot  be  contented  with  things  as  they  are,  and  make  the 
best  of  them,  the  philosopher  can  say  no  more  to  the  man.  He  tells 
him  to  depart.  What  else  could  he  say  to  a  grumbler,  who  is  also  a 
believer  in  God?  If  he  is  not  a  believer,  Epictetus  might  say  the  same 
to  him  also.  The  case  is  past  help  or  advice.  The  Christian  doctrine, 
of  which  probably  Epictetus  knew  nothing,  is  very  different.  It  promises 
future  happiness  on  certain  <_oimitions  to  Christians,  but  to  Christians 
only,  if  I  understand  it  right. 


343 

they  did  not  when  they  were  present  behave  as  they  ought 
to  do  at  a  festival  nor  fill  up  their  place  properly,  but  they 
lamented,  found  fault  with  the  deity,  fortune,  their  com- 
panions ;  not  seeing  both  what  they  had,  and  their  own 
powers,  which  they  received  for  contrary  purposes,  the 
powers  of  magnanimity,  of  a  generous  mind,  manly  spirit, 
and  what  we  are  now  inquiring  about,  freedom.  For 
what  purpose  then  have  I  received  these  things  ?  To  use 
them.  How  long?  So  long  as  he  who  has  lent  them 
chooses.  What  if  they  are  necessary  to  me:  Do  not 
attach  yourself  to  them  and  they  will  not  be  necessary: 
do  not  say  to  yourself  that  they  are  necessary,  and  then 
they  are  not  necessary. 

This  study  you  ought  to  practice  from  morning  to  even- 
ing, beginning  with  the  smallest  things  and  those  most 
liable  to  damage,  with  an  earthen  pot.  with  a  cup.  Then 
proceed  in  this  way  to  a  tunic,  to  a  little  dog,  to  a  horse, 
to  a  small  estate  in  land  :  then  to  yourself,  to  your  body, 
to  the  parts  of  your  body,  to  your  children,  to  your  wife, 
to  your  brothers.  Look  all  round  and  throw  these  things 
from  you  (which  are  not  yours).  Purge  your  opinions,  so 
that  nothing  cleave  to  you  of  the  things  which  are  not 
your  own,  that  nothing  grow  to  you,  that  nothing  give 
you  pain  when  it  is  torn  from  you  ;  and  say.  while  you 
are  daily  exercising  yourself  as  you  do  there  (in  the 
school),  not  that  you  are  philosophizing,  for  this  is  an 
arrogant  (offensive)  expression,  but  that  you  are  present- 
ing an  asserter  of  freedom  :  for  this  is  really  freedom.  To 
this  freedom  Diogenes  was  called  by  Antisthenes,  and  he 
said  that  he  could  no  longer  be  enslaved  by  any  man. 
For  this  reason  when  he  was  taken  prisoner.*  how  did  he 
behave  to  the  pirates?  Did  he  call  any  of  them  master? 
and  I  do  not  speak  of  the  name,  for  I  am  not  afraid  of 
the  word,  but  of  the  state  of  mind,  by  which  the  word  is 

»  See  iii.  J4,  (•O,  ii.  13,  24. 


344 

produced.  How  did  he  reprove  them  for  feeding  badly 
their  captives  ?  How  was  he  sold  ?  Did  he  seek  a  mas- 
ter? no;  but  a  slave.  And  when  he  was  sold  how  did 
he  behave  to  his  master?  *  Immediately  he  disputed  with 
him  and  said  to  his  master  that  he  ought  not  to  be  dressed 
as  he  was,  nor  shaved  in  such  a  manner  ;  and  about  the 
children  he  told  them  ho\v  he  ought  to  bring  .them  up. 
And  what  was  strange  in  this  ?  for  if  his  master  had  bought 
an  exercise  master,  would  he  have  employed  him  in  the 
exercises  of  the  palaestra  as  a  servant  or  as  a  master?  and 
and  so  if  he  had  bought  a  physician  or  an  architect.  And 
so  in  every  matter,  it  is  absolutely  necessary  that  he  who 
has  skill  must  be  the  superior  of  him  who  has  not.  Who- 
ever then  generally  possesses  the  science  of  life,  what  else 
must  he  be  than  master?  For  \vho  is  master  of  a  ship? 
The  man  who  governs  the  helm?  Why?  Because  he 
who  will  not  obey  him  suffers  for  it.  But  a  master  can 
give  me  stripes.  Can  he  do  it  then  without  suffering  for 
it  ?  So  I  also  used  to  think.  But  because  he  cannot  do 
it  without  suffering  for  it,  for  this  reason  it  is  not  in  his 
power  :  and  no  man  can  do  what  is  unjust  without  suffer- 
ing for  it.  And  what  is  the  penalty  for  him  who  puts  his 
own  slave  in  chains,  what  do  you  think  that  is  ?  The  fact 
of  putting  the  slave  in  chains  :  and  you  also  will  admit 
this,  if  you  choose  to  maintain  the  truth,  that  man  is  not 
a  wild  beast,  but  a  tame  animal.  For  when  is  a  vine  do- 
ing badly  ?  When  it  is  in  a  condition  contrary  to  its 
nature.  When  is  a  cock?.  Just  the  same.  Therefore  a 
man  also  is  so.  What  then  is  a  man's  nature  ?  To  bite, 
to  kick,  and  to  throw  into  prison  and  to  behead?  No  : 
but  to  do  good,  to  co-operate  with  others,  to  wish  them 
well.  At  that  time  then  he  is  in  a  bad  condition,  whether 

*See   the  same  story  in  Aulus  Gellius  (ii.  c.  18),  who  says  that    \< 
riacles,  a  Corinthian,  bought  Diogenes,  manumitted  him  and  made  liii» 
l^e  master  of  his  children. 


•A  //.-A'.  345 

you  choose  to  admit  it  or  not,  when  he  is  acting 
foolishly. 

Socrates  then  did  not  fare  badly  ?  No  :  hut  his  judges 
and  his  accusers  did.  Nor  did  Helvidius  *  at  Rome  fare 
badly  ?  No  ;  but  his  murderer  did.  How  do  you  mean  ? 
The  same  as  you  do  when  you  say  that  a  cock  has  not 
fared  badly  when  he  has  gained  the  victory  and  been 
severely  wounded ;  but  that  the  cock  has  fared  badly 
when  he  has  been  defeated  and  is  unhurt  :  nor  do  you 
call  a  dog  fortunate,  who  neither  pursues  game  nor  labors, 
but  when  you  see  him  sweating,  f  when  you  see  him  in 
pain  and  panting  violently  after  running.  What  paradox 
(unusual  thing)  do  we  utter  if  we  say  that  the  evil  in 
everything  is  that  which  is  contrary  to  the  nature  of  the 
thing?  Is  that  a  paradox  ?  for  do  you  not  say  this  in 
the  case  of  all  other  things  ?  Why  then  in  the  case  of 
man  only  do  you  think  differently  ?  But  because  we  say 
that  the  nature  of  man  is  tame  (gentle)  and  social  and 
faithful,  you  will  not  say  that  this  is  a  paradox  ?  It 
is  not.  What  then  is  it  a  paradox  to  say  that  a  man  is 
not  hurt  when  he  is  whipped,  or  put  in  chains,  or  be- 
headed? does  he  not,  if  he  suffers  nobly,  come  off  even 
with  increased  advantage  and  profit  ?  But  is  he  not  hurt, 
who  suffers  in  a  most  pitiful  and  disgraceful  way,  who  in 
place  of  a  man  becomes  a  wolf,  or  viper  or  wasp  ? 

Well  then  let  us  recapitulate  the  things  which  have 
been  agreed  on.  The  man  who  is  not  under  restraint  is 
free,  to  whom  things  are  exactly  in  that  state  in  which  he 
wishes  them  to  be  :  but  he  who  can  be  restrained  or  com- 
pelled or  hindered,  or  thrown  into  any  circumstances 
against  his  will,  is  a  slave.  But  who  is  free  from  re- 
straint ?  He  who  desires  nothing  that  belongs  to  (is  in  the 

*See  page  10,  note. 

t  I  do  not  know  if  <lo^s  sweat ;  at  least  in  a  state  of  health  I  have 
never  seen  it.  Hut  this  is  a  question  for  the  learned  in  dog  sek-i 


346  I'TICTETUS. 

power  of)  others.  And  what  arc  the  things  which  belong 
to  others  ?  Those  which  are  not  in  our  power  either  to 
have  or  not  to  have,  or  to  have  of  a  certain  kind  or  in  a 
certain  manner.*  Therefore  the  body  belongs  to  another, 
the  parts  of  the  body  belong1  to  another,  possession 
(property)  belongs  to  another.  If  then  you  are  attached 
to  any  of  these  things  as  your  own,  you  will  pay  the 
penalty  which  it  is  proper  for  him  to  pay  who  desires 
what  belongs  to  another.  This  road  leads  to  freedom, 
this  is  the  only  way  of  escaping  from  slavery,  to  be  able 
to  say  at  last  with  all  your  soul  : 

Lead  me,  O  Zeus,  and  thou  O  destiny, 
The  way  that  I  am  bid  by  you  to  go.  t 

But  what  do  you  say,  philosopher?  The  tyrant  summons 
you  to  say  something  which  does  not  become  you.  Do  you 
say  it  or  do  you  not  ?  Answer  me.  Let  me  consider.  Will 
you  consider  now  ?  But  when  you  were  in  the  school,  what 
was  it  which  you  used  to  consider?  Did  you  not  study 
what  are  the  things  that  are  good  and  what  are  bad,  and 
what  things  are  neither  one  nor  the  other?  I  did.  What 
then  was  our  opinion  ?  That  just  and  honorable  acts 
were  good  ;  and  that  unjust  and  disgraceful  (foul)  acts 
were  bad.  Is  life  a  good  thing  ?  No.  Is  death  a  bad 
thing?  No.  Is  prison?  No.  But  what  did  we  think 
about  mean  and  faithless  words  and  betrayal  of  a  friend 
and  flattery  of  a  tyrant  ?  That  they  are  bad.  Well  then, 
you  are  not  considering,  nor  have  you  considered  nor  de- 
liberated. For  what  is  the  matter  for  consideration,  is  it 
whether  it  is  becoming  for  me,  when  I  have  it  in  my 
power,  to  secure  for  myself  the  greatest  of  good  things, 

Upton    remarks,  Kpictetus  is  referring  to  the  four  categories  of 
the  Stoics. 

t  Epictetu.-:,  Encheiridion,  c.  52.     M.  Antoninus,  Gatak.  2d   ed.  1697, 
Annot.  p.  96. 


EP1CTETUS.  347 

and  not  to  secure  tor  myself  (that  is,  not  to  avoid)  the 
greatest  evils?  A  fine  inquiry  indeed,  and  necessary,  and 
one  that  demands  much  deliberation.  Man,  why  do  you 
mock  us?  Such  an  inquiry  is  never  made.  If  you  really 
imagined  that  base  things  were  bad  and  honorable  things 
were  good,  and  that  all  other  things  were  neither  good 
nor  bad,  you  would  not  even  have  approached  this  in- 
quiry, nor  have  come  near  it  ;  but  immediately  you  would 
have  been  able  to  distinguish  them  by  the  understanding 
as  you  would  do  (in  other  cases)  by  the  vision.  For 
when  do  you  inquire  if  black  things  are  white,  if  heavy 
things  are  light,  and  do  not  comprehend  the  manifest 
evidence  of  the  senses  ?  How  then  do  you  now  say  that 
you  are  considering  whether  things  which  are  neither 
good  nor  bad  ought  to  be  avoided  more  than  things  which 
are  bad  ?  But  you  do  not  possess  these  opinions  ;  and 
neither  do  these  things  seem  to  you  to  be  neither  good 
nor  bad.  but  you  think  that  they  are  the  greatest  evils  : 
nor  do  you  think  those  other  things  (mean  and  faithless 
words,  etc.)  to  be  evils,  but  matters  which  do  not  concern 
us  at  all.  For  thus  from  the  beginning  you  have  accus- 
tomed yourself.  Where  am  I  ?  In  the  schools  :  and  are 
any  listening  to  me?  I  am  discoursing  among  philoso- 
phers. But  I  have  gone  out  of  the  school.  Away  with 
this  talk  of  scholars  and  fools.  Thus  a  friend  is  over- 
powered by  the  testimony  of  a  philosopher  :  *  thus  a  phi- 
losopher becomes  a  parasite  ;  thus  he  lets  himself  for  hire 
for  money  :  thus  in  the  senate  a  man  does  not  say  what 
he  thinks  ;  in  private  (in  the  school)  he  proclaims  his 
opinions.  You  are  a  cold  and  miserable  little  opinion, 
suspended  from  idle  words  a<  from  a  hair.  But  keep 

<  cidit  Bareani,  delator  amicum, 
Discipulumque  senex. 

Juvenal,  iii.    116. 

Epictetus  is  supposed  to  allude  to  the  crime  of  Egnatiu.s  Celer  who  ac- 
cused Barea.  Soranus  at  Rome  in  the  i  re  (Tacit.  Ann.  x 


348  EPICTETI.'S. 

}rourself  strong  and  tit  for  the  uses  of  life  and  initiated  l>y 
being  exercised  in  action.  How  do  you  hear  (the  report)  ? 
I  do  not  say.  that  your  child  is  dead — for  how  could  you 
bear  that  ? — but  that  your  oil  is  spilled,  your  wine  drunk 
up.  Do  you  act  in  such  a  way  that  one  standing  by  you 
while  you  are  making  a  great  noise,  may  say  this  only, 
Philosopher,  you  say  something  different  in  the  school. 
Why  do  you  deceive  us  ?  Why,  when  you  are  only  a 
worm,  do  you  say  that  you  are  a  man  ?  I  should  like  to 
be  present  when  some  of  the  philosophers  is  lying  with  a 
woman,  that  I  might  see  how  he  is  exerting  himself,  and 
what  words  he  is  uttering,  and  \vhether  he  remembers  his 
title  of  philosopher,  and  the  words  which  he  hears  or  says 
or  reads. 

And  what  is  this  to  liberty?  Nothing  else  than  this, 
whether  you  who  are  rich  choose  or  not.  And  who  is 
your  evidence  for  this  ?  who  else  than  yourselves  ?  who 
have  a  powerful  master  (Caesar),  and  who  live  in  obedi- 
ence to  his  nod  and  motion,  and  who  faint  if  he  only  looks 
at  you  with  a  scowling  countenance  ;  you  who  court  old 
women*  and  old  men,  and  say,  I  cannot  do  this  :  it  is  not 
in  my  power.  Why  is  it  not  in  your  power  ?  Did  you 
not  lately  contend  with  me  and  say  that  you  are  free  ? 
But  Aprullaf  has  hindered  me.  Tell  the  truth  then, 
slave,  and  do  not  run  away  from  your  masters,  nor  deny, 
nor  venture  to  produce  any  one  to  assert  your  freedom, 
when  you  have  so  many  evidences  of  your  slavery. 
And  indeed  when  a  man  is  compelled  by  love  to  do 
something  contrary  to  his  opinion  (judgment),  and  at 
the  same  time  sees  the  better,  but  has  not  the  strength  to 
follow  it,  one  might  consider  him  still  more  worthy  of 
excuse  as  being  held  by  a  certain  violent  and  in  a  manner 

•Horace  Sat.  ii.  5. 

t  Aprulla  is  a  Roman  woman's  name.  It  means  some  old  woman 
who  is  courted  for  her  money. 


EPICTETUS. 


349 


a  divine  power.*  But  who  could  endure  you  who  are  in 
love  with  old  women  and  old  men,  and  wipe  the  old 
women's  noses,  and  wash  them  and  give  them  presents, 
and  also  wait  on  them  like  a  slave  when  they  are  sick,  and 
at  the  same  time  wish  them  dead,  and  question  the  physi- 
cians whether  they  are  sick  unto  death  ?  And  again,  when 
in  order  to  obtain  these  great  and  much-admired  magis- 
tracies and  honors,  you  kiss  the  hands  of  these  slaves  of 
others,  and  so  you  are  not  the  slave. even  of  freemen. 
Then  you  walk  about  before  me  in  stately  fashion  a  pra?tor 
or  a  consul.  Do  I  not  know  how  you  became  a  praetor, 
by  what  means  you  got  your  consulship,  who  gave  it  to 
you?  I  would  not  even  choose  to  live,  if  I  must  live  by 
help  of  Felicion  f  and  endure  his  arrogance  and  servile 
insolence  ;  for  I  know  what  a  slave  is,  who  is  fortunate, 
as  he  thinks,  and  puffed  up  by  pride. 

You  then,  a  man  may  say,  are  you   free?     I  wish,  by 

*  Compare  Plato  (Symposium,  p.  206)  :  "  All  men  conceive  both  as  to 
the  body  and  as  to  the  soul,  and  when  they  have  arrived  at  a  certain 
age,  our  nature  desires  to  procreate.  But  it  cannot  procreate  in  that 
which  is  ugly,  but  in  that  which  is  beautiful.  For  the  conjunction  of 
man  and  woman  is  generation ;  but  this  act  is  divine,  and  this  in  the 
animal  which  is  mortal  is  divine,  conceiving  and  begetting."  See  what 
is  said  in  ii.  23,  note  10  on  marrying.  In  a  certain  sense  the  procreation 
of  children  is  a  duty,  and  consequently  the  providing  for  them  is  also  a 
duty.  It  is  the  fulfilling  of  the  will  and  purpose  of  the  Deity  to  people 
the  earth  ;  and  therefore  the  act  of  procreation  is  divine.  So  a  man's 
duty  is  to  labor  in  some  way,  and  if  necessary,  to  earn  his  living  and  sus 
tain  the  life  which  he  has  received;  and  this  is  also  a  divine  act.  Paul'- 
opinion  of  marriage  is  contained  in  Cor.  i.  7.  Some  of  his  teaching  on 
this  matter  has  been  justly  condemned.  He  has  no  conception  of  tin- 
true  nature  of  marriage;  at  least  he  does  not  show  that  he  has  in  thi> 
chapter.  His  teaching  is  impracticable,  contrary  to  that  of  Kpictctn*., 
and  to  the  nature  and  constitution  of  man ;  and  it  is  rejected  by  the 
good  sense  of  Christians  who  affect  to  receive  his  teaching;  except,  I 
suppose,  by  the  superstitious  body  of  Christians,  who  recommend  and 
commend  the  so-called  religious,  and  unmarried  life, 

I  I-Vlicion.     See  i.  19. 


350  F.PfCTETUS. 

the  Gods,  and  pray  to  be  free;  but  I  am  not  yet  able  to 
face  my  masters,  I  still  value  my  poor  body,  I  value 
greatly  the  preservation  of  it  entire,  though  I  do  not  pos- 
sess it  entire.*  But  I  can  point  out  to  you  a  free  man,  that 
you  may  no  longer  seek  an  example.  Diogenes  was  free. 
How  was  he  free? — not  because  he  was  born  of  free 
parents,  but  because  he  was  himself  free,  because  lie  had 
cast  off  all  the  handles  of  slavery,  and  it  was  not  possible 
for  any  man  to  approach  him.  nor  had  any  man  the  means 
of  laying  hold  of  him  to  enslave  him.  He  had  everything 
easily  loosed,  everything  only  hanging  to  him.  If  you 
laid  hold  of  his  property,  he  would  rather  have  let  it  go 
and  be  yours,  than  he  v/guld  have  followed  you  for  it  :  if 
you  had  laid  hold  of  his  leg,  he  would  have  let  go  his  leg  : 
if  of  all  his  body,  all  his  poor  body  :  his  intimates,  friends, 
country,  just  the  same.  For  he  knew  from  whence  he  had 
them,  and  from  whom,  and  on  what  conditions.  His  true 
parents  indeed,  the  Gods,  and  his  real  country  he  would 
never  have  deserted,  nor  would  he  have  yielded  to  any 
man  in  obedience  to  them  or  to  their  orders,  nor  would 
any  man  have  died  for  his  country  more  readily.  For  he 
Was  not  used  to  inquire  when  he  should  be  considered  to 
have  done  anything  on  behalf  of  the  whole  of  things  (the 
universe,  or  all  the  world),  but  he  remembered  that  every- 
thing which  is  done  comes  from  thence  and  is  done  on 
behalf  of  that  country  and  is  commanded  by  him  who  ad- 
ministers it.  Therefore  see  what  Diogenes  himself  says 
and  writes  :  "For  this  reason,"  he  says,  "  Diogenes,  it  is 
in  your  power  to  speak  both  with  the  king  of  the  Persians 
and  with  Archidamus,  the  king  of  the  Lacedaemonians,  as 
you  please. "  Was  it  because  he  was  born  of  free  parents  ? 
I  suppose  all  the  Athenians  and  all  the  Lacedaemonians, 
because  they  were  born  of  slaves,  could  not  talk  with 

*  Epictetus  alludes  to  his  lameness;  compare  i.  S,  14,!.  16,  20,  and 
other  passages. — Upton. 


EPZCTETUS. 


35* 


them  (these  kings)  as  they  wished,  but  feared  and  paid 
court  to  them.  Why  then  does  he  say  that  it  is  in  his 
power?  Because  I  do  not  consider  the  poor  body  to  be 
my  own,  because  I  want  nothing,  because  la\v*  is  every- 
thing to  me,  and  nothing  else  is.  These  were  the  things 
which  permitted  him  to  be  free. 

And  that  you  may  not  think  that  I  show  you  the  ex- 
ample of  a  man  who  is  a  solitary  person,  who  has  neither 
wife  nor  children,  nor  country,  nor  friends  nor  kinsmen, 
by  whom  he  could  be  bent  and  drawn  in  various  direc- 
tions, take  Socrates  and  observe  that  he  had  a  wife  and 
children,  but  he  did  not  consider  them  as  his  own  ;  that 
he  had  a  country,  so  long  as  it  was  fit  to  have  one,  and 
in  such  a  manner  as  was  fit  :  friends  and  kinsmen  also, 
but  he  held  all  in  subjection  to  law  and  to  the  oht-dirnco 
due  to  it.  For  this  reason  he  was  the  first  to  go  out  as  a 
soldier,  when  it  was  necessary,  and  in  war  he  e.\; 
himself  to  danger  most  unsparingly  ;  f  and  when  he  was 
sent  by  the  tyrants  to  seize  Leon,  he  did  not  even  deliber- 
ate about  the  matter,  because  he  thought  that  it  was  a 
base  action,  and  he  knew  that  he  must  die  (for  his  refusal) 
if  it  so  happened-!  And  what  difference  did  that  make 
to  him  ?  for  he  intended  to  preserve  something  else,  not 
his  poor  flesh,  but  his  fidelity,  his  honorable  char;. 

*  The  sense  of  "  law  "  can  be  collected  from  what  follows.     Compare 
the  discourse  of  Socrates  on  obedience  to  the  law.     (Criton,  c.  1 1,  etc.) 

I  Socrates  fought  at  Potidaea,  Amphipolis  and  Odium.     He  is  said  to 
have  gained  the  prize  for  courage  at  Delium.     He  was  a  brave    soldier 
i  philosopher,  a  union   Of  qua!;'  >mmon.     (Plato's 

Apology.) 

t  Socrates  with  others  was  ordered  by  the  Thirty  tyrants,  who  at   that 
time   governed  Athcn-  ;iu.«-    and    to 

bring  him  to  be  ),  rates  rcfi  order. 

Few   men   would  have   done    what    he   di<:. 
(Plato's  Apology;  M   Antiminu.;,  vii.  66.) 


352 

These  are  things  which  could  not  ho  assailed  nor  brought 
into  subjection.  Then  when  he  was  obliged  to  speak  in 
defense  of  his  life,  did  he  behave  like  a  man  who  had 
children,  who  had  a  wife  ?  No,  but  he  behaved  like  a 
man  who  has  neither.  And  what  did  he  do  when  he  was 
(ordered)  to  drink  the  poison,  and  when  he  had  the  power 
of  escaping  from  prison,  and  when  Crito  said  to  him, 
Escape  for  the  sake  of  your  children,  what  did  Socrates 
say  ?  *  did  he  consider  the  power  of  escape  as  an  unex- 
pected gain  ?  By  no  means  :  he  considered  what  was  fit 
and  proper  ;  but  the  rest  he  did  not  even  look  at  or  take 
into  the  reckoning.  For  he  did  not  choose,  he  said,  to 
save  his  poor  body,  but  to  save  that  which  is  increased 
and  saved  by  doing  what  is  just,  and  is  impaired  and 
destroyed  by  doing  what  is  unjust.  Socrates  will  not  save 
his  life  by  a  base  act  ;  he  who  would  not  put  the  Athe- 
nians to  the  vote  when  they  clamored  that  he  should  do 
so,f  he  who  refused  to  obey  the  tyrants,  he  who  dis- 
coursed in  such  a  manner  about  virtue  and  right  behavior. 
It  is  not  possible  to  save  such  a  man's  life  by  base  acts, 
but  he  is  saved  by  dying,  not  by  running  away.  For  the 
good  actor  also  preserves  his  character  by  stopping  when 
he  ought  to  stop,  better  than  when  he  goes  on  acting 
beyond  the  proper  time.  What  then  shall  the  children  of 
Socrates  do?  "If,"  said  Socrates.  "  I  had  gone  off  to 

*  The  Dialogue  of  Plato,  named  Criton,  contains  the  arguments  which 
were  used  by  his  friends  to  persuade  Socrates  to  escape  from  prison,  and 
the  reply  of  Socrates. 

t  This  alludes  to  the  behavior  of  Socrates  when  he  refused  to  put  to 
the  vote  the  matter  of  the  Athenian  generals  and  their  behavior  after  the 
naval  battle  of  Arginusae.  The  violence  of  the  weather  prevented  the 
commanders  from  collecting  and  honorably  burying  those  who  fell  in 
the  battle ;  and  the  Athenians  after  their  hasty  fashion,  wished  all  the 
commanders  to  be  put  to  death.  But  Socrates,  who  was  in  office  at  this 
time,  resisted  the  unjust  clamor  of  the  people.  Xenophon,  Ilellenica,  L 
c.  7,  15;  Plato,  Apologia;  Xenophon,  Memorab.  i.  i,  j8. 


353 

Thessaly,  would  you  have  taken  care  of  them  :  and  if  I 
depart  to  the  \vorld  below,  will  there  be  no  man  to  take 
care  of  them  ?  "  See  how  he  gives  to  deatli  a  gentle  name 
and  mocks  it.  But  if  you  and  I  had  been  in  his  place,  we 
should  have  immediately  answered  as  philosophers  that 
those  who  act  unjustly  must  be  repaid  in  the  same  way, 
and  we  should  have  added,  "  I  shall  be  useful  to  many, 
if  my  life  is  saved,  and  if  1  die,  I  shall  be  useful  to  no 
man."  For,  if  it  had  been  necessary,  we  should  have 
made  our  escape  by  slipping  through  a  small  hole.  And 
how  in  that  case  should  we  have  been  useful  to  any  man  ? 
for  where  would  they  have  been  then  staying?  or  if  we 
were  useful  to  men  while  we  were  alive,  should  we  not 
have  been  much  more  useful  to  them  by  dying  when  we 
ought  to  die,  and  as  we  ought  ?  And  now  Socrates  being 
dead,  no  less  useful  to  men,  and  even  more  useful,  is  the 
remembrance  of  that  which  he  did  or  said  when  he  was 
alive.  * 

*This  is  the  conclusion  about  Socrates,  whom  Epictetus  highly  valued  : 
the  remembrance  of  what  Socrates  did  and  said  is  even  more  useful  than 
his  life.  "  The  life  of  the  dead,"  says  Cicero  of  Servius  Sulpicius,  the 
great  Roman  jurist  and  Cicero's  friend,  "  rests  in  the  remembrance  of 
the  living."  Epictetus  has  told  us  of  some  of  the  acts  of  Socrates, 
which  prove  him  to  have  been  a  brave  and  honest  man.  He  does  not 
tell  us  here  what  Socrates  said,  which  means  what  he  taught ;  but  he 
knew  what  it  was.  Modern  writers  have  expounded  the  matter  at 
length,  and  in  a  form  which  Epictetus  would  not  or  couidnot  have  used. 
Socrates  left  to  others  the  questions  which  relate  to  the  material  world, 
and  he  first  taught,  as  we  are  told,  the  things  which  concern  man's  daily 
life  and  his  intercourse  with  other  men  ;  in  other  words  he  taught  Ethic 
(the  principles  of  morality).  Fields  and  trees,  he  said,  will  teach  me 
nothing,  but  man  in  his  social  state  will ;  and  man  then  is  the  proper 
subject  of  the  philosophy  of  Socrates.  The  beginning  of  this  knowledge 
he  said,  to  know  himself  according  to  the  precept  of  the  Delphic 
oracle,  "  Know  thyself :  "  and  the  object  of  his  philosophy  was  to  com- 
prehend the  nature  of  man  as  a  moral  being  in  all  relations  ;  and  among 
these  the  relation  of  man  to  God  as  the  father  of  all,  creator  and  ruler  of 
all.  .is  Plato  expresses  it.  Socrates  taught  that  what  we  call  death  is  not 
23 


354 


EPICTETUS. 


Think  of  these  things,  these  opinions,  these  words  •. 
look  to  these  examples,  if  you  would  be  free,  if  you  de- 
sire the  thing  according  to  its  worth.  And  what  is  the 
wonder  if  you  buy  so  great  a  thing  at  the  price  of  things 
so  many  and  so  great  ?  For  the  sake  of  this  which  is 
called  liberty,  some  hang  themselves,  others  throw  them- 
selves down  precipices,  and  sometimes  even  whole  cities 
have  perished :  and  will  you  not  for  the  sake  of  the  true 
and  unassailable  and  secure  liberty  give  back  to  God 
when  he  demands  them  the  things  which  he  has  given  ? 
Will  you  not,  as  Plato  says,  study  not  to  die  only,  but 
also  to  endure  torture,  and  exile,  and  scourging,  and  in  a 
word  to  give  up  all  which  is  not  your  own  ?  If  you  will 
not.  you  will  be  a  slave  among  slaves,  even  if  you  be  ten 
thousand  times  a  consul  ;  and  if  you  make  your  way  up 
to  the  Palace  (Ceesar's  residence),  you  will  no  less  be 
a  slave  :  and  you  will  feel,  that  perhaps  philosophers 
utter  words  which  are  contrary  to  common  opinion 
(paradoxes),  as  Cleanthes  also  said,  but  not  words 
contrary  to  reason.  For  you  will  know  by  experience 
that  the  words  are  true,  and  that  there  is  no  profit 
from  the  things  which  are  valued  and  eagerly  sought  to 

the  end  of  man  ;  death  is  only  the  road  to  another  life.  The  death  of 
Socrates  '.vas  conformable  to  his  life  and  teaching.  "  Socrates  died  not 
only  with  the  noblest  courage  and  tranquillity,  but  he  also  refused,  as  we 
are  told,  to  escape  from  death,  which  the  laws  of  the  state  permitted, 
by  going  into  exile  or  paying  a  fine,  because  as  he  said,  if  he  had  himself 
consented  to  a  fine  or  allowed  others  to  propose  it  (Xenophon,  Apol.  § 
22),  such  an  act  would  have  been  an  admission  of  his  guilt.  Both 
(Socrates  and  Jesus)  offered  themselves  with  the  firmest  resolution  fora 
holy  cause,  which  was  so  far  from  being  lost  through  their  death  that  it 
only  served  rather  to  make  it  the  general  cause  of  mankind."  (  > 
Christliche  des  Platonismus  oder  Socrates  und  Christ  us,  by  F.  C.  Baur.) 
This  essay  by  ]!auris  very  ingenious.  Perhaps  there  are  some  readers 
•  ill  disagree  with  him  on  many  points  in  the  comparison  of  Socrates 
and  Christus.  However  the  essay  is  well  worth  the  trouble  of  reading. 
The  opinion  of  Rousseau  in  his  comparison  of  Jesus  and  Socrates  is  in 


EP1CTETUS.  355 

ihose  who  have  obtained  them  ;  and  to  those  \vho  have 
not  yet  obtained  them  there  is  an  imagination,  that  when 
these  things  are  come,  all  that  is  good  will  come  with 
them  ;  then,  when  they  are  come,  the  feverish  feeling  is 
the  same,  the  tossing  to  and  fro  is  the  same,  the  satiety, 
the  desire  of  things  which  are  not  present ;  for  freedom  is 
acquired  not  by  the  full  possession  of  the  things  which 
arc  desired,  but  by  removing  the  desire.  And  that  you 
may  know  that  this  is  true,  as  you  have  labored  for  those 
things,  so  transfer  your  labor  to  these  :  be  vigilant  for  the 
purpose  of  acquiring  an  opinion  which  will  make  you 
free  ;  pay  court  to  a  philosopher  instead  of  to  a  rich  old 
man  :  be  seen  about  a  philosopher's  doors  :  you  will  not 
disgrace  yourself  by  being  seen  ;  you  will  not  go  away 
empty  nor  without  profit,  if  you  go  to  the  philosopher  as 
you  ought,  and  if  not  (if  you  do  not  succeed),  try  at  least : 
the  trial  (attempt)'is  not  disgraceful. 

some  resj>ects  nrore  just  than  that  of  Baur,  though  the  learning  of  the 
Frenchman  is  very  small  when  compared  with  that  of  the  German. 
"  What  prejudices,  what  blindness  must  a  man  have,"  says  Rousseau, 
"  when  he  dares  to  compare  the  son  of  Sophroniscus  with  the  son  of 
Mary  !  The  death  of  Socrates  philosophizing  tranquilly  with  his  friends 
is  the  most  gentle  that  a  man  could  desire  ;  that  of  Jesus  expiring  in 
torments,  insulted,  jeered,  cursed  by  a  whole  people,  is  the  most  horrible 
that  a  man  could  dread.  Socrates  taking  the  poisoned  cup  blesses  him 
who  presents  it  and  weeps ;  Jesus  in  his  horrible  punishment  pray*  for 
liis  savage  executioners.  Yes,  if  the  life  and  the  death  of  Socrates  are 
•>f  a  sage,  the  life  and  the  death  of  Jesus  are  those  of  a  God." 
(Rousseau,  Emile,  vol.  iii.  p.  t<36.  Amsterdam,  1765.) 


356  Ll'lCTETUS. 


CHAPTER  II. 

OX    FAMILIAR    INTIMACY. 

To  this  matter  before  all  you  must  attend,  that  you  be 
never  so  closely  connected  with  any  of  your  former  inti- 
mates or  friends  as  to  come  down  to  the  same  acts  as  he 
does.*  If  you  do  not  observe  this  rule,  you  will  ruin 
yourself.  But  if  the  thought  arises  in  your  mind,  "  I 
shall  seem  disobliging  to  him  and  he  will  not  have  the 
same  feeling  toward  me,"  remember  that  nothing  is  done 
without  cost,  nor  is  it  possible  for  a  man  if  he  does  not  do 
the  same  things  to  be  the  same  man  that  he  was.  Choose 
then  which  of  the  two  you  will  have,  to  be  equally  loved 
by  those  by  whom  you  were  formerly  loved,  being  the 
same  with  your  former  self  ;  or  being  superior,  not  to  ob- 
tain from  your  friends  the  same  that  you  did  before.  For 
if  this  is  better,  immediately  turn  away  to  it,  and  let 
not  other  considerations  draw  you  in  a  different  direction. 
For  no  man  is  able  to  make  progress  (improvement), 
when  he  is  wavering  between  opposite  things  ;  but  if  you 
have  preferred  this  (one  thing)  to  all  things,  if  you  choose 
to  attend  to  this  only,  to  work  out  this  only,  give  up 
everything  else.  But  if  you  will  not  do  this,  your  waver- 
ing will  produce  both  these  results  :  you  will  neither  im- 
prove as  you  ought,  nor  will  you  obtain  what  you  for- 
merly obtained.  For  before  by  plainly  desiring  the  things 
which  were  worth  nothing,  you  pleased  your  associates. 

*  He  means  that  you  must  not  do  as  he  does,  because  he  does  this  or 
that  act.  The  advice  is  in  substance,  Do  not  do  as  your  friend  does 
simply  because  he  is  your  friend. 


EPICTKTrs.  357 

But  you  cannot  excel  in  both  kinds,  and  it  is  necessary 
that  so  far  as  you  share  in  the  one,  you  must  fall  short  in 
the  other.  You  cannot,  when  you  do  not  drink  with 
those  with  whom  you  used  to  drink,  be  agreeable  to  them 
as  you  were  before.  Choose  then  whether  you  will  be  a 
hard  drinker  and  pleasant  to  your  former  associates  or  a 
sober  man  and  disagreeable  to  them.  You  cannot,  when 
you  do  not  sing-  with  those  whom  you  used  to  sing,  be 
equally  loved  by  them.  Choose  then  in  this  matter  also 
which  of  the  two  you  will  have.  For  if  it  is  better  to  be 
modest  and  orderly  than  for  a  man  to  say,  lie  is  a  jolly 
fellow,  give  up  the  rest,  renounce  it,  turn  away  from  it, 
have  nothing  to  do  with  such  men.  But  if  this  behavior 
shall  not  please  you.  turn  altogether  to  the  opposite:  be- 
come a  catamite,  an  adulterer,  and  act  accordingly,  and 
you  will  get  what  you  wish.  And  jump  up  in  the 
theater  and  bawl  out  in  praise  of  the  dancer.  But  char- 
acters so  different  cannot  be  mingled :  you  cannot  act 
both  Thersites  and  Agamemnon.  If  you  intend  to  be 
Thersites,*  you  must  be  humpbacked  and  bald:  if  Aga- 
memnon, you  must  be  tall  and  handsome,  and  love  those 
who  are  placed  in  obedience  to  you. 


CHAPTER  III. 

WHAT  THINGS    WK    Stiol  I.I)   K\(H.\\(iK    KOK   OTHKK    THINGS. 

KKKP  this  thought  in  readiness,  when  you  lose  anything 
external,  what  you  acquire  in  place  of  it  ;  and  if  it  be 
worth  more,  never  say,  I  have  had  a  loss  ;  neither  if  you 

•See  Iliad,  ii.  216;  and  for  the  description  of  Ayanu-innon,  ITud,  ii> 
167. 


358  EPICTETUS. 

have  got  a  horse  in  place  of  an  ass,  or  an  ox  in  place  of  a 
sheep,  nor  a  good  action  in  place  of  a  bit  of  money,  nor  in 
place  of  idle  talk  such  tranquillity  as  befits  a  man,  nor  in 
place  of  lewd  talk  if  you  have  acquired  modesty.  If  you 
remember  this,  you  will  always  maintain  your  character 
such  as  it  ought  to  be.  But  if  you  do  not,  consider  that 
the  times  of  opportunity  are  perishing,  and  that  whatever 
pains  you  take  about  yourself,  you  are  going  to  waste 
them  all  and  overturn  them.  And  it  needs  only  a  few 
things  for  the  loss  and  overturning  of  all,  namely  a  small 
deviation  from  reason.  For  the  steerer  of  a  ship  to  upset 
it,  he  has  no  need  of  the  same  means  as  he  has  need  offer 
saving  it  :  but  if  he  turns  it  a  little  to  the  wind,  it  is 
lost ;  and  if  he  does  not  do  this  purposehr,  but  has  been 
neglecting  his  duty  a  little,  the  ship  is  lost.  Something  of 
the  kind  happens  in  this  case  also  :  if  you  only  fall  a 
nodding  a  little,  all  that  you  have  up  to  this  time  col- 
lected is  gone.  Attend  therefore  to  the  appearances  of 
things,  and  watch  over  them  ;  for  that  which  you  have  to 
preserve  is  no  small  matter,  but  it  is  modesty  and  fidelity 
and  constancy,  freedom  from  the  affects,  a  state  of  mind 
undisturbed,  freedom  from  fear,  tranquillity,  in  a  word 
liberty.  For  what  will  you  sell  these  things  ?  See  what 
is  the  value  of  the  things  which  you  will  obtain  in  ex- 
change for  these.  But  shall  I  not  obtain  any  such  thing 
for  it  ?  See,  and  if  you  do  in  return  get  that,  see  what 
you  receive  in  place  of  it.  I  possess  decency,  he  possesses 
a  tribuneship  :  he  possesses  a  praetorship,  I  possess 
modesty.  But  I  do  not  make  acclamations  where  it  is 
not  becoming  :  I  will  not  stand  up  where  I  ought  not  ;  * 
for  I  am  free,  and  a  friend  of  God,  and  so  I  obey  him 
willingly.  But  I  must  not  claim  (seek)  anything  else, 
neither  body  nor  possession,  nor  magistracy,  nor  good  re- 
port, nor  in  fact  anything.  For  he  (God)  does  not  a"liov.r 

*  He  alludes  to  the  factions  in  the  theaters,  iii.  4,  4;  iv.  2-9. — Upton. 


EPICTETUS. 


359 


)  claim  (sock)  them  :  for  if  ho  had  cli<  sen,  he  \vould 
have  made  them  good  for  me  ;  but  he  has  not  don. 
and  lor  this  reason  I  cannot  transgress  his  commands.* 
Preserve  that  which  is  your  own  good  in  everything  ;  and 
as  to  every  other  thing,  as  it  is  permitted,  and  so  far  as  to 
behave  consistently  with  reason  in  respect  to  them,  con- 
tent with  this  only.  If  you  do  not,  you  will  be  unfortu- 
nate, you  will  fail  in  all  things,  you  will  be  hindered,  you 
will  be  impeded.  These  are  the  laws  which  have  been 
sent  from  thence  (from  God)  ;  these  are  the  orders.  Of 
these  laws  a  man  ought  to  be  an  expositor,  to  these  he 
ought  to  submit,  not  to  those  of  Masurius  and  Cassius.  f 


CHAPTER   IV. 

TO  THOSE  WHO  AKK     DESIROUS  OK  PASSINC   I. IKK   I\    TRANQUILLITY. 

RK.MI -MHI-.K  that  not  only  the  desire  of  power  and  of 
riches  makes  us  mean  and  subject  to  others,  but  even  the 
desire  of  tranquillity,  and  of  leisure,  and  of  traveling 
abroad,  ami  of  learning.  For  to  speak  plainly,  whatever 
the  external  thing  may  be,  the  value  which  we  set  upon  it 
places  us  in  subjection  to  others.  What  then  is  the  differ- 
ence between  desiring  to  be  a  senator  or  not  desiring-  to 
be  one  ;  what  is  the  difference  between  desiring  power  or 
being  content  with  a  private  station  ;  what  is  the  differ- 

*  See  i.  25  ;  iv.  7,  17. 

t  Masurius  Sabinus  was  a  great  Roman  jurisconsult  in  the  times  of 
Augustus  and  Tiberius.  He  is  sometimes  named  Masurius  only  (Persius, 
v.  90).  C.  Cassius  Longinus  was  also  a  jurist,  and,  it  is  said,  a  descend- 
ant of  the  Cassius,  who  was  one  of  the  murderers  of  the  dictator  C. 
Cscsar.  He  lived  from  the  time  of  Tiberius  to  that  of  Vespasian. 


360  PICTETUS. 

ence  between  saying,  I  am  unhappy,  I  have  nothing  to  do, 
but  I  am  bound  to  my  books  as  a  corpse  ;  or  saying,  I 
am  unhappy,  I  have  no  leisure  for  reading  ?  For  as  saluta- 
tions and  power  are  things  external  and  independent  of 
the  will,  so  is  a  book.  For  what  purpose  do  you  choose 
to  read  ?  Tell  me.  For  if  you  only  direct  your  purpose 
to  being  amused  or  learning  something,  you  are  a  silly 
fellow  and  incapable  of  enduring  labor.*  But  if  you  refer 
reading  to  the  proper  end,  what  else  is  this  than  a  tranquil 
and  happy  life  ?  But  if  reading  does  not  secure  for  you  a 
happy  and  tranquil  life,  what  is  the  use  of  it?  But  it 
does  secure  this,  the  man  replies,  and  for  this  reason  I 
am  vexed  that  I  am  deprived  of  it.  And  what  is  this 
tranquil  and  happy  life,  which  any  man  can  impede,  I  do 
not  say  Caesar  or  Caesar's  friend,  but  a  crow,  a  piper,  a 
fever,  and  thirty  thousand  other  things  ?  But  a  tranquil 
and  happy  life  contains  nothing  so  sure  as  continuity  and 
freedom  from  obstacle.  Now  I  am  called  to  do  some- 
thing :  I  will  go  then  with  the  purpose  of  observing  the 
measures  (rules)  which  I  must  keep  f  of  actii.c"  with 
modesty,  steadiness,  without  desire  and  aversion  tc  things 
external  :  \  and  then  that  I  may  attend  to  men,  what  they 

*  See  Bishop  Butler's  remarks  in  the  Preface  to  his  Sermons,  vol.  ii. 
He  speaks  of  the  "idle  way  of  reading  and  considering  things :  by  thi-> 
means,  time  even  in  solitude  is  happily  got  rid  of  without  the  pain  01 
attention :  neither  is  any  part  of  it  more  put  to  the  account  of  idleness, 
one  can  scarce  forbear  saying,  is  spent  with  less  thought  than  great  part 
of  that  which  is  spent  in  reading." 

t  Sed  vene  nurnerosque  modosquee  cliscere  vitae.  Hor.  Epp.  ii.  2,  144. 
M.  Antoninus,  iii.  r 

{"The  readers  perhaps  may  grow  tired  with  being  so  often  told 
what  they  will  find  it  very  difficult  to  believe,  That  because  externals  air 
not  in  our  power  they  are  nothing  to  us.  Hut  in  excuse  for  this  frequent 
repetition.it  must  be  considered  that  the  Stoics  had  reduced  themselves 
to  a  necessity  of  dwelling  on  this  consequence,  extravagant  as  it  is,  !>;• 
rejecting  stronger  aids.  ( >ne  cannot  indeed  avoid  highly  admiring  the 


KriCTKTUS.  361 

say.  how  they  are  moved  :  *  and  this  not  with  any  bad 
disposition,  or  that  I  may  have  something  to  blame  or  to 
ridicule  ;  but  I  turn  to  myself,  and  ask  if  I  also  commit 
the  same  faults.  How  then  shall  I  cease  to  commit  them  ? 
Formerly  I  also  acted  wrong,  but  now  I  do  not  :  thanks 
to  r,od. 

Come,  when  you  have  done  these  things  and  have  at 
tended  to  them,  have  you  done  a  worse  act  than  when 
you  have  read  a  thousand  verses  or  written  as  many  ? 
For  when  you  eat,  are  you  grieved  because  you  are  not 
reading  ?  are  you  not  satisfied  with  eating  according  to 
what  you  have  learned  by  reading,  and  so  with  bathing 
and  with  exercise  ?  Why  then  do  you  not  act  consist- 
ently in  all  things,  both  when  you  approach  Ca?sar  and 
when  you  approach  any  person  ?  If  you  maintain  your- 
self free  from  perturbation,  free  from  alarm,  and  steady  ; 
if  you  look  rather  at  the  things  which  are  done  and  hap- 
pen than  are  looked  at  yourself;  if  you  do  not  envy  those 
\vho  are  preferred  before  you  ;  if  surrounding  circum- 
stances do  not  strike  you  with  fear  or  admiration,  what 
do  you  want  ?  Books  ?  How  or  for  what  purpose  ?  for 
is  not  this  (the  reading  of  books)  a  preparation  for  life  ? 
and  is  not  life  itself  (living)  made  up  of  certain  other 
things  than  this  ?  This  is  just  as  if  an  athlete  should 
weep  when  he  enters  the  stadium,  because  he  is  not  being 
exercised  outside  of  it.  It  was  for  this  purpose  that  you 

very  few,  who  attempted  to  amend  and  exalt  themselves  on  this  foun- 
dation. No  one  perhaps  ever  carried  the  attempt  so  far  in  practice,  and 
no  one  ever  spoke  so  well  in  support  of  the  argument  as  Epictettis.  Y.-i 
notwithstanding  his  great  abilities  and  the  force  of  his  example,  one 
linds  him  strongly  complaining  of  the  want  of  success;  and  on. 
from  this  circumstance  as  well  as  from  others  in  the  Stok  writings, 
That  virtue  cannot  be  maintained  in  the  world  without  the  hope  «f  a 
future  reward." — Mrs.  Carter. 

'  Compare  Horace,  Sat.  i.  4.  133  :  N'eque  enim  cum  lectuliis,  etc. 


362  EPICTETUS. 

used  to  practice  exercise  ;  for  this  purpose  were  used  the 
halteres  (weights),*  the  dust,  the  young  men  as  antago- 
nists ;  and  do  you  seek  for  those  things  now  when  it  is  the 
time  of  action  ?  This  is  just  as  if  in  the  topic  (matter)  of 
assent  when  appearances  present  themselves,  some  of 
which  can  be  comprehended,  and  some*  cannot  be  com- 
prehended, we  should  not  choose  to  distinguish  them  but 
should  choose  to  read  what  has  been  written  about  com- 
prehension. 

What  then  is  the  reason  of  this  ?  The  reason  is  that  we 
have  never  read  for  this  purpose,  we  have  never  written 
for  this  purpose,  so  that  we  may  in  our  actions  use  in  a 
way  conformable  to  nature  the  appearances  presented  to 
us  ;  but  we  terminate  in  this,  in  learning  what  is  said, 
and  in  being  able  to  expound  it  to  another,  in  resolving  a 
syllogism, f  and  in  handling  the  hypothetical  syllogism. 
For  this  reason  where  our  study  (purpose)  is,  there  alone 
is  the  impediment.  Would  you  have  by  all  means  the 
things  which  are  not  in  your  power  ?  Be  prevented  then, 
be  hindered,  fail  in  your  purpose.  But  if  we  read  what  is 
written  about  action,  not  that  we  may  see  what  is  said  about 
action,  but  that  we  may  act  well  :  if  we  read  what  is  said 
about  desire  and  aversion  (avoiding  things),  in  order  that 
we  may  neither  fail  in  our  desires,  nor  fall  into  that  which 
we  try  to  avoid  :  if  we  read  what  is  said  about  duty  (offi- 
cium),  in  order  that  remembering  the  relations  (of  things 
to  one  another)  we  may  do  nothing  irrationally  nor  con- 
trary to  these  relations  ;  we  should  not  be  vexed  in  being 
hindered  as  to  our  readings,  but  we  should  be  satisfied 
with  doing  the  acts  which  are  conformable  (to  the  rela- 

*  See  i.  4,  iii.  15,  4  ;  and  i.  24,  i,  i.  29,  34.  The  athletes  were  oiled,  but 
they  used  to  rub  themselves  with  dust  to  be  enabled  to  lay  hold  of  one 
another. 

;  M.  Antoninus,  i.  17,  thanks  the  gods  that  he  did  not  waste  his  time 
in  the  resolution  of  syllogisms. 


Rpi<  363 

tions),  and  we  should  be  reckoning:  not  what  so  far  we 

been  accustomed  to  reckon  :  To-day  I  Inn 
many  1    have   written   so   many  ;  but   (we  shou'.d 

To-day  I  have  employed  my  action  as  it  is  taught 
by  the  philosophers  ;  I  have  not  employed  my  desire  ;  I 
have  u>ed  avoidance  only  with  respect  to  things  which 
are  within  the  power  of  my  will  ;  I  have  not  been  afraid 
of  such  a  person,  I  have  not  been  prevailed  upon  by  the 
entreaties  of  another  ;  I  have  exercised  my  patience,  my 
abstinence,  my  co-operation  with  others ;  and  so  we 
should  thank  God  for  what  we  ought  to  thank  him. 

But  now  we  do  not  know  that  we  also  in  another  . 
are  like  the  many.  Another  man  is  afraid  that  he  shall 
not  have  power  :  you  are  afraid  that  you  will.  Do  not  do 
so,  my  man  ;  but  as  you  ridicule  him  who  is  afraid  that 
he  shall  not  have  power,  so  ridicule  yourself  also.  For  it 
makes  no  difference  whether  you  are  thirsty  like  a  man 
who  has  a  fever,  or  have  a  dread  of  water  like  a  man  who 
]->  mad.  Or  how  will  you  still  be  able  to  say  as  Socrates' 
did,  If  so  it  pleases  God,  so  let  it  be?  Do  you  think  that 
Socrates  if  he  had  been  eager  to  pass  his  leisure  in  the 
Lyceum  or  in  the  Academy  and  to  discourse  daily  with 
the  young  men,  would  have  readily  served  iu  militar 
peditions  so  often  as  he  did  ;  and  would  he  not  have- 
lamented  and  groaned,  Wretch  that  I  am  :  1  must  now  he 
.tble  here,  when  I  might  be  sunning  myself  in  the 
:m  ?  Why.  was  this  your  business,  to  sun  yourself? 
And  is  it  not  your  business  to  be  happy,  to  be  t 
hindrance,  free  from  impediment?  And  could  he  still 
rates,  if  he  hi  d  lamented  in  this  way  :  how 
would  he  still  have  been  able  to  write  Paeans  in  his 
prison  ?  * 

In  short  remember  this,  that  what  you  shall  prize  which 

*  Plato  in  the  Phaedon  (c.  4)  says  that  Socrates   in  his  prison  wrote  a 
hymn  to  Apollo. 


364 

is  beyond  your  will,  so  far  you  have  destroyed  your  will. 
But  these  things  are  out  of  the  power  of  the  will,  not  only 
power  (authority),  but  also  a  private  condition  :  not  only 
occupation  (business),  but  also  leisure.  Now  then  must  I 
live  in  this  tumult  ?  Why  do  you  say  tumult  ?  I  mean 
among  many  men.  Well  what  is  the  hardship  ?  Suppose 
that  you  are  at  Olympia  :  imagine  it  to  be  a  panegyris 
(public  assembly),  where  one  is  calling  out  one  thing,  an- 
other is  doing  another  thing,  and  a  third  is  pushing  an- 
other person  :  in  the  baths  there  is  a  crowd  :  and  who  ot 
us  is  not  pleased  with  this  assembly,  and  leaves  it  unwill- 
ingly ?  Be  not  difficult  to  please  nor  fastidious  about 
what  happens.  Vinegar  is  disagreeable,  for  it  is  sharp  ; 
honey  is  disagreeable,  for  it  disturbs  my  habit  of  body. 
I  do  not  like  vegetables.  So  also  I  do  not  like  leisure  :  it 
is  a  desert  :  I  do  not  like  a  crowd  ;  it  is  confusion.  But 
if  circumstances  make  it  necessary  for  you  to  live  alone 
or  with  a  few,  call  it  quiet,  and  use  the  thing  as  you  ought  : 
talk  with  yourself,  exercise  the  appearances  (presented  to 
you),  work  up  your  preconceptions.  If  you  fall  into  a 
crowd,  call  it  a  celebration  of  games,  a  panegyris,  a  fes- 
tival :  try  to  enjoy  the  festival  with  other  men.  For  what 
is  a  more  pleasant  sight  to  him  who  loves  mankind  than 
a  number  of  men  ?  We  see  with  pleasure  herds  of  horses 
or  oxen  :  we  are  delighted  when  we  see  many  ships  :  who 
is  pained  when  he  sees  many  men  ?  But  they  deafen  me 
with  their  cries.  Then  your  hearing  is  impeded.  What 
then  is  this  to  you  ?  Is  then  the  power  of  making  use  of 
appearances  hindered  ?  And  who  prevents  you  from 
using  according  to  nature  inclination  to  a  thing  and 
aversion  from  it  ;  and  movement  toward  a  thing  and 
movement  from  it  ?  What  tumult  (confusion)  is  able  to 
do  this  ? 

Do  you  on.y  bear  in  mind  the  general  rules  :  what  is 
mine,  what  is  not  mine  ;  what  is  given  (permitted)  to  me  ; 


EP1CTETUS.  365 

what  does  God  will  that  I  should  do  now  ?  what  does  he 
not  will  ?  A  little  before  he  willed  you  to  be  at  leisure,  to 
talk  with  yourself,  to  write  about  these  things,  to  read,  to 
hear,  to  prepare  yourself.  You  had  sufficient  time  for  this. 
Xow  he  says  to  you  :  Come  now  to  the  contest,  show  us 
what  you  have  learned,  how  you  have  practiced  the 
athletic  art.  How  long  will  you  be  exercised  alone? 
Now  is  the  opportunity  for  you  to  learn  whether  you  are 
an  athlete  worthy  of  victory,  or  one  of  those  who  go  about 
the  world  and  are  defeated.  Why  then  are  you  vexed  ? 
No  contest  is  without  confusion.  There  must  be  many 
who  exercise  themselves  for  the  contests,  many  who  call 
out  to  those  who  exercise  themselves,  many  masters,  many 
spectators.  But  my  wish  is  to  live  quietly.  Lament  then 
and  groan  as  you  deserve  to  do.  For  what  other  is  a 
greater  punishment  than  this  to  the  untaught  man  and  to 
him  who  disobeys  the  divine  commands,  to  be  grieved,  to 
lament,  to  envy,  in  a  word  to  be  disappointed  and  to  be 
unhappy  ?  Would  you  not  release  yourself  from  these 
things?  And  how  shall  I  release  myself ;  Have  you  not 
often  heard,  that  you  ought  to  remove  entire; 
apply  aversion  (turning  away)  to  those  things,  only  which 
are  within  your  power,  that  you  ought  to  give  up  every- 
thing, body,  property,  fame,  books,  tumult,  power,  private- 
station  ?  for  whatever  way  you  turn,  you  are  a  slave,  you 
are  subjected,  you  are  hindered,  you  are  compelled,  you 
are  entirely  in  the  power  of  others.  But  keep  the  words 
of  Cleanthes  in  readiness. 

Lead  me.  O  Zeus,  and  thou  necessity.* 

Is  it  your  will  that  1  should  go  to   Koine  ?     I  will  go  to 
Rome.      To  Gyara  ,;      1  will  go  to  <  ivara.      To  Athen- 
will  go  to  Athens.      To  prison5      1  will  go   to  prison.      If 

•Compart-  hiu IK  iri •'  ii.untlu->.  uuv  .1  Stoic  philosopher,  who 

also  w  i"!,-  n  .i-i.-  piiriiy. 


366 

you  should  once  say,  When  shall  a  man  go  to  Athens  ? 
you  are  undone.  It  is  a  necessary  consequence  that  tl-is 
desire,  if  it  is  not  accomplished,  must  make  you  unhapp_,  : 
and  if  it  is  accomplished,  it  must  make  you  vain,  since 
you  are  elated  at  things  at  which  you  ought  not  to  be 
elated ;  and  on  the  other  hand,  if  you  are  impeded,  it 
must  make  you  wretched  because  you  fall  into  that  which 
you  would  not  fall  into.  Give  up  then  all  these  things. 
Athens  is  a  good  place.  But  happiness  is  much  better  : 
and  to  be  free  from  passions,  free  from  disturbance,  for 
your  affairs  not  to  depend  on  any  man.  There  is  tumult 
at  Rome  and  visits  of  salutation.*  But  happiness  is  an 
equivalent  for  all  troublesome  things.  If  then  the  time 
comes  for  these  things,  why  do  you  not  take  away  the 
wish  to  avoid  them  ?  what  necessity  is  there  to  carry  a 
burden  like  an  ass,  and  to  be  beaten  with  a  stick  r  But 
if  you  do  not  so,  consider  that  you  must  always  be  a 
slave  to  him  who  has  it  in  his  power  to  effect  your  release, 
and  also  to  impede  you.  and  you  must  serve  him  as  an 
evil  genius,  f 

There  is  only  one  way  to  happiness,  and  let  this  rule  be 
ready  both  in  the  morning  and  during  the  day  and  by 
night  ;  the  rule  is  not  to  look  toward  things  which  are  out 
of  the  power  of  our  will,  to  think  that  nothing  is  our 
to  give  up  all  things  to  the  Divinity,  to  Fortune  ;  to  make 
them  the  superintendents  of  these  things,  whom  Zeus  also 
has  made  so  ;  for  a  man  to  observe  that  only  which  is 
his  own,  that  which  cannot  be  hindered  :  and  when  we 
read,  to  refer  our  reading  to  this  only,  and  our  writing 
and  our  listening.  For  this  reason  I  cannot  call  the  man 
industrious,  if  I  hear  this  only,  that  he  reads  and  writes  ; 

*He  alludes  to  the  practice  of  dependents  paying  formal  visits  in  the 
morning  at   the  houses  of   the   great  and   powerful  at   Ror"e 
refers  to  Virgil,  Georgics,  ii.  461. 

t  Compare  i.  19,  6. 


I'.PICTETUS.  367 

and  even  if  a  man  adds  that  he  reads  all  night,  I  C 
say  so,  if  he  knows  not  to  what  he  should  refer  his  read- 
ing. For  neither  do  you  say  that  a  man  is  industrious  if 
he  keeps  awake  for  a  girl  :  *  nor  do  I.  But  if  he  does  it 
(reads  and  writes)  for  reputation,  I  say  that  he  is  a  lover 
of  reputation.  And  if  he  does  it  for  money,  I  say  that  he 
is  a  lover  of  money,  not  a  lover  of  labor  ;  and  if  he  does 
it  through  love  of  learning,  I  say  that  he  is  a  lover  of 
learning.  But  if  he  refers  his  labor  to  his  own  ruling 
power,  that  he  may  keep  it  in  a  state  eonformable  to 
nature  and  pass  his  life  in  that  state,  then  only  do  I  say 
that  he  is  industrious.  For  never  commend  a  man  on 
account  of  these  things  which  are  common  to  all,  but  on 
account  of  his  opinions  (principles)  ;  for  these  are  the 
things  which  belong  to  each  man,  which  make  his  actions 
bad  or  good.  Remembering  these  rules,  rejoice  in  that 
which  is  present,  and  be  content  with  the  things  which 
come  in  season,  f  If  you  see  anything  which  you  have 
learned  and  inquired  about  occurring  to  you  in  your  course 
of  life  (or  opportunely  applied  by  you  to  the  acts  of  life), 
be  delighted  at  it.  If  you  have  laid  aside  or  have  lessened 
bad  disposition  and  a  habit  of  reviling  :  if  you  have  done 
so  with  rash  temper,  obscene  words,  hastin  /gish- 

ness  ;  if  you  are  not  moved  by  what  you  formerly  wcrj, 
and  not  in  the  same  way  as  you  once  were,  you  can 
rate  a  festival  daily,  to-day  because  you  have  behaved 
well  in  one  act,  and  to-morrow  because  you  have  behaved 
well  in  another.  How  much  greater  is  this  a  reason  for 
making  sacrifices  than  a  consulship  or  the  government  of 
a  province?  These  things  come  to  you  from  yourself  and 

*  Compare  Horace,  Sat.  i.  5,  83. 

1  See  Antoninus,  vi.  2;  and  ix.  6,  "Thy  present  opinion  founded  on 
understanding,  and  thy  present  conduct  directc-d  to  social  good,  and  thy 
:  disposition  of  contentment  with  everything  which  happens — 
that  is  enough." 


368  I'-t'tCTETL'S. 

from  the  gods.  Remember  this,  who  gives  thet>e  things 
and  to  whom,  and  for  what  purpose.  If  you  cherish 
yourself  in  these  thoughts,  do  you  still  think  that  it  makes 
any  difference  where  you  shall  be  happy,  where  you  shall 
please  God  ?  Are  not  the  gods  equally  distant  from  all 
places?  Do  they  not  see  from  all  places  alike  that  which 
is  going  on  ? 


CHAPTER  V. 

AGAINST  THE  QUARRELSOME  AND  FEROCIOUS. 

THE  wise  and  good  man  neither  himself  fights  with  any 
person,  nor  does  he  allow  another,  so  far  as  he  can  pre- 
vent it.  And  an  example  of  this  as  well  as  of  all  other 
things  is  proposed  to  us  in  the  life  of  Socrates,  who  not 
only  himself  on  all  occasions  avoided  fights  (quarrels),  but 
would  not  allow  even  others  to  quarrel  See  in  Xenophon  s 
Symposium  *  how  many  quarrels  he  settled,  how  further 
he  endured  Thrasymachus  and  Polus  and  Callicles  ;  how 
he  tolerated  his  wife,  and  how  he  tolerated  his  son  f  who 
attempted  to  confute  him  and  to  cavil  with  him.  For  IK- 
remembered  well  that  no  man  has  in  his  power  another 
man's  ruling  principle.  He  wished  therefore  for  nothing 
else  than  that  which  was  his  own.  And  what  is  this  ? 
Not  that  this  or  that  man  may  act  according  to  nature  : 
for  that  is  a  thing  which  belongs  to  another;  but  that 
while  others  are  doing  their  own  acts,  as  they  choose,  la- 
may  nevertheless  be  in  a  condition  conformable  to 
nature  and  live  in  it.  only  doing  what  is  his  own  to  the 
end  that  others  also  may  be  in  a  state  conformable  t; 

*  See  ii.  12,  15.  t  See  Xenophon,  Memorabilia,  ii. ... 


/./'/<V/:  77 '.V. 


3;'9 


nature.  For  this  is  the  object  ahvays  set  before  him  by 
the  wise  and  good  man.  Is  it  to  be  commander  (a  praetor) 
of  an  army  ?  No  :  but  if  it  is  permitted  him.  his  object  is 
in  this  matter  to  maintain  his  own  ruling  principle.  Is  it 
to  marry?  No  :  but  if  marriage  is  allowed  to  him.  in  this 
matter  his  object  is  to  maintain  himself  in  a  condition 
conformable  to  nature.  But  if  he  would  have  his  son  not 
to  do  wrong  or  his  wife,  he  would  have  what  belongs  to 
another  not  to  belong  to  another  :  and  to  be  instructed  is 
this,  to  learn  what  things  are  a  man's  own  and  what  be- 
longs to  another. 

I  low  then  is  there  left  any  place  for  fighting  (quarrel- 
ing) to  a  man  who  has  this  opinion  (which  he  ought  to 
have)  ?  Is  he  surprised  at  anything  which  happens,  and 
does  it  appears  new  to  him  ?  Does  he  not  expect  that 
which  comes  from  the  bad  to  be  worse  and  more  griev- 
ous than  what  actually  befalls  him?  And  does  he  not 
reckon  as  pure  gain  wiirttever  they  (the  bad)  may  do 
which  falls  short  of  extreme  wickedness  ?  Such  a  person 
has  reviled  you.  Great  thanks  to  him  for  not  having 
struck  you.  But  he  has  struck  me  also.  Great  thanks 
that  he  did  not  wound  you.  But  he  wounded  me  also. 
Great  thanks  that  he  did  not  kill  you.  For  when  did  he 
learn  or  in  what  school  that  man  is  a  tame*  animal,  that 
men  love  one  another,  that  an  act  of  injustice  is  a  great 
harm  to  him  who  does  it.  Since  then  he  has  not  learned 
this  and  is  not  convinced  of  it,  why  shall  he  not  follow 
that  which  seems  to  be  for  his  own  interest  ?  Your 
neighbor  has  thrown  stones.  Have  youthen  done  any- 
thing wrong?  But  the  things  in  the  house  have  been 
broken.  Are  you  then  a  utensil  ?  No  :  but  a  free  powei 
of  will.t  What  then  is  given  to  you  (to  do)  in  answer  to 

*  See  ii.  10,  14.  iv.  r,  120.  So  I'lato  says  (I-egg.  vi.),  t»at  *  man  whc 
has  had  right  education  is  wont  to  be  the  most  divine  and  the  lamest  • 
animals.— Upton.  t  See  iii.  1,40. 

24 


370  F.riCTF.Tl'S. 

this  ?  If  you  are  like  a  \volf,  you  must  bite  in  retun,  and 
thro\v  more  stones.  But  if  you  consider  what  is  proper 
for  a  man,  examine  your  store-house,  see  with  what  facul- 
ties you  came  into  the  world.  Have  you  the  disposition 
of  a  wild  beast,  have  you  the  disposition  of  revenge  for  an 
injury?  When  is  a  horse  wretched  ?  When  he  is  deprived 
of  his  natural  faculties,  not  \vhen  he  cannot  c; 
cock,  but  when  he  cannot  run.  When  is  a  dog  wretched  ? 
Not  when  he  cannot  fly,  but  when  he  cannot  track  his 
game,  Is  then  a  man  also  unhappv  in  tin's  way,  not 
because  he  cannot  strangle  lions  or  embrace  statues,*  for 
lie  did  not  come  into  the  world  in  the  possession  of  certain 
powers  from  nature  for  this  purpose,  but  because  he  has 
lost  his  probity  and  his  fidelity  ?  People  ought  to  meet 
and  lament  such  a  man  for  the  misfortunes  into  which  he 
has  fallen  ;  not  indeed  to  lament  because  a  man  lias  been 
born  or  has  died,~f~  but  because  it  has  happened  to  him  in 
his  life-time  to  have  lost  the  things  which  are  his  own, 
not  that  which  he  received  from  his  father,  not  his  land 
and  house,  and  his  inn,  and  his  slaves  ;  for  not  one  of  these 
things  is  a  man's  own,  but  all  belong  to  others,  are  servile, 
and  subject  to  account,  at  different  times  given  to  different 
persons  by  those  who  have  them  in  their  power  :  but  I 
mean  the  things  which  belong  to  him  as  a  man,  the  marks 
(stamps)  in  his  mind  with  which  he  came  into  the  world, 
such  as  we  seek  also  on  coins,  and  if  we  find  them,  we 
approve  of  the  coins,  and  if  we  do  not  find  the  marks,  we 
reject  them.  What  is  the  stamp  on  this  Sestertius?  The 

*Like  Hercules  and  Diogenes.     See  iii.  12,  2. 

I  Herodotus  (v.  4)  says  of  the  Trausi,  a  Thracian  tribe:  "when  a 
child  is  born,  the  relatives  sit  round  it  and  lament  over  all  the  evils 
which  it  must  suffer  on  coming  into  the  world  and  enumerate  all  the 
calamities  of  mankind  :  but  when  one  dies,  they  hide  him  in  the  earth 
with  rejoicing  and  pleasure,  reckoning  all  the  evils  from  which  he  is  now 
released  and  in  possession  of  all  happiness." 


KP/CTRTUH.  37  i 

stamp  of  Trajan.  Present  it.  It  is  the  stamp  of  Xero. 
Throw  it  away  :  it  cannot  be  accepted,  it  is  counterfeit.* 
So  also  in  this  case  :  What  is  the  stamp  of  his  opinions  : 
It  is  gentleness,  a  sociable  disposition,  a  tolerant  temper, 
a  disposition  to  mutual  affection.  Produce-  these  qualities. 
I  accept  them  :  I  consider  this  man  a  citizen,  I  accept 
him  as  a  neighbor,  a  companion  in  my  voyages.  Only 
sec  that  he  has  not  Nero's  stamp.  Is  he  passional*.-,  is  he 
full  of  resentment,  is  he  fault-finding  ?  If  the  whim  sei/es 
him,  does  he  break  the  heads  of  those  who  conic  in  his 
way?  (If  so),  why  then  did  you  say  that  he  is  a  man  ? 
Is  everything  judged  (determined)  by  the'  bare  form  ?  If 
that  is  so,  say  that  the  form  in  wax  is  an  apple  and  has 
the  smell  and  the  taste  of  an  apple.  lint  the  external  fig- 
i  not  enough  :  neither  then  is  the  nose  enough  and 
yes  to  make  the  man,  but  he  must  have  the  opinions 
of  a  man.  Here  is  a  man  who  does  not  listen  to  rca 
who  does  not  know  when  he  is  refuted  :  lie  is  an  ass  :  in 
another  man  the  sense  of  shame  is  become  dead  :  he  is 
good  for  nothing,  he  is  anything  rather  than  a  man. 

*  This  does  not  mean,  it   is  said,  that  Xcro   issued  counterfeit   coins, 
for  there  are  extant  many  coins  of  Nero  which  both   in   form  and  in  the 
purity  of  the  metal  are  complete.     A  learned  numismatist.  1 
ffllow  of  Trinity  College,  Oxford,  in  a  letter  to  I  pton,  says   that  i 

:i  for  Nero's  coins  bei:u;    rejected  in   commercial  dc.il- 
ii  except  the  fact  of  the  t\  n   di.xl.in.-d 

by  the  Senate  tu  be  an  enemy  to  the  Commonwealth.     (Suetonius, 
c.  .49.)      When  Domitian  wa.s  murdered,  tlie  Senate  ordered  his  b;: 
be  taken  down,  as  the  French  now  do  aft-jr  a  revolution,  and  all  memo- 
rials of  him    to    be    destroyed    ( Suetoniu -,  Iloini 

reports  (i.x.)  that  when  Caligula  was  murdei  ordered  that   all 

the  brass  coin  which  bore  hi-  'mid  be    incited,  and,  I   su] 

coined  a[,rain.     There  is  more  on  this  subject  in    V.  .1  do  not 

believe  that  genuine  coins  would  be  refused  in  commercial    dealings  for 
the  reasons  which  Wise  gives,  at  least  not  p-fii-i-d  in  parts  distant  from 
•i-.aps  Kpictettis  means  that  some  people  would  not  toiuh  thu 
coins  of  tiie  detestable  Nero. 


372  EPICTETUS. 

This  man  seeks  whom  he  may  meet  and  kick  or  bite,  so 
that  he  is  not  even  a  sheep  or  an  ass,  but  a  kind  of  wild 
beast. 

What  then  ?  would  you  have  me  to  be  despised  ?  By 
whom  ?  by  those  who  know  you  ?  and  how  shall  those 
who  know  you  despise  a  man  who  is  gentle  and  modest  ? 
Perhaps  you  mean  by  those  who  do  not  know  you  ? 
What  is  that  to  you  ?  For  no  other  artisan  cares  for  the 
opinion  of  those  who  know  not  his  art.  But  they  will  be 
more  hostile  to  me  for  this  reason.  Why  do  you  say 
"me"?  Can  any  man  injure  your  will,  or  prevent  you 
from  using  in  a  natural  way  the  appearances  which  are 
presented  to  you  ?  In  no  way  can  he.  Why  then  are 
you  still  disturbed  and  why  do  you  choose  to  show  your- 
self afraid  ?  And  why  do  you  not  come  forth  and  pro- 
claim that  you  are  at  peace  with  all  men  whatever  they 
may  do,  and  laugh  at  those  chiefly  who  think  that  they 
can  harm  you  ?  These  slaves,  you  can  say,  know  not 
either  who  I  am,  nor  where  lies  my  good  or  my  evil,  be- 
cause they  have  no  access  to  the  things  which  are  mine. 

In  this  way  also  those  who  occupy  a  strong  city  mock 
the  besiegers  (and  say)  :  What  trouble  these  men  are  now 
taking  for  nothing  :  our  wall  is  secure,  we  have  food  for 
a  very  long  time,  and  all  other  resources.  These  are  the 
things  which  make  a  city  strong  and  impregnable  :  but 
nothing  else  than  his  opinions  makes  a  man's  soul  im- 
pregnable. For  what  wall  is  so  strong,  or  what  body  is 
so  hard,  or  what  possession  is  so  safe,  or  what  honor 
(rank,  character)  so  free  from  assault  (as  a  man's  opin- 
ions) ?  All  (other)  things  everywhere  are  perishable, 
easily  taken  by  assault,  and  if  any  man  in  any  way  is 
attached  to  them,  he  must  be  disturbed,  expect  what  is 
bad,  he  must  fear,  lament,  find  his  desires  disappointed, 
and  fall  into  things  which  he  would  avoid.  Then  do  we 
not  choose  to  make  secure  the  only  means  of  safety  which 


i-:ric  I'E'rrs.  373 

an-  offered  to  us,  awl  do  we  not  choose  to  withdraw  our- 
-  from  that  which  is  perishable  and  servile  ami  to 
labor  at  the  things  which  are  imperishable  and  by  nature 
free  ;  and  do  we  not  remember  that  no  man  either  hurts 
another  or  does  good  to  another,  but  that  a  man's  opinion 
about  each  thing,  is  that  which  hurts  him.  is  that  which 
overturns  him  :  this  is  fighting,  this  is  civil  discord,  this  is 
war  ?  That  which  made  Eteocles  and  Polynices  *  enemies 
was  nothing  else  than  this  opinion  which  they  had  about 
royal  power,  their  opinion  about  exile,  that  the  one  is  the 
extreme  of  evils,  the  other  the  greatest  good.  Xow  this 
is  the  nature  of  every  man  to  seek  the  good,  to  avoid  the 
bad  ;t  to  consider  him  who  deprives  us  of  the  one  and  in- 
volves us  in  the  other  an  enemy  and  treacherous,  even  if 
he  be  a  brother,  or  a  son  or  a  father.  For  nothing  is 
more  akin  to  us  than  the  good  :  therefore  if  these  things 
(externals)  are  good  and  evil,  neither  is  a  father  a  friend 
to  sons,  nor  a  brother  to  a  brother,  but  all  the  world  is 
everywhere  full  of  enemies,  treacherous  men,  and  syco- 
phants But  if  the  will  (the  purpose,  the  intention)  being 
what  it  ought  to  be.  is  the  only  good ;  and  if  the  will  be- 
ing such  as  it  ought  not  to  be.  is  the  only  evil,  wh< 
there  any  strife,  where  is  there  reviling?  about  what? 
about  the  things  which  do  not  concern  us  ?  and  strife 
with  whom  ?  with  the  ignorant,  the  unhappy,  with  those 
who  are  deceived  about  the  chief  things? 

Remembering  this  Socrates  managed  his  own  house  and 
endured  a  very  ill-tempered  wife  and  a  foolish  (ungrate- 

*  Eteocles  and  Polynices  were  the  sons  of  the  unfortunate  (Kdipus 
who  quarreled  about  the  kingship  of  Thebes  and  killed  one  another. 
This  quarrel  is  the  subject  of  the  Seven  against  Thebes  of  .Kschylus 
uiul  the  1'hoenissze  of  Euripides.  See  ii.  22,  note  3. 

t  "  Kvery  man  in  everything  he  does  naturally  acts  upon  the  fore- 
thought and  apprehension  of  avoiding  evil  or  obtaining  good."  P.p. 
Butler,  Analogy,  chap 


374 


Er/CTETUS. 


ful  ?)  son.*  For  in  what  did  she  show  her  bad  temper  r 
In  pouring  water  on  his  head  as  much  as  she  liked,  and 
in  trampling  on  the  cake  (sent  to  Socrates).  And  what  is 
this  to  me,  if  I  think  that  these  things  are  nothing  to  me? 
But  this  is  my  business  ;  and  neither  tyrant  shall  check 
my  will  nor  a  master  ;  nor  shall  the  many  check  me  who 
am  only  one,  nor  shall  the  stronger  check  me  who  am  the 
weaker  ;  for  this  power  of  being  free  from  check  (hin- 
drance) is  given  by  God  to  every  man.  For  these  opin- 
ions make  love  in  a  house  (family),  concord  in  a  state, 
among  nations  peace,  and  gratitude  to  God  ;  they  make  a 
man  in  all  things  cheerful  (confident)  in  externals  as  about 
things  which  belong  to  others,  as  about  things  which  are 
of  no  value. f  We  indeed  are  able  to  write  and  to  read 
these  things,  and  to  praise  them  when  they  are  read,  but 
\ve  do  not  even  come  near  to  being  convinced  of  them. 
Therefore  what  is  said  of  the  Lacedaemonians,  "Lions  at 
home,  but  in  Kphesus  foxes."  will  fit  in  our  case  also, 
•  Lions  in  the  school,  but  out  of  it  foxes." 

rates'  wife  Xanthippe  is  charged  by  her  eldest  son  Lamprocle.s 
with  being  so  ill-tempered  as  to  be  past  all  endurance  (Xenophon. 
Memorab.  ii.  2,  7).  Xenophon  in  this  chapter  has  reported  the  con- 
versation of  Socrves  with  hi.v  son  on  this  matter.  Diogenes  l.aertius 
(ii.)  tells  the  story  of  Xanthippe  pouring  water  on  the  head  of  Socrates, 
and  dirty  water,  as  Seneca  says  (De  Constantia,  c.  18).  .Klian  (xi.  \2.} 
reports  that  Alcibiades  sent  Socrates  a  large  and  good  cake,  which 
Xanthippe  trampled  under  her  feet.  Socrates  only  laughed  and  said, 
Well  then,  you  will  not  have  your  share  of  it.  The  philosopher  shower 
that  his  philosophy  was  practical  by  enduring  the  torment  of  a  very  ill- 
tempered  wife,  one  of  the  greatest  calamities  that  can  happen  to  a  niait 
and  the  trouble  of  an  nndutiful  son. 

t  This  is  one  of  the  wisest  and  noblest  expressions  of  Lpictetus. 


KP1CTETUS. 


37S 


CHAPTER  VI. 

AGAINST    THOSE    WHO    LAMENT    OVKK    BEING    PITIED. 

I  AM  grieved,  a  man  says,  at  being-  pitied.  Whether 
then  is  the  fact  of  your  being  pitied  a  thing  which  con- 
cerns you  or  those  who  pity  you  ?  Well,  is  it  in  your 
power  to  stop  this  pity  ?  It  is  in  my  power,  if  I  show 
them  that  1  do  not  require  pity.  And  whether  then  are 
you  in  the  condition  of  not  deserving  (requiring)  pity,  or 
are  you  not  in  that  condition  ?  I  think  I  am  not  :  but 
these  persons  do  not  pity  me,  for  the  things  for  which,  if 
they  ought  to  pity  me,  it  would  be  proper,  I  mean,  for  my 
faults  ;  but  they  pity  me  for  my  poverty,  for  not  possess- 
ing honorable  offices,  for  diseases  and  deaths  and  other 
such  things.  Whether  then  are  you  prepared  to  convince 
the  many  that  not  one  of  these  things  is  an  evil,  but  that  it  is 
possible  for  a  man  who  is  poor  and  has  no  office  (a,i>dpxom.) 
and  enjoys  no  honor  to  be  happy  ;  or  to  show  yourself  to 
them  as  rich  and  in  power?  For  the  second  of  these 
things  belong  to  a  man  who  is  boastful,  silly  and  good  for 
nothing.  And  consider  by  what  means  the  pretense  must 
be  supported.  It  will  be  necessary  for  you  to  hire  slaves 
and  to  possess  a  few  silver  vessels,  and  to  exhibit  them  in 
public,  if  it  is  possible,  though  they  are  often  lla-  same, 
and  to  attempt  to  conceal  the  fact  that  they  arc  the  same, 
and  to  have  splendid  garments,  and  all  other  things  for 
display,  and  to  show  that  you  are  a  man  honored  by  the 
great,  anil  to  try  to  sup  at  their  houses  or  to  br  suppoM-d 
to  sup  there,  and  as  to  your  person  to  employ  some  mean 
arts,  that  you  may  appear  to  be  more  handsome  and 


376  rriCTi-.Ti-s. 

nobler  than  you  arc.  These  thing-s  you  must  contrive,  if 
you  choose  to  go  by  the  second  path  in  order  not  to  be 
pitied.  But  the  first  way  is  both  impracticable  and  long, 
to  attempt  the  very  thing  which  Zeus  has  not  been  able  to 
do,  to  convince  all  men  what  things  are  good  and  bad.* 
Is  this  power  given  to  you  ?  This  only  is  given  to  you,  to 
convince  yourself;  and  you  have  not  convinced  yourself. 
Then  I  ask  you,  do  you  attempt  to  persuade  other  men  ? 
and  who  has  lived  so  long  with  you  as  you  with  yourself? 
and  who  has  so  much  power  of  convincing  you  as  you 
have  of  convincing  yourself ;  and  who  is  better  disposed 
and  nearer  to  you  than  you  are  to  yourself?  How  then 
have  you  not  convinced  yourself  in  order  to  learn  ?  At 
present  are  not  things  upside  down?  Is  this  what  you 
have  been  earnest  about  doing,  to  learn  to  be  free  from 
grief  and  free  from  disturbance,  and  not  to  be  humbled 
(abject),  and  to  be  free?  Have  you  not  heard  then  that 
there  is  only  one  way  which  leads  to  this  end,  to  give  up 
(dismiss)  the  things  which  do  not  depend  on  the  will,  to 
withdraw  from  them,  and  to  admit  that  they  belong  to 
others  ?  For  another  man  then  to  have  an  opinion  about 
you,  of  what  kind  is  it  ?  It  is  a  thing  independent  of  the 
will.  Then  is  it  nothing  to  you  ?  It  is  nothing.  When 
then  you  are  still  vexed  at  this  and  disturbed,  do  you  think 
that  you  are  convinced  about  good  and  evil  ? 

Will  you  not  then  letting  others  alone  be  to  yourself  both 

*  Here  it  is  implied  that  there  are  things  which  God  cannot  do.  Per- 
haps he  means  that  as  God  has  given  man  certain  powers  of  will  and 
therefore  of  action,  he  cannot  at  the  same  time  exercise  the  contradictory 
powers  of  forcing  man's  will  and  action  ;  for  this  would  be  at  the  same 
time  to  give  power  and  to  take  it  away.  Butler  remarks  (Analogy,  chap. 
5)  "  the  present  is  so  far  from  proving  in  event  a  discipline  of  virtue  to 
the  generality  of  men  that  on  the  contrary  they  seem  to  make  it  a  dis- 
cipline of  vice."  In  fact  all  men  are  not  convinced  and  cannot  be  con- 
vinced in  the  present  constitution  of  things  "  what  things  are  good  and 
bad." 


ET1C  Tl:  ITS.  3;; 

scholar  and  teacher?  The  rest  of  mankind  will  look  after 
this,  whether  it  is  to  their  interest  to  be  and  to  pass  their 
lives  in  a  state  contrary  to  nature  :  but  to  me  no  man  is 
nearer  than  myself.  What  then  is  the  meaning  of  this, 
that  I  have  listened  to  the  words  of  the  philosophers  and  I 
assent  to  them,  but  in  fact  I  am  noway  made  easier  (more 
content)?  Am  I  so  stupid?  And  yet  in  all  other  things 
Mich  as  I  have  chosen.  1  have  not  been  found  very  stupid  : 
but  I  learned  letters  quickly,  and  to  wrestle,  and  geometry, 
and  to  resolve  syllogisms.  Has  not  then  reason  convinced 
me?  and  indeed  no  other  things  have  I  from  the  beginning 
so  approved  and  chosen  (as  the  things  which  arc  rational)  : 
and  now  I  read  about  these  things,  hear  about  them,  write 
about  them  :  I  have  so  far  discovered  no  reason  stronger 
than  this  (living  according  to  nature).  In  what  then  am  I 
deficient  ?  Have  the  contrary  opinions  not  been  eradicated 
from  me?  Have  the  notions  (opinions)  themselves  not 
been  exercised  nor  used  to  be  applied  to  action,  but  as 
armor  are  laid  aside  and  rusted  and  cannot  fit  me  ?  And 
yet  neither  in  the  exercises  of  the  pahestra.  nor  in  writing 
or  reading  am  I  satisfied  with  learning,  but  I  turn  up  ami 
down  the  syllogisms  which  are  proposed,  and  I  make 
others,  and  sophistical  syllogisms  also.  But  the  neccssary 
theorems  by  proceeding  from  which  a  man  can  become 
free  from  grief,  fear,  passions  (affects),  hindrance,  and  a 
free  man.  these  I  do  not  exercise  myself  in  nor  do  I  prac- 
tice in  these  the  proper  practice  (study).  Then  I  care 
about  what  others  will  say  of  me,  whether  I  shall  appear 
to  them  worth  notice,  whether  I  shall  appear  happy. 

Wretched  man,  will  you  not  see  what  you  are  saying 
about  yourself?  What  do  you  appear  to  yourself  to  be  ? 
in  your  opinions,  in  your  desires,  in  your  aversions  from 
things,  in  your  movements  (purposes),  in  your  preparation 
(for  anything),  in  your  designs  (plans),  and  in  other  acts 
suitable  to  a  man  ?  But  do  you  trouble  yourself  about 


378  EPICTETUS. 

this,  whether  others  pity  you?  Yes,  but  I  am  pitied  not 
as  I  ought  to  be.  Are  you  then  pruned  at  this?  and  is  he 
who  is  pained,  an  object  of  pity  ?  Yes.  How  then  are 
you  pitied  not  as  you  ought  to  be  ?  For  by  the  very  aet 
that  you  feel  (suffer)  about  being  pitied,  you  make  your- 
self deserving  of  pity.  'What  then  says  Antisthenes  ? 
Have  you  not  heard?  lilt  is  a  royal  thing,  O  Cyrus,  to 
do  right  (well)  and  to  be  ill-spoken  of."*  My  head  is 
sound,  and  all  think  that  I  have  the  headache.  What  do 
I  eare  for  that  ?  I  am  free  from  fever,  and  people  sym- 
pathize with  me  as  if  I  had  a  fever  (and  say),  Poor  man, 
for  so  Ion  a  time  you  have  not  ceased  to  have  fever.  1 
also  say  with  a  sorrowful  countenance,  In  truth  it  is  now 
a  long  time  that  I  have  been  ill.  What  will  happen  then  ? 
As  God  may  please  :  and  at  the  same  time  I  secretly  laugh 
at  those  who  are  pitying  me.  What  then  hinders  the 
same  being  done  in  this  case  also  ?  I  am  poor,  but  I  have 
a  right  opinion  about  poverty.  Why  then  do  I  care  if 
they  pity  me  for  my  poverty?  I  am  not  in  power  (not  a 
magistrate)  ;  but  others  are  :  and  I  have  the  opinion 
which  I  ought  to  have  about  having  and  not  having 
power.  Let  them  look  to  it  who  pity  me  :  but  I  am 
neither  hungry  nor  thirsty  nor  do  I  suffer  cold  :  but 
because  they  are  hungry  or  thirsty  they  think  that  I  too 
am.  What  then  shall  I  do  for  them  ?  Shall  I  go  about 
and  proclaim  and  say,  Be  not  mistaken,  men.  I  am  very 
well,  1  do  not  trouble  myself  about  poverty,  nor  want  of 
power,  nor  in  a  word  about  anything  else  than  right 
opinions.  These  I  have  free  from  restraint,  I  care  for 
nothing  at  all.  What  foolish  talk  is  this  ?  How  do  1 
possess  right  opinions  when  1  am  not  content  with  being 
what  I  am.  but  am  uneasy  about  what  I  am  supposed  to 
be  ? 

But   you   say,  others  will  get   more  and  be   preferred  to 

*  M.  Antoninus,  vii.  36. 


KPICTETUS.  379 

me.  What  then  is  more  reasonable  than  for  those  who 
have  labored  about  anything  to  have  more  in  that  thing 
in  which  they  have  labored  •  They  have  labored  for 

r.  you  have  labored  about  opinions  :  and  they  have 
labored  for  wealth,  you  for  the  proper  use  of  appearances. 
See  if  they  have  more  than  you  in  this  about  which  you 
have  labored,  and  which  they  neglect  ;  if  they  assent 

r  than  you  with  respect  to  the  natural  rules  (meas- 
ures) of  things;  if  they  are  less  disappointed  than  you 
in  their  desires  ;  if  they  fall  less  into  things  which  they 
would  avoid  than  you  do  ;  if  in  their  intentions,  if  in  the 
things  which  they  propose  to  themselves,  if  in  their  pur- 

,  if  in  their  motions  toward  an  object  they  take  a 
I >ettcr  aim  ;  if  they  better  observe  a  proper  behavior,  as 
men.  as  sons,  as  parents,  and  so  on  as  to  the  other  names 
by  which  we  express  the  relations  of  life.  But  if  they  ex- 
ercise power,  and  you  do  not,  will  you  not  choose  to  tell 
yourself  the  truth,  that  you  do  nothing  for  the  sake  of  this 
(power),  and  they  do  all  ?  But  it  is  most  unreasonable 
that  he  who  looks  after  anything  should  obtain  less  than 
he  who  does  not  look  after  it. 

Xot  so  :  but  since  I  care  about  right  opinions,  it  is  more 
reasonable  for  me  to  have  power.  Yes  in  the  matter 
about  which  y«m  do  care,  in  opinions.  lUit  in  a  matter  in 
which  they  have  cared  more  than  you,  give  way  to  them. 
The  cas«;  is  just  the  same  as  if  because  you  have  right 
opinions,  you  thought  that  in  using  the  bow  you  should 
hit  the  mark  better  than  an  archer,  and  in  world; 

you   should  succeed  better  than  a  smith.      (Jive   up 
then  your  earnestness   about   opinions   and   employ  your- 

ibout    the    things    which    you   wish   to   acquire  :   and 

:  unent,   if  you  do    not   succeed  ;   for   you   d 
lament.      Hut    now    you   say  that    you   are   occupied  with 
other  things,  that  you  are  look^  other  things  :   but 

the  many  say  this  truly,  that  one  act  has  no  community 


with  another. *  lie  who  lias  risen  in  the  morning- seeks 
whom  (of  the  house  of  Caesar)  he  shall  salute,  to  whom 
lie  shall  say  something-  agreeable,  to  whom  he  shall  send 
a  present,  how  he  shall  please  the  dancing  man.  how  by 
bad  behavior  to  one  he  may  please  another.  When  he 
prays,  he  prays  about  these  things  :  when  he  sacrifices, 
he  sacrifices  for  these  things  :  the  saying  of  Pythagoras 

Let  sleep  not  come  upon  thy  languid  eyes  t 

he  transfers  to  these  things.  Where  have  I  failed  in  the 
matters  pertaining  to  flattery?  What  have  I  done?  Any- 
thing like  a  free  man,  anything  like  a  noble-minded  man  ? 
And  if  he  finds  anything  of  the  kind,  he  blames  and  ac- 
cuses himself:  "Why  did  you  say  this?  Was  it  not  in 
your  power  to  lie  ?  Even  the  philosophers  say  that 
nothing  hinders  us  from  telling  a  lie. "  But  do  you,  if  in- 
deed you  have  cared  about  nothing  else  except  the  proper 
use  of  appearances,  as  soon  as  you  have  risen  in  the 
morning  reflect,  "  What  do  I  want  in  order  to  be  free  from 
passion  (affects),  and  free  from  perturbation  ?  What  am 
I  ?  Am  I  a  poor  body,  a  piece  of  property,  a  thing  of 
which  something  is  said  ?  I  am  none  of  these.  But  what 
am  I  ?  I  am  a  rational  animal.  What  then  is  required  of 
me?  "  Reflect  on  your  acts.  Where  have  I  omitted  the 
things  which  conduce  to  happiness  ?  What  have  I  done 
which  is  either  unfriendly  or  unsocial?  what  have  I  not 
done  as  to  these  things  which  I  ought  to  have  done  ? 
So  great  then  being  the  difference  in  desires,  actions, 

*  Schweig.  says  that  he  has  not  observed  that  this  proverb  is  men- 
tioned by  any  other  writer,  and  that  he  does  not  quite  see  the  meaning 
of  it,  unless  it  be  what  he  expresses  in  the  Latin  version  (iv.  10,  24), 
"alterum  opus  cum  altero  nihil  commune  habet.''  I  think  that  the  con- 
text explains  it :  if  you  wish  to  obtain  a  particular  end,  employ  the 
proper  means,  and  not  the  means  which  do  not  make  for  the  end 

t  F.pictetus  is  making  a  parody  of  the  verses  of  Pythagoras. 


wishes,  would  you  still  have  the  same  share  with  others 
in  those  things  about  which  you  have  not  labored,  and 
they  have  labored  ?  Then  are  you  surprised  it"  they  pity 
you,  and  are  you  vexed?  Hut  they  are  not  vexed  if  you 
pity  them.  Why  ?  Because  they  are  convinced  that  they 
have  that  which  is  good,  and  you  are  not  convinced. 
For  this  reason  you  are  not  satisfied  with  your  own,  but 
you  desire  that  which  they  have  :  but  they  are  satisfied 
with  their  own,  and  do  not  desire  what  you  have  :  since 
if  you  were  really  convinced,  that  with  respect  to  what 
i>  good,  it  is  you  who  are  the  possessor  of  it  and  that 
they  have  missed  it,  you  would  not  even  have  thought  o( 
what  they  say  about  you. 


rilAPTKK   VII. 

ON   KKEKDOM   KKOM    I  FAR. 

WHAT  makes  the  tyrant  formidable  ?     The  guards,  you 
say,  and  their  swords,  and  the   men    of  the   bedchamber 
and  those  who  exclude  them  who  would  enter.      Why  then 
if  you  bring  a  boy  (child)  to  the  tyrant   when   he   is   with 
his  guards,  is   he   not   afraid  ;   or   is   it   because   the   child 
does  not  understand  these  things?     If  then  any  man  doe-, 
understand  what  guards  arc  and  that  they   have  swords 
and  comes  to  the  tyrant  for  this  very  purpose  becau.-e  he 
wishes  to  die.  on  account  of  some  circumstance  and  B 
to  die  easily  by  the  hand   of  another,  is   he  afraid   of  the 
guards?     Xo,  for  he   wishes    for   the   thing   which    makes 
the  guards  formidable.       If  then  neither  any  man    wishing 
to  die  nor  to  live  by  all  means,  but  only  as  it  may  1" 
mitted,    approaches    the   tyrant,    what   hinder.-   him 


382 

approaching  the  tyrant  without  fear  ?  Nothing.  If  then 
a  man  has  the  same  opinion  about  his  property  aa 
man  whom  I  have  instanced  has  about  his  body  . 
also  about  his  children  and  his  wife,  and  in  a  word  is  so 
affected  by  some  madness  or  despair  that  he  cares  not 
whether  he  possesses  them  or  not,  but  like  children  who 
are  playing  with  shells  care  (quarrel)  about  the  play,  but 
do  not  trouble  themselves  about  the  shells,  so  he  too  has 
set  no  value  on  the  materials  (things),  but  values  the  pleas- 
ure that  he  has  with  them  and  the  occupation,  what 
tyrant  is  then  formidable  to  him  or  what  guards  or  what 
swords  ? 

Then  through  madness  is  it  possible  for  a  man  to  be  so 
disposed  toward  these  things,  and  the  Galilaeans  through 
habit,*  and  is  it  possible  that  no  man  can  learn  from  reason 
and  from  demonstration  that  God  has  made  all  the  things 
in  the  universe  and  the  universe  itself  completely  free  from 
hindrance  and  perfect,  and  the  parts  of  it  for  the  use  of 
the  whole  ?  All  other  animals  indeed  are  incapable  of 
comprehending  the  administration  of  it  ;  but  the  rational 
animal  man  has  faculties  for  the  consideration  of  all  these 
things,  and  for  understanding  that  it  is  a  part,  and  what 
kind  of  a  part  it  is,  and  that  it  is  right  for  the  parts  to  be 
subordinate  to  the  whole.  And  besides  this  being  natu- 
rally noble,  magnanimous  and  free,  man  sees  that  of  the 

*  By  the  Galilaeans  it  is  probable  that  Epictetus  means  the  Christians, 
whose  obstinacy  Antoninus  also  mentions  (xi.  3).  Epictetus,  a  contem- 
porary of  St.  Paul,  knew  little  about  the  Christians,  and  only  knew  some 
examples  of  their  obstinate  adherence  to  the  new  faith  and  the  fanatical 
behavior  of  some  of  the  converts.  That  there  were  wild  fanatics  among 
the  early  Christians  is  proved  on  undoubted  authority ;  and  also  that 
there  always  have  been  such,  and  now  are  such.  The  abuse  of  any 
doctrines  or  religious  opinions  is  indeed  no  argument  against  such 
doctrine  or  religious  opinions ;  and  it  is  a  fact  quite  consistent  with 
experience  that  the  best  things  are  liable  to  be  perverted,  misunderstood, 
and  misused. 


EflCTKTUS. 

tilings  which  surround  him  some  arc  free  from  hindrance 
and  in  his  power,  and  the  other  tilings  arc  subject  to  hin- 
drance and  in  the  power  of  others  ;  that  the  things  which 
are  free  from  hindrance  are  in  the  power  of  the  \vill  :  and 
those  which  are  subject  to  hindrance  are  the  things  which 
are  not  in  the  po\vcr  of  the  will.  And  for  this  reason  if 
he  thinks  that  his  good  and  his  interest  be  in  these  things 
only  which  are  free  from  hindrance  and  in  his  own  power, 
lie  will  be  free,  prosperous,  happy,  free  from  harm,  mag- 
nanimous, pious,  thankful  to  God  *  for  all  things  :  in  no 
matt.T  rinding  fault  with  any  of  the  things  which  have 
not  been  put  in  his  power,  nor  blaming  any  of  them.  But 
if  he  thinks  that  his  good  and  his  interest  arc  in  externals 
and  in  things  which  are  not  in  the  power  of  his  will,  he 
must  of  necessity  be  hindered,  be  impeded.  Vie  a  slave  to 
those  who  have  the  power  over  things  which  he  admires 
(desires)  and  fears  ;  and  he  must  of  necessity  be  impious 
because  he  thinks  that  he  is  harmed  by  ( iod,  and  he  must 
be  unjust  because  lie  always  claims  more  than  belongs  to 
him  :  and  lie  must  of  necessity  be  abject  and  mean. 

What  hinders  a  man,  who  has  clearly  separated  (com- 
prehended) these  things,  from  living  with  a  light  heart 
and  bearing  easily  the  reins,  quietly  expecting  everything 
which  can  happen,  and  enduring  that  which  has  already 
happened?  Would  you  have  me  to  bear  poverty  •'  i'ome 
and  you  will  know  what  poverty  is  when  it  has  found  one 
who  can  act  well  the  part  of  a  poor  man.  Would  you 
me  to  po^M-ss  power:  Let  me  have  power,  and 
also  the  trouble  of  it.  Well,  banishment  :  When  I 
shall  go.  there  it  will  be  well  with  me  :  for  here  al>o  where 
I  am,  it  was  not  because  of  the  place  that  it  was  well  with 
me.  but  }  »f  my  opinions  which  I  shall  carry  olf 

with  me  :    for  neither  can    any  man    deprive   me  of  them  : 

-  ••   i  .  .  , .  _-o  :  '  tiiving  thanks  always  for  all 

to  < ;.).!.'  '' — Mr-,.  Carter. 


384  EPICTETUS. 

but  my  opinions  alone  are  mine  and  they  cannot  be  taken 
from  me,  and  I  am  satisfied  while  I  have  them,  wherever 
I  may  be  and  whatever  I  am  doing.  But  now  it  is  time 
to  die.  Why  do  you  say  to  die  ?  Make  no  tragedy  show 
of  the  thing,  but  speak  of  it  as  it  is  :  it  is  now  time  for  the 
matter  (of  the  body)  to  be  resolved  into  the  things  out  of 
which  it  was  composed.  And  what  is  the  formidable 
thing  here  ?  what  is  going  to  perish  of  the  things  which 
are  in  the  universe  ?  *  what  new  thing  or  wondrous  is 
going  to  happen  ?  Is  it  for  this  reason  that  a  tyrant  is 
formidable  ?  Is  it  for  this  reason  that  the  guards  appear 
to  have  swords  which  are  large  and  sharp  ?  Say  this  to 
others  ;  but  I  have  considered  about  all  these  things  ;  no 
man  has  power  over  me.  I  have  been  made  free  ;  I  know 
his  commands,  no  man  can  now  lead  me  as  a  slave.  I 
have  a  proper  person  to  assert  my  freedom  ;  I  have  proper 
judges.  (I  say)  are  you  not  the  master  of  my  body  ? 
What  then  is  that  to  me  ?  Are  you  not  the  master  of  my 
property  ?  What  then  is  that  to  me  ?  Are  you  not  the 
master  of  my  exile  or  of  my  chains  ?  Well,  from  all  these 
things  and  all  the  poor  body  itself  I  depart  at  your  bid- 
ding, when  you  please.  Make  trial  of  your  power,  and 
you  will  know  how  far  it  reaches. 

Whom  then  can  I  still  fear  ?  Those  who  are  over  the 
bedchamber  ?  Lest  they  should  do.  what  ?  Shut  me  out  ? 
If  they  find  that  I  wish  to  enter,  let  them  shut  me  out. 
Why  then  do  you  go  to  the  doors?  Because  I  think  it 
befits  me,  while  the  play  (sport)  lasts,  to  join  in  it.  How 
then  are  you  not  shut  out  ?  Because  unless  some  one 
allows  me  to  go  in,  I  do  not  choose  to  go  in,  but  am 

*  He  says  that  the  body  will  be  resolved  into  the  things  of  which  it  is 
composed :  none  of  them  will  perish.  The  soul,  as  he  has  said  else- 
where, will  go  to  him  who  gave  it  (iii.  13,  note  4).  But  I  do  not  sup- 
pose that  he  means  that  the  soul  will  exist  as  having  a  separate  con- 
sciousness, 


EPIC  TE  ITS.  385 

always  content  with  that  which  happens  ;  for  I  think  that 
what  God  chooses  is  better  than  what  I  choose.*  I  will 
attach  myself  as  a  minister  and  follower  to  him  ;  I  have 
the  same  movements  (pursuits)  as  he  has,  I  have  the  same 
desires  ;  in  a  word,  I  have  the  same  will.  There  is  no 
shutting  out  for  me,  but  for  those  who  would  force  their 
way  in.  Why  then  do  not  I  force  my  way  in  ?  Because 
I  know  that  nothing  good  is  distributed  within  to  those 
who  enter.  But  when  I  hear  any  man  called  fortunate 
because  he  is  honored  by  Caesar,  I  say,  what  does  he  hap- 
pen to  get  ?  A  province  (the  government  of  a  province). 
Does  he  also  obtain  an  opinion  such  as  he  ought  ?  The 
office  of  a  Prefect.  Does  he  also  obtain  the  power  of 
using  his  office  well  ?  Why  do  I  still  strive  to  enter 
(Caesar's  chamber)  ?  A  man  scatters  dried  figs  and  nuts  : 
the  children  seize  them,  and  fight  with  one  another  ;  men 
do  not,  for  they  think  them  to  be  a  small  matter.  But  if 
a  man  should  throw  about  shells,  even  the  children  do  not 
sei/.e  them.  Provinces  are  distributed  :  let  children  look 
to  that.  Money  is  distributed  :  let  children  look  to  that. 
Proctorships,  consulships  are  distributed  :  let  children 
scramble  for  them,  let  them  be  shut  out,  beaten,  kiss  the 
hands  of  the  giver,  of  the  slaves  :  but  to  me  these  are  only 
dried  figs  and  nuts.  What  then  ?  If  you  fail  to  get  them, 
while  Caesar  is  scattering  them  about,  do  not  be  troubled  : 
if  a  dried  fig  come  into  your  lap,  take  it  and  eat  it ;  for  so 
far  you  may  value  even  a  fig.  But  if  I  should  stoop  down 
and  turn  another  over,  or  be  turned  over  by  another,  and 
shall  flatter  those  who  have  got  into  (Caesar's)  chamber, 
neither  is  a  dried  fig  worth  the  trouble,  nor  anything  else 

•"Nevertheless  not  as  I  will,  but  as  thou  wilt,"  Matthew  xxvi.  39.— 
Mrs.  Carter.  "  Our  resignation  to  the  will  of  God  may  be  said  to  be 
perfect,  when  our  will  is  lost  and  resolved  up  into  his ;  when  we  rest  in 
his  will  as  our  end,  as  being  itielf  most  just  and  right  and  good." — Bp. 
Butler,  Sermon  on  the  Love  of  God. 
25 


386  EPJCTETUS. 

of  the  things  which  are  not  good,  which  the  philosophers 
have  persuaded  me  not  to  think  good. 

Show  me  the  swords  of  the  guards.  See  how  big  they 
are,  and  how  sharp.  What  then  do  these  big  and  sharp 
swords  do  ?  They  kill.  And  what  does  a  fever  do  ? 
Nothing  else.  And  what  else  a  (falling)  tile?  Nothing 
else.  Would  you  then  have  me  to  wonder  at  these  things 
and  worship  them,  and  go  about  as  the  slave  of  all  of 
them?  I  hope  that  this  will  not  happen  :  but  when  I 
have  once  learned  that  everything  which  has  come  into 
existence  must  also  go  out  of  it,  that  the  universe  may 
not  stand  still  nor  be  impeded,  I  no  longer  consider  it  any 
difference  whether  a  fever  shall  do  it  or  a  tile,  or  a  soldier. 
But  if  a  man  must  make  a  comparison  between  these 
things,  I  know  that  the  soldier  will  do  it  with  less  trouble 
(to  me),  and  quicker.  When  then  I  neither  fear  anything 
which  a  tyrant  can  do  to  me,  nor  desire  anything  which 
he  can  give,  why  do  I  still  look  on  with  wonder  (admira- 
tion) ?  Why  am  I  still  confounded  ?  Why  do  I  fear  the 
guards  ?  Why  am  I  pleased  if  he  speaks  to  me  in  a 
friendly  way,  and  receives  me,  and  why  do  I  tell  others 
how  he  spoke  to  me  ?  Is  he  a  Socrates,  is  he  a  Diogenes 
that  his  praise  should  be  a  proof  of  what  I  am  ?  Have  I 
been  eager  to  imitate  his  morals?  But  I  keep  up  the  play 
and  go  to  him,  and  serve  him  so  long  as  he  does  not  bid 
me  to  do  anything  foolish  or  unreasonable.  But  if  lie 
says  to  me,  Go  and  bring  Leon  *  of  Salamis,  I  say  to  him, 
Seek  another,  for  I  am  no  longer  playing.  (The  tyrant 
says)  :  Lead  him  away  (to  prison).  I  follow  ;  that  is 
part  of  the  play.  But  your  head  will  be  taken  off.  Does 
the  tyrant's  head  always  remain  where  it  is,  and  the 
heads  of  you  who  obey  him  ?  But  you  will  be  cast  out 
unburied  ?  If  the  corpse  is  1,  I  shall  be  cast  out  ;  but  if 
I  am  different  from  the  corpse,  speak  more  properly 

*  See  iv.  i. 


&P1CT&TVS.  3*7 

accurding  as  the  fact  is.  and  do  not  think  of  frightening 
me.  These  thing's  are  formidable  to  children  and  fools.. 
But  if  any  man  has  once  entered  a  philosopher's  school 
and  knows  not  what  he  is,  he  deserves  to  he  full  of 
and  to  flatter  those  whom  afterward  he  used  to  flatter  : 
(and)  if  he  has  not  yet  learned  that  he  is  not  flesh  nor 
bones  nor  sinews,  but  he  is  that  which  makes  use  of  these 
parts  of  the  body  and  governs  them  and  follows  (under- 
stands) the  appearances  of  thii. 

Yes.  but  this  talk  makes  us  despise  the  laws.  And  what 
kind  of  talk  makes  men  more  obedient  to  the  laws  who 
employ  such  talk  ?  And  the  things  which  are  in  the  p* 
of  a  fool  are  not  law.f  And  yet  sec'  how  this  talk  makes 
us  disposed  as  we  ought  to  be  even  to  these  men  (fools); 
since  it  teaches  us  to  claim  in  opposition  to  them  none  of 
the  things  in  which  they  are  able  to  surpass  us.  This 
talk  teaches  us  as  to  the  body  to  give  it  up,  as  to  property 
ve  that  up  also,  as  to  children,  parents,  brothers, 
to  retire  from  these,  to  give  up  all  :  it  only  make- 
exception  of  the  opinions,  which  even  Xeus  has  willed 

the  select  property  of  every  man.      What  trans 
sion   of  the  laws  is  there  here,  what   folly  ''.      Where  you 

Here  Kpictetns  admits  that  there  is  some  power  in  man    whii  1 
the    body,    directs  and  governs  it.      Ho  does  not  say  what  the  power    is 
nor    what  he  supposes  it  to  he.     "  Upon  the  whole  then  our    origin-    of 
sen>e  and  our  limbs  are  certainly  instruments,  which  the  living  p< 
ourselves,  make  use  of  to  perceive  and  move  with." — l!utler'>    Analogy, 
chap.  i. 

.  fool  does   not    make    law.  I  iit<>rtunately  it 

if  we  use  the  word  law  in  the  >tn  •    law  ;  for  : 

eral  command  from  .1  prr-on,  .in  absolute  kins.',  for  example,  who  has 
power  to  enforct-  it  on  those  to  whom  the  i  omm.md  N  addressed,  or  if 
not  to  enforce  it.  t<>  puni>li  fni  di><  ilu-<!it-n,  »•  to  it.  This  <trict  useof  the 
word  "  law"  is  independent  of  the  quality  of  the  command,  which  may 
bu  \vi<.-  or  foolish,  good  or  bad.  I!ut  Kpiu. 
"law  "  in  the  strict  « 


388  KPICTETUS. 

are  superior  and  stronger,  there  I  gave  way  to  you  : 
on  the  other  hand,  where  I  am  superior,  do  you  yield  to 
me  ;  for  I  have  studied  (cared  for)  this,  and  you  have- 
not.  It  is  your  study  to  live  in  houses  with  floors  formed 
of  various  stones,  how  your 'slaves  and  dependents  shall 
serve  you,  how  you  shall  wear  fine  clothing,  have  many 
hunting  men,  lute  players,  and  tragic  actors.  Do  I  claim 
any  of  these  ?  have  you  made  any  study  of  opinions,  and 
of  your  own  rational  faculty  ?  Do  you  know  of  what 
parts  it  is  composed,  how  they  are  brought  together,  how 
they  are  connected,  what  powers  it  has,  and  of  what  kind? 
Why  then  arc  you  vexed,  if  another  who  has  made  it  his 
study,  has  the  advantage  over  you  in  these  things  ?  But 
these  things  are  the  greatest.  And  who  hinders  you  from 
being  employed  about  these  things  and  looking  after 
them  ?  And  wTio  has  a  better  stock  of  books,  of  leisure, 
of  persons  to  aid  you  ?  Only  turn  your  mind  at  last  to 
these  things,  attend,  if  it  be  only  a  short  time,  to  your  own 
ruling  faculty  :  *  consider  what  this  is  that  you  possess, 
and  whence  it  came,  this  which  uses  all  other  (faculties^, 
and  tries  them,  and  selects  and  rejects.  But  so  long  as 
you  employ  yourself  about  externals  you  will  possess 
them  (externals)  as  no  man  else  does  :  but  you  will  have 
this  (the  ruling  faculty)  such  as  you  choose  to  have  it, 
sordid  and  neglected. 

*This  term  has  been  often  used  by  Epictetus  (i.  26.  15,  etc.),  and  by  M. 
Antoninus.  Here  Epictetus  gives  a  definition  or  description  of  it :  it  is 
the  faculty  by  which  we  reflect  and  judge  and  determine,  a  faculty  which 
no  other  animal  has,  a  faculty  which  in  many  men  is  neglected,  and 
weak  because  it  is  neglected;  but  still  it  ought  to  be  what  its  constitu- 
tion forms  it  to  be,  a  faculty  which  "plainly  bears  upon  it  the  marks  of 
authority  over  all  the  rest,  and  claims  the  absolute  direction  of  them  all, 
to  allow  or  forbid  their  gratification." — (bp.  Butler,  Preface  to  his  Ser- 
mons.) 


389 


CHAPTER  VTIT. 

AGAINST    THOSK    WHO    HASTILY    Rl'SH     INTO    THK    I'SE    OK    THK 
PHILOSOPHIC     DKKSS. 

XKVER  praise  nor  blame  a  man  because  of  the  t! 
which  are  common  (to  all,  or  to  most),*  and  do  not  as- 
cribe to  him  any  skill  or  want  of  skill  :  and  thus  you 
be  free  from  rashness  and  from  malevolence.  This  man 
bathes  very  quickly.  Does  he  then  do  wrong-?  Certain!-,- 
not.  But  what  does  he  do  ?  He  bathes  very  quickly. 
Are  all  things  then  done  well  ?  Uy  no  means  :  but  tin- 
acts  which  proceed  from  right  opinions  are  done  well  :  and 
those  which  proceed  from  bad  opinions  are  done  ill.  Hut 
do  you,  until  you  know  the  opinion  from  which  a  man 
does  each  thing,  neither  praise  nor  blame  the  act.  But 
the  opinion  is  not  easily  discovered  from  the  rxternal 
things  (acts).  This  man  is  a  carpenter.  Why?  l!< 
he  uses  an  ax.  What  then  is  this  to  the  matter?  This 
man  is  a  musician  because  lie  sings.  And  what  does  that 
signify?  This  man  is  a  philosopher.  Because  lie  w< 
cloak  and  long  hair.  And  what  does  a  juggler  wear? 
For  this  reason  if  a  man  sees  any  philosopher  acting  in- 
decently, immediately  he  says.  See  what  the  philosopher 
is  doing  ;  but  he  ought  because  of  the  man's  indecent  be- 
havior rather  to  say  that  he  is  not  a  philosopher.  Kor  if 
this  is  the  preconceived  notion  of  a  philosopher  and  what 
lie  pr>  to  wear  a  cloak  and  long  hair,  men  would 

say  well  ;   but  if  what  lie  professes  is  this   rather,  to   keq> 
himself  free   from    faults, "why  do  wr    not    rather,  because 

•    i\  •  •»•  •»  1 


3g  o  i-:rrcTF.rrs. 

he  does  not  make  good  his  professions,  take  front  him  the 
name  of  philosopher?  For  so  \ve  do  in  the  case  of  all 
other  arts.  When  a  man  sees  another  handling-  an  ax 
badly,  he  does  not  say.  What  is  the  use  of  the  carpenter's 
art  ?  See  ho\v  badly  carpenters  do  their  work  ;  but  he 
says  just  the  contrary,  This  man  is  not  a  carpenter,  for  he 
uses  an  ax  badly.  In  the  same  way  if  a  man  hears  an- 
other singing  badly,  he  does  not  say.  See  how  musicians 
sing  :  but  rather,  This  man  is  not  a  musician.  But  it  is 
in  the  matter  of  philosophy  only  that  people  do  this. 
When  they  see  a  man  acting  contrary  to  the  profession  of 
a  philosopher,  they  do  not  take  away  his  title,  but  they 
assume  him  to  be  a  philosopher,  and  from  his  acts  deriv- 
ing the  fact  that  he  is  behaving  indecently  they  conclude 
that  there  is  no  use  in  philosophy. 

What  then  is  the  reason  of  this  ?  Because  we  attach 
value  to  the  notion  of  a  carpenter,  and  to  that  of  a  musi- 
cian, and  to  the  notion  of  other  artisans  in  like  manner, 
but  not  to  that  of  a  philosopher,  and  we  judge  from  ex- 
ternals only  that  it  is  a  thing  confused  and  ill  defined. 
And  what  other  kind  of  art  has  a  name  from  the  dress  and 
the  hair  :  and  has  not  both  theorems  and  a  material  and 
an  end?  What  then  is  the  material  (matter)  of  the 
philosopher  ?  Is  it  a  cloak  ?  No,  but  reason.  What  is 
his  end?  is  it  to  wear  a  cloak?  No,  but  to  possess  the 
reason  in  a  right  state.  Of  what  kind  are  his  theorems  ? 
Are  they  those  about  the  way  in  which  the  beard  becomes 
great  or  the  hair  long?  No.  but  rather  what  Zeno  - 
to  know  the  elements  of  reason,  what  kind  of  a  thing  each 
of  them  is,  and  how  they  are  fitted  to  one  another,  and 
what  things  are  consequent  upon  them.  Will  you  not 
then  see  first  if  he  does  what  he  professes  when  he  acts  in 
an  unbecoming  manner,  and  then  blame  his  study  (pur- 
suit) ?  But  now  when  you  yourself  are  acting  in  a  sober 
way,  you  say  in  consequence  of  what  he  seems  to  you  to 


be  doing  wrong.  Look  at  the  philosopher,  as  if  it  were 
proper  to  call  by  the  name  of  philosopher  one  \vh» 
these  things  :  and  further.  This  is  the  conduct  of  a  philos- 
opher. But  you  do  not  say,  Look  at  the  carpenter,  when 
you  know  that  a  carpenter  is  an  adulterer  or  you  see  him 
to  be  a  glutton  ;  nor  do  you  say.  See  the  musician. 
Thus  to  a  certain  degree  even  you  perceive  (understand) 
the  profession  of  a  philosopher,  but  you  fall  away  from 
the  notion,  and  you  are  confused  through  want  of 
care. 

But  even  the  philosophers  themselves  as  they  are  called 
pursue  the  thing  (philosophy)  by  beginning  with  things- 
which  are  common  to  them  and  others  on  as  they 

have  assumed  a  cloak  and  grown  a  beard,  they  say,  T  am 
a  philosopher.  But  no  man  will  say.  I  am  a  musician,  if 
he  has  bought  a  plectrum  (fiddlestick)  and  a  lute  :  nor 
will  he  say,  I  am  a  smith,  if  he  has  put  on  a  cap  and 
apron.  But  the  dress  is  tilted  to  the  art  ;  and  they  take 
their  name  from  the  art.  and  not  from  the  dress.  For 
this  reason  Euphrates*  used  to  say  well.  A  long  time  I 
strove  to  be  a  philosopher  without  people  knowing  it  : 
and  this,  he  said,  was  useful  to  me  :  tor  first  I  knew  that 
when  I  did  anything  well,  I  did  not  do  it  for  the  sa 
the  spectators,  but  for  the  sake  of  myself:  I  ate  well  for 
the  sake  of  myself ;  1  had  my  countenance  well  com: 
and  my  walk:  all  for  myself  and  for  ( iod.  Then,  as  1 
struggled  alone,  so  I  alone  also  was  in  danger  :  in  no 

t  through  me.  if  1  did  any  tiling  base  orunbecoii 
was  philosophy  endangered  :  nor  did  1  injure  the  many 
by  doing  anything  wrong  as  a  philosopher.  For  this 
reason  those  who  did  not  know  my  purpose  used  to 
wonder  how  it  was  that  while  1  conversed  and  lived 
altogether  with  all  philosophers.  I  was  not  a  philosopher 
myself.  And  what  was  the  harm  tor  me  to  be  known  to 

*  See  Ui.  1 5,  S. 


392  J-.P/CTETL'S. 

be  a  philosopher  by  my  acts  and  not  by  outward  marks  ''.  * 
See  how  I  eat,  how  I  drink,  how  I  sleep,  how  1  bear  and 
forbear,  how  I  co-operate,  how  I  employ  desire,  how  I 
employ  aversion  (turning  from  things),  how  I  maintain  the 
relations  (to  things)  those  which  are  natural  or  those  which 
are  acquired,  how  free  from  confusion,  how  free  from  hin- 
drance. Judge  of  me  from  this,  if  you  can.  But  if  you  are 
so  deaf  and  blind  that  you  cannot  conceive  even  Hephics- 
tus  to  be  a  good  smith,  unless  you  see  the  cap  on  his 
head,  what  is  the  harm  in  not  being  recognized  by  so 
foolish  a  judge  ? 

So  Socrates  was  not  known  to  be  a  philosopher  by 
most  persons  ;  and  they  used  to  come  to  him  and  ask  to  be 
introduced  to  philosophers.  Was  he  vexed  then  as  we  are. 
and  did  he  say,  And  do  you  not  think  that  I  am  a  philoso- 
pher ?  No.  but  he  would  take  them  and  introduce  them, 
being  satisfied  with  one  thing,  with  being  a  philosopher  : 
and  being  pleased  also  with  not  being  thought  to  be  a 
philosopher,  he  was  not  annoyed  :  for  he  thought  of  his 
own  occupation.  What  is  the  work  of  an  honorable  and 
good  man  ?  To  have  many  pupils  ?  By  no  means. 
They  will  look  to  this  matter  who  are  earnest  about  it. 
But  was  it  his  business  to  examine  carefully  difficult 
theorems?  Others  will  look  after  these  matters  also.  In 
what  then  was  he.f  and  who  was  he  and  whom  did  he 
wish  to  be  ?  He  was  in  that  (employed  in  that)  wherein 
there  was  hurt  (damage)  and  advantage.  If  any  man 
can  damage  me,  he  says,  I  am  doing  nothing  :  if  I  am 
waiting  for  another  man  to  do  me  good.  I  am  noth- 


*"  Yea,  a  man  may  say,  Thou  hast  faith,  and  I  have  works  : 
thy  faith  without  thy  works,  and  I  will  shew  thee  my  faith  by  my 
works,"  Epistle  of  James,  ii.  18.  So  a  moral  philosopher  may  say,  I 
show  my  principles,  not  by  what  I  profess,  but  by  that  which  I  do. 

t"  In  what  then  was  he  "    seems  to  mean   "in   what   did  lie   employ 
himself  ?  " 


393 

ing.  If  I  wish  for  anything,  and  it  does  not  happen, 
I  am  unfortunate.  To  such  a  contest  he  invited  every 
man,  and  I  do  not  think  that  he  would  have  declined  the 
contest  with  any  one.  What  do  you  suppose  ?  was  it  by 
proclaiming  and  saying.  I  am  such  a  man  ?  Far  from  it. 
but  by  being  such  a  man.  For  further,  this  is  the  char- 
acter of  a  fool  and  a  boaster  to  say,  I  am  free  from  pas- 
sions and  disturbance  :  do  not  be  ignorant,  my  friends, 
that  while  you  are  uneasy  and  disturbed  about  things  of 
no  value,  I  alone  am  free  from  all  perturbation.  So  is  it  not 
enough  for  you  to  feel  no  pain,  unless  you  make  this  proc- 
lamation :  Come  together  all  who  are  suffering  gout, 
pains  in  the  head,  fever,  ye  who  are  lame,  blind,  and  ob- 
serve that  I  am  sound  (free)  from  every  ailment.  This  is 
empty  and  disagreeable  to  hear,  unless  like  /Esculapius 
you  are  able  to  show  immediately  by  what  kind  of  treat- 
ment they  also  shall  be  immediately  free  from  di^ 
and  unless  you  show  your  own  health  as  an  example. 

For  such  is  the  Cynic  who  is  honored  with  the  scepter 
and  the  diadem  of  Xeus,  and  says.  That  you  may  s 
men,  ti'at  you  seek  happiness  and  tranquillity  not  where  it 
is,  but  where  it  is  not,  behold  I  am  sent  to  you  by  (Jod  as 
an  example.*  I  who  have  neither  property  nor  house,  nor 
wife  nor  children,  nor  even  a  bed,  nor  coat  nor  household 
utensil  ;  and  see  how  healthy  I  am  :  try  me.  and  if  you 
see  that  I  am  free  from  perturbations,  hear  the  remedies 
and  how  I  have  been  cured  (treated).  This  is  both  phil- 
anthropic and  noble-.  But  see  whose  work  it  is,  the  work 
of  Xeus,  or  of  him  whom  he-  may  judge  worthy  of  this 
service,  that  he  may  never  exhibit  anything  to  the 
many,  by  which  he  shall  make  of  no  effect  his  own  testi- 
mony, whereby  he  gives  testimony  to  virtue,  and  bears 
evidence  against  external  things  : 

inpan-  iii.  < 


394 


His  beauteous  face  pales  not,  nor  from  his  cheeks 
He  wipes  a  tear.  —  Odyssey,  'xi.  52.S. 


And  not  this  only,  but  he  neither  desires  nor  seeks  any- 
thing, nor  man  nor  place  nor  amusement,  as  children  seek 
the  vintage  or  holidays  :  ahvays  fortified  by  modesty  a> 
others  are  fortified  by  walls  and  doors  and  door-keepers. 

But  no\v  (these  men)  being  only  moved  to  philosophy, 
as  those  who  have  a  bad  stomach  are  moved  to  some  kinds 
of  food  which  they  soon  loath,  straightway  (rush)  toward 
the  scepter  and  to  the  royal  power.  They  let  the  hair 
grow,  they  assume  the  cloak,  they  show  the  shoulder 
bare,  they  quarrel  with  those  whom  they  meet;  and  if 
they  see  a  man  in  a  thick  winter  coat,  they  quarrel  with 
him.  Man,  first  exercise  yourself  in  winter  weather  :  see 
your  movements  (inclinations)  that  they  are  not  those  of 
a  man  with  a  bad  stomach  or  those  of  a  longing  woman. 
First  strive  that  it  be  not  known  what  you  are  :  be  a 
philosopher  to  yourself  (or,  philosophize  to  yourself)  a 
short  time.  Fruit  grows  thus  :  the  seed  must  be  buried 
for  some  time.  hid.  grow  slowly  in  order  that  it  may  come 
to  perfection.  But  if  it  produces  the  ear  before  the 
jointed  stem,  it  is  imperfect,  a  produce  of  the  garden  of 
Adonis.*  Such  a  poor  plant  are  you  also  :  you  have 
blossomed  too  soon  ;  the  cold  weather  will  scorch  you  up. 
See  what  the  husbandmen  say  about  seeds  when  there  is 
warm  weather  too  early.  They  are  afraid  lest  the  seeds 
should  be  too  luxuriant,  and  then  a  single  frost  should  lay 
hold  of  them  and  show  that  they  are  too  forward.  Do  you 
also  consider,  my  man  :  you  have  shot  out  too  soon,  you 

*"  The  gardens  of  Adonis"  are  things  growing  in  earthen  vessels, 
carried  about  for  show  only,  not  for  use.  "  The  gardens  of  Adonis  "  is 
a  proverbial  expression  applied  to  things  of  no  value,  to  plants,  for 
instance,  which  last  only  a  short  time,  have  no  roots,  and  soon  wither. 
Such  things,  we  may  suppose,  were  exhibited  at  the  festivals  of  Adonis. 
—  Schweig.'s  note. 


F.r/CTKTUS.  395 

have  hurried  toward  a  little  fame  before  the  proper 
season  :  you  think  that  you  are  something,  a  fool  among 
fools  :  you  will  be  caught  by  the  frost,  and  rather  you  have 
been  frost-bitten  in  the  root  below,  but  your  upper  parts 
still  blossom  a  little,  and  for  this  reason  you  think  that 
you  are  still  alive  and  flourishing.  Allow  us  to  ripen  in 
the  natural  way  :  why  do  you  bare  (expose")  us  ?  why  do 
you  force  us  ?  we  are  not  yet  able  to  bear  the  air.  Let  the 
root  grow,  then  acquire  the  first  joint,  then  the  second, 
and  then  the  third  :  in  this  way  then  the  fruit  will  natu- 
rally force  itself  out,  even  if  I  do  not  choosr.  For  who 
that  is  pregnant  and  filled  with  such  great  principles  docs 
not  also  perceive  his  own  powers  and  move  toward  the 
corresponding  acts  ?  A  bull  is  not  ignorant  of  his  own 
nature  and  his  powers,  when  a  wild  beast  shows  itself,  nor 
'ie  wait  for  one  to  urge  him  on  :  nor  a  dog  when  he 
sees  a  wild  animal.  But  if  I  have  the  pou  good 

man,  shall  I  wait  for  you  to  prepare  me  for  my  own 
(proper)  acts  ?  At  present  I  have  them  not,  believe  me. 
\\'hy  then  do  you  wish  me  to  be  withered  up  before  the 
time,  as  you  have  been  withered  up? 


CHAPTER  IX. 

TO    A     PERSON    WHO     HAD     BEEN      CHAN(iKI)     TO     A     CHARACTER    OK 
SHAMF.LESSNI 

WHEN  you  see  another  man  in  the  possession  of  power 
(magistracy),  set  against  this  the  fact  that  you  hav 

*  "They,  who  are  desirous  of  taking  refuge  in  Heathenism  from  the 
strictness  of  the  Christian  morality,  will  find  no  great  consolation  in 
reading  thi<  chapter  of  F.pictctus." — Mrs.  Carter. 


396  KPICTl-.TUS. 

the  want  (desire)  of  power  ;  when  you  see  another  rich, 
see  what  you  possess  in  place  of  riches  :  for  if  you  possess 
nothing  in  place  of  them,  you  are  miserable  ;  but  if  you 
have  not  the  want  of  riches,  know  that  you  possess  more 
than  this  man  possesses  and  what  is  worth  much  more. 
Another  man  possesses  a  handsome  woman  (wife) :  you 
have  the  satisfaction  of  not  desiring  a  handsome  wife. 
Do  these  things  appear  to  you  to  be  small?  And  how 
much  would  these  persons  give,  these  very  men  who  are 
rich,  and  in  possession  of  power,  and  live  with  handsome 
women,  to  be  able  to  despise  riches  and  power,  and  these 
very  women  v/hom  they  love  and  enjoy  ?  Do  you  not 
know  then  what  is  the  thirst  of  a  man  who  has  a  fever? 
Me  possesses  that  which  is  in  no  degree  like  the  thirst  of 
a  man  who  is  in  health :  for  the  man  who  is  in  health 
ceases  to  be  thirsty  after  he  has  drunk  ;  but  the  sick  man 
being  pleased  for  a  short  time  has  a  nausea,  he  converts 
the  drink  into  bile,  vomits,  is  griped,  and  more  thirsty. 
It  is  such  a  thing  to  have  desire  of  riches  and  to  possess 
riches,  desire  of  power  and  to  possess  power,  desire  of  a 
beautiful  woman  and  to  sleep  with  her  :  to  this  is  added 
jealousy,  fear  of  being  deprived  of  the  thing  which  you 
love,  indecent  words,  indecent  thoughts,  unseemly  acts. 

And  what  do  I  lose?  you  will  say.  My  man,  you  were 
modest,  and  you  are  so  no  longer.  Have  you  lost  nothing  ? 
In  place  of  Chrysippus  and  Zeno  you  read  Aristides  and 
Evenus  ;  *  have  you  lost  nothing  ?  In  place  of  Socrates 

*  Aristides  was  a  Greek,  but  his  period  is  not  known.  He  was  the 
author  of  a  work  named  Milesiaca  or  Milesian  stories.  All  that  we 
know  of  the  work  is  that  it  was  of  a  loose  description,  amatory  and 
licentious.  It  was  translated  into  Latin  by  L.  Cornelius  Sisenna,  a  con- 
temporary of  the  Dictator  Sulla ;  and  it  is  mentioned  by  Plutarch  (Life 
of  Crassus,  c.  32),  and  several  times  by  Ovid  (Tristia,  ii.  413,  etc.). 
Evenus  was  perhaps  a  poet.  We  know  nothing  of  this  Evenus,  but  we 
may  conjecture  from  being  here  associated  with  Aristides  what  his  char- 
acter was. 


397 

and  Diogelies,  you  admire  him  who  is  able  to  corrupt  and 
seduce  most  women.  You  wish  to  appear  handsome  and 
try  to  make  yourself  so,  though  you  arc  not.  You  like  to 
display  splendid  clothes  that  you  may  attract  women  ; 
and  if  you  find  any  fine  oil  (for  the  hair),  you  imagine 
that  you  are  happy.  But  formerly  you  did  not  think  of 
any  such  thing,  but  only  where  there  should  be  decent 
talk,  a  worthy  man,  and  a  generous  conception.  There- 
fore you  slept  like  a  man,  walked  forth  like  a  man,  wore  a 
manly  dress,  and  used  to  talk  in  a  way  becoming  a  good 
man  ;  then  do  you  say  to  me,  I  have  lost  nothing  ?  So  do 
men  lose  nothing  more  than  coin  ?  Is  not  modesty  lost  ? 
Is  not  decent  behavior  lost  ?  is  it  that  he  who  has  lost  these 
things  has  sustained  no  loss  ?  Perhaps  you  think  that  not 
one  of  these  things  is  a  loss.  But  there  was  a  time  when 
you  reckoned  this  the  only  loss  and  damage,  and  you  were 
anxious  that  no  man  should  disturb  you  from  these  (good) 
words  and  actions. 

Observe,  you  are  disturbed  from  these  good  words  and 
actions  by  nobody,  but  by  yourself.  Fight  with  yourself, 
restore  yourself  to  decency,  to  modesty,  to  liberty.  If  any 
man  ever  told  you  this  about  me,  that  a  person  forces  me 
to  la-  an  adulterer,  to  wear  such  a  dress  as  yours,  to  per- 
fume myself  with  oils,  would  you  not  have  gone  and  with 
vour  own  hand  have  killed  the  man  who  thus  calumniated 
me?  Now  will  you  not  help  yourself?  and  how  much 
easier  is  this  help?  There  is  no  need  to  kill  any  man,  n<;r 
to  put  him  in  chains,  nor  to  treat  him  with  contumely, 
nor  to  enter  the  Forum  (go  to  the  courts  of  law),  but  it  is 
only  necessary  for  you  to  speak  to  yourself  who  will  be 
most  easily  persuaded,  with  whom  no  man  has  nun 
power  of  persuasion  than  yourself.  First  of  all,  condeim. 
what  you  are  doing,  and  then  when  you  have  condemned 
it.  do  not  despair  of  yourself,  and  be  not  in  the  condition 
of  those  men  of  mean  spirit,  who.  when  they  have  onee 


EPICTETUS. 

in,  surrender  themselves  completely  and  are  carried 
away  as  if  by  a  torrent.  But  see  what  the  trainers  of  boys 
do.  Has  the  boy  fallen  ?  Rise,  they  say,  wrestle  again 
till  you  are  made  strong.  Do  you  also  do  something  of 
the  same  kind  :  for  be  well  assured  that  nothing  is  more 
'.ractable  than  the  human  soul.  You  must  exercise  the 
U'ill,  *  and  the  thing  is  done,  it  is  set  right  :  as  on  the 
other  hand,  only  fall  a-nodding  (be  careless),  and  the 
thing  is  lost  :  for  from  within  comes  ruin  and  from  within 
comes  help.  Then  (you  say)  what  good  do  I  gain? 
And  what  greater  good  do  you  seek  than  this?f  From  a 
shameless  man  you  will  become  a  modest  man,  from  a 
disorderly  you  will  become  an  orderly  man.  from  a  faith- 
Jess  yon  will  become  a  faithful  man,  from  a  man  of  un- 
bridJed  habits  a  sober  man.  If  you  seek  anything  more 
than  this,  go  on  doing  what  you  are  doing  :  not  even  a 
God  can  now  help  you. 

*  The  power  of  the  Willis  a  fundamental  principle  with  Epictetus. 
The  will  is  strong  in  some,  but  very  feeble  in  others ;  and  sometimes,  as 
experience  seems  to  show,  it  is  capable  of  resisting  the  power  of  old 
habits. 

t  Virtue  is  its  own  reward,  said  the  Stoics.  This  is  the  meaning  of 
Epictetus,  and  it  is  consistent  with  his  principles  that  a  man  should  live 
conformably  to  his  nature,  and  so  he  will  have  ali  the  happiness  of  which 
human  nature  is  capable.  Mrs.  Carter  has  a  note  here,  which  I  do  not 
copy,  and  T  hardly  understand.  It  seems  to  refer  to  the  Christian  d<"  - 
trine  of  a  man  being  rewarded  in  a  future  life  according  to  hi.s  works  : 
but  we  have  no  evidence  that  Epictetus  believed  in  a  future  life,  and  lie 
therefore  could  not  go  further  than  to  maintain  that  virtuous  behavior 
is  the  best  thing  in  this  short  life,  and  will  give  a  man  the  happiix .,.-, 
which  he  can  obtain  in  no  other  way. 


EPiC  TUTUS.  399 


<  HAPTF.R    X. 
WHAT  THINGS  \VK  OULHT  10  I>I-SI>I>K,  .\xi>  WHAT  THINGS  WK 

(in.HT   TO   VA, 

THE  difficulties  of  all  men  are  about  external  things, 
their  helplessness  is  about  externals.  What  shall  I  do, 
how  will  it  be.  how  will  it  turn  out,  will  this  happen,  will 
that  ?  All  these  are  the  words  of  those  who  are  turning 
themselves  to  things  which  are  not  within  the  power  of 
the  will.  For  who  says.  How  shall  I  not  assent  to  that 
which  is  false  ?  how  shall  I  not  turn  away  from  the  truth  ? 
If  a  man  be  of  such  a  good  disposition  as  to  be  anxious 
aboutthe.se  things,  I  will  remind  him  of  this,  Why  are 
you  anxious  ?  The  thing  is  in  your  own  power  :  be  as- 
sured :  do  not  be  precipitate  in  assenting  before  you  apply 
the  natural  rule.  On  the  other  side,  if  a  man  is  anxious 
(uneasy)  about  desire,  lest  it  fail  in  its  purpose  and  miss 
its  end,  and  with  respect  to  the  avoidance  of  things, 
lest  he  should  fall  into  that  which  he  would  avoid.  I  will 
first  kiss  (love;  him.  because  he  throws  away  the  things 
about  which  others  arc  in  a  Mutter  (others  desire)  and 
their  fears,  and  employs  his  thought  about  his  own  affairs 
and  his  own  condition.  Then  I  shall  say  to  him,  if  you 
do  not  choose  to  desire  that  which  you  will  fail  to  obtain 
nor  to  attempt  to  avoid  that  into  which  you  will  fall, 
desire  nothing  which  belongs  to  (which  is  in  the  p 
of)  others,  nor  try  to  avoid  any  of  the  things  which  are 
not  in  -your  power.  If  you  do  this  rule,  you 

must  of  necessity  fail  in  your  desires  and  fall  into  that 
which  you  would  avoid.  What  is  the  difficulty  here  ? 
where  is  there  room  for  the  words.  How  will  it  be?  and 
How  will  it  turn  out?  and  will  this  happen  or  that? 


400  EP1CTETUS. 

Now  is  not  that  which  will  happen  independent  of  the 
will  ?  Yes.  And  the  nature  of  good  and  of  evil  is  it  not 
in  the  things  which  are  within  the  power  of  the  will  ? 
Yes.  Is  it  in  your  power  then  to  treat  according  to  nat- 
ure everything  which  happens  ?  Can  any  person  hinder 
you?  No  man.  No  longer  then  say  to  me,  How  will  it 
be  ?  For  however  it  may  be,  you  will  dispose  of  it  well,* 
and  the  result  to  you  will  be  a  fortunate  one.  What 
would  Hercules  have  been  if  he  had  said,  How  shall  a 
great  lion  not  appear  to  me,  or  a  great  boar,  or  savage 
men  ?  And  what  do  you  care  for  that  ?  If  a  great  boar 
appear,  you  will  fight  a  greater  fight  :  if  bad  men  appear, 
you  will  relieve  the  earth  of  the  bad.  Suppose  then  that 
I  may  lose  my  life  in  this  way.  You  will  die  a  good 
man,  doing  a  noble  act.  For  since  we  must  certainly  die, 
of  necessity  a  man  must  be  found  doing  something,  either 
following  the  employment  of  a  husbandman,  or  digging, 
or  trading,  or  serving  in  a  consulship  or  suffering  from  in- 
digestion or  from  diarrhoea.  What  then  do  you  wish  to 
be  doing  when  you  are  found  by  death  ?  I  for  my  part 
urould  wish  to  be  found  doing  something  which  belongs 
to  a  man,  beneficent,  suitable  to  the  general  interest, 
noble.  But  if  I  cannot  be  found  doing  things  so  great,  I 
would  be  found  doing  at  least  that  which  I  cannot  be 
hindered  from  doing,  that  which  is  permitted  me  to  do, 
correcting  myself,  cultivating  the  faculty  which  makes 
use  of  appearances,  laboring  at  freedom  from  the  affects 
(laboring  at  tranquillity  of  mind),  rendering  to  the  rela- 

*  See  a  passage  in  Plutarch  on  Tranquillity  from  Euripides,  the  great 
store-house  of  noble  thoughts,  from  \\hii  h  ancient  writers  drew  much 
good  matter ;  and  perhaps  it  was  one  of  the  reasons  why  so  many  o£ 
his  plays  and  fragments  have  been  preserved. 

We  must  not  quarrel  with  the  things  that  are, 
1  or  they  c.ire  not  for  us  :   but  lie  who  feels  them, 
If  he  disposes  well  of  things,  farts  well. 


EPJCTETUS. 


401 


lions  of  life  their  due ;  if  1  succeed  SD  far.  also  (I  \voui.l 
be  found)  touching  on  (ad\  anci:i:;  to)  the  third  topic-  'or 
head)  safety  in  the  forming  judgments  about  things.  '  If 
death  surprises  me  when  I  run  busy  about  these  things,  it 
is  enough  for  me  if  lean  stretch  out  my  hands  to  (Jodaml 
say  : 

The  means  which  I  have  received  from  thee  for  seeing 
thy  administration  (of  the  world)  and  following  it.  I  have 
not  neglected  :  I  have  not  dishonored  thee  by  my  acts  : 
see  how  I  have  used  my  perceptions,  see  how  I  have  used 
my  preconceptions:  have  I  ever  blamed  thee?  have  1 
been  discontented  with  anything  that  happens,  or  wished 
it  to  be  otherwise  ?  have  I  wished  to  transgress  the 
(established)  relation  (of  things)?  That  tliou  hast  given 
me  life,  1  thank  thee  for  what  thou  hast  given  :  so  long 
as  I  have  used  the  things  which  are  thine  I  am  content  ; 
lake  them  back  and  place  them  wherever  thou  mayest 
choose  ;  for  thine  were  all  things,  thou  gavest  them  to 
me.f  Is  it  not  enough  to  depart  in  this  state- of  mind, 
and  what  life  is  better  and  more  becoming  than  that  of  a 
man  who  is  in  this  state  of  mind?  and  what  end  is  more 
happy ?  \ 

*  See  iii.  c.  2. 

t"  Thine  they  were,  and  thou  gavest  them  to  me."  John  xvii.  6. 
— Mrs.  Carter. 

{  "  I  wish  it  were  possible  to  palliate  the  ostentation  of  this  passage, 
by  applying  it  to  the  ideal  perfect  character  :  but  it  is  in  a  general  way 
that  Kpictetus  hath  proposed  such  a  dying  speech,  as  cannot  without 
shocking  arrogance  be  uttered  by  any  one  born  to  die.  Unmixed  as  it  is 
with  any  acknowledgment  of  faults  or  imperfections,  at  present,  or  with 
any  sense  of  guilt  on  account  of  the  past,  it  must  give  every  solx/i 
reader  a  very  disadvantageous  opinion  of  some  principles  of  the  philos- 
ophy, on  which  it  is  founded,  as  contradictory  to  the  voice  of  conscience, 
and  formed  on  absolute  ignorance  or  neglect  of  the  condition  and  cir- 
tumsunces  of  such  a  creature  as  man." — Mrs.  Carter.  I  am  inclined  to 
think  that  Epictetus  does  refer  to  the  "ideal  perfect  character;"  but 
26 


402  KPfCTKTUS. 

But  that  this  may  be  done  (t!i-ii  such  a  declaration  may 
be  made),  a  man  must  receive  ibeur)  no  small  things,  nor 
are  the  things  small  which  he  must  lose  (go  without*. 
You  cannot  both  wish  to  be  a  consul  and  to  have  these 
things  (the  power  of  making  such  a  dying  speech),  and  to 
be  eager  to  have  lands,  and  these  tilings  also  ;  and  to  be 
solicitous  about  slaves  and  about  yourself.  But  if  you 
wish  for  anything  which  belongs  to  another,  that  which 
is  your  own  is  lost.  This  is  the  nature  of  the  thing  : 
nothing  is  given  or  had  for  nothing.*  And  where  is  the 
wonder  ?  If  you  wish  to  be  a  consul,  you  must  keep  awake, 
run  about,  kiss  hands,  waste  yourself  with  exhaustion 

others  may  not  understand  him  in  this  way.  When  Mrs.  Carter  says 
"  but  it  is  in  a  general  .  .  .  dying  speech,"  she  can  hardly  suppose,  as 
her  words  seem  to  mean,  that  Epictetus  proposed  such  a  dying  speech 
for  every  man  or  even  for  many  men,  for  he  knew  and  has  told  us  how 
"bad  many  men  are,  and  how  few  are  good  according  to  his  measure  and 
rule  :  in  fact  his  meaning  is  plainly  expressed.  The  dying  speech  may 
even  be  stronger  in  the  sense  in  which  Mrs.  Carter  understands  it,  in  my 
translation,  where  I  have  rendered  one  passage  in  the  text  by  the  words, 
"  I  have  not  dishonored  thee  by  my  acts,"  which  she  translates,  "as  far 
as  in  me  lay,  I  have  not  dishonored  thee  :*'  which  apparently  means, 
'j  as  far  as  I  could,  I  have  not  dishonored  thee."  The  Latin  translation 
"  quantum  in  me  fuit,"  seems  rather  ambiguous  to  me.  There  is  a  gen- 
eral confession  of  sins  in  the  prayer-book  of  the  Church  of  England, 
part  of  which  Epictetus  would  not  have  rejected,  I  think.  Of  course 
the  words  which  form  the  peculiar  Christian  character  of  the  confession 
would  have  been  unintelligible  to  him.  It  is  a  confession  which  all  per- 
sons of  all  conditions  are  supposed  to  make.  If  all  persons  made  the 
confession  with  sincerity,  it  ought  to  produce  a  corresponding  behavior 
and  make  men  more  ready  to  be  kind  to  one  another,  for  all  who  use 
it  confess  that  they  fail  in  their  duty,  and  it  ought  to  lower  pride  and 
banish  arrogance  from  the  behavior  of  those  who  in  wealth  and  condi- 
tion are  elevated  above  the  multitude.  But  I  have  seen  it  somewhere 
said,  I  cannot  remember  where,  but  said  in  no  friendly  spirit  to  Christian 
prayer,  that  some  men  both  priests  and  laymen  prostrate  themselves  in 
humility  before  God  and  indemnify  themselves  by  arrogance  to  man. 

*  See  iv.  2,  2. 


EPICTRTUS. 


403 


at  other  men's  doors,  say  and  do  many  things  unworthy 
of  a  free  man,  send  gifts  to  many,  daily  presents  t«>  some. 
And  what  is  the  thing  that  is  got  ?  Twelve  lumd' 
rods  (the  consular  fasces),  to  sit  three  or  four  times  on  the 
tribunal,  to  exhibit  the  games  in  the  Circus  and  to  give 
suppers  in  small  baskets."1  <  )r.  if  you  do  not  agree  about 
this,  let  some  one  show  me  what  tin-re  is  besides  these 
things.  In  order  then  to  secure  freedom  from  passions. 
tranquillity,  to  sleep  well  when  you  do  sleep,  to  be  really 
awake  when  you  are  awake,  to  fear  nothing,  to  be  anxious 
about  nothing,  will  you  spend  nothing  and  give  no  labor? 
Hut  if  anything  belonging  to  you  be  lost  while  you  are 
thus  busied,  or  be  wasted  badly,  or  another  obtains  what 
you  ought  to  have  obtained,  will  you  immediately  be 
i  at  what  has  happened  ?  Will  you  not  take  into  the 
account  on  the  other  side  what  you  receive  and  for  what, 
how  much  for  how  much  ?  Do  you  expect  to  have  for 
nothing  things  so  great  ?  And  how  can  you?  One  work 
(thing)  has  no  community  with  another.  You  cannot  have 
both  external  things  after  bestowing  care  on  them  and 
your  own  ruling  faculty  :  t  but  if  you  would  have  t: 
give  up  this.  If  you  do  not.  you  will  have  neither  this 
nor  that,  while  you  are  drawn  in  different  ways  to  both.} 
The  oil  will  be  spilled,  the  household  vessels  will  perish  : 
(that  may  be),  but  I  shall  be  free  from  passions  (tranquil). 
There  will  be  a  fire  when  I  am  not  present,  and  the  books 
will  be  destroyed  :  but  I  shall  treat  appearai.  .rding 

* Tli.  hat  the  Romans  named  "sportula.-."    in  which  the  rich 

•  eatables  to   poor  dependents    who   .-.tiled  to   pay  their 
.irly  hum. 

N.IIK  sj»rtuU  )irinm 
I  .inline  p.tr\.i  -.filet  tiulM    r.ipicnd.i  !•  . 

t  ••  You    f.iniK.t    ierve    <;•»!    :md    M.uiunon."      Matthew    \\    - '\  —Mis. 
Tarter.  -.  5- 


404  I'.riCTETUS. 

to  nature.  Well  ;  but  I  shall  have  nothing-  to  eat.  If  1 
am  so  unlucky,  death  is  a  harbor;  and  death  is  the  harbor 
for  all  ;  this  is  the  place  of  refuge  ;  and  for  this  reason  not 
one  of  the  things  in  life  is  difficult  :  as  soon  as  you 
choose,  you  are  out  of  the  house,  and  are  smoked  no 
more.*  Why  then  are  you  anxious,  why  do  you  lose 
your  sleep,  why  do  you  not  straightway,  after  considering 
wherein  your  good  is  and  your  evil,  say.  Both  of  them 
are  in  my  power  ?  Neither  can  any  man  deprive  me  of 
the  good,  nor  involve  me  in  the  bad  against  my  will. 
Why  do  I  not  throw  myself  down  and  snore  ?  for  all  that 
I  have  is  safe.  As  to  the  things  which  belong  to  others, 
he  will  look  to  them  who  gets  them,  as  they  may  be  given 
by  him  who  has  the  power.  Who  am  I  who  wish  to  have 
them  in  this  way  or  in  that  ?  is  u  power  of  selecting-  them 
given  to  me  ?  has  any  person  made  me  the  dispenser  oi 
them  ?  Those  things  are  enough  for  me  over  which  1 
have  power  :  I  ought  to  manage  them  as  well  as  I  can  : 
and  all  the  rest,  as  the  master  of  them  ((iod)  may  choose. 
When  a  man  has  these  things  before  his  eyes,  does  lie 
keep  awake  and  turn  hither  and  thither?  What  would  he 
have,  or  what  does  he  regret,  Patroclus  or  Antilochus  or 
.MenclausPt  For  when  did  he  suppose  that  any  of  his 
friends  was  immortal,  and  when  had  he  not  before  his 
eyes  that  on  the  morrow  or  the  day  after  he  or  his  friend 
must  die?  Yes,  he  says,  but  I  thought  that  he  would 
survive  me  and  bring  up  my  son.  You  were  a  fool  for 
that  reason,  and  you  were  thinking  of  what  was  uncertain. 
Why  then  do  you  not  blame  yourself,  and  sit  crying  like 
girls  ?  But  he  used  to  set  my  food  before  me.  Because  lie 
was  alive,  you  fool,  but  now  he  cannot  :  but  Automedon 

*  Compare  i.  25,  18,  and  i.  9.  20. 

i  Ki>irteUis  refers  to  the  passage  in  the  Iliad  xxiv.  5,  where  Achilles  is 
lamenthi ••;  the  death  of  I'atroclus  and  cannot  sleep. 


ErrCTKTUS.  405 

wfll  set  it  before  you,  and  if  Automedon  also  dies,  you 
will  find  another.  But  if  the  pot,  in  which  your  meat  was 
cooked,  should  be  broken,  must  you  die  of  hunger, 
because  you  have  not  the  pot  which  you  are  accustomed 
to  ?  Do  you  not  send  and  buy  a  new  pot  ?  He  says  : 

No  greater  ill  than  this  could  fall  on  me.     (Iliad  xix.  321.) 

Why  is  this  your  ill  ?  Do  you  then  instead  of  removing 
it  blame  your  mother  (Thetis)  for  not  foretelling  it  to  you 
that  you  might  continue  grieving  from  that  time  ?  What 
do  you  think  ?  do  you  not  suppose  that  Homer  wrote  this 
that  we  may  learn  that  those  of  noblest  birth,  the  strong- 
est and  the  richest,  the  most  handsome,  when  they  have 
not  the  opinions  which  they  ought  to  have,  are  not  pre- 
vented from  berny;  most  wretched  and  unfortunate? 


CHAPTER  XI. 

ABOUT    PURITY    (CLEAXLINESS). 

SOME  persons  raise  a  question  whether  the  social  feeling* 
i?  contained  in  the  nature  of  man  ;  and  yet  I  think  that 
these  same  persons  would  have  no  doubt  that  love  of 
purity  is  certainly  contained  in  it,  and  that  if  man  is  dis- 
tinguished from  other  animals  by  anything,  he  is  distin- 
guished by  this.  When  then  we  see  any  other  animal 
cleaning  itself,  we  are  accustomed  to  speak  of  the  act 
with  surprise,  and  to  add  that  the  animal  is  acting  like  a 
man  :  and  on  the  other  hand,  if  the  man  blames  an 
animal  for  being  dirty,  straightway  as  if  we  were  making 
an  excuse  for  it,  we  say  that  of  course-  the  animal  is  not  a 

:iip.U<-  i.   Jj,    I,  ii.    I".    14.  »•   -°.  &• 


.406  EffCTETUS. 

human  creature.  So  we  suppose  that  there  is  something 
superior  in  man,  and  that  \ve  first  receive  it  from  the  Gods. 
For  since  the  Gods  by  their  nature  are  pure  and  free  from 
corruption,  so  far  as  men  approach  them  by  reason,  so 
far  do  they  cling-  to  purity  and  to  a  love  (habit)  of  purity. 
But  since  it  is  impossible  that  man's  nature  can  be  alto- 
gether pure  being  mixed  (composed)  of  such  materials, 
reason  is  applied,  as  far  as  it  is  possible,  and  reason  en- 
deavors to  make  human  nature  love  purity.* 

The  first  then  and  highest  purity  is  that  which  is  in  the 
soul ;  and  we  say  the  same  of  impurity.  Now  you  could 
not  discover  the  impurity  of  the  soul  as  you  could  discover 
that  of  the  body  :  but  as  to  the  soul,  what  else  could  you 
find  in  it  than  that  which  makes  it  filthy  in  respect  to  the 
acts  which  are  her  own  ?  Now  the  acts  of  the  soul  are 
movement  toward  an  object  or  movement  from  it,  desire, 
aversion,  preparation,  design  (purpose),  assent.  What 
then  is  it  which  in  these  acts  makes  the  soul  filthy  and 
impure?  Nothing  else  than  her  own  bad  judgments. 
Consequently  the  impurity  of  the  soul  is  the  soul's  bad 
opinions  ;  and  the  purification  of  the  soul  is  the  planting 
in  it  of  proper  opinions  ;  and  the  soul  is  pure  which  has 
proper  opinions,  for  the  soul  alone  in  her  own  acts  is  free 
from  perturbation  and  pollution. 

Now  we  ought  to  work  at  something  like  this  in  the 
body  also,  as  far  as  we  can.  It  was  impossible  for  the 
defluxions  of  the  nose  not  to  run  when  man  has  such  a 
mixture  in  his  body.  For  this  reason  nature  has  made 
hands  and  the  nostrils  themselves  as  channels  for  carry- 
ing off  the  humors.  If  then  a  man  sucks  up  the  deflux- 
ions, I  say  that  he  is  not  doing  the  act  of  a  man.  It  was 
impossible  for  a  man's  feet  not  to  be  made  muddy  and  not 
be  soiled  at  all  when  he  passes  through  dirty  places.  For 

*  In  the  text  there  are  two  words,  one  which  means  "pure,"  and  the 
other  which  means  "of  a  pure  nature,"  "loving  purity." 


EPICTKTUS. 


407 


this  reason  nature  (God)  has  made  water  and  hands.  It 
wan  impossible  that  some  impurity  should  not  remain  in 
the  teeth  from  eating  :  for  this  reason,  she  says,  wash  the 
teeth.  Why  ?  In  order  that  you  may  be  a  man  and  not 
a  wild  beast  or  a  hog.  It  was  impossible  that  from  the 
sweat  and  the  pressing  of  the  clothes  there  should  not 
remain  some  impurity  about  the  body  which  requires  to 
be  cleaned  away.  For  tin's  reason  water,  oil,  hands. 
towels,  scrapers  (strigils),*  niter,  sometimes  all  other 
kinds  of  means  are  necessary  for  cleaning  the  body.  You 
do  not  act  so  :  but  the  smith  will  take  off  the  rust  from  the 
iron  (instruments),  and  he  will  have  tools  prepared  for 
this  purpose,  and  you  yourself  wash  the  platter  when  you 
arc  going  to  eat,  if  you  are  not  completely  impure  and 
dirty  :  but  will  you  not  wash  the  body  nor  make  it  clean  ; 
Why  ?  he  replies.  1  will  tell  you  again  :  in  the  tirst  place. 
that  you  may  do  .the  acts  of  a  man  ;  then,  that  you  may 
not  be  disagreeable  to  those  with  whom  you  associate. 
You  do  something  of  this  kind  even  in  this  matter,  and 
you  do  not  perceive  it  :  you  think  that  you  deserve  to 
stink.  Let  it  be  so  :  deserve  to  stink.  Do  you  think  that 
also  those  who  sit  by  you.  those  who  recline  at  table  with 
you,  that  those  who  kiss  you  deserve  the  same  ?  Hither 
go  into  a  desert,  where  you  deserve  to  go,  or  live  by  your- 
self, and  smell  yourself.  For  it  is  just  that  you  alone 
should  enjoy  your  own  impurity.  l>ut  when  you  are  in 
a  city,  to  behave  so  inconsiderately  and  foolishly,  to  what 
character  do  you  think  that  it  belongs?  If  nature  had 
intrusted  to  you  a  horse.,  would  you  have  overlooked  and 


This  \v;i-  th.    Koin.ui  "  siri.uilis,"  whiiii  was  n^i-dlo- 
of  the  body  in  bathing 

"I,    plKT.    I''.  'I'll    ^J    I'.ll'l' 

The  sttigiles  "  were  of  bronze  or  iron  <>t"  \arimi-  t'..nns.     They  « 

plied  ti>    the-   body  niu 
applied  to  a  sweating  !i 


;c8  i-.i'icTh  /T.S-. 

neglected  him  ?  And  now  think  that  you  have  been  in- 
trusted with  your  own  body  as  with  a  horse  :  wa>h  it, 
wipe  it,  take  care  that  no  man  turns  away  from  it.  that 
no  one  gets  out  of  the  way  for  ii.  Hut  who  does  not  get 
out  of  the  way  of  a  dirty  man,  of  a  stinking  man,  of  a 
man  whose  skin  is  foul,  mon-  than  he  does  out  of  the  way 
of  a  man  who  is  daubed  with  muck  ?  That  smell  is  from 
without,  it  is  put  upon  him  :  but  the  other  smell  is  from 
want  of  care,  from  within,  and  in  a  manner  from  a  body 
in  putrefaction. 

But  Socrates  washed  himself  seldom.  Yes,  but  his  body 
was  clean  and  fair  :  and  it  was  so  agreeable  and  sweet 
that  the  most  beautiful  and  the  most  noble  loved  him,  and 
desired  to  sit  by  him  rather  than  by  the  side  of  those  who 
had  the  handsomest  forms.  It  was  in  his  power  neither  to 
use  the  bath  nor  to  wash  himself,  if  he  chose  ;  and  yet  the 
rare  use  of  water  had  an  effect.  [If  you  do  not  choose  to 
wash  with  warm  water,  wash  with  cold.*]  But  Aristo- 
phanes says 

Those  who  are  pale,  unshod,  'tis  those  I  mean. 

(N'ubes,  v.  1 02.) 

For  Aristophanes  says  of  Socrates  that  he  also  walked  the 
air  and  stole  clothes  from  the  palaestra,  f  But  all  who 
have  written  about  Socrates  bear  exactly  the  contrary  evi- 
dence in  his  favor  ;  they  say  that  he  was  pleasant  not  only 
to  hear,  but  also  to  see.  \  On  the  other  hand  they  write 
the  same  about  Diogenes.  §  For  we  ought  not  even  by  the 
appearance  of  the  body  to  deter  the  multitude  from  phi- 
losophy :  but  as  in  other  things,  a  philosopher  should 
show  himself  cheerful  and  tranquil,  so  also  he  should  in 

*  See  what  is  said  of  this  passage  in  the  latter  part  of  this  chapter. 

t  Aristophanes,  N'ubes,  v.  225,  and  v.  179. 

\  Xenophon,  Memorab.  iii.  12.  §  See  iii.  22,  88, 


AVVcVA/T.V.  409 

tiio  things  that  relate  to  the  body.  See.  ye  men.  tli:it  T 
nothing,  that  I  want  nothing  :  see  how  I  am  withmit 
a  iiuuse,  and  without  a  city,  and  an  exile,  if  it  happens  i<> 
be  so,*  and  without  a  hearth  I  live  more  free  from  trouble 
and  more  happily  than  all  of  noble  birth  and  than  the 
rich.  But  look  at  my  poor  body  also  and  observe  that  it 
is  not  injured  by  my  hard  way  of  living.  But  if  a  man 
says  this  to  me.  who  has  the  appearance  (dress)  and  face 
of  a  condemned  man,  what  ( Jod  shall  persuade  me  to 
approach  philosophy,  if  it  makes  men  such  persons?  Far 
from  it  ;  I  would  not  choose  to  do  so,  even  if  I  were  going 
to  become  a  wise  man.  I  indeed  would  rather  that  a 
young  man,  who  is  making  his  first  movements  toward 
philosophy,  should  come  to  me  with  his  hair  carefully 
trimmed  than  with  it  dirty  and  rough,  for  there  is  seen  in 
him  a  certain  notion  (appearance)  of  beauty  anil  a  desire 
of  (attempt  at)  that  which  is  becoming;  and  where  he 
supposes  it  to  be,  there  also  he  strives  that  it  shall  be.  It 
is  only  necessary  to  show  him  (what  it  is),  and  to  say  : 
Young  man,  you  seek  beauty,  and  you  do  well  :  you  must 
know  then  that  it  (is  produced)  grows  in  that  part  of  you 
where  you  have  the  rational  faculty  :  seek  it  there  where 
you  have  the  movements  toward  and  the  movements  from 
things,  where  you  have  the  desire  toward,  and  the  aver- 
sion from  things  :  for  this  is  what  you  have  in  yourself  of 
a  superior  kind  ;  but  the  poor  body  is  naturally  only  earth  : 
why  do  you  labor  about  it  to  no  purpose  ?  if  you  shall 
learn  nothing  else,  you  will  learn  from  time  that  the  body 
is  nothing.  But  if  a  man  comes  to  me  daubed  with  tilth. 
dirty,  with  a  moustache  down  to  his  knees,  what  can  I 
say  to  him,  by  what  kind  of  resemblance  can  I  lead  him 
on  ?  For  about  what  has  he  busied  himself  which  resem- 

*  Diogenes,  it  is  said,  was  driven  from  his  native  town  Sinope  in  Asia 
on  a  charge  of  having  debased  or  counterfeited  the  coinage.  —  t"pt"ii. 
It  i-  probable  that  this  is  falsi-. 


.jro  EJ'JCJ'KTUS. 

blcs  beauty,  that  I  may  be  ;.ible  to  change  him  and  say. 
Beauty  is  not  in  this,  but  in  that?  \Vould  you  have  me 
to  tell  him,  that  beauty  consists  not  in  being-  daubed  with 
muck,  but  that  it  lies  in  the  rational  part  ?  Has  he  any 
desire  of  beauty?  has  he  any  form  of  it  in  his  mind? 
Go  and  talk  to  a  hog,  and  tell  him  not  to  roll  in  the 
mud. 

For  this  reason  the  words  of  Xenocrates  touched  Pole- 
mon  also  ;  since  he  was  a  lover  of  beauty,  for  he  entered 
(the  room)  having  in  him  certain  incitements  to  love  of 
beauty,  but  he  looked  for  it  in  the  wrong  place.*  For 
nature  has  not  made  even  the  animals  dirty  which  live 
with  man.  Does  a  horse  ever  wallow  in  the  mud,  or  a 
well-bred  dog?  But  the  hog,  and  the  dirty  geese,  and 
worms  and  spiders  do.  which  are  banished  furthest  from 
human  intercourse.  Do  you  then  being  a  man  choose  to 
be  not  as  one  of  the  animals  which  live  with  man.  but 
rather  a  worm,  or  a  spider  ?  Will  you  not  wash  yourself 
somewhere  some  time  in  such  manner  as  you  choose  ?  t 
Will  you  not  wash  off  the  dirt  from  your  body  ?  Will  you 
not  come  clean  that  those  with  whom  you  keep  company 
may  have  pleasure  in  being  with  you  ?  But  do  you  go 
with  us  even  into  the  temples  in  such  a  state,  where  it  is 
not  permitted  to  spit  or  blow  the  nose,  being  a  heap  of 
spittle  and  of  snot? 

When  then  ?  does  any  man  (that  is.  do  1 )  require  you  to 
ornament  yourself?  Far  from  it  ;  except  to  ornament 
that  which  we  really  are  by  nature,  the  rational  faculty. 
the  opinions,  the  actions  :  but  as  to  the  bod}'  only  so  far 
as  purity,  only  so  far  as  not  to  give  offense.  But  if  yen 
are  told  that  you  ought  not  to  wear  garments  dyed  with 

*  As  to  Polemon  see  iii.  c.  i.  14. 

t  It  has  been  suggested  that  the  words  s.  19  [if  you  do  not  choose  to 
wash  with  warm  water,  wash  with  cold]  belong  to  this  place. 


I-.TTCTf-lTl'S.  411 

]>urple,  go  and  daub  your  cloak  with  muck  or  tear  it.* 
!>ut  how  shall  1  have  a  neat  cloak:  Man.  you  have 
water  :  wash  it.  Mi-re  is  a  youth  worthy  of  being  lon-il.  f 
here  is  an  old  man  worthy  of  loving  and  being1  loved  in 
return,  a  fit  person  for  a  man  to  intrust  to  him  a  son's 
instruction,  to  whom  daughters  and  young-  men  shall 
come,  it  opportunity  shall  so  happen,  that  the  teacher  shall 
deliver  his  lessons  to  them  on  a  dunghill.  Let  this  not 
be  SO  :  every  deviation  comes  from  something  which  is 
m  man's  nature  :  but  this  (deviation)  is  near  being  some- 
I'lin-r  not  in  man's  nature. 


rilAl'TKR  XII. 

ON    ATTKNTION. 

WHKN  you  have  remitted  your  attention  for  a  short  time, 
do  not  imagine  this,  that  you  will  recover  it  when  you 
choose  ;  but  let  this  thought  be  present  to  you,  that  in 
consequence  of  the  fault  committed  to-day  your  affairs 
must  be  in  a  worse  condition  for  all  that  follows.  F<» 
first,  and  what  causes  most  trouble,  a  habit  of  not  attend- 
ing is  formed  in  you  :  then  a  habit  of  deferring  your 
attention.  And  continually  from  time  to  time  you  drive 
away  by  deferring  it  the  happiness  of  life,  proper  be- 
havior, the  being  and  living  conformably  to  nature.  If 
then  the  procrastination  of  attention  is  profitable,  the 

*  Thus  is  the  literal  translation  ;   l.ut  it  mean*,  "will  ,  tear 

it  ?  " 

i 

t"The  youth,  probably,  means  tin .-  scholar,  who  neglects  neatness; 
and  the  old  man,  tin-  tutor,  that  gives  him  n<>  precept  or  example  of  it." 
— Mrs.  CarU-i. 


4-J  F.PICTI 

complete  omission  of  attention  is  more  profitable  :  hut  if 
it  is  not  profitable,  why  do  you  not  maintain  your  at- 
tention constant  ?  To-day  I  choose  to  play.  Well  then, 
ought  you  not  to  play  with  attention  ?  I  choose  to  sing. 
What  then  hinders  you  from  doing  so  with  attention  ? 
Is  there  any  part  of  life  excepted,  to  which  attention  does 
not  extend  ?  For  will  you  do  it  (anything  in  life')  worse 
by  using  attention,  and  better  by  not  attending  at  all  ? 
And  what  else  of  things  in  life  is  done  better  by  those  who 
do  not  use  attention  ?  Does  he  who  works  in  wood  work 
better  by  not  attending  to  it  ?  Does  the  captain  of  a  ship 
manage  it  better  by  not  attending?  and  is  any  of  the 
smaller  acts  done  better  by  inattention  ?  Do  you  not  see 
that  when  you  have  let  your  mind  loose,  it  is  no  longer 
in  your  power  to  recall  it.  either  to  propriety,  or  to 
modesty,  or  to  moderation  :  but  you  do  everything  that 
comes  into  your  mind  in  obedience  to  your  inclinations  ? 
To  what  things  then  ought  I  to  attend  ?  First  to  those 
general  (principles)  and  to  have  them  in  readiness,  and 
without  them  not  to  sleep,  not  to  rise,  not  to  drink,  not  to 
eat.  not  to  converse  (associate)  with  men  :  that  no  man  is 
master  of  another  man's  will,  but  that  in  the  will  alone  is 
the  good  and  the  bad.  No  man  then  has  the  power  either 
to  procure  for  me  any  good  or  to  involve  me  in  any  evil, 
but  I  alone  myself  over  myself  have  power  in  these  things. 
When  then  these  things  are  secured  to  me,  why  need  I  be 
disturbed  about  external  things  ?  What  tyrant  is  formida- 
ble, what  disease,  what  poverty,  what  offense  (from  any 
man)  ?  Well.  I  have  not  pleased  a  certain  person.  Is  he 
then  (the  pleasing  of  him)  my  work,  my  judgment?  Xo. 
Why  then  should  I  trouble  myself  about  him  ?  But  he  is 
supposed  to  be  some  one  (of  importance).  He  will  look 
to  that  himself;  and  those  who  think  so  will  also.  But  I 
have  one  whom  I  ought  to  please,  to  whom  I  ought  to 
subject  myself,  whom  I  ought  to  obey,  God  and  those 


4>3 

who  are  next  to  him.*  He  has  placed  me  with  myself, 
and  has  put  my  will  in  obedience  to  myself  alone,  and 
has  given  me  rules  for  the  right  use  of  it ;  and  when  1 
follow  these  rules  in  syllogisms,  1  do  not  care  for  any 
man  who  says  anything  else  (different)  :  in  sophistical 
argument,  I  care  for  no  man.  Why  then  in  greater  mat- 
ters do  those  annoy  me  who  blame-  me?  What  is  the 
cause  of  this  perturbation  ?  Nothing  else  than  because  in 
this  matter  (topic)  I  am  not  disciplined.  For  all  knowl- 
edge (science)  despises  ignorance  and  the  ignorant  ;  and 
not  only  the  sciences,  but  even  the  arts.  Produce  any 
shoemaker  that  you  please,  and  he  ridicules  the  many 
in  respect  to  his  own  work  f  (business).  Produce  any 
carpenter. 

First  then  we  ought  to  have  these  (rules)  in  readiness, 
and  to  do  nothing  without  them,  and  we  ought  to  keep 
the  soul  directed  to  this  mark,  to  pursue  nothing  external, 
and  nothing  which  belongs  to  others  (or  is  in  the  powerof 
others),  but  to  do  as  he  has  appointed  who  has  the  power  ; 
we  ought  to  pursue  altogether  the  things  which  are  in  the 
power  of  the  will,  and  all  other  things  as  it  is  permitted. 
Next  to  this  we  ought  to  remember  who  we  are.  and  what 
is  our  name,  and  to  endeavor  to  direct  our  duties  toward 
the  character  (nature)  of  our  several  relations  (in  life)  in 
this  manner  :  what  is  the  season  for  singing,  what  is  the 
senson  for  play,  and  in  whose  presence  :  what  will  be  the 
consequence  of  the  act;  whether  our  associates  will 
despise  us,  whether  we  shall  despise  them  ;  when  to  jeer, 
and  whom  to  ridicule  ;  and  on  what  occasion  to  comply 

*  Compare  iv.  4,  30,  i.  14.  i  -• :  and  Kndieirid.  C.  ;,-'.  and  tiu   remark*  of 
Simplichi*. 

t  Compare  ii.  13,  15  and  20  ;  and  Antoninus,  vi.  35  :  "  Is  it  not  strange 
if    the  architect  and  the  physician  shall  have  more  respect  to  the 
(the   principles)  of  their  own  arts  than  m.in  to  his  own   reason,  whidi   is 
common  to  him  and  the  gods  ?  " 


and  with  whom  ;  and  finally,  in  complying  how  to  main- 
tain our  own  character.  *  But  wherever  you  have  deviated 
from  any  of  these  rules,  there  is  damage  immediately,  not 
from  anything  external,  but  from  the  action  itself. 

What  then  ?  is  it  possible  to  be  free  from  faults  (if  you 
do  all  this)?  It  is  not  possible;  but  this  is  possible,  to 
direct  your  efforts  incessantly  to  being  faultless.  For  we 
must  be  content  if  by  never  remitting  this  attention  \ve 
shall  escape  at  least  a  few  errors.  But  now  when  you 
have  said,  To-morrow  I  will  begin  to  attend,  you  must 
be  told  that  you  are  saying  this,  To-day  I  will  be  shame- 
less, disregarded  of  time  and  place,  mean  ;  it  will  be  in 
the  power  of  others  to  give  me  pain  :  to-day  I  will  be 
passionate,  and  envious.  See  how  many  evil  things  you 
are  permitting  yourself  to  do.  If  it  is  good  to  use  atten- 
tion to-morrow,  how  much  better  is  it  to  do  so  to-day  ':  if 
to-morrow  it  is  in  your  interest  to  attend,  much  mon 
to-day,  that  you  maybe  able  to  do  so  to-morrow  - 
and  may  not  defer  it  again  to  the  third  day. f 


CH AFTER    XIII. 

io.UXST    OR    TO    THOSE  WHO    READILY    TELL  THEIR  OW.X   AFFAIRS. 

WHEN  a  man  has  seemed  to  us  to  have  talked  with  sim- 
plicity (candor)  about  his  own  affairs,  how  is  it  that  ;it 
last  we  are  ourselves  also  induced  to  discover  to  him  our 

*  See  iii.  14,  7,  i.  29,  64. 

t  Compare  Antoninus,  viii.  22:  "  Attend  to  the  matter  which  is  before 
ihee,  whether  it  is  an  opinion,  or  an  act,  or  a  word.  Thou  sufferesi  this 
justly,  for  thou  choosest  rather  to  become  good  to-morrow  than  tu  Lu 
good  to-day." 


F.PTCTF.Trs.  4,5 

own  secrets  and  we  think  this  to  be  candid  behavior?  In 
the  first  place  because  it  seems  unfair  for  a  man  to  have 
listened  to  the  affairs  of  his  neighbor,  and  not  to  com- 
municate to  him  also  in  turn  our  own  affairs  :  next,  be- 
cause we  think  that  we  shall  not  present  to  them  the  ap- 
pearance of  candid  men  when  we  are  silent  about  our  own 
affairs.  Indeed  men  are  often  accustomed  to  say,  I  have- 
told  you  all  my  affairs,  will  you  tell  me  nothing  of  your 
own  ?  where  is  this  done  ?  Besides,  we  have  also  this 
opinion  that  we  can  safely  trust  him  who  has  already  told 
us  his  own  affairs  ;  for  the  notion  rises  in  our  mind  that 
this  man  could  never  divulge  our  affairs  because  he 
would  be  cautious  that  we  also  should  not  divulgr 
In  this  way  also  the  incautious  are  caught  by  the  soldiers 
at  Rome.  A  soldier  sits  by  you  in  a  common  dress  and 
begins  to  speak  ill  of  Caesar  ;  then  you,  as  if  you  had 
received  a  pledge  of  his  fidelity  by  his  having  begun 
the  abuse,  utter  yourself  also  what  you  think,  and  then 
you  are  carried  off  in  chains.* 

Something  of  this  kind  happens  to  us  generally.      Now 
as  this  man  has  confidently  intrusted  iris  affairs  to  me, 
shall  I  also  do  so  to  any  man  whom  I   meet  ?     (No),  for 
when  I  have  heard,  I  keep  silence,  if  I  am  of  such  a  dis- 
position ;  but  he  goes  forth  and  tells  all  men  what  h- 
heard.     Then  if  I  hear  what  has  been  done,  if  I  be  a  man 
like  him,  I  resolve  to  l>e  revenged,  1  divulge  what  !:• 
told  me  ;   I   both  disturb  others  and  am  disturbed   nr 

*The  man,  whether  a  soldier  or  not,  was  an  informer,  one  of  those 
vile  men  who  carried  on  this  shameful  business  under  the  empire.      !!<_• 
was  what  Juvenal  names  a  "delator."     Upton,  who  refers  to  the  life   of 
Hadrian  by   /Klius  Spartianus,  speaks  even   of  this  emperor    employing 
soldiers  named  Frumentarii  for  the  purpose  of  discovering  what  wa 
and   done  in  private  houses.     John  the  Uaptist  (Luke  iii.  14)   in 
to  the   question    of   the  soldiers,  "  And  what  shall  w_-  do?"  said    unto 
them  "  Do  violence  to  no  man,  neither  accuse  any  fa!.-- 
tent  with  your  wages." — Upton. 


4iG  KP/CTETUH. 

But  if  I  remember  tluit  one  man  does  not  injure  another, 
and  that  every  man's  acts  injure  and  profit  him,  I  secure 
this,  that  I  do  not  anything-  like  him,  but  still  I  suffer 
\vhat  I  do  suffer  through  my  own  silly  talk. 

True  :  but  it  is  unfair  when  you  have  heard  the  secrets 
of  your  neighbor  for  you  in  turn  to  communicate  nothing 
to  him.  Did  1  ask  you  for  your  secrets,  my  man  ?  did 
you  communicate  your  affairs  on  certain  terms,  that  you 
should  in  return  hear  mine  also  ?  If  you  are  a  babbler 
and  think  that  all  who  meet  you  are  friends,  do  you  wish 
me  also  to  be  like  you  ?  But  why,  if  you  did  well  in  in- 
trusting your  affairs  to  me.  and  it  is  not  well  for  me  to 
intrust  mine  to  you,  do  you  wish  me  to  be  so  rash  ?  It  is 
just  the  same  as  if  I  had  a  cask  which  is  water-tight,  and 
you  one  with  a  hole  in  it.  and  you  should  come  and  de- 
posit with  me  your  wine  that  I  might  put  it  into  my  cask, 
and  then  should  complain  that  I  also  did  not  intrust  my 
wine  to  you,  for  you  have  a  cask  with  a  hole  in  it.  How 
then  is  there  any  equality  here  ?  You  intrusted  your  af- 
fairs to  a  man  who  is  faithful  and  modest,  to  a  man  who 
thinks  that  his  own  actions  alone  are  injurious  and  (or) 
useful,  and  that  nothing  external  is.  Would  you  have  me 
intrust  mine  to  you,  a  man  who  has  dishonored  his  own 
faculty  of  will,  and  who  wishes  to  gain  some  small  bit  of 
money  or  some  office  or  promotion  in  the  court  (emperor's 
palace),  even  if  you  should  be  going  to  murder  your  own 
children,  like  Medea  ?  Where  (in  what)  is  this  equality 
(fairness)  ?  But  show  yourself  to  me  to  be  faithful,  mod- 
est, and  steady  :  show  me  that  you  have  friendly  opin- 
ions :  show  that  your  cask  has  no  hole  in  it  ;  and  you 
will  see  how  I  shall  not  wait  for  you  to  trust  me  with 
your  affairs,  but  I  myself  shall  come  to  you  and  ask  you 
to  hear  mine.  For  who  does  not  choose  to  make  use  of  a 
good  vessel  ?  Who  does  not  value  a  benevolent  and 
faithful  adviser  ?  who  will  not  willingly  receive  a  man 


/./'/(•/•/-.  vr.v 


-n; 


who  is  ready  to  bear  a  share,  as  we  may  say,  of  the  dim'- 
culty  of  his  circumstances.  and  1>y  this  very  act  to  ease 
the  burden,  by  taking  a  part  of  it. 

True:  but  I  trust  you:  you  do  not  trust  inc.  In  the 
first  place,  not  even  do  you  trust  me,  but  you  are  a  bab- 
bler, and  for  this  reason  you  cannot  hold  anything  ;  for 
indeed,  if  it  is  true  that  you  trust  me,  trust  your  affairs  to 
me  only  ;  but  now  whenever  you  see  a  man  at  leisure, 
you  seat  yourself  by  him  and  say  :  Brother,  I  have  no 
friend  more  benevolent  than  you  nor  dearer  ;  I  request 
you  to  listen  to  my  affairs.  And  you  do  this  even  to 
those  who  are  not  known  to  you  at  all.  Hut  if  you  really 
trust  me,  it  is  plain  that  you  trust  me  because  I  am  faith- 
ful and  modest,  not  because  I  have  told  my  affairs  to 
you.  Allow  me  then  to  have  the  same  opinion  about 
you.  Show  me  that  if  one  man  tells  his  affairs  to  an- 
other, he  who  tells  them  is  faithful  and  modest.  For  if 
this  were  so,  I  would  go  about  and  tell  my  affairs  to  every 
man,  if  that  would  make  me  faithful  and  modest.  I5ut 
the  thing  is  not  so,  and  it  requires  no  common  opinions 
(principles).  If  then  you  see  a  man  who  is  busy  about 
things  not  dependent  on  his  will  and  subjecting  his  will 
to  them,  you  must  know  that  this  man  has  ten  thousand 
persons  to  compel  and  hinder  him.  He  has  no  need  of 
pitch  or  the  wheel  to  compel  him  to  declare  what  he 
knows  :  *  but  a  little  girl's  nod,  if  it  should  so  happen, 
will  move  him,  the  blandishment  of  one  who  beloi 
( 'u-sar's  court,  desire  of  a  magistracy  or  of  an  inheritance, 
and  things  without  end  of  that  sort.  You  must  remem- 
ber then  among  general  principles  that  secret  discourses 
(discourses  about  secret  matters)  require  fidelity  and  cor- 
responding opinions.  Hut  where  can  we  now  find  these 
easily?  Or  if  you  cannot  answer  that  question,  let  some 

*  The  wheel  and  pitch   were  instruments  of  torture  to  extract  con- 
fessions.    Seu  ii.  6,  iS. 
27 


4lg  EPICTETUS. 

one  point  out  to  me  a  man  who  can  say  :  1  care  only 
about  the  things  which  are  my  own,  the  things  which 
are  not  subject  to  hindrance,  the  things  which  are  by  na- 
ture free.  This  I  hold  to  be  the  nature  of  the  good  :  but 
let  all  other  things  be  as  they  are  allowed  ;  I  do  not  con- 
cern myself. 


THE   ENCHEIRIDION,  OR  MANUAL 


i. 

OF  things  some  are  in  our  power,  and  others  are  not. 
In  our  power  are  opinion,  movement  toward  a  thing,  desire, 
aversion  (turning  from  a  thing)  ;  and  in  a  word,  whatever 
are  our  own  acts  :  not  in  our  power  are  the  body,  property, 
reputation,  offices  (magisterial  power),  and  in  a  word, 
whatever  are  not  our  own  acts.  And  the  things  in  our 
power  are  by  nature  free,  not  subject  to  restraint  nor  hin- 
drance :  but  the  things  not  in  our  power  are  weak,  slav- 
ish, subject  to  restraint,  in  the  power  of  others.  Remem- 
ber then  that  if  you  think  the  things  which  are  by  nature 
slavish  to  be  free,  and  the  things  which  are  in  the  power 
of  others  to  be  your  own,  you  will  be  hindered,  you 
will  lament,  you  will  be  disturbed,  you  will  blame  both 
gods  and  men  :  but  if  you  think  that  only  which  is 
your  own  to  be  your  own.  and  if  you  think  that  what 
is  another's,  as  it  really  is,  belongs  to  another,  no  man 
will  ever  compel  you,  no  man  will  hinder  you,  you 
will  never  blame  any  man,  you  will  accuse  no  man 
will  do  nothing  involuntarily  (against  your  will),  no  man 
will  harm  you.  you  will  have  no  enemy,  for  you  will  not 
suffer  any  harm. 

If  then  ymi  desire  (aim  at)  such  great  things  remember 
that  you  must  not  (attempt  to;  lay  hold  of  them  with  a 
small  effort  ;  but  you  must  leave  alone  some  things  en- 
lin-ly.  and  postpone  others  for  the  present.  I5ut  if  you 

419 


4»o  /•:/•/(  v/;  /  T.v. 

\vish  for  these  things  also  (such  great  things),  and  power 
(office)  and  wealth,  perhaps  you  will  not  gain  even  these 
very  things  (power  and  wealth)  because  you  aim  also  at 
those  former  things  (such  great  things)  :  certainly  you  will 
fail  in  those  things  through  which  alone  happiness  and 
freedom  are  secured.  Straightway  then  practice  saying 
to  every  harsh  appearance.  *  You  are  an  appearance,  and 
in  no  manner  what  you  appear  to  l>e.  Then  examine  it 
by  the  rules  which  you  possess,  and  by  this  first  and 
chiefly,  whether  it  relates  to  the  things  which  art- 
in  our  power  or  to  the  things  which  are  not  in 
our  power  :  and  if  it  relates  to  anything  which  is  not  in 
our  power,  be  ready  to  say,  that  it  does  not  concern 
you. 

II. 

Remember  that  desire  contains  in  it  the  profession 
(hope)  of  obtaining  that  which  you  desire  ;  and  the  pro- 
fession (hope)  in  aversion  (turning  from  a  thing)  is  that 
you  will  not  fall  into  that  which  you  attempt  to  avoid  : 
and  he  who  fails  in  his  desire  is  unfortunate  ;  and  he  who 
falls  into  that  which  he  would  avoid  is  unhappy.  If  then 
you  attempt  to  avoid  only  the  things  contrary  to  nature 
which  are  within  your  power,  you  will  not  be  involved  in 
any  of  the  things  which  you  would  avoid.  But  if  you  at- 
tempt to  avoid  disease  or  death  or  poverty,  you  will  be 
unhappy.  Take  away  then  aversion  from  all  things 
which  are  not  in  our  power,  and  transfer  it  to  the  things 
contrary  to  nature  which  are  in  our  power.  But  destroy 
desire  completely  for  the  present.  For  if  you  desire  any- 
thing which  is  not  in  our  power,  you  must  be  unfortu- 

*  Appearances  are  named  "  harsh  "  or  "  rough  "  when  they  are  "  con- 
trary to  reason  and  over  exciting  and  in  fact  make  life  rough  (uneven) 
by  the  want  of  symmetry  and  by  inequality  in  the  movements." — Sim- 
plicius.  v.  (i.  5). 


KP/CTRTUS. 

note  :  but  of  the  things  in  our  power,  and  which  it  would 
be  good  to  desire,  nothing  yet  is  before  you.  But  em- 
ploy only  the  power  of  moving  toward  an  object  and  re- 
tiring from  it  ;  and  these  powers  indeed  only  slightly  and 
with  exceptions  and  with  remission. 

III. 

In  everything  which  pleases  the  soul,  or  supplies  a 
want,  or  is  loved,  remember  to  add  this  to  the  (description, 
notion)  ;  what  is  the  nature  of  each  thing,  beginning  from 
the  smallest  ?  If  you  love  an  earthen  vessel,  say  it  is  an 
earthen  vessel  which  you  love  ;  for  when  it  has  been 
broken,  you  will  not  be  disturbed.  If  you  are  kissing 
your  child  or  wife,  say  that  it  is  a  human  being  whom 
you  are  kissing,  for  when  the  wife  or  child  dies,  you  will 
not  be  disturbed. 

IV. 

When  you  are  going  to  take  in  hand  any  act,  remind 
yourself  what  kind  of  an  act  it  is.  If  you  are  going  to 
bathe,  place  before  yourself  what  happens  in  the  bath  : 
some  splashing  the  water,  others  pushing  against  one 
another,  others  abusing  one  another,  and  some  stealing  : 
and  thus  with  more  safety  you  will  undertake  the  matter, 
if  you  say  to  yourself,  I  now  intend  to  bathe,  and  to  main- 
tain my  will  in  a  manner  conformable  to  nature.  And  so 
you  will  do  in  every  act  :  for  thus  if  any  hindrance  to 
bathing  shall  happen,  let  this  thought  be  ready  ;  it  was 
not  this  only  that  I  intended,  but  I  intended  also  to  main- 
tain my  will  in  a  way  conformable  to  nature  :  but  I  shall 
not  maintain  it  so,  if  I  am  vexed  at  what  happens. 


Men  are  disturbed  not  by  the  things  which  happen,  but 


422  F.riCTETUS. 

by  the  opinions  about  the  things  :  for  example,  death  is 
nothing  terrible,  for  if  it  were,  it  would  have  seemed  so  to 
Socrates  ;  for  the  opinion  about  death,  that  it  is  terrible, 
is  the  terrible  thing.  When  then  we  are  impeded  or  dis- 
turbed or  grieved,  let  us  never  blame  others,  but  ourselves, 
that  is,  our  opinions.  It  is  the  act  of  an  ill-instructed 
man  to  blame  others  for  his  own  bad  condition  ;  it  is  the 
act  of  one  who  has  begun  to  be  instructed,  to  lay  the 
blame  on  himself;  and  of  one  whose  instruction  is  com- 
pleted, neither  to  blame  another,  nor  himself. 

VI. 

Be  not  elated  at  any  advantage  (excellence),  which  be- 
longs to  another.  If  a  horse  when  he  is  elated  should  say, 
I  am  beautiful,  one  might  endure  it.  But  when  you  are 
elated,  and  say,  I  have  a  beautiful  horse,  you  must  know 
that  you  are  elated  at  having  a  good  horse.*  What  then 
is  your  own  ?  The  use  of  appearances.  Consequently 
when  in  the  use  of  appearances  you  are  conformable  to 
nature,  then  be  elated,  for  then  you  will  be  elated  at  some- 
thing good  which  is  your  own. 

VII. 

As  on  a  voyage  when  the  vessel  has  reached  a  port,  if 
you  go  out  to  get  water,  it  is  an  amusement  by  the  way 
to  pick  up  a  shell-fish  or  some  bulb,  but  your  thoughts 
ought  to  be  directed  to  the  ship,  and  you  ought  to  be  con- 
stantly watching  if  the  captain  should  call,  and  then  you 
must  throw  away  all  those  things,  that  you  may  not  be 
bound  and  pitched  into  the  ship  like  sheep  :  so  in  life  also, 
if  there  be  given  to  you  instead  of  a  little  bulb  and  a  shell 
a  wife  and  child,  there  will  be  nothing  to  prevent  (you 

*  Upton  proposes  to  read  "  elated  at  something  good  which  is  in  the 
horse.''  T  think  tlint  he  is  right. 


I-.PICJ'KTUS.  433 

from  taking  them).  But  if  the  captain  should  call,  run  to 
the  ship,  and  leave  all  those  things  without  regard  to 
them.  But  if  you  are  old,  do  not  even  go  far  from  the 
ship,  lest  when  you  are  called  you  make  default. 

VIII. 

Seek  not  that  the  things  which  happen  should  happen 
as  you  wish  ;  but  wish  the  things  which  happen  to  be  as 
they  are,  and  you  will  have  a  tranquil  flow  of  life. 

IX. 

Disease  is  an  impediment  to  the  body,  but  not  to  the 
will,  unless  the  will  itself  chooses.  Lameness  is  an  im- 
pediment to  the  leg,  but  not  to  the  will.  And  add  this 
reflection  on  the-  occasion  of  everything  that  happens  :  for 
you  will  find  it  an  impediment  to  something  else,  but  not 
to  yourself. 

X. 

On  the  occasion  of  every  accident  (event)  that  befalls 
you,  remember  to  turn  to  yourself  and  inquire  what  power 
you  have  for  turning  it  to  use.  If  you  see  a  fair  man  or  a 
fair  woman,  you  will  find  that  the  power  to  resist  is  tem- 
perance (continence).  If  labor  (pain)  be  presented  to 
you,  you  will  find  that  it  is  endurance.  If  it  be  abusive 
words,  you  will  find  it  to  be  patience.  And  if  you  have 
been  thus  formed  to  the  (proper)  habit,  the  appearances 
will  not  carry  you  along  with  them. 

XI. 

Never  say  about  anything,  I  have  lost  it,  but  say  I  have 
restored  it.  Is  your  child  dead  ?  It  has  been  restored. 
Is  your  wife  dead?  She  has  been  restored.  Has  your 


424  EPJCTETUS. 

estate  been  taken  from  you?  Has  not  then  this  also  been 
restored  ?  But  he  who  has  taken  it  from  me  is  a  bad  man. 
But  what  is  it  to  you,  by  whose  hands  the  giver  demanded 
it  back?  So  long  as  he  may  allow  you,  take  care  of  it  as 
a  thing  which  belongs  to  another,  as  travelers  do  with 
their  inn. 

XII. 

If  you  intend  to  improve,  throw  away  such  thoughts  as 
these  :  if  I  neglect  my  affairs,  I  shall  not  have  the  means 
of  living  :  unless  I  chastise  my  slave,  he  will  be  bad.  For 
it  is  better  to  die  of  hunger  and  so  to  be  released  from 
grief  and  fear  than  to  live  in  abundance  with  perturbation  : 
and  it  is  better  for  your  slave  to  be  bad  than  for  you  to  be 
unhappy.*  Begin  then  from  little  things.  Is  the  oil 
spilled  ?  Is  a  little  wine  stolen  ?  Say  on  the  occasion,  at 
such  price  is  sold  freedom  from  perturbation  :  at  such 
price  is  sold  tranquillity,  but  nothing  is  got  for  nothing. 
And  when  you  call  your  slave,  consider  that  it  is  possible 
that  he  does  not  hear  :  and  if  he  does  hear,  that  lie  will 
do  nothing"  which  you  wish  But  matters  ruv  not  ~o  well 

him,  but  altogether  well  with  you.  that  it  shrn.. 
in  his  power  for  you  to  be  not  disturbed  t 

XIII. 

If  you  would  improve,  submit  to  be  considered  without 
sense  and  foolish  with  respect  to  externals.  Wish  t>-  l.c 
considered  to  know  nothing  :  and  if  you  shall  seem  to 

'  He  means.  Do  not  chastise  your  slave  while  you  are  in  a  p.-. 
lest,  while  you  are  trying  to  correct  him,  and  it  is  very  doubtful  whet  her 
you    will  succeed,  you  fall  into  a  vice  which  is   a   man's  great   and    only 
calamity. — Schweig. 

t  The  passage  seems  to  mean,  that  your  slave  has  not  the  power  of 
disturbing  you,  Irecause  you  have  the  power  of  not  being  disturbed. 
Hee  Upton's  note  on  the  text. 


/•:/'/<  •/•/•:  i  T.S. 


425 


some  to  be  a  person  of  importance,  distrust  yourself.  For 
you  should  know  that  it  is  not  easy  both  to  keep  your 
will  in  a  condition  conformable  to  nature  and  (to  secure) 
external  things:  but  if  a  man  is  careful  about  the  one,  it 
is  an  absolute  necessity  that  he  will  neglect  the  other. 

XIV. 

If  you  would  have  your  children  and  your  wife  and 
your  friends  to  live  forever,  you  are  silly  ;  for  you  would 
have  the  things  which  are  not  in  your  power  to  be  in 
your  power,  and  the  things  which  belong  to  others  to  be 
yours.  So  if  you  would  have  your  slave  to  be  free  from 
faults,  you  are  a  fool  ;  for  you  would  have  badness  not 
to  be  badness,  but  something  else.*  But  if  you  wish  not 
to  fail  in  your  desires,  you  are  able  to  do  that.  Practice 
then  this  which  you  are  able  to  do.  He  is  the  master  of 
every  man  who  has  the  power  over  the  things,  which 
another  person  wishes  or  does  not  wish,  the  power  to  con- 
fer them  on  him  or  to  take  them  away.  Whoever  then 
wishes  to  be  free,  let  him  neither  wish  for  anything  nor 
avoid  anything  which  depends  on  others  :  if  he  does  not 
observe  this  rule,  he  must  be  a  slave. 

XV. 

Remember  that  in  life  you  ought  to  behave  as  at  a 
banquet.  Suppose  that  something  is  carried  round  and  is 
opposite  to  you.  Stretch  out  your  hand  and  take  a  por- 
tion with  decency.  Suppose  that  it  passes  by  you.  I  ><> 

*\Vheu  Epictetus  says  "you  would  have  badness  not  to  be  badness," 
he  means  that  "  badness  "  is  in  the  will  of  him  who  has  the  hadiu-sv, 
and  as  you  wish  to  subject  it  to  your  will,  you  are  a  fool.  It  is  your 
business,  as  far  as  you  can,  to  improve  the  slave:  you  may  wish  this. 
It  is  his  business  to  obey  your  instruction  :  this  is  what  he  ought  to  wish 
to  do;  but  for  him  to  will  to  do  this,  that  lies  in  himself,  nut  hi  yon. 
— Schweig. 


426 

not  detain  it.  Suppose  that  it  is  not  yet  come  to  you. 
Do  not  send  your  desire  forward  to  it,  but  wait  till  it  is 
opposite  to  you.  Do  so  with  respect  to  children,  MI 
with  respect  to  a  wife,  so  with  respect  to  magisterial 
offices,  so  with  respect  to  wealth,  and  you  will  be  some 
time  a  worthy  partner  of  the  banquets  of  the  gods.  But 
if  you  take  none  of  the  things  which  are  set  before  you, 
and  even  despise  them,  then  you  will  be  not  only  a  fel- 
low-banqueter with  the  gods,  but  also  a  partner  with  them 
in  power.  For  by  acting  thus  Dioger.es  and  Heracleitus 
and  those  like  them  were  deservedly  divine,  and  were  so 
called. 

XVI. 

When  you  see  a  person  weeping  in  sorrow  either  when 
a  child  goes  abroad  or  when  he  is  dead,  or  when  the  man 
has  lost  his  property,  take  care  that  the  appearance  do  not 
hurry  you  away  with  it.  as  if  he  were  suffering  in  external 
things.*  But  straightway  make  a  distinction  in  your  own 
mind,  and  be  in  readiness  to  say,  it  is  not  that  which  has 
happened  that  afflicts  this  man,  for  it  does  not  afflict  an- 
other, but  it  is  the  opinion  about  this  thing  which  afflicts 
the  man.  So  far  as  words  then  do  not  be  unwilling 
to  show  him  sympathy,  f  and  even  if  it  happens  so,  to 
lament  with  him.  But  take  care  that  you  do  not  lament 
internally  also. 

*  This  is  obscure.  "  It  is  true  that  the  man  is  wretched,  not  because 
of  the  things  external  which  have  happened  to  him.  But  through  the 
fact  that  he  allows  himself  to  be  affected  so  much  by  external  things 
which  are  placed  out  of  his  power." — Schweig. 

t  It  has  been  objected  to  Epictetus  that  he  expresses  no  sympathy 
with  those  who  suffer  sorrow.  But  here  he  tells  you  to  show  sympathy, 
a  thing  which  comforts  most  people.  But  it  would  be  contrary  to  his 
teaching,  if  he  told  you  to  suffer  mentally  with  another. 


/•:/>,(•/•/:  7 Y/.V.  427 

XVII. 

Remember  that  thou  art  an  actor  in  a  play  of  such  a 
kind  as  the  teacher  (author)  may  choose  ;  it"  short,  of  a 
short  one  ;  it  loncj;,  of  a  long  one  :  if  he  wishes  you  to  act 
the  part  of  a  poor  man,  see  that  you  act  the  part  natu- 
rally ;  if  the  part  of  a  lame  man,  of  a  magistrate,  of  a 
private  person  (do  the  same).  For  this  is  your  duty,  to 
act  well  the  part  that  is  given  to  you  ;  but  to  select  the 
part,  belongs  to  another. 

XVIII. 

When  a  raven  has  croaked  inauspiciously,  let  not  the 
appearance  hurry  you  away  with  it;  but  straightway 
make  a  distinction  in  your  mind  and  say,  None  of  these 
things  is  signified  to  me,  but  either  to  my  poor  body,  or 
to  my  small  property,  or  to  my  reputation,  or  to  my  chil- 
dren or  to  my  wife  :  but  to  me  all  significations  are 
auspicious  if  I  choose.  For  whatever  of  these  things  re- 
sults, it  is  in  my  power  to  derive  benefit  from  it. 

XIX. 

can  be  invincible,  if  you  enter  into  no  contest  in 
ii  is  not  in  your  power  to  conquer.  Take  care 
then  when  you  observe  a  man  honored  before  oth< 
possessed  of  great  power  or  highly  esteemed  for  any 
reason,  not  to  suppose  him  happy,  and  be  not  carried 
away  by  the  appearance.  For  if  the  nature  of  the  good 
is  in  our  power,  neither  envy  nor  jealousy  will  have  a 
place  in  us.  But  you  yourself  will  not  wish  to  be  a 
general  or  senator  or  consul,  but  a  free  man  :  and  there 
is  only  one  way  to  this,  to  despise  (care  not  for)  the 
things  which  are  not  in  our  power. 


Remember  that  it  is  not  he  who  reviles  you  or  strikes 
you,  who  insults  you,  but  it  is  your  opinion  about  these 
things  as  being  insulting.  When  then  a  man  irritates 
you,  you  must  know  that  it  is  your  own  opinion  which 
has  irritated  you.  Therefore  especially  try  not  to  be  car- 
ried away  by  the  appearance.  For  if  you  once  gain  time 
anil  delay,  you  will  more  easily  master  yourself. 

XXI. 

Let  death  and  exile  and  every  other  thing  which  ap- 
pears dreadful  be  daily  before  your  eyes  ;  but  most  of  all 
death  :  and  you  will  never  think  of  anything  mean  nor 
will  you  desire  anything  extravagantly. 

XXII. 

If  you  desire  philosophy,  prepare  yourself  from  the  be- 
ginning to  be  ridiculed,  to  expect  that  many  will  sneer  at 
you,  and  say,  He  has  all  at  once  returned  to  us  as  a 
philosopher ;  and  whence  does  he  get  this  supercilious 
look  for  us  ?  Do  you  not  show  a  supercilious  look  :  but 
hold  on  to  the  things  which  seem  to  you  best  as  one  ap- 
pointed by  God  to  this  station.  And  remember  that  if 
you  abide  in  the  same  principles,  these  men  who  first 
ridiculed  will  afterward  admire  you  :  but  if  you  shall 
have  been  overpowered  by  them,  you  will  bring  on  your- 
self double  ridicule. 

XXIII. 

If  it  should  ever  happen  to  you  to  be  turned  to  externals 
in  order  to  please  some  person,  you  must  know  that  you 
have  lost  your  purpose  in  life.*  Be  satisfied  then  in 

* "  If  I  yet  pleased  men,  I  should  not  be  the  servant  of  Chri.-i." 
Gal.  i.  10. — Mrs.  Carter. 


n-.rrs.  4_^ 

everything  with  being  a  philosopher  ;  and  if  you  wish  to 
seem  also  to  any  person  to  be  a  philosopher,  appear  so  to 
yourself,  and  you  will  be  able  to  do  this. 

XXIV. 

Let  not  these  thoughts  afflict  you.  I  shall  live  unl.onored 
and  be  nobody  nowhere.  For  if  want  of  honor  (dr^ia)  js 
an  evil,  you  cannot  be  in  evil  through  the  means  (fault) 
of  another  any  more  than  you  can  be  involved  in  any- 
thing base.  Is  it  then  your  business  to  obtain  the  rank 
of  a  magistrate,  or  to  be  received  at  a  banquet  ?  By  no 
means.  How  then  can  this  be  want  of  honor  (dishonor)? 
And  how  will  you  be  nobody  nowhere,  when  you  ought 
to  be  somebody  in  those  things  only  which  are  in  your 
power,  in  which  indeed  it  is  permitted  to  you  to  be  a  man 
of  the  greatest  worth  ?  But  your  friends  will  be  without 
assistance  !  What  do  you  mean*  by  being  without  assist- 
ance ?  They  will  not  receive  money  from  you.  nor  will 

make  them  Roman  citizens       U'hi.  tl.«M. 
these  arc  among  the  thiny- 
not  iii  the  power   of  other?  -     AIM    who 
other  what    ho   has   not   himself        A.-iti,irr-   mo;. 
your  friends  say.  that  we  also  may  have  somoth.M          !: 
I  can  acquire  money  and  also  keep  myseil   mo.u-st,  and 
faithful  and  magnanimous,  point  out  the  way.  and  i  will 
acquire  it.      But  if  yon  ask   me  to   lose  the   things  which 
are  good  and  my  own,  in   order   that   you    may  gain    the 
things  which  are  not   iMiod.  see  how  unl.u'r  and  silly  vmi 
are.      Besides,  which  would  you  rather  h.»\e,  money  or  .1 
faithful  and  modest  friend?      For  this  end  then  rather  help 
me  to  be  such  a  man.  and  do  not    a>k    me   to   do    this   by 
which  I  shall  Ifise  that  character.      Hut   my  country,  you 
say.  as  far  as  it  depends  «>n  me.   will  be  without  my  help. 
I  ask  again,   \vh.  it  help  do   you    mean-      It    will    not    have 


430  I'.riC 

porticoes  or  baths  through  you.  And  what  does  this 
mean  ?  For  it  is  not  furnished  with  shoes  by  means  of  a 
smith,  nor  with  arms  by  means  of  a  shoemaker, 
is  enough  if  every  man  fully  discharges  the  work  t' 
his  own  :  and  if  you  provided  it  with  another  citizen  faith- 
ful and  modest,  would  you  not  be  useful  to  it  ?  Yes. 
Then  you  also  cannot  be  useless  to  it.  What  place  then, 
you  say,  shall  I  hold  in  the  city  ?  Whatever  you  can,  if 
you  maintain  at  the  same  time  your  fidelity  and  modesty. 
But  if  when  you  wish  to  be  useful  to  the  state,  you  shall 
lose  these  qualities,  what  profit  could  you  be  to  it,  if  you 
were  made  shameless  and  faithless  ? 

XXV. 

Has  any  man  been  preferred  before  you  at  a  banquet, 
or  in  being  saluted,  or  in  being  invited  to  a  consultation  ? 
if  these  things  are  good,  you  ought  to  rejoice  that  he  has 
obtained  them  :  but  if  bad,  be  not  grieved  because  you 
have  not  obtained  them  ;  and  remember  that  you  cannot, 
if  you  do  not  the  same  things  in  order  to  obtain  what  is 
not  in  our  power,  be  considered  worthy  of  the  same 
(equal)  things.  For  how  can  a  man  obtain  an  equal  share 
with  another  when  he  does  not  visit  a  man's  doors  as  that 
other  man  does,  when  he  does  not  attend  him  when  he 
goes  abroad,  as  the  other  man  does  ;  when  he  does  not 
praise  (flatter)  him  as  another  does?  You  will  be  unjust 
then  and  insatiable,  if  you  do  not  part  with  the  price,  in 
return  for  which  those  things  are  sold,  and  if  you  wish 
to  obtain  them  for  nothing.  Well,  what  is  the  price  of 
lettuces?  An  obolus*  perhaps.  If  then  a  man  gives  up 
the  obolus,  and  receives  the  lettuces,  and  if  you  do  not 
give  up  the  obolus  and  do  not  obtain  the  lettuces,  do  not 
suppose  that  you  receive  less  than  he  who  has  got  the 

*  The  sixth  part  of  a  drachma. 


lettuces  ;  for  as  lie  has  the  lettuces,  so  you  have  UK  >  • 
which  you  did  not  give.  In  the  same  way  then  in  the 
other  matter  also  you  have  not  been  invited  to  a  man's 
feast,  for  you  did  not  give  to  the  host  the  price  at  which 
the  supper  is  sold  :  but  he  sells  it  for  praise  (flatter}'),  he 
sells  it  for  personal  attention.  Give  then  the  price,  if  it  is 
for  your  interest,  for  which  it  is  sold.  But  if  you  wish 
both  not  to  give  the  price  and  to  obtain  the  things,  you 
are  insatiable  and  silly.  Have  you  nothing'  then  in  place 
of  the  supper  ?  You  have  indeed,  you  have  the  not  flat- 
tering of  him,  whom  you  did  not  choose  to  flatter ;  you 
have  the  not  enduring  of  the  man  when  he  enters  the 
room. 

XXVI. 

We  may  learn  the  wish  (will)  of  nature  from  the  things 
in  which  we  do  not  differ  from  one  another  :  for  instance. 
when'your  neighbor's  slave  has  broken  his  cup,  or  any- 
thing else,  we  are  ready  to  say  forthwith,  that  it  is  one  of 
the  things  which  happen.  You  must  know  then  that 
when  your  cup  also  is  broken,  you  ought  to  think  as  you 
did  when  your  neighbor's  cup  was  broken.  Transfer  this 
reflection  to  greater  tilings  also.  Js  another  man's  child 
or  wife  dead?  There  is  no  one  who  would  not  say,  this 
is  an  event  incident  to  man.  Hut  when  a  man's  own 
child  or  wife  is  dead,  forthwith  he  calls  out.  \Y<>  to  me. 
how  wretched  L  am.  But  we  ought  to  remember  how  we 
feel  when  we  hear  that  it  has  happened  to  others. 

XXVII. 

As  a  mark  is  not  set  i:p  tor  the  purpose  of  missing 
the  aim,  so  neither  docs  the  nature  of  evil  exist  in  the 
world.* 

*This  passage  is  explained  in  the  commentary  of  Simplicius  (xxxiv.,  in 
Schweig.'s  ed.  x.xvii.  p.  264),  and  Schweigliaciisur  .igrucs  with  tin- 


432  EP1CTETUS. 

XXVIII. 

If  any  person  was  intending  to  put  your  body  in  the 
power  of  any  man  whom  you  fell  in  with  on  the  way.  you 
would  be  A'exed  :  but  that  you  put  your  understanding'  in 
the  power  of  any  man  whom  you  meet,  so  that  if  he 
should  revile  you,  it  is  disturbed  and  troubled,  are  you  not 
ashamed  at  this  ? 

XXIX.* 

In  every  act  observe  the  things  which  come  first,  and 
those  which  follow  it  ;  and  so  proceed  to  the  act.  If  you 
do  not,  at  first  you  will  approach  it  with  alacrity,  without 
having  thought  of  the  things  which  will  follow  ;  but 
afterward,  when  certain  base  (ugly)  things  have  shown 
themselves,  you  will  be  ashamed.  A  man  wishes  to 
conquer  at  the  Olympic  games.  I  also  wish  indeed, t  for  it 
is  a  fine  thing.  But  observe  both  the  things  which  come 
first,  and  the  things  which  follow  ;  and  then  begin  the  act 
You  must  do  everything  according  to  rule,  eat  according 
I.;  strict  order?,  abstain  from  delicacies,  exercise  yourself 
as  you  are  bid  ai  appointed  times,  in  heat,  in  cold,  you 
must  not  drink  cold  water,  nor  wine  as  you  choose  ;  in  a 
word,  you  must  deliver  yourself  up  to  the  exercise  master 

nation,  which  is  this  :  Nothing  in  the  world  (universe)  can  exist  or  be 
clone  (happen)  which  in  its  proper  sense,  in  itself  and  in  its  nature  ir. 
bad  ;  for  everything  is  and  is  done  by  the  wisdom  and  will  of  God  and 
for  the  purpose  which  he  intended  :  but  to  miss  a  mark  is  to  fail  \i\  -tii 
intention ;  and  as  a  man  does  not  set  up  a  mark,  or  does  not  form  :i  pur- 
pose for  the  purpose  of  missing  the  mark  or  the  purpose,  so  it  is  absurd 
(inconsistent)  to  say  that  God  has  a  purpose  or  design,  and  that  he  pur- 
posed or  designed  anything  which  in  itself  and  in  its  nature  is  bad.  The 
commentary  of  Simplicius  is  worth  reading,  l.ut  how  many  will  read 
it  ?  Perhaps  one  in  a  million. 

*"  Compare  iii.  15,  from  which  all  this  passage  lias  been  transferred 
to  the  Encheiridion  by  the  copyists." — Upton. 


433 

as  you  do  to  the  physician,  ami  then  proceed  to  the  con- 
test.  And  sometimes  you  will  strain  the  hand,  put  the 
ankle  out  of  joint,  swallow  much  dust,  sometimes  l>e 
flogged,  and  after  all  this  be  defeated.  When  you  have 
considered  all  this,  if  you  still  choose,  go  to  the  contest  : 
if  you  do  not,  you  will  behave  like  children,  who  at  one 
time  play  at  wrestlers,  another  time  as  flute  players,  again 
as  gladiators,  then  as  trumpeters,  then  as  tragic  actor- 
you  also  will  be  at  one  time  an  athlete,  at  another  a  gladia- 
tor, then  a  rhetorician,  then  a  philosopher,  but  with  your 
whole  soul  you  will  be  nothing  at  all  ;  but  like  an  ape  you 
imitate  everything  that  you  see,  and  one  thing  after  an- 
other pleases  you.  For  you  have  not  undertaken  any- 
thing with  consideration,  nor  have  you  surveyed  it  well  : 
but  carelessly  and  with  cold  desire.  Thus  some  who  have 
seen  a  philosopher  and  having  heard  one  speak,  as  F.u- 
phrates  speaks, — and  who  can  speak  as  he  does  ? — they 
wish  to  be  philosophers  themselves  also.  My  man,  first 
of  all  consider  what  kind  of  thing  it  is  :  and  then  examine 
your  own  nature,  if  you  are  able  to  sustain  the  character. 
Do  you  wish  to  be  a  pentathlete  or  a  wrestler  ?  Look  at 
your  arms,  your  thighs,  examine  your  loins.  For  differ- 
ent men  are  formed  by  nature  for  different  things.  Do 
you  think  that  if  you  do  these  things,  you  can  eat  in  the 
same  manner,  drink  in  the  same  manner,  and  in  the  same 
manner  loathe  certain  things  ?  You  must  pass  sleepless 
nights,  endure  toil,  go  away  from  your  kinsmen,  be  de- 
spised by  a  slave,  in  everything  have  the  inferior  part,  in 
honor,  in  office,  in  the  courts  of  justice,  in  every  little 
matter.  Consider  these  things,  if  you  would  exchange 
for  them,  freedom  from  passions,  liberty,  tranquillity.  If 
not,  take  care  that,  like  little  children,  you  be  not  now  a 
philosopher,  then  a  servant  of  the  publicani,  then  a  rheto- 
rician, then  a  procurator  (manager)  for  C&sar.  These 
things  are  not  consistent  You  must  be  one  man.  either 
28 


434  I'.PICTKTUS. 

good  or  bad.  You  must  either  cultivate  your  own  ruling 
faculty,  or  external  things  ;  you  must  either  exercise  your 
skill  on  internal  things  or  on  external  things  :  that  is,  you 
must  either  maintain  the  position  of  a  philosopher  or  thai 
of  a  common  person. 

XXX. 

Duties  are  universally  measured  by  relations.  Is  a  man 
a  father?  The  precept  is  to  take  care  of  him,  to  yield  to 
him  in  all  things,  to  submit  when  he  is  reproachful,  when 
he  inflicts  blows.  But  suppose  that  he  is  a  bad  father. 
Were  you  then  by  nature  made  akin  to  a  good  father  ? 
Mo  ;  but  to  a  father.  Does  a  brother  wrong  you  ?  Main- 
tain then  your  own  position  toward  him,  and  do  not 
examine  what  he  is  doing,  but  what  you  must  do  that 
your  will  shall  be  conformable  to  nature.  For  another 
will  not  damage  you,  unless  you  choose  :  but  you  will  be 
damaged  then  when  you  shall  think  that  you  are  damaged- 
In  this  way  then  you  will  discover  your  duty  from  the 
relation  of  a  neighbor,  from  that  of  a  citizen,  from  that  of 
a  general,  if  you  are  accustomed  to  contemplate  the 
relations. 

XXXI. 

As  to  piety  toward  the  Gods  you  must  know  that  this 
is  the  chief  thing,  to  have  right  opinions  about  them,  to 
think  that  they  exist,  and  that  they  administer  the  All 
well  and  justly  ;  and  you  must  fix  yourself  in  this  princi- 
ple (duty),  to  obey  them,  and  yield  to  them  in  everything 
which  happens,  and  voluntarily  to  follow  it  as  being  ac- 
complished by  the  wisest  intelligence.  For  if  you  do  so, 
you  will  never  either  blame  the  Gods,  nor  will  you  u>. 
them  of  neglecting  ypu.  And  it  is  not  possible  for  t.. 
be  done  in  any  other  way  than  by  withdrawing  from 
the  things  which  are  not  in  our  power,  and  by  placing  the 


/•:/'/ 


good  and  the  evil  only  in  the-  which   are  in  our 

power.  For  if  you  think  that  any  of  the'  things  which  an- 
no! in  our  power  is  good  or  bad,  it  lely  nee*. 
that,  when  you  do  not  obtain  what  you  wish,  and  when 
you  fall  into  those  things  which  you  do  not  wish,  you  will 
tind  fault  and  hate  those  who  are  the  cause  of  them  :  for 
every  animal  is  formed  by  nature  to  this,  t>  n  and 
to  turn  from  the  things  which  appear  harmful  and  the 
things  which  are  the  cause  of  the  harm,  but  to  follow  and 
admire  the  things  which  arc  useful  and  the  causes  of  the 
useful.  It  is  impossible  then  for  a  poison  who  thinks  that 
lie  is  harmed  to  be  delighted  with  that  which  he  thinks  to 
be  the  cause  of  the  harm,  as  it  is  also  impossible  to  be 
pleased  with  the  harm  itself.  For  this  reason  also  a  father 
is  reviled  by  his  son,  when  he  gives  no  part  to  his  son  of 
the  things  which  are  considered  to  be  good  :  and  it  was 
this  which  made  Polynices  anil  Kteoc'es  *  enemies,  the 
opinion  that  royal  power  was  a  good.  It  is  for  this  n 
that  the  cultivator  of  the  earth  reviles  the  Gods,  for  this 
lilor  does,  and  the  merchant,  and  for  this 
reason  those  who  lose  their  wives  and  their  children. 
For  where  the  useful  (your  interest)  is.  there  also  piety  is.  f 
Consequently  he  who  takes  care  to  desire  as  he  ought 
and  to  avoid  as  he  ought,  at  the  same  time  also 

piety.      But  to  make  libations  and  to  sacrifice  and  to 

•See  ii.  22,  13,  iv.  5,  9. 

t  "It  is  plain  enough  that  the  philosopher  does  not  say  this,  that  the 
reckoning  of  our  private  advantage  ou;;ht  to  he  the  sole  origin  .tml 
foundation  of  piety  toward  God."  Schweig.,  and  hepr  \plain 

the  sentence,  which  at  first    appears    rather   obscure.     Perhaps   Airiun 
intends  to  say  that  the  feeling  of  piety  coincides  with  the  opinion  of  the 
useful,  the  profitable;  and  that  the  man  who  takes  care   to  desire  as  he 
ought  to  do  and  to  avoid  as  he  ought  to  do,  thu^ 
and  so  he  will  secure  his  interest  (the  profitable)  am!  he  will  not    ! 
contented. 


436 

offer  first  fruits  according  to  the  custom  of  our  fathers, 
purely  ami  not  meanly  nor  carelessly  nor  scantily  nor 
above  our  ability,  is  a  thing  which  belongs  to  all  to  do. 

XXXII. 

When  you  have  recourse  to  divination,  remember  that 
you  do  not  know  how  it  will  turn  out,  but  that  you  are 
come  to  inquire  from  the  diviner.  But  of  what  kind  it  is, 
you  know  when  you  come,  if  indeed  you  are  a  philos- 
opher. For  if  it  is  any  of  the  things  which  are  not  in  our 
power,  it  is  absolutely  necessary  that  it  must  be  neither 
good  nor  bad.  Do  not  then  bring  to  the  diviner  desire  or 
aversion  (*K/tX«ru>)  :  if  you  do,  you  will  approach  him 
with  fear.  But  having  determined  in  your  mind  that 
everything  which  shall  turn  out  (result)  is  indifferent,  and 
does  not  concern  you,  and  whatever  it  may  be,  for  it  will 
be  in  your  power  to  use  it  well,  and  no  man  will  hinder 
this,  come  then  with  confidence  to  the  Gods  as  your  ad- 
visers. And  then  when  any  advice  shall  have  been 
given,  remember  whom  you  have  taken  as  advisers,  and 
whom  you  will  have  neglected,  if  you  do  not  obey  them. 
And  go  to  divination,  as  Socrates  said  that  you  ought, 
about  those  matters  in  which  all  the  inquiry  has  reference 
to  the  result,  and  in  which  means  are  not  given  either  by 
reason  nor  by  any  other  art  for  knowing  the  thing  which 
is  the  subject  of  the  inquiry.  Wherefore  when  we  ought 
to  share  a  friend's  danger  or  that  of  our  country,  you  must 
not  consult  the  diviner  whether  you  ought  to  share  it. 
For  even  if  the  diviner  shall  tell  you  that  the  signs  of  the 
victims  are  unlucky,  it  is  plain  that  this  is  a  token  of  death 
or  mutilation  of  part  of  the  body  or  of  exile.  But  reason 
prevails  that  even  with  these  risks  we  should  share  the 
dangers  of  our  friend  and  of  our  country.  Therefore 
attend  to  the  greater  diviner,  the  Pythian  God,  who 


BPICTETUS.  .J37 

ejected  from  the  temple  him  who  did  not  assist  his  friend 
\vlien  he  was  being  murdered. 

XXXIII. 

Immediately  prescribe  some  character  and  some  form 
to  yourself,  which  you  shall  observe  both  when  you  are 
alone  and  when  you  meet  with  men. 

And  let  silence  be  the  general  rule,  or  let  only  what  is 
necessary  be  said,  and  in  few  words.  And  rarely  and 
when  the  occasion  calls  we  shall  say  something  ;  but 
about  none  of  the  common  subjects,  nor  about  gladiators, 
nor  horse-races,  nor  about  athletes,  nor  about  eating  or 
drinking,  which  are  the  usual  subjects  ;  and  especially 
not  about  men,  as  blaming  them,  or  praising  them,  or  com- 
paring them.  If  then  you  are  able,  bring  over  by  your 
conversation  the  conversation  of  your  associates  to  that 
which  is  proper  ;  but  if  you  should  happen  to  be  confined 
to  the  company  of  strangers,  be  silent. 

Let  not  your  laughter  be  much,  nor  on  mai. 

Rrfr.se  altogether  to  take  an  oath,  n  il  if  n 

is  not,  refuse  as  far  as  you  are  able. 

•  id  banquets  which  are  given  by  strangers  and  l>v 
ignorant  persons.  But  if  ever  there  is  occasion  to  join  in 
them,  let  your  attention  be  carefully  fixed,  that  you  slip 
not  into  the  manners  of  the  vulgar  (the  uninstructed). 
For  you  must  know,  that  if  your  companion  be  impure, 
he  also  who  keeps  company  with  him  must  beconi. 
pure,  though  he  should  happen  to  be  pine. 

Take  (apply)  the  things  whirh  relate  to  the  body  as 
far  as  the  bare  use,  as  food,  drink,  clothing,  house,  and 
slaves  :  but  exclude  everything  which  is  for  show  or 
luxury. 

A>    to   pleasure  with  women,    abstain  a^    i;u   ;i-.   you  can 


,jj,S  EPICTETUS. 

before  marriage  :  but  if  you  do  indulge  in  ;;  ilo  it  in  the 
\vay  \vhicli  is  conformable  to  custom.  Do  not  however 
be  disagreeable  to  those  who  indulge  in  these  pleasures, 
or  reprove  them  :  and  do  not  often  boast  that  you  do  not 
indulge  in  them  yourself. 

If  a  man  has  reported  to  you,  that  a  certain  person 
speaks  ill  of  you,  do  not  make  any  defense  (answer)  to 
what  has  been  told  you  :  but  reply,  The  man  did  not 
know  the  rest  of  my  faults,  for  he  would  not  have  men- 
tioned these  only. 

It  is  not  necessary  to  go  to  the  theaters  often  :  but  if 
there  is  ever  a  proper  occasion  for  going,  do  not  show 
yourself  as  being  a  partisan  of  any  man  except  yourself, 
that  is,  desire  only  that  to  be  done  which  is  done,  and  for 
him  only  to  gain  the  prize  who  gains  the  prize  ;  for  in 
this  way  you  will  meet  with  no  hindrance.  But  abstain 
entirely  from  shouts  and  laughter  at  any  (thing  or  person), 
or  violent  emotions.  And  when  you  are  come  away,  do 
not  talk  much  about  what  has  passed  on  the  stage,  except 
about  that  which  may  lead  to  your  own  improvement. 
For  it  is  plain,  if  you  do  talk  much  that  you  admired  the 
spectacle  (more-  than  you  ought).* 

Do  not  go  to  the  hearing  of  certain  persons'  recitations 
nor  visit  them  readily,  t  But  if  you  do  attend,  observe 
gravity  and  sedateness.  and  also  avoid  making  yourself 
disagreeable. 

When  you  are  going  to  meet  with  any  person,  and  par- 
ticularly one  of  those  who  are  considered  to  be  in  a  superior 
condition,  place  before  yourself  what  Socrates  or  Zeno 
would  have  done  in  such  circumstances,  and  you  will 

*  To  admire  is  contrary  to  the  precept  of  Epictetus ;  i.  29,  ii.  6,  iii.  20. 
Upton. 

t  Such  recitations  were  common  at  Rome,  when  authors  read  their 
works  and  invited  persons  to  attend.  These  recitations  are  often  men- 
tioned in  the  letters  of  the  younger  Pliny.  See  Kpictetus,  iii.  23. 


have  no  difficulty  in  making  a  prop  ision. 

When  you  are  going  to  any  of  those  \vho   are    in   great 
power,  place  before   yourself  that   you  will    not    find    the 
man  at  home,  that  you  will  be  excluded,  that  the  door  will 
not  be  opened  to  you,  that  the    man  will    not   care   ; 
you.      And  if  with  all  this  it  is  your  duty  to  visit  him. 
what  happens,  and  never  say  to  yourself  that   it  wa 
worth  the  trouble.      For  this  is  silly,  and  marks  the  char- 
acter of  a  man  who  is  offended  by  externals. 

In  company  take  care  not  to  speak  much  and  exces- 
sively about  your  own  acts  or  dangers  :  for  as  it  is  pleas- 
ant to  you  to  make  mention  of  your  dangers,  it  is  not  so 
pleasant  to  others  to  hear  what  has  happened  to  you. 
Take  care  also  not  to  provoke  laughter  :  for  this  is  a  slip- 
pery way  toward  vulgar  habits,  and  is  also  adapted  to 
diminish  the  respect  of  your  neighbors.  It  is  a  dang' 
habit  also  to  approach  obscene  talk.  When  then  any- 
thing of  this  kind  happens,  if  there  is  a  good  opportunity, 
rebuke  the  man  who  has  proceeded  to  this  talk:  but  if 
there  is  not  an  opportunity,  by  your  silence  at  least,  and 
blushing  and  expression  of  dissatisfaction  by  your  counte- 
nance, show  plainly  that  you  are  displeased  at  such  talk. 

XXXIV. 

Ifj'ouhave  received  the  impression  of  any  pleasure, 
guard  yourself  against  being  carried  away  by  it  ;  but  let 
the  thing  wait  for  you,  and  allow  yourself  a  certain  delay 
on  your  own  part.  Then  think  of  both  times,  of  the  time 
when  you  will  enjoy  the  pleasure,  and  of  the  time  after 
the  enjoyment  of  the  pleasure  when  you  will  repent  and 
will  reproach  yourself.  And  set  against  these  things  how 
you  will  rejoice  if  you  have  abstained  from  the  pleasure, 
and  how  you  will  commend  yourself.  1'nt  if  it  si-em  to 
you  seasonable  to  undertake  (do)  the  thing,  take  i;.re  that 


440 

the  charm  of  it,  and  the  pleasure,  and  the  attraction  of  it 
shall  not  conquer  you  :  but  set  on  the  other  side  the  con- 
sideration how  much  better  it  is  to  be  conscious  that  you 
have  gained  this  victory. 

XXXV. 

When  you  have  decided  that  a  thing  ought  to  be  done 
and  are  doing  it,  never  avoid  being  seen  doing  it,  though 
the  many  shall  form  an  unfavorable  opinion  about  it. 
For  if  it  is  not  right  to  do  it,  avoid  doing  the  thing  ;  but  if 
it  is  right,  why  are  you  afraid  of  those  who  shall  find  fault 
wrongly  ? 

XXXVI. 

As  the  proposition  it  is  either  day  or  it  is  night  is  <>;' 
great  importance  for  the  disjunctive  argument,  but  for  the 
conjunctive  is  of  no  value,*  so  in  a  symposium  (enter- 
tainment) to  select  the  larger  share  is  of  great  value  for 
the  body,  but  for  the  maintenance  of  the  social  feeling  is 
worth  nothing.  When  then  you  are  eating  with  another, 
remember  to  look  not  only  to  the  value  for  the  body  of 
the  things  set  before  you,  but  also  to  the  value  of  the 
behavior  toward  the  host  which  ought  to  be  observed. 

XXXVII. 

If  you  have  assumed  a  character  above  your  strength, 
you  have  both  acted  in  this  matter  in  an  unbecoming  way, 
and  you  have  neglected  that  which  you  might  have  ful- 
filled. 

XXXVIII. 

In  walking  about  as  you  take  care  not  to  step  on  a  nail 
or  to  sprain  your  foot,  so  take  care  not  to  damage  your 

*  Compare  i.  25.  H,  etc, 


EP/CTETVS.  .,,, 

own  ruling  faculty  :   and  if  we  observe  this  rule    in   every 
act,  we  shall  undertake  the  act  with  more  security. 

XXX IX. 

The  measure  of  possession  (property)  is  to  every  man 
the  body,  as  the  foot  is  of  the  shoe.  If  then  you  stand  on 
this  rule  (the  demands  of  the  body),  you  will  maintain 
the  measure  :  but  if  you  pass  beyond  it,  you  must  then  of 
necessity  be  hurried  as  it  were  down  a  precipice.  As  also 
in  the  matter  of  the  shoe,  if  you  go  beyond  the  (necessi- 
ties of  the)  foot,  the  shoe  is  gilded,  then  of  a  purple  color, 
then  embroidered  :  for  there  is  no  limit  to  that  which  has 
once  passed  the  true  measure. 


Women  forthwith  from  the  age  of  fourteen*  are  called 
by  the  men  mistresses  (dominie).  Therefore  since  they 
see  that  there  is  nothing  else  that  they  can  obtain,  but 
only  the  power  of  lying  with  men.  they  begin  to  decorate 
themselves,  and  to  place  all  their  hopes  in  this.  It  i.> 
worth  our  while  then  to  take  care  that  they  may  know 
that  they  are  valued  (by  men)  for  nothing  else  than  ap- 
pearing (being)  decent  and  modest  and  discreet. 

XLI. 

It  is  a  mark  of  a  mean  capacity  to  spend  much  time  on 
the  things  which  concern  the  body,  such  as  much  exer- 
cise, much  eating,  much  drinking,  much  easing  of  the 
body,  much  copulation.  Hut  these  things  should  be  done 
as  subordinate  things  :  and  let  all  your  care  be  dir 
to  the  mind. 

'  Fourteen  was  considered  the  age  of  puberty  in  Ki»ni;in  inalo,  but  in 
fein.ile.s  the  age  of  twelve  (Justin,  lust.  I.  tit.  M).  <  nmp.ire  ( ;.uus.  i. 


442  EPICTETUS. 

XLII. 

When  any  person  treats  you  ill  or  speaks  ill  of  you,  re- 
member that  he  does  this  or  says  this  because  he  thinks 
that  it  is  his  duty.  It  is  not  possible  then  for  him  to  fol- 
low that  which  seems  right  to  you,  but  that  which  seems 
right  to  himself.  Accordingly  if  he  is  wrong  in  his  < 
ion,  he  is  the  person  who  is  hurt,  for  he  is  the  person  who 
has  been  deceived  ;  for  if  a  man  shall  suppose  the  true 
conjunction  to  be  false,  it  is  not  the  conjunction  which  is 
hindered,  but  the  man  who  has  been  deceived  about  it. 
If  you  proceed  then  from  these  opinions,  you  will  be  mild 
in  temper  to  him  who  reviles  you  :  for  say  on  each  occa- 
sion, It  seemed  so  to  him. 

XLIII. 

Everything  has  two  handles,  the  one  by  which  it  may 
be  borne,  the  other  by  which  it  may  not.  If  your  brother 
acts  unjustly,  do  not  lay  hold  of  the  act  by  that  handle 
wherein  he  acts  unjustly,  for  this  is  the  handle  which 
cannot  be  borne  ;  but  lay  hold  of  the  other,  that  he  is 
your  brother,  that  he  was  nurtured  with  you,  and  you  will 
lay  hold  of  the  thing  by  that  handle  by  which  it  can  be 
borne. 

XLIY. 

These  reasonings  do  not  cohere  :  I  am  richer  than  you, 
therefore  I  am  better  than  you  :  I  am  more  eloquent  than 
you,  therefore  I  am  better  than  you.  On  the  contrary 
these  rather  cohere,  I  am  richer  than  you,  therefore  my 
possessions  are  greater  than  yours  :  I  am  more  eloquent 
than  you,  therefore  my  speech  is  superior  to  yours.  But 
you  are  neither  possession  nor  speech. 


tPlCTETUS.  443 

XLV. 

"Hoes  a  man  bathe  quickly  ('early)?  do  not  say  that  he 
bathes  badly,  but  that  he  bathes   quickly.  man 

drink  much  wine?   do  not  say  that  he  does  this  badh 
say  that  he  drinks  much.      For  before  you  shall  hav 
termined  the  opinion,*   how   do   you  know  whether  he  is 
acting  wrong?     Thus  it  will   not   happen    to  you  to  com- 
prehend some  appearances   which   are  capable  of  being 
comprehended,  but  to  assent  to  ot!. 

XLVI. 

On  no  occasion  call  yourself  a  philosopher,  and  do  not 
speak  much  among-  the  uninstructed  about  theorems 
(philosophical  rules,  precepts)  :  but  do  that  which  follows 
from  them.  For  example  at  a  banquet  do  not  say  1.' 
man  ought  to  eat.  but  eat  as  you  ought  to  eat.  For  re- 
member that  in  this  way  Socrates  +  also  altogether  avoided 
ostentation  :  persons  used  to  come  to  him  and  ask  to  be 
recommended  by  him  to  philosophers,  and  he  used  to 
take  them  to  philosophers  :  so  easily  did  he  submit 
to  being  overlooked.  Accordingly  if  any  conversation 
should  arise  among  uninstructed  persons  about  any  theo- 
rem, generally  be  silent ;  for  there  -  that 
you  will  immediately  vomit  up  what  you  have  not  di- 
gested. And  when  a  man  shall  say  to  you.  that  you 
know  nothing,  and  you  are  not  vexed,  then  be  sure  that 
you  have  begun  the  work  (of  philosophy).  For  even 
sheep  do  not  vomit  up  the  grass  and  show  to  the  shep- 
herds ho\v  much  they  have  eaten  ;  but  w!.  have 
internally  digested  the  pasture,  they  produce  extcr: 

s.  Carter   translates    thin.  "  Unless  you  perfectly  nnd«r*tand    the 
principle  [from  which  any  one  a 

t  bee  iii.  23.  22;  jv.  S,  z. 


U4.  EFICTETUS. 

wool  and  milk.  Do  you  al&o  show  not  your  theorems  to 
the  uninstructed.  but  show  the  acts  which  come  from 
their  digestion. 

XLVII. 

When  at  a  small  cost  you  are  supplied  with  everything 
for  the  body,  do  not  be  proud  of  this  ;  nor.  if  you  drink 
water,  say  on  every  occasion.  I  drink  water.  But  con- 
sider first  how  much  more  frugal  the  poor  are  than  we. 
and  how  much  more  enduring  of  labor.  And  if  you  ever 
wish  to  exercise  yourself  in  labor  and  endurance,  do  it 
for  yourself,  and  not  for  others  :  do  not  embrace  statues.* 
But  if  you  are  ever  very  thirsty,  take  a  draught  of  cold 
water,  and  spit  it  out,  and  tell  no  man. 

XLVIIL 

The  condition  and  characteristic  of  an  uninstructed  per- 
son is  this  :  he  never  expects  from  himself  profit  (advan- 
tage) nor  harm,  but  from  externals.  The  condition  and 
characteristic  of  a  philosopher  is  this  :  he  expects  all  ad- 
vantage and  all  harm  from  himself.  The  signs  (marks) 
of  one  who  is  making  progress  are  these  :  he  censures  no 
man,  he  praises  no  man,  he  blames  no  man,  he  accuses 
no  man,  he  says  nothing  about  himself  as  if  he  were 
somebody  or  knew  something  ;  when  he  is  impeded  at  all 
or  hindered,  he  blames  himself:  if  a  man  praises  him,  he 
ridicules  the  praiser  to  himself :  if  a  man  censures  him, 
he  makes  no  defense  :  he  goes  about  like  weak  persons, 
being  careful  not  to  move  any  of  the  things  which  are 
placed,  before  they  are  firmly  fixed  :  he  removes  all  de- 
sire from  himself,  and  he  transfers  aversion  («KK\IOIV)  to 
those  things  only  of  the  things  within  our  power  which 
are  contrary  to  nature  :  he  employs  a  moderate  move- 

*  See  iii.  1 2. 


44S 

ment  toward  everything  :  whether  In-  is  considered  fool- 
ish  or  ignorant,  lie  cares  not  :  and  in  a  word  he  watches 
himself  as  if  he  were  an  em-my  and  lying  in  ambush. 

XI. IX. 

When  a  man  is  proud  because  lu-  can  understand  and 
explain  the  writings  of  Oirysippus.  say  to  yourself,  If 
Oirysippus  had  not  written  obscurely,  this  man  would 
have  had  nothing  to  be  proud  of.  But  what  is  it  that  I 
wish  ?  To  understand  Nature  and  to  follow  it.  I  impure 
therefore  who  is  the  interpreter  :  and  when  I  have  heard 
that  it  is  Chrysippus,  I  come  to  him  (the  interpreter). 
But  I  do  not  understand  what  is  written,  and  therefore  I 
seek  the  interpreter.  And  so  far  there  is  yet  nothing  to 
be  proud  of.  But  when  I  shall  have  found  the  interpreter, 
the  thing  that  remains  is  to  use  the  precepts  (the  les.- 
This  itself  is  the  only  tiling  to  be  proud  of.  But  if  1  shall 
admire  the  exposition,  what  else  have  I  been  made  unless 
a  grammarian  instead  of  a  philosopher?  except  in  one 
thing,  that  I  am  explaining  Chrysippus  instead  of  Homer. 
When  then  any  man  says  to  me.  Read  Oirysippus  to  me, 
I  rather  blush,  when  I  cannot  show  my  acts  like  to  and 
consistent  with  his  words. 

L 

Whatever  things  (rules)  are  proposed  *  to  you  [for  tin- 
conduct  of  life  j  abide  by  them,  as  if  they  were  laws, 
you  would  be  guilty  of  impiety  if  you  transgressed  anyol 
them.  And  whatever  any  man  shall  say  about  you,  do 
not  attend  to  it  :  for  this  is  no  affair  of  yours.  How  Ion- 
will  you  then  still  defer  thinking  yourself  worthy  of  the 

*  This  may    mean,  "  what  is  proposed  to    you    by   philosophers,"  ;m<i 
especially  in   this  little  lx>ok.     S<  •hweighaeu^rr  think',  that  it  m.iv   nx-.m 
"  what  VMM  have  proposed  to  yourx-lf  :  "  hut  he  is  im  lim-cl  I-'  imtl. 
it  simply.  "  \\liat  i-  proposed  above,  or  taught    V 


446 

best  things,  and  in  no  matter  transgressing  the  distinctive 
reason  ?  Have  you  accepted  the  theorems  (rules),  which 
it  was  your  duty  to  agree  to,  and  have  you  agreed  to 
them  ?  what  teacher  then  do  you  still  expect  that  you 
defer  to  him  the  correction  of  yourself  ?  You  are  no  longei 
a  youth,  but  already  a  full-grown  man.  If  then  you  are 
negligent  and  slothful,  and  arc  continually  making  pro- 
crastination after  procrastination,  and  proposal  (intention') 
after  proposal,  and  fixing  day  after  day,  after  which  you 
will  attend  to  yourself,  you  will  not  know  that  you  are 
not  making  improvement,  but  you  will  continue  ignorant 
(uninstructed)  both  while  you  live  and  till  you  die.  Im- 
mediately then  think  it  right  l<>  live  as  a  full-grown  man, 
and  one  who  is  making  proficiency,  and  let  everything 
which  appears  to  you  to  be  the  best  be  to  you  a  law 
which  must  not  be  transgressed.  And  if  anything  labor- 
ious, or  pleasant  or  glorious  or  inglorious  be  presented  to 
you,  remember  that  now  is  the  contest,  now  are  the 
Olympic  games,  and  they  cannot  be  deferred  ;  and  that  it 
depends  on  one  defeat  and  one  giving  way  that  progress 
is  either  lost  or  maintained.  Socrates  in  this  way  became 
perfect,  in  all  things  improving  himself,  attending  to 
nothing  except  to  reason.  But  you,  though  you  arc-  not 
yet  a  Socrates,  ought  to  live  as  one  who  wishes  to  be  a 
Socrates. 

LI. 

The  first  and  most  necessary  place  (part;  in  philosophy 
is  the  use  of  theorems  (precepts),  for  instance,  that  we  must 
not  lie  :  the  second  part  is  that  of  demonstrations,  for 
instance,  How  is  it  proved  that  we  ought  not  to  lie  :  the 
third  is  that  which  is  confirmatory  of  these  two  and  ex- 
planatory, for  example,  How  is  this  a  demonstration? 
For  what  is  demonstration,  what  is  consequence,  v. 
contradiction,  what  is  truth,  what  is  falsehood  ?  The  third 


447 

y  on  account  of  the  second,  and  the 

second  on  account  of  the  first ;  but  the  most  necessary  and 
that  on  which  we  ought  to  rest  is  the  first.  But  we  do  the 
contrary.  For  we  spend  our  time  on  the  third  topic,  and 
all  our  earnestness  is  about  it  :  but  we  entirely  neglect  the 
first.  Therefore  we  lie  ;  but  the  demonstration  that  we 
ought  not  to  lie  we  have  ready  to  hand. 

LII. 

In    every  thing  (circumstance)  we   should  hold   these 
maxims  ready  to  hand  : 

Lead  me,  ( >  Zeus,  and  thou  O  Destiny, 

The  way  that  I  am  bid  by  you  to  go : 

To  follow  I  am  ready.     If  I  choose  not, 

I  make  myself  a  wretch,  and  still  must  follow.* 

But  whoso  nobly  yields  unto  necessity, 

We  hold  him  wise,  and  skill'd  in  things  divine,  t 

And  the  third  also  :  O  I'rito,  if  so  it  pleases  the  Gods,  so 
K't  it  be  ;  Anytus  and  Melitus  are  able  indeed  to  kill  me, 
but  they  cannot  harm  me.  £ 

*  The  first  two  verses  are  by  the  Stoic  Cleanthes,  the  pupil  of  Zeno, 
and  the  teacher  of  Chrysippus.  He  was  a  native  of  Assus  in  Mysia; 
and  Simplicius,  who  wrote  his  commentary  on  the  Kncheiridion  in  the 
sixth  century,  A.  I  >.,  saw  even  at  this  late  period  in  Assus  a  beautiful 
statue  of  Cleanthes  erected  by  a  decree  of  the  Roman  senate  in  honor 
of  this  excellent  man. 

t  The   two   second  verses  are  from  a  play  of  Euripides,  a    writer   who 
-upplied  nv  :or  quotation  than  any  ancient  tragedian. 

I  The  third  quotation  is  from  the  C'riton  of    Plato.     Socrates   is    the 
speaker.     The    last  part  is  from  the  Apology  of  Plato,  and    Socrates   is 
also  the  speaker.     The  word*  "  and  the  third  also."  Schweig!; 
have  been  introduced  from  the  comnn  :  Simplicius 

concludes  his  commentary  thus  :  K|>ictctu>  connects  the  end  with  the 
beginning,  \\hich  reminds  us  of  uhat  wa>  said  in  the  beginning,  that  the 
man  who  places  the  good  and  the  evil  among  the  things  which  are 
in  our  power,  and  not  in  external-.,  will  neither  be  compelled  by  any  man 
nor  ever  injured. 


FRAGMENTS  OF   EPICTETUS. 


THP.SE  Fragments  are  entitled  "  Epicteti  Fragmenta 
maxime  ex  loanne  Stobaeo,  Antonio,  et  Maximo  collecta" 
(ed.  Schweig. ).  There  are  some  notes  and  emendations 
on  the  Fragments  ;  and  a  short  dissertation  on  them  by 
Schweighaeuser. 

Nothing  is  known  of  Stobeeus  nor  of  his  time,  except 
the  fact  that  he  has  preserved  some  extracts  of  an  ethical 
kind  from  the  New  Platonist  Hieroclcs,  who  lived  about 
the  middle  of  the  fifth  century  A.  D.  ;  and  it  is  therefore 
concluded  that  Stolueus  lived  after  Hierocles.  The  frag- 
ments attributed  to  Epictetus  are  preserved  by  Slobieusin 
his  work  entitled  ' Av9o\6ymi>,  or  Florilegium  or  Sermoncs. 

Antonius  Monachus,  a  Greek  monk,  also  made  a  Flori- 
legium, entitled  Melissa  (the  bee).  His  date  is  uncertain, 
but  it  was  certainly  much  later  than  the  time  of  Stobu-us. 

Maximus,  also  named  the  monk,  and  reverenced  as  a 
saint,  is  said  to  have  been  a  native  of  Constantinople,  and 
born  about  A.  I).  580. 

Some  of  the  Fragments  contained  in  the  edition  of 
Schweighaeuscr  are  certainly  not  from  Epictetus.  Many 
of  the  fragments  are  obscure  ;  but  they  are  translated  as 
accurately  as  I  can  translate  them,  and  the  reader  must 
give  to  them  such  meaning  as  he  can. 

I. 

THE  life  which  is  implicated  with  fortune  (depends  on 
29  449 


450  EPICTETUS. 

fortune)  is  like  a  winter  torrent  :  for  it  is  turbulent,  and 
full  of  mud,  and  difficult  to  cross,  and  tyrannical,  and 
noisy,  and  of  short  duration. 

II. 

A  soul  which  is  conversant  with  virtue  is  like  an  ever- 
flowing  source,  for  it  is  pure  and  tranquil  and  potable  and 
sweet  and  communicative  (social),  and  rich  and  harmless 
and  free  from  mischief. 

III. 

If  you  wish  to  be  good,  first  believe  that   you  are  bad. 

IV. 

It  is  better  to  do  wrong  seldom  and  to  own  it,  and  to 
act  right  for  the  most  part,  than  seldom  to  admit  that  you 
have  done  wrong  and  to  do  wrong  often. 

V. 

Check  (punish)  your  passions  that  you  may  not  be  pun- 
ished by  them. 

VI. 

Do  not  so  much  be  ashamed  of  that  (disgrace)  which 
proceeds  from  men's  opinions  as  fly  from  that  which  comes 
from  the  truth. 

VII. 

If  you  wish  to  be  well  spoken  of,  learn  to  speak  well  (of 
others)  :  and  when  you  have  learned  to  speak  well  of 
them,  try  to  act  well,  and  so  you  will  reap  the  fruit  of 
being  well  spoken  of. 


/.vv  ±s  i 

\ll\. 

Freedom  and  slavery,  the  one  is  the  name  m"  virtue,  and 
the  other  of  vice  :  and  both  are  acts  of  the  will.  Hut 
where  there  is  no  will,  neither  of  them  touches  (affects) 
these  things.  But  the  soul  is  accustomed  to  be  master  of 
the  body,  and  the  things  which  belong-  to  the  body  have 
no  share  in  the  will.  For  no  man  is  a  slave  who  is  free 
in  his  will. 

IX. 

It  is  an  evil  chain,  fortune  (a  chain)  of  the  body,  and 
vice  of  the  soul.      For  he  who  is  loose  (tree)  in  thr  !•• 
but  bound  in  the  soul  is  a  slave  :   but  on   the  contrary  lie 
who  is  bound  in  the  body,  but  free  (unbound)  in  the  soul, 
is  free. 


The  bond  of  the  body  is  loosened  by  nature  through 
death,  and  by  vice  through  money  :  *  but  the  bond  of  the 
soui  is  loosened  by  learning,  and  by  experience  and  by 
discipline. 

XI. 

If  you  wish  to  live  without  perturbation  and  with  pleas- 
ure, try  to  have  all  who  dwell  with  you  good.  And  you 
will  have  them  good,  if  you  instruct  the  willing,  and  dis- 
miss those  who  are  unwilling  (to  be  taught)  :  for  there 
will  fly  away  together  with  those  who  have  fled  away 
loth  wickedness  and  slavery  :  and  there  will  be  left  with 
those  who  remain  with  yon  ,;,  .odnos  and  liberty. 

*  "  He   does  not  say  ihi.-  '  (hut  it  is  bad  if  a  man  by  money  .-hould   re- 
hiinself   from   bonds,'  but  he  mean*  ili.u  '  i-ven  a  bad  nian.   if    he 
lias  money,  can  redeem  himself  from  the  bonds  of  the  body  and  so  si-cure 
his  liberty.'  " — Schweig. 


452  EP1CTETUS. 

XIL 

It  is  a  shame  for  those  who  sweeten  drink  with  the  gifts 
of  the  bees,  by  badness  to  embitter  reason  which  is  the 
gift  of  the  gods. 

XIII. 

Xo  man  who  loves  money,  and  loves  pleasure,  and  loves 
fame,  also  loves  mankind,  but  only  he  who  loves  virtue. 

XIV. 

As  you  would  not  choose  to  sail  in  a  large  and  decorat- 
ed and  gold-laden  ship  (or  ship  ornamented  with  gold), 
and  to  be  drowned  :  so  do  not  choose  to  dwell  in  a  large 
and  costly  house  and  to  be  disturbed  (by  cares). 


When  we  have  been  invited  to  a  banquet,  we  take  what 
is  set  before  us  :  but  if  a  guest  should  ask  the  host  to  set 
before  him  fish  or  sweet  cakes,  he  would  be  considered  to 
be  an  unreasonable  fellow..  But  in  the  world  we  ask  the 
Gods  for  what  they  do  not  give  ;  and  we  do  this  though 
the  things  are  many  which  they  have  given. 


They  are  amusing  fellows,  said  he  (Epictetus),  who  are 
proud  of  the  things  which  are  not  in  our  power.  A  man 
says.  I  am  better  than  you,  for  I  possess  much  land,  and 
you  are  wasting  with  hunger.  Another  says,  lam  of  con- 
sular rank.  Another  says,  I  am  a  Procurator  (^irpoTros). 
Another,  I  have  curly  hair.  But  a  horse  does  not  say  to 
a  horse,  I  am  superior  to  you,  for  I  possess  much  fodder, 
and  much  barley,  and  my  bits  are  of  gold  and  my  harness 
is  embroidered  :  but  he  says,  I  am  swifter  than  you. 


And  every  animal  is  better  or  worse  from  his  own  merit 
(virtue)  or  liis  o\vn  badness.  Is  tin-re  then  no  virtue  in 
man  only  ?  and  must  \ve  look  to  the  hair,  and  our  clothes 
and  to  our  ancestors? 

XVII. 

The  sick  are  vexed  -\vith  the  physician  who  gives  them 
no  advice,  and  think  that  he  has  despaired  <>t  them, 
why  should  they  not  have  the  same  feeling  toward  the 
•philosopher,  and  think  that  lie  has  despaired  of  their  com i 
ing  to  a  sound  state  of  mind,  if  he  says  nothing  at  all  that 
is  useful  to  a  man  ? 

XVIII. 

Those  who  are  well  constituted  in  the  body  endure  both 
heat  and  cold  :  and  so  those  who  are  well  constituted  in 
the  soul  endure  both  anger  and  grief  and  excessive  joy 
and  the  other  affects. 

XIX. 

Examine  yourself  whether  you  wish  to  be  rich  or  to  be 
happy.  If  you  wish  to  be  rich,  you  should  know  that  it 
is  neither  a  good  thing  nor  at  all  in  your  power  :  but  if 
you  wish  to  be  happy,  you  should  know  that  it  is  both  a 
good  thing  and  in  your  power,  for  the  one  is  a  temporary 
loan  of  fortune,  and  happiness  comes  from  the  will. 

XX. 

when  you  see  a  viper  or  an  asp  or  a  scorpion  in  an 
ivory  or  golden  box,  you  do  not  on  account  of  the  costli- 
ness of  the  material  love  it  or  think  it  happy,  but  because 
the  nature  of  it  is  pernicious,  you  turn  away  from  it  and 
loath  it  :  so  when  you  shall  see  vice  dwelling  in  wealth 
and  i:i  the  swollen  fullness  of  fortune.  IK-  not  struck  by 


454 


EPICTRTVS. 


the  splendor  of  the  material,  but  despise  the  false  charac- 
ter of  the  morals. 

XXI. 

Wealth  is  not  one  of  the  good  things  ;  great  expenditure 
is  one  of  the  bad  ;  moderation  is  one  of  the  good  things. 
And  moderation  invites  to  frugality  and  the  acquisition  of 
good  things  :  but  wealth  invites  to  great  expenditure  and 
draws  us  away  from  moderation.  It  is  difficult  then  for 
a  rich  man  to  be  moderate,  or  for  a  moderate  man  to  be 
rich.* 

XXII. 

As  if  you  were  begotten  or  born  in  a  ship,  you  would 
not  be  eager  to  be  the  master  of  it,  so — f  For  neither 
there  (in  the  ship)  will  the  ship  naturally  be  connected 
with  you,  nor  wealth  in  the  other  case  ;  but  reason  is 
everywhere  naturally  connected  with  you.  As  then 
reason  is  a  thing  which  naturally  belongs  to  you  and  is 
born  in  you,  consider  this  also  as  specially  your  own  and 
take  care  of  it. 

XX I  IT. 

If  you  had  been  born  among  the  Persians,  you  would 
not  have  wished  to  live  in  Hollas  (Clreece),  but  to  have 

*"  How  hardly  shall  they  that  have  riches  enter  the  kingdom  of  God." 
Mark  x.  23  (Mrs.  Carter).  This  expression  in  Mark  sets  forth  the  dan- 
ger of  riches,  a  fact  which  all  men  know  who  use  their  observation.  In 
the  next  verse  the  truth  is  expressed  in  this  form,  "  How  hard  it  is  for 
them  that  trust  in  riches  to  enter  into  the  kingdom  of  God.''  The 
Stoics  viewed  wealth  as  among  the  things  which  are  indifferent,  neither 
good  nor  bad. 

t  The  other  member  of  the  comparison  has  been  omitted  by  some  ac- 
cident in  the  MSS.  Wolf  in  his  I. atin  version  supplied  by  c  onjcn  m.- 
the  omission  in  this  manner:  "  it:i  neque  in  terris  divitix  tibi  expetend;e 
sunt." — Schweig. 


455 

lived  in  Persia  happy  :  ><>  :t  you  tire  burn  in  poverty,  why 
do  you  seek  to  grow  rich,  and  why  do  you  not  remain  in 
poverty  and  be  happy  ?  * 

XXIV. 

As  it  is  better  to  lie  compressed  in  a  narrow  bed  and  be 
healthy  than  to  be  tossed  with  disease  on  a  broad  couch, 
so  also  it  is  better  to  contract  yourself  within  a  small 
competence  and  to  be  happy  than  to  have  a  great  fortune 
and  to  be  wretched. 

XXV. 

It  is  not  poverty  which  produces  sorrow,  but  desire  ; 
nor  does  wealth  release  from  fear,  but  reason  (the  power 
of  reasoning).  If  then  you  acquire  this  power  of  reason- 

*  To  some  persons  the  comparison  will  not  seem  apt.     Also  the  notion 
that  every  man  should  be  taught  to  rise  above  the  condition  in  which  he 
is    bom  is,  in  the  opinion  of  >ome  persons,  a  better    teaching.      I    think 
that    it   is  not.     Few  persons  have  the  talents  and   the  character  which 
enable  them    to  rise  from  a  low  condition  ;  and  the  proper   lesson   for 
them  is  to  stay  in  the  condition  in  which  they  are  born  and  to  l>r  content 
with  it.     Those  who  have  the  power  of  rising  from  a  low  condition  will 
rise    whether  they  are  advised  to  attempt  it  or  not  :  and  generally    they 
will    not  be    able    to   rise    without    doing   something  useful 
Those  who  have  ability  sufficient  to  raise  themselves  from  a  low 
and  at  the  same  time  to  do  it  to  the  damage  of  society,  are  perhaps  only 
few,  bnt    certainly  there  are  such  persons.     They  rise  by  ability,  by    the 
•    fraud,    by    bad  means  almost  innumerable.     They  pain    wealth, 
they    fill    high   places,  they  disturb  society,  they  are  plagues    and 
and    the    world  look.-  on  sometimes  with  stupid  admiration   until    death 
remove*  the  dueling  and  deceitful  image,  and  honest  men  breathe  freely 
again.     In  the  Church  of  Kngland  (  atechi<m  there  are  two  ansv. 
two  questions,  one  on  our  duty  '  our  dutx 

neighbor.  Both  the  answers  would  l>e  accepted  by  Kpictetus.  except 
such  few  words  as  were  not  applicable  to  the  circumstances  of  his 
The  second  answer  ends  with  the  words  "  to  learn  and  labor  to 
pet  mine  own  living  and  to  do  my  duty  in  that  state  of  life  unto  which  il 
shall  please  God  to  call  me." 


45  6  E/'/CTKTUS. 

ing,    you    will    neither   desire   wealth    nor   complain    of 
poverty. 

XXVI. 

Neither  is  a  horse  elated  nor  proud  of  his  manger  and 
trappings  and  coverings,  nor  a  bird  of  his  little  shreds  of 
cloth  and  of  his  nest  :  but  both  of  them  are  proud  of  their 
swiftness,  one  proud  of  the  swiftness  of  the  feet,  and  the 
other  of  the  wings.  Do  you  also  then  not  be  greatly  proud 
of  your  food  and  dress  and,  in  short,  of  any  external 
things,  but  be  proud  of  your  integrity  and  good  deeds. 

XXV II. 

To  live  well  differs  from  living  extravagantly  :  for  the 
fir.st  comes  from  moderation  and  a  sufficiency  and  good 
order  and  propriety  and  frugality  :  but  the  other  comes 
from  intemperance  and  luxury  and  want  of  order  and 
want  of  propriety.  And  the  end  (the  consequence)  of  the 
one  is  true  praise,  but  of  the  other  blame.  If  then  you 
wish  to  live  well,  do  not  seek  to  be  commended  for  pro- 
fuse expenditure. 

XXVI I  i. 

Let  the  measure  to  you  of  all  food  and  drink  be  the  first 
satisfying  of  the  desire  ;  and  let  the  food  and  the  pleasure 
be  the  desire  (appetite)  itself  :  and  you  will"  neither  take 
more  than  is  necessary,  nor  will  you  want  cooks,  and  you 
will  be  satisfied  with  the  drink  that  comes  in  the  way. 

XXIX. 

Make  your  manner  of  eating  neither  luxurious  nor 
gloomy,  but  lively  and  frugal,  that  the  soul  may  not  be 
perturbed  through  being  deceived  by  the  pleasures  of  the 
body,  and  that  it  may  despise  them  :  and  that  tin-  soul 


•157 

may  not  be   injured   by  the   enjoyment  of  present  luxury 
and  the  body  may  not  afterward  suffer  from  disease.* 

XXX. 

Take  care  that  the  food  which  you  put  into  the  stomach 
does  not  fatten  ('nourish)  you,  but  the  cheerfulness  of  the 
mind  :  for  the  food  is  changed  into  excrement,  and  ejected. 
and  the  urine  also  flows  out  at  the  same  time  :  but  the 
cheerfulness,  even  if  the  soul  be  separated,  remains  always 
tin  corrupted,  f 

XXXI. 

In  banquets  remember  that  you  entertain  two  guests, 
body  and  soul  :  and  whatever  you  shall  have  given  to 
the  body  you  soon  eject  :  but  what  you  shall  have  given 
to  the  soul,  you  keep  always. 

XXX 11. 

Do  not  mix  anger  with  profuse  expenditure  and  serve 
them  up  to  your  guests.  Profusion  which  fills  the  body 
is  quickly  gone  ;  but  anger  sinks  into  the  soul  and  remains 
for  a  long  time.  Consider  then  that  you  be  not  trans- 
ported with  anger  and  insult  your  guests  at  a  great  ex- 
pense ;  but  rather  please  them  with  frugality  and  by 
gentle  behavior. 

XXXIII. 

In  your  banquets  (meals)  take  care  that  those  who  serve 
(your  slaves)  are  not  more  than  those  who  are  served  ; 

*  Mrs.  Carter  says,  "  1  have  not  translated  this  fragment,  because  I  do 
not  understand  it."  Schweighaeusur  say.  also  that  he  does  not  under- 
hand it.  I  have  given  what  may  be  the  meaning;  but  it  is  not  an  exact 
translation,  which  in  the  present  state  of  the  text  is  not  possible. 

t  This  fragment  is  perhaps  more  corrupt  than  XXIX. 


458 

for  it  is  foolish  for  many  souls  (persons)  to  wait  on  a  few 
couches  (seats). 

XXXIV. 

It  is  best  if  even  in  the  preparations  for  a  feast  you  take 
a  part  of  the  labor,  and  at  the  enjoyment  of  the  food, 
while  you  are  feasting,  you  share  with  those  who  serve 
the  things  which  are  before  you.  But  if  such  behavior  be 
unsuitable  to  the  occasion,  remember  that  you  are  served 
when  you  are  not  laboring;  by  those  who  are  laboring, 
when  you  are  eating  by  those  who  are  not  eating,  when 
you  are  drinking  by  those  who  are  not  drinking,  while 
you  arc  talking  by  those  who  are  silent,  while  you  are  at 
ease  by  those  who  are  under  constraint  ;  and  if  you 
remember  this,  you  will  neither  being  heated  with  anger 
be  guilty  of  any  absurdity  yourself,  nor  by  irritating  an- 
other will  you  cause  any  mischief.* 

XXXV. 

Quarreling  and  contention  are  everywhere  foolish,  and 
particularly  in  talk  over  wine  they  are  unbecoming  :  for 
a  man  who  is  drunk  could  not  teach  a  man  who  is  sober, 
nor  on  the  other  hand  could  a  drunken  man  be  convinced 
by  a  sober  man.  But  where  there  is  not  sobriety,  it  will 
appear  that  to  no  purpose  have  you  labored  for  the  result 
of  persuasion,  f 

XXXVT. 

Grasshoppers  (cicadae)  are  musical  :  snails  have  no 
voice.  Snails  have  pleasure  in  being  moist,  but  grass- 
hoppers in  being  dry.  Next  the  dew  invites  forth  the 

*  I  am  not  sure  about  the  exact  meaning  of  the  conclusion. 

t  This  is  not  a  translation  of  the  conclusion,  Perhaps  it  is  something 
like  the  meaning. 


Ei'lCTJ  . 


459 


snails,  and  for  this    they  crawl   out  :  but   on  the   contrary 
the  sun  when  he  is  hot,  rouses  the  grasshoppers  ami  they 
sing  in    the  sun.      Therefore   if  you  wish   to   be  a  nv 
man   and  to   hurmoni/e  well  with   others,  when   over  the 
cups  the  soul   is  bedewed  with  wine,  at   that  time  di 
permit  the  soul  to  go  forth  and  to  be  polluted  ;  but  when 
in  company  (parties)  it  is  tired  by  reason,  then  bid  her  to 
utter  oracular  words  ami  to  sing  the  oracles  of  justi 

XXX  VII. 

Kxamine  in  three  ways  him  who  is  talking  with  you.  as 
superior,  or  as  inferior,  or  as  equal  :  and  il  he  is  superior, 
you  should  listen  to  him  and  be  convinced  by  him  :  but 
if  lie  is  inferior,  you  should  convince  him  ;  if  he  is  equal, 
you  should  agree  with  him  ;  and  thus  you  will  never  be 
guilty  of  being  quarrelsome. 

XXXVI II. 

It  is  better  by  assenting  to  truth  to  conquer  opinion, 
than  by  assenting  to  opinion  to  be  conquered  by  truth. 

XXXIX. 

If  you  seek  truth,  you  will  not  seek  by  every  means  to 
gain  a  victory  ;  and  if  you  have  found  truth,  you  will 
have  the  gain  of  not  being  defeated. 

XI, 

Truth  conquers  with  itself;  but  opinion  conquers 
among  those  who  are  external.* 

XLI. 

It  is  better  to  live  with  one  free  man  and  to  be  without 

than  to  be  a  slave  with  many. 

ii»  i-i  not  cleur 


460  KJ'ICTETl'S. 

XLII. 

What  you  avoid  suffering,  do  not  attempt  to  make 
others  suffer.  You  avoid  slavery  :  take  care  that  others 
are  not  your  slaves.  For  if  you  endure  to  have  a  slave, 
you  appear  to  he  a  slave  yourself  first.  For  vice  has  no 
community  with  virtue,  nor  freedom  with  slavery. 

XLIII. 

As  he  who  is  in  health  would  not  choose  to  be  served 
(ministered  to)  by  the  sick,  nor  for  those  who  dwell  with 
him  to  be  sick,  so  neither  would  a  free  man  endure  to  be 
served  by  slaves,  or  for  those  who  live  with  him  to  be 
slaves. 

XLIV. 

Whoever  you  are  who  wish  to  be  not  among  the  num- 
ber of  slaves,  release  yourself  from  slavery  :  and  you  will 
be  free,  if  you  are  released  from  desire.  For  neither  Aris- 
tides  nor  Epaminondas  nor  Lycurgus  through  being  rich 
and  served  by  slaves  were  named  the  one  just,  the  other 
a  god,  and  the  third  a  savior,  but  because  they  were  poor 
and  delivered  Hellas  (Greece)  from  slavery.* 

XLV. 

If  you  wish  your  house  to  be  well  managed,  imitate 
the  Spartan  Lycurgus.  For  as  he  did  not  fence  his  city 
with  walls,  but  fortified  the  inhabitants  by  virtue  and  pre- 
served the  city  always  free  ;  f  so  do  you  not  cast  around 
(your  house)  a  large  court  and  raise  high  towers,  but 

*  It   is  observed  that  the  term  "just  "  applies  to  Aristides;  the  term 
"  god  "  was  given  to  Lycurgus  by  the  Pythia  or  Delphic  oracle ;  the 
name  "savior"  by  his  own  citizens  to  Epaminondas. 

*  Schweig.  quotes  Polybius  i.x.  10,  i,  "  a  city  is  not  adorned  by  eternal 
things,  but  by  the  virtue  of  those  who  dwell  in  it." 


l-.r/CTETUS.  461 

strengthen  the  (hvellers  by  good-will  and  fidelity  and 
friendship,  and  then  nothing  harmful  will  enter  it.  not 
even  if  the  whole  band  of  wickedness  shall  array  itself 
against  it. 

XLVI. 

Do  not  hang  your  house  round  with  tablets  and  pict- 
ures, but  decorate  it  with  moderation  :  for  the  one  is  of  a 
foreign  (unsuitable)  kind,  and  a  temporary  deception  of 
the  eyes  ;  but  the  other  is  a  natural  and  indelible,  and 
perpetual  ornament  of  the  house. 

XLVI  I. 

Instead  of  a  herd  of  oxen,  endeavor  to  assemble  herds 
of  friends  in  your  house. 

XLVIII. 

As  a  wolf  resembles  a  dog,  so  both  a  flatterer,  and  an 
adulterer  and  a  parasite,  resemble  a  friend  Take  care 
then  that  instead  of  watch-dogs  you  do  not  without 

Unov.-insf  it  let  in  mischievou-  y.-oi . 

XLIX. 

To  be  eager  that  your  house  should  be  admired  by  be- 
ing whitened  with  gypsum,  is  the  mark  of  a  man  who  has 
no  taste  :  but  to  set  off  (decorate)  our  morals  by  the 
goodness  of  our  communication  (social  habits)  is  tin- 
mark  of  a  man  who  is  a  lover  of  beauty  and  a  lover  of 
man. 

L 

If  you  begin  by  admiring  little  things,  you  will  not  be 
thought  worthy  of  great  things  :  but  if  you  despise  the 
little,  you  will  be  greatly  admired. 


462  EPICTETUS. 

LI. 

Nothing-  is  smaller  (meaner)  than  love  of  pleasure,  and 
love  of  gain  and  pride.  Nothing  is  superior  to  magna- 
nimity, and  gentleness,  and  love  of  mankind,  and  benefi- 
cence. 

LII. 

They  bring  forward  (they  name,  they  mention)  the 
peevish  philosophers  (the  Stoics),  whose  opinion  it  is  that 
pleasure  is  not  a  thing  conformable  to  nature,  but  is  a 
thing  which  is  consequent  on  the  things  which  are  con- 
formable to  nature,  as  justice,  temperance,  freedom. 
What  then  ?  is  the  soul  pleased  and  made  tranquil  by  the 
pleasures  of  the  body  which  are  smaller,  as  Epicurus 
says  ;  and  is  it  not  pleased  with  its  own  good  things, 
which  are  the  greatest?  And  indeed  nature  has  given  to 
me  modesty,  and  I  blush  much  when  I  think  of  saying  any- 
thing base  (indecent).  This  motion  (feeling)  does  not 
permit  me  to  nuike  (consider)  pleasure  the  good  and  the 
end  (purpose)  of  life. 

LIII. 

In  Rome  the  women  have  in  their  hands  Plato's  Polity 
(the  Republic),  because  it  allows  (advises)  the  women  to 
be  common,  for  they  attend  only  to  the  words  of  Plato. 
not  to  his  meaning.  Now  he  does  not  recommend  mar- 
riage and  one  man  to  cohabit  with  one  woman,  and  then 
that  the  women  should  be  common  :  but  he  takes  away 
such  a  marriage,  and  introduces  another  kind  of  marriage. 
And  in  fine,  men  are  pleased  with  finding  excuses  for 
their  faults.  Yet  philosophy  says  that  we  ought  not  to 
stretch  out  even  a  finder  without  a  reason. 


hPICTKTL'S.  463 

LIV. 

Of  pleasures  those  which  occur  most  rarely  give  the 
greatest  delight. 

LV. 

If  a  man  should  transgress  moderation,  the  things  which 
give  the  greatest  delight  would  become  the  things  which 
give  the  least. 

LV1. 

It  is  just  to  commend  Agrippinus  for  this  reason,  that 
though  he  was  a  man  of  the  highest  worth,  he  never 
praised  himself :  hut  even  it  another  person  praised  him. 
he  would  blush.  And  he  was  such  a  man  (Kpictetus  said) 
that  he  would  write  in  praise  of  anything  disagreeable 
that  befell  him  :  if  it  was  a  fever,  he  would  write 

:   if  lie  was  disgraced,  he  would    write   of  disgi . 
if  he  were  banished,  of  banishment.      And  on  one 
(he  mentioned)  when  he  was  going  to  dine,    a  n. 
brought  him  news   that  Nero  commanded  him  to  go  into 
banishment  ;   on    which    Agrippinus    said,    Well  then    we 
will  dine  at  Aricia.* 

LVII. 

Diogenes  said  that  no  labor  wa>  good,  unless  the  end 
(purpose)  of  it  was  coura/c  and  strength  of  the  soul,  but 
not  of  the  body. 

I.VI11. 

\-  a  true  balance  is  neither  corrected  by  a  true  balance 
nor  judged  by  a  false  balance,  so  also  ajust  judge  is  neither 
vted  by  just  judges  nor  is  he  judged  (condemned)  by 
unjust  judges. 

i.  i. 


464 

LIX. 

As  that  which  is  straight  does  not  need  that  which  is 
straight,  so  neither  does  the  just  need  that  which  is  just. 

LX. 

Do  not  give  judgment  in  one  court  (of  justice)  before 
you  have  been  tried  yourself  before  justice.  * 

LXI. 

If  you  wish  to  make  your  judgments  just,  listen  not  to 
(regard  not)  any  of  those  who  are  parties  (to  the  suit),  nor 
to  those  who  plead  in  it,  but  listen  to  justice  itself. 

LXI  I. 

You  will  fail  (stumble)  least  in  your  judgments,  if  you 
yourself  fail  (stumble)  least  in  your  life. 

LXIII. 

It  is  better  when  you  judge  justly  to  be  blamed  unde- 
servedly by  him  who  has  been  condemned  than  when  you 
judge  unjustly  to  be  justly  blamed  by  (before)  nature. 

LXIY. 

As  the  stone  which  tests  the  gold  is  not  at  all  tested 
itself  by  the  gold,  so  it  is  with  him  who  has  the  faculty 
of  judging. 

LXY. 

It  is  shameful  for  the  judge  to  be  judged  by  others. 

LXVI. 

As  nothing  is  straighter  than  that  which  is  straight, 
so  nothing  is  juster  than  that  which  is  just. 

*  Compare  Iviii. 


LXVIL 

Who  among  us  docs  not  admire  the  act  of  Lycurgus  the 
Lacedremonian  ?  For  after  lie  was  maimed  in  one  of  his 
eyes  by  one  of  the  citizens,  and  the' voting  man  wa- 
livered  up  to  him  by  the  people  that  lie  might  punish  him 
as  he  chose,  Lycurgus  spared  him:  and  after  instructing 
him  and  making-  him  a  good  man  he  brought  him  into  the 
theater.  When  the  Lacedemonians  expressed  their  sur- 
prise. Lycurgus  said,  I  received  from  you  this  youth  when 
he  was  insolent  and  violent  :  I  restore  him  to  you  gentle 
and  a  good  citizen. 

LXVIII. 

Pittacus  after  being  wronged  by  a  certain  person  and 
having  the  power  of  punishing  him  let  him  go,  saying. 
Forgiveness  is  better  than  revenge  :  for  forgiveness  is  the 
sign  of  a  gentle  nature,  but  revenge  the  sign  of  a  savage 
nature.* 

LXIX. 

But  before  everything  this  is  the  act  of  nature  to  bind 
together  and  to  fit  together  the  movement  toward  the  ap- 
pearance of  that  which  is  becoming  (fit)  and  useful. 

LXX. 

To  suppose  that  we  shall  be  easily  despised  by  others, 
if  we  do  not  in  every  way  do  some  damage  to  those  who 
first  show  us  their  hostility,  is  the  mark  of  very  ignoble 
and  foolish  men  :  for  (thus)  we  affirm  that  the  man  is 
considered  to  be  contemptible  because  ;;f  his  inability  to 
do  what  is  good  (useful). 

*  I'ittacus  was  one  of  the  seven  wise  men,  as  they  are  named, 
authorities  state  that    he  lived    in  thr  M-venth  ceiiiniy    I'.  <        I'.y  this 
maxim  he  anticipated  one  cf  the  Christian  doctrine^  I 
3° 


466  KPICTETCS. 

LXXI. 

When  you  are  attacking  (or  going  to  attack)  any  person 
violently  and  with  threats,  remember  to  say  to  yourself 
first,  that  you  are  (by  nature)  mild  (gentle)  ;  and  if  you 
do  nothing  savage,  you  will  continue  to  live  without 
repentance  and  without  blame. 

I, XXII. 

A  man  ought  to  know  that  it  is  not  easy  for  him  to  have 
an  opinion  (or  fixed  principle),  if  he  does  not  daily  say 
the  same  things,  and  hear  the  same  things,  and  at  the 
same  time  apply  them  to  life. 

LXXI  1 1. 

[Nicias  was  so  fond  of  labor  (assiduous)  that  he  often 
asked  his  slaves,  if  he  had  bathed  and  if  he  had  dined.] 

LXXIV. 

[The  slaves  of  Archimedes  used  to  drag  him  by  force 
from  his  table  of  diagrams  and  anoint  him  ;  and  Archi- 
medes would  then  draw  his  figures  on  his  own  body  when 
it  had  been  anointed.] 

LXXV. 

[Lampis  the  shipowner  being  asked  how  he  acquired 
his  wealth,  answered.  With  no  difficulty,  my  great  wealth  ; 
but  my  small  wealth  (my  first  gains),  with  much  labor.] 

LXXVI. 

Solon  having  been  asked  by  Periander  over  their  cups 
(irapa  TT&TOV),  since  he  happened  to  say  nothing,  Whether  he 
was  silent  for  want  of  words  or  because  he  was  a  fool, 
replied  ;  No  fool  is  able  to  be  silent  over  his  cups. 


/•/'  •  4<>7 

I  XXVII. 

Attempt  on  every  occasion  to  provide  for  nothing  so 
much  as  that  which  is  safe:  for  silence  is  safer  than  speak- 
ing. And  omit  speaking  whatever  is  without  sense  and 
reason. 

I.XXYTH. 

As  the  fire-lights  in  harbors  by  a  few  pieces  of  dry  wood 
;i  great  llaine  and  give   sufficient  help  to  ships  which 
are  wandering  on  the  s».-;i  ;   so  also  an  illustrious  man  in  a 
state  which  is  tempest-tossed,  while  he  is  himself  sat 
with  a  few  things,  does  great  services  to  his  citb 

I.XXIX. 

A-  if  you  attempted  to  manage  a  ship,  you  would 
tainly  learn  completely  the  steersman's  art,  [so  if  you 
would  administer  a  state,  learn  the  art  of  managing  a 
For  it  will  be  in  your  power,  as  in  the  first  case,  to 
manage  the  whole  ship,  so  in  the  second  case  also  to  man- 
age the  whole  state. 


If  you  propose  to  adorn  your  city  by  the  dedication  of 
offerings  (monuments),  first  dedicate  to  yourself  (decorate 
yourself  with)  the  noblest  offering  of  gentleness  and  jus- 
tice and  beneficence. 

LXXXI 

You  will  do  the  greatest  services  to  the  st-t".  if  you 
raise  not  the  roofs  of  the  houses,  but  th 
/eiift  :   for  it  is  bt-ttrr  that  great  souls  should  dwr!l  in 
houses  than  for  mean  -  ;reat  hou 


468  EPICTETUS. 

LXXXII. 

Do  not  decorate  the  walls  of  your  house  with  the  valu- 
able stones  from  Euboea  and  Sparta  ;  but  adorn  the  minds 
(breasts)  of  the  citizens  and  of  those  who  administer  the 
state  with  the  instruction  which  comes  from  Hellas 
(Clreece).  For  states  are  well  governed  by  the  wisdom 
(judgment)  of  men,  but  not  by  stone  and  wood.* 

LXXXII  I. 

As.  if  you  wished  to  breed  lions,  you  would  not  care 
about  the  costliness  of  their  dens,  but  about  the  habits  of 
the  animals  :  so.  if  you  attempt  to  preside  over  your  citi- 
zens, be  not  so  anxious  about  the  costliness  of  the  build- 
ings as  careful  about  the  manly  character  of  those  who 
dwell  in  them. 

LXXXIV.t 

As  a  skillful  horse-trainer  does  not  feed  (only)  the  good 
colts  and  allow  to  starve  those  who  are  disobedient  to  the 
rein,  but  he  feeds  both  alike,  and  chastises  the  one  more 
and  forces  him  to  be  equal  to  the  other  :  so  also  a  careful 
man  and  one  who  is  skilled  in  political  power,  attempts  to 
treat  well  those  citizens  who  have  a  good  character,  but 
does  not  will  that  those  who  are  of  a  contrary  character 
should  be  ruined  at  once  :  and  he  in  no  manner  grudges 
both  of  them  their  food,  but  he  teaches  and  urges  on  with 
more  vehemence  him  who  resists  reason  and  law. 

*The  marbles  of  Carystus  in  Eubcea  and  the  marbles  of  Taenarum 
near  Sparta  were  used  by  the  Romans,  and  perhaps  by  the  Creeks  also. 
for  architectural  decoration. 

f  This  fragment  contains  a  lesson  for  the  administration  of  a  state. 
The  good  must  be  protected,  and  the  bad  must  be  improved  by  disci- 
pline and  punishment. 


LP1CTETCS.  469 

I. XXXV. 

As  a  goose  is  not  frightened  by  cackling  nor  a  sheep  l)V 
bleating,  so  let  not  the  clamor  of  a  senseless  multitude 
alarm  you. 

LXXXVI. 

As  a  multitude,  when  they  without  reason  demand  of 
you  anything  of  your  own,  do  not  disconcert  you,  so  do 
not  be  moved  from  your  purpose  even  by  a  rabble  when 
they  unjustly  attempt  to  move  you. 

LXXXVII. 

What  is  due  to  the  state  pay  as  quickly  as  you  can,  and 
you  will  never  be  asked  for  that  which  is  not  due. 

LXXXVI  1 1. 

As  the  sun  does  not  wait  for  prayers  and  incantations  to 
be  induced  to  rise,  but  immediately  shines  and  is  saluted 
by  all  :  so  do  you  also  not  wait  for  clappings  . 
and  shouts  and  praise  to  be  induced  to  do  good 
doer  of  good  voluntarily,  and  you  will  U-  In-loved  as  much 
as  the  sun. 

LXXXIX. 

Neither  should  a  ship  rely  on  one  small  anchor,  nor 
should  life  rest  on  a  single  hope. 


We  ought  to  stretch  our  legs  and  stretch  our  hopes  only 
to  that  which  is  possible. 

XCL 

When    Thai.-  asked    what    is    most    universal,    he 


470 

answered,    Hope,    for  hope   stays   with  those   \vho  have 
nothing  else. 

XC1I. 

It  is  more  necessary  to  heal  the  soul  than  the  body,  for 
to  die  is  better  than  to  live  a  bad  life. 

XCIII. 

Pyrrho  used  to  say  that  there  is  no  difference  between 
dying  and  living  :  and  a  man  said  to  him.  Why  then  do 
you  not  die  ?  Pyrrho  replied,  Because  there  is  no  dif- 
ference. 

XCIV.* 

Admirable  is  nature,  and,  as  Xenophon  says,  a  lover  of 
animated  beings.  The  body  then,  which  is  of  all  things 
the  most  unpleasant  and  the  most  foul  (dirty),  we  love  and 
take  care  of:  for  if  we  were  obliged  for  five  days  only  to 
take  care  of  our  neighbor's  body,  we  should  not  be  able  to 
endure  it.  Consider  then  what  a  thing  it  would  be  to  rise 
in  the  morning  and  rub  the  teeth  of  another,  and  after 
doing  some  of  the  necessary  offices  to  wash  those  parts. 
In  truth  it  is  wonderful  that  we  love  a  thing  to  which  we 
perform  such  services  every  day.  I  fill  this  bag,  and  then 

*  Compare  Xenophon,  Memorab.  i.  4.  r;.  The  body  is  here,  and  else- 
where in  Epictetus,  considered  as  an  instrument,  which  another  uses  who 
is  not  the  body;  and  that  which  so  uses  the  body  must  be  something 
which  is  capable  of  using  the  body  and  a  power  which  possesses  what 
we  name  intelligence  and  consciousness.  Our  bodies,  as  Bishop  Butler 
says,  are  what  we  name  matter,  and  differ  from  other  matter  only  in  be- 
ing more  closely  connected  with  us  than  other  matter.  It  would  be  easy 
to  pass  from  these  notions  to  the  notion  that  this  intelligence  and  power, 
or  to  use  a  common  word,  the  soul,  is  something  which  exists  independ- 
ent of  the  body,  though  we  only  know  the  soul  while  it  acts  within  and 
on  the  body,  and  by  the  body. 


/v'  471 

I  empty  it  :*   what  is  more  troublesome?      Hut  I   must  art 
as  the   servant  of  God.      For  this  reason    I   remain  (:. 
and  I  endure  to  wash  this  miserable  body,  to  feed    it    and 
to  clothe  it.      But  when  I  was    younger,  <  iod    imposed  on 
me  also  another  tiling,  and  I  submitted  to    it.      Why   then 
do  you    not  submit,  when  Nature  who  has  given  us   this 
body  takes  it   away?      I    love    the    body,    you    may 
Well,  as  I  said  just  now.    Nature  gave  you    also  this  love 
of  the  body  :   but  Nature  >ays.   Leave  it  now,  and  have  no 
more  trouble  (with  it). 

XCY. 

When  a  man  dies  young,  he  blames  the  gods.  When 
he  is  old  and  does  not  die,  he  blames  the  gods  because  he 
suffers  when  he  ought  to  have  already  ceased  from  suffer- 
ing. And  nevertheless,  when  death  approaches,  he 
wishes  to  live,  and  sends  to  the  physician  and  entreat- 
him  to  omit  no  care  or  trouble.  Wonderful,  he  said 
men,  who  are  neither  willing  to  live  nor  to  die. 

XCYI. 

To  the  longer  life  and  the  worse,  the  shorter  life,  if  it  is 
better,  ought  by  all  means  to  be  preferred. 


When    we   are    children    our     parents     deliver    us 
pedagogue  to  take  care  on  all  occasions  that    we  sul: 
harm.       Hut  when  we  are  become  men.  (iod  delivers  us   to 
our  innate  conscience  to  take  care  of  us.      This   -uanlian- 
ship  then  we  must  in    no  way    despise,  for  we  shall    both 
displease  (  iod  and  be  eneniie-  to  our  own    COnSCietl 

•This  hag  is  the  body,  or  that  "part  ••(  it  which  !u>hU   tin-    food   which 

is  t:it  '•<*>. 


472  '. 

XCVIII. 

[We  ought  to  use  wealth  as  the  material  for  some  act, 
not  for  every  act  alike.] 

XCIX. 

[Virtue  then  should  be  desired  by  all  men  more  than 
wealth  which  is  dangerous  to  the  foolish  :  for  the  wicked- 
ness of  men  is  increased  by  wealth.  And  the  more  a 
man  is  without  sense,  the  more  violent  is  he  in  excess, 
for  he  has  the  means  of  satisfying  his  mad  desire  for 
pleasures.  ] 

C. 

What  we  ought  not  to  do.  we  should  not  even  think  of 
.  .  fe 

doing. 

CI. 

Deliberate  much  before  saying  or  doing  anything,  for 
you  will  not  have  the  power  of  recalling  what  has  been 
said  or  done. 

CII. 

Every  place  is  safe  to  him  who  lives  with  justice. 

cm. 

Crows  devour  the  eyes  of  the  dead,  when  the  dead  have 
no  longer  need  of  them.  But  flatterers  destroy  the  souls 
of  the  living  and  blind  their  eyes. 

CIV. 

The  anger  of  an  ape  and  the  threats  of  a  flatterer  should 
be  considered  as  the  same. 

CV. 

Listen  to  those  who  wish  to  advise  what  is  useful,  but 


Awry/.  yy.Y.  47j 

not  to  those  who  are  eager  to  Hatter  on  all  occasion.-  :   lor 
the  first  really  see  what  is  useful.  Imt    the  second  look   to 
that  which  agrees  with   the  opinion  of   those  who  po 
power,  and  imitating  the  shadows  of  bodies  they  assent 
to  what  is  said  by  the  powerful. 

CVI. 

The  man  who  gives  advice  ought  first  to  have  regard  to 
the  modesty  and  character  (reputation)  of  those  whom  he 
advises  ;  for  those  who  have  lost  the  capacity  of  blushing 
are  incorrigible. 

CVI  I. 

To  admonish  is  better  than  to  reproach  :  for  admonition 
is  mild  and  friendly,  but  reproach  is  harsh  and  insulting  : 
and  admonition  corrects  those  who  are  doing  wrong,  but 
reproach  only  convicts  them. 

CVIIL 

Give  of  what  you  have  to  strangers  and  to  those  wh<> 
have  need  :  for  he  who  gives  not  to  him  who  wants,  will 
not  receive  himself  when  he  wants. 

CIX 

A  pirate  had  been  cast  on  the  land  and  was  perishing 
through  the  tempest.  A  man  took  clothing  and  gave  it  to 
him,  and  brought  the  pirate  into  his  house,  and  supplied 
him  with  everything  else  that  was  necessary.  When  the 
man  was  reproached  by  a  person  for  doing  kindm 
the  bad,  he  replied,  I  have  shown  this  regard  not  to  the 
man,  but  to  mankind.* 

*Mrs.  Carter  in  her  notes  often  refers  to  ilic  Christian  precepts,  hut 
she  says  nothing  here.  The  fragment  is  not  from  Kpictetus ;  lint, 
whether  the  story  is  true  or  not,  it  is  an  example  of  the  behavior  of  a 
wise  and  pood  man. 


.174  &PICTETVS. 

CX. 

A  man  should  choose  (pursue)  not    every  pleasure,  but 
the  pleasure  which  leads  to  goodness. 


It  is  the  part  of  a  wise  man  to  resist  pleasures,  but  of  a 
foolish  man  to  be  a  slave  to  them. 

CXII. 

Pleasure,  like  a  kind  of  bait,  is  thrown  before  (in  front 
of)  everything  which  is  really  bad,  and  easily  allures 
greedy  souls  to  the  hook  of  perdition. 

CXIII. 

Choose  rather  to  punish  your  appetites  than  to  be 
punished  through  them. 

CXIV. 

No  man  is  free  who  is  not  master  of  himself. 
CXV. 

The  vine  bears  three  bunches  of  grapes  :  the  first  i> 
that  of  pleasure,  the  second  of  drunkenness,  the  third  of 
violence. 

CXVI. 

Over  your  wine  do  not  talk  much  to  display  your  learn- 
ing ;  for  you  will  utter  bilious  stuff. 

C'XYII. 

He  is  intoxicated  who  drinks  more  than  three  cups  : 
and  if  he  is  not  intoxicated,  he  has  exceeded  moderation. 


EP1  47  5 

( 'XVII  I. 

Let  your  talk  of  God  be  renewed  every  day,  rather  than 
your  food. 

rxix. 

Think  of  God  more  frequently  than  you  breathe. 
(XX. 

If  you  always  remember  that  whatever  you  are  doing  in 
the  soul  or  in  the  body,  God  stands  by  as  an  inspector, 
you  will  never  err  (do  wrong)  in  all  your  prayers  and  in 
all  your  acts,  but  you  will  have  God  dwelling  with  you.* 

(XXI. 

As  it  is  pleasant  to  see  the  sea  from  the  land,  so  it  is 
pleasant  for  him  who  has  escaped  from  troubles  to  think 
of  them. 

CXXI1. 

Law  intends  indeed  to  do  service  to  human  life,  but  it 
is  not  able  when  men  do  not  choose  to  accept  her  serv- 
ices ;  for  it  is  only  in  those  who  are  obedient  to  her  that 
she  displays  her  special  virtue. 

CXXIIt 

A.s  to  the  sick  physicians  are  as  saviors,  so  to  tl 
who  are  wronged  are  the  laws. 

<  XXIV. 
The  justest  laws  are  those  which  are  the  tn 

•This  i.-  tin.-  doctrine  of  God  hdii^:  in  man.      See  tin    i 


476  A/'/ CTE  '1  //.S. 

cxxv. 

To  yield  to  law  and  to  a  magistrate  and  to  him  who  is 
wiser  than  yourself,  is  becoming. 

CXXVI. 

The  things  which  are  done  contrary  to  law  are  the  same 
as  things  which  are  not  done. 

CXXVII. 

In  prosperity  it  is  very  easy  to  find  a  friend  ;  but  in  ad- 
versity it  is  most  difficult  of  all  things. 

CXXVII  I. 

Time  relieves  the  foolish  from  sorrow,  but  reason 
relieves  the  wise. 

CXXIX. 

He  is  a  wise  man  who  does  not  grieve  for  the  things 
which  he  has  not,  but  rejoices  for  those  which  he  has. 

cxxx. 

Kpictetus  being  asked  how  a  man  should  give  pain  to 
his  enemy  answered,  By  preparing  himself  to  live  the  best 
life  that  he  can. 

CXXX  I. 

Let  no  wise  man  be  averse  to  undertaking  the  office  of 
a  magistrate  :  for  it  is  both  impious  for  a  man  to  with- 
draw himself  from  being  useful  to  those  who  have  need 
of  our  services,  and  it  is  ignoble  to  give  way  to  the 
worthless  :  for  it  is  foolish  to  prefer  being  ill-governed  to 
governing  well. 


CXXXII. 

Nothing  is  more  becoming  to  him  who  governs  than  t« 
despise  no  man  and  not  show  arrogance,  but  to  preside 
over  all  with  equal  care. 

(XXXIII. 

[In  poverty  any  man  lives  (can  live)  happily,  but  very 
seldom  in  wealth  and  power.  The  value  of  poverty  ex- 
cels so  much  that  no  just  man  would  exchange  poverty 
for  disreputable  wealth,  unless  indeed  the  richest  of  the 
Athenians  Themistocles,  the  son  of  Neocles,  was  better 
than  Aristides  and  Socrates,  though  he  was  poor  in  virtue. 
But  the  wealth  of  Themistocles  and  Themistocles  himself 
have  perished  and  have  left  no  name.  For  all  things  die 
with  death  in  a  bad  man,  but  the  good  is  eternal.]* 

CXXXIV. 

Remember  that  such  was,  and  is,  and  will  be  the  nature 
of  the  universe,  and  that  it  is  not  possible  that  the  things 
which  come  into  being  can  come  into  being  otherwise 
than  they  do  now  ;  and  that  not  only  men  have  partici- 
pated in  this  change  and  transmutation,  and  all  other 
living  things  which  are  on  the  earth,  but  also  the  things 
which  are  divine.  And  indeed  the  very  four  elements  are 
changed  and  transmuted  up  and  down,  and  earth  becomes 
water  and  water  becomes  air,  and  the  air  again  is  trans- 
muted into  other  things,  and  the  same  manner  of  tran>- 
mutation  takes  place  from  above  to  In-low.  If  a  man 
attempts  to  turn  his  mind  toward  these  thoughts,  and  to 
persuade  himself  to  accept  with  willingness  that  which  is 
necessary,  he  will  pass  through  life  with  complete  modera- 
tion and  harmony. 

*This  fragment  is  not  from  Kpictrtu-;. 


478 

cxxxv. 

He  who  is  dissatisfied  with  things  present  and  what  is 
given  by  fortune  is  an  ignorant  man  in  life  :  hut  he  who 
bears  them  nobly  and  rationally  and  the  things  which  pro- 
ceed from  them  is  worthy  of  being  considered  a  good 
man. 

( 'XXX  VI. 

All  things  obey  and  serve  the  world  (the  universe), 
earth  and  sea  and  sun  and  the  rest  of  the  stars,  and  the 
plants  of  earth  and  animals.  And  our  body  obeys  it  also 
both  in  disease  and  in  health  when  it  (the  universe) 
chooses,  both  in  youth  and  in  age,  and  when  it  is  passing 
through  the  other  changes.  What  is  reasonable  then  and 
in  our  power  is  this,  for  our  judgment  not  to  be  the  only 
thing  which  resists  it  (the  universe)  :  for  it  is  strong  and 
superior,  and  it  has  determined  better  about  us  by  admin- 
istering (governing)  us  also  together  with  the  whole. 
And  besides,  this  opposition  also  is  unreasonable  and  does 
nothing  more  than  cause  us  to  be  tormented  uselessly  and 
to  fall  into  pain  and  sorrow. 


The  fragments    which  follow   are  in  part   assigned  to 
Epictetus.  in  part  to  others. 

CXXXV1I. 

Contentment,    as  it   is  a  short  road  and  pleasant,   has 
great  delight  and  little  trouble. 

CXXXYIll. 

Fortify  yourself  with  contentment,  for  this  is  an  impreg- 
nable fortress. 


EPICTETUS.  479 

CXXXIX. 

Let  nothing  be  valued  more  than  truth :  not  even  selec- 
tion of  a  friendship  which  lies  without  the  influence  of 
the  affects,  by  which  (affects)  justice  is  both  confounded 
(disturbed)  and  darkened.  * 

CXL. 

Truth  is  a  thing  immortal  and  perpetual,  and  it  gives  to 
us  a  beauty  which  fades  not  away  in  time  nor  does  it  take 
away  the  freedom  of  speech  which  proceeds  from  justice; 
but  it  gives  to  us  the  knowledge  of  what  is  just  and  law- 
ful, separating  from  them  the  unjust  and  refuting  them. 

CXLI. 

We  should  not  have  either  a  blunt  knife  or  a  freedom  of 
speech  which  is  ill-managed. 

CXLII. 

Nature  has  given  to  men  one  tongue,  but  two  ears,  that 
we  may  hear  from  others  twice  as  much  as  we  speak. 

CXLI  1 1. 

Nothing  really  pleasant  or  unpleasant  subsists  by 
nature,  but  all  things  become  so  through  habit  (custom). 

CXLIV. 

Choose  the  best  life,  for  custom  (habit)  will  make  it 
pleasant 

CXLV. 

Be  careful  to  leave  your  sons  well  instructed  rather  th» 
*The  meaning  of  the  second  part  is  confused  and  uncertain. 


480  EPICTETUS. 

rich,  for  the  hopes  of  the  instructed  are  better  than  the 
wealth  of  the  ignorant. 

CXLVI. 

A  daughter  is  a  possession  to  her  father  which  is  not  his 
own. 

CXLVII. 

The  same  person  advised  to  leave  modesty  to  children 
rather  than  gold. 

CXLVIII. 

The  reproach  of  a  father  is  agreeable  medicine,  for  it 
contains  more  that  is  useful  than  it  contains  of  that  which 
gives  pain. 

CXLIX. 

He  who  has  been  lucky  in  a  son-in-law  has  found  a 
son  :  but  he  who  has  been  unlucky,  has  lost  also  a 
daughter. 

CL. 

The  value  of  education  (knowledge)  like  that  of  gold  is 
valued  in  every  place. 

CLI. 

He  who  exercises  wisdom  exercises  the  knowledge 
which  is  about  God 

CLIL 

Nothing  among  animals  is  so  beautiful  as  a  man 
adorned  by  learning  (knowledge). 

CLin. 

We  ought  to  avoid  the  friendship  of  the  bad  and  the 
enmity  of  the  good. 


EPICTETUS.  481 

CLIV. 

The  necessity  of  circumstances  proves  friends  and  de- 
tects enemies. 

CLV. 

When  our  friends  are  present,  we  ought  to  treat  them 
well ;  and  when  they  are  absent,  to  speak  of  them  well. 

CLVI. 

Let  no  man  think  that  he  is  loved  by  any  man  when  he 
loves  no  man. 

CLVI  I. 

You  ought  to  choose  both  physician  and  friend  not  the 
most  agreeable,  but  the  most  useful. 

CLVIII. 

If  you  wish  to  live  a  life  free  from  sorrow,  think  of  what 
is  going  to  happen  as  if  it  had  already  happened. 

CLIX. 

Be  free  from  grief  not  through  insensibility  like  the  irra- 
tional animals,  nor  through  want  of  thought  like  the  fool- 
ish, but  like  a  man  of  virtue  by  having  reason  as  the  con- 
solation of  grief. 

CLX. 

Whoever  are  least  disposed  in   mind  by  calamities,  and 
in  act  struggle  most  against  them,  these  are  the  best  men 
in  states  and  in  private  life. 
3* 


482  EPICTETUS. 

CLXI. 

Those  who  have  been  instructed,  like  those  who  have 
been  trained  in  the  palaestra,  though  they  may  have 
fallen,  rise  again  from  their  misfortune  quickly  and  skill- 
fully. 

CLXII. 

We  ought  to  call  in  reason  like  a  good  physician  as  a 
help  in  misfortune. 

CLXIII. 

A  fool  having  enjoyed  good  fortune  like  intoxication  to 
a  great  amount  becomes  more  foolish. 

CLXIV. 

Envy  is  the  antagonist  of  the  fortunate. 
CLXV. 

He  who  bears  in  mind  what  man  is  will  never  be  trou- 
bled at  anything  which  happens. 

CLXVI. 

For  making  a  good  voyage  a  pilot  (master)  and  wind 
are  necessary :  and  for  happiness,  reason  and  art 

CLXVII. 

We  should  enjoy  good  fortune  while  we  have  it,  like 
the  fruits  of  autumn. 

CLXVIII. 

He  is  unreasonable  who  is  grieved  (troubled)  at  th« 
things  which  happen  from  the  necessity  of  nature. 


EPICTETUS,  483 

SOME  FRAGMENTS   OF   EPICTKTI  s  OMITTED    BY  UPTON  AND  BY 

Ml.  I  HUM  IIS. 

CLXIX. 

Of  the  things  which  are,  (iod  has  put  some  of  them  in 
our  power,  and  some  he  has  not.  In  our  own  power  he 
has  placed  that  which  is  the  best  and  the  most  important, 
that  indeed  through  which  he  himself  is  happy,  the  use  of 
appearances.  For  when  the  use  is  rightly  employed. 
there  is  freedom,  happiness,  tranquillity,  constancy  :  and 
this  is  also  justice  and  law,  and  temperance,  and  every 
virtue.  But  all  other  things  he  has  not  placed  in  our 
power.  Wherefore  we  also  ought  to  be  of  one  mind  with 
God,  and  making  this  division  of  things,  to  look  after 
those  which  are  in  our  power  ;  and  of  the  things  not  in 
our  power,  to  intrust  them  to  the  I  and  \\ ! 

it   should  require   our   children,   or  our  country,   or  our 
body,  or  anything  else,  willingly  to  give  them  up.* 

CLXX. 

When  a  young  man   was  boasting  in   the  theater  and 
saying,  I  am  wise,  for  I  have  conversed  with  many 
men  ;   Epictetus  said,  I  also  have  conversed  with  many 
rich  men,  but  I  am  not  rich. 

CLXX1. 

The  same  person  said,  It  is  not  good  for  him  who  IKIS 
been  well  taught  to  talk  among  the  untaught,  as  it  is  not 
right  for  him  who  is  sober  to  talk  among  those  who  are- 
drunk. 

*  This  is  a  valuable  fragment,  and  I  think,  a  genuine  f  Moment   of 
Epictetus.     There  is  plainly  a  defect  in  the  text,  which    Schweigh.. 
has  judiciously  supplied. 


484  JEPICTETUS. 

CLXXII. 

Epictetus  being  asked,  What  man  is  rich,  answered,  He 
who  is  content  (who  has  enough). 

CLXXIII. 

Xanthippe  was  blaming  Socrates,  because  he  was  mak- 
ing small  preparation  for  receiving  his  friends  :  but  Soc- 
rates said,  If  they  are  our  friends,  they  will  not  care  about 
it ;  and  if  they  are  not,  we  shall  care  nothing  about  them. 

CLXXIV. 

When  Archelaus  was  sending  for  Socrates  to  make  him 
rich,  Socrates  told  the  messengers  to  return  this  answer  : 
At  Athens  four  measures  (chcenices)  of  meal  are  sold  for 
one  obolus  (the  sixth  of  a  drachme),  and  the  fountains  run 
with  water  :  if  what  I  have  is  not  enough  (sufficient)  for 
me,  yet  I  am  sufficient  for  what  I  have,  and  so  it  becomes 
sufficient  for  me.  Do  you  not  see  that  it  was  with  no 
nobler  voice  that  Polus  acted  the  part  of  CEdipus  as  king 
than  of  CEdipus  as  a  wanderer  and  beggar  at  Colonus  ? 
Then  shall  the  good  man  appear  to  be  inferior  to  Polus, 
and  unable  to  act  well  every  character  (personage)  im- 
posed on  him  by  the  Deity  ?  and  shall  he  not  imitate 
Ulysses,  who  even  in  rags  made  no  worse  figure  than  in 
the  soft  purple  robe  ? 

CLXXV. 

What  do  I  care,  he  (Epictetus)  says,  whether  all  things 
are  composed  of  atoms,  or  of  similar  parts  or  of  fire  and 
earth  ?  for  is  it  not  enough  to  know  the  nature  of  the  good 
and  the  evil,  and  the  measures  of  the  desires  and  the  aver- 
sions, and  also  the  movements  toward  things  and  from 
them  ;  and  using  these  as  rules  to  administer  the  affairs  of 


EP1CTE  TVS.  485 

life,  but  not  to  trouble  ourselves  about  the  things  above 
us  ?  For  these  things  are  perhaps  incomprehensible  to  the 
human  mind  :  and  if  any  man  should  even  suppose  them 
to  be  in  the  highest  degree  comprehensible,  what  th 
the  profit  of  them,  if  they  are  comprehended  ?  And  must 
we  not  say  that  those  men  have  needless  trouble  who 
assign  these  things  as  necessary  to  the  philosopher's  dis- 
course ?  Is  then  also  the  precept  written  at  Delphi  super- 
fluous, which  is  Know  thyself?  It  is  not  so,  he  s 
What  then  is  the  meaning  of  it?  If  a  man  gave  to  a 
choreutes  (member  of  chorus)  the  precept  to  know  him- 
self, would  he  not  have  observed  in  the  precept  that  he 
must  direct  his  attention  to  himself? 

CLXXVI. 

You  are  a  little  soul  carrying  a  dead  body,  as  Epictetus 
said. 

CLXXVII. 

He  (Epictetus)  said  that  he  had  discovered  an  art  in 
giving  assent ;  and  in  the  topic  (matter)  of  the  movements 
he  had  discovered  that  we  must  observe  attention,  that  the 
movements  be  subject  to  exception,  that  they  be  social, 
that  they  be  according  to  the  worth  of  each  thing  ;  and 
that  we  ought  to  abstain  entirely  from  desire,  and  to  em- 
ploy aversion  to  none  of  the  things  which  are  not  in  our 
power. 

CLXXVI  1 1. 

About  no  common  thing,  he  said,  the  contest  (dispute) 
is,  but  about  being  mad  or  not 


486  EPICTETUS. 

CLXXIX. 
AUL.  GELLIUS,  xvn.   19. 

Favorinum  ego  audivi  dicere  Epictetum  philosophum 
dixisse,  "plerosque  istos  qui  philosophari  videntur,   phi- 

loSOphoS  CSSe  hujuscemodi,  &vev  TOV  irpdrreiv,  ^XP'  T°V  X^yeti/."* 

Id  significat,  factis  procul,  verbis  tenus.  Jam  illud  est 
vehementius,  quod  Arrianus  solitum  eum  dictitare  in  libris, 
quos  de  Dissertationibusejus  composuit,  scriptum  reliquit. 
Nam,  "quum,"  inquit,  "  animadverterat  hominem  pudore 
amisso,  importuna  industria,  corruptis  moribus,  audacem, 
confidentem  lingua,  caeteraque  omnia  praeter  animum  pro- 
curantem  ;  istiusmodi,"  inquit,  "  hominem  quum  viderat 
studia  quoque  et  disciplinas  philosophise  contrectare,  et 
physica  adire  et  meditari  dialectica,  multaque  id  genus 
theoremata  suspicari  sciscitarique,  inclamabet  deum  atque 
hominum  fidem,  ac  plerumque,  inter  clamandum  his  eum 
verbis  increpabat  :  "AvOponre,  irov  /3dXXe«  ;  <TKl\f/ai  el  KeKdOaprat  r& 
tLyyciov  .  Hv  yap  eis  TT\V  ot^ffiv  /SdX\7js,  dn-wXero,  &v  ffairij,  ij  otipov  ^  6!-os 
ytvoir  &S  T;"  ri  TOI/TWV  x«pov.'  Nihil  profecto  his  verbis  gravius, 
nihil  verius,  quibus  declarabat  maximus  philosophorum, 
"  literas  atque  doctrinas  Philosophise,  quum  in  hominem 
falsum  atque  degenerem,  tamquam  in  vas  spurcum  atque 
pollutum  influxissent,  verti,  mutari,  corrumpi,  et  (quod 
ipse  KwiKwrepov  ait)  urinam  fieri,  aut  si  quid  est  urina  spur- 
cius.  "  Prseterea  idem  ille  Epictetus,  quod  ex  eodem  Favo- 
rino  audivimus,  solitus  dicere  est  :  "  duo  esse  vitia  multo 
omnium  gravissima  et  taeterrima,  intolerantiam  et  incon- 
tinentiam,  quum  aut  injurias  quas  sunt  ferendae  non  tole- 
ramus  neque  ferimus,  aut  a  quibus  rebus  voluptatibusque 
nos  tenere  debemus  non  tenemus.  Itaque,"  inquit,  "si 
quis  haec  duo  verba  cordi  habeat,  eaque  sibi  imperando 
atque  observando  curet,  is  erit  pleraque  impeccabilis  vi- 
tamque  vivet  tranquillissimam.  Verba  duo  haec  dicebat, 


*  Arrian,  Dissert,  ii.  19. 


EPICTETUS.  487 

CLXXX. 
AUL.   GELLIUS,  xix.    i. 

Philosophus  in  disciplina  Stoica  celebratus     ...     ex 
sarcinula  sua  librum  protulit  Epectiti  philosophi  quintum 
AiaXe^ar  :  quas  ah  Arriano  digestas  congruere  scriptis  Xmo- 
nis  et  Chrysippi  non  dubium  est.     In  eo  libro  Graeca  scilicet 
oratione  scriptum   ad  hanc  sententiam   legimu- 
animi,"  quas  ^arra<rios  philosophi  appellant,  "quibus  mens 
hominis  prima  statim    specie    accidentis  ad  animum  rei 
pellitur,  non  voluntatis  stint,  neque  arbitraria,  sed  vi  qua- 
darn  suainferunt  sese  hominibusnoscitanda.      Probat 
autem   quas  <riry«iTa0aAr«j  vacant,  quibus  eadem  visa  nos- 
cuntur  ac  dijudicantur,  voluntaries  sunt  fiuntquehominum 
arbitratu.      Propterea  quum  sonus  aliquis  ant  caelo  aut  ex 
ruina  aut  repentinus   [nescius]   periculi  nuntius  vel  quid 
aliud  ejusmodi  factum,  sapientis  quoque  animum  paulisper 
moveri  et  contrahi  et  pallescere  necessum  est,  non  opinione 
alicujus  mali  prsecepta,  sed  quibusdam  motibus  rapi.. 
inconsultis  officium  mentis  atque  rationis  praevertentibus. 
Mox  tamen  ille  sapiens  ibidem  [idem  ?]  r«ki  To«u/ra*  <t>arra- 
(7/as,  id  est,  visa  istaec  animi  sui  terrifica  non  approbat  :  hoc 
est  ov  <TvjK<iTaTl8tTai.  ovSi  irpo<reiri5o$d^',  sed  abjicit  respuitaque, 
nee  ei  metuendum  esse  in  his  quidquam  videtur.     Atque 
hoc  inter  insipientis  sapientisque  animum  differre  dicunt, 
quod  insipiens,  qualia  esse  primo  animi  sui  pulsu 
saeva  et  aspera,  talia  esse  vcro  putat,  et  oadi-m  in> 
tamquam  iure  metuenda  sint,  sua  quoqi 
probat  Kai  vpofftTTtSo^ti  (hoc  enini  vcrbo  Stoici  quum 
ista  re  disserunt  utuntur).      Sapiens  autem  quum  l>r. 
et  strictim  colore  atque  vultu  motus  est,  ov  ffvyKararietra^ 
statum  vigoremque  sententia?  sua-  retmet,  quani  de  hujus- 
cemodi  visis  semper  habuit,  ut  de  mimrne  metuendi- 
fronte  falsa  et  formidine  inani  territanti: 


$&  EPICTETUS. 

CLXXXI. 

ARNOBIUS  ADVERS.   GENTES,   IN  FINE  LIBRI  SECUNDI. 

Quum  de  animarum  agitur  salute  ac  de  respectu  nostn  ; 
"aliquid  et  sine  ratione  faciendum  est,"*  ut  Epictetum 
dixisse  approbat  Arrianus. 

*"Nempe  ubi  ratio  deficit,  ibi  sola  fiducia  in  Deum  reposita  et 
obsequio  vpluntati  ejus  ab  ipso  declaratae  unice  subjecto  agendum  est." 
— Schweig.'  See  Encheirid.  xxxii. 


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I  Jack  Harkaway's  School  Days. 

3  Jack  Harkaway  After  School  Days. 

3  Jack  Harkaway  Afloat  and  Ashore. 

4  Jack  Harkaway  at  Oxford,  Part  i. 

5  Jack  Harkaway  at  Oxford,  Part  2. 

6  Jack  Harkaway  Among  the  Brigands,  Part  i. 

7  Jack  Harkaway  Among  the  Brigands,  Part  2. 

8  Jack  Harkaway's  Adventures  Around  the  World. 

9  Jack  Harkaway  in  America  and  Cuba. 

10  Jack  Harkawfty's  Adventures  fn  China. 

11  Jack  Harkaway's  Adventures  in  Greece,  Part  i. 

12  Jack  Harkaway's  Adventures  in  Greece,  Part  2. 

13  Jack  Harkaway's  Adventures  in  Australia. 

14  Jack  Harkiway  and  His  Boy  Tinker,  Part  i. 

15  Jack  Harkaway  and  H2s  Boy  Tinker,  Part  2. 

"  N<>  mor<>  r«';ul;iV.  iutad 

"ihan  these  fifteen  volumes." — Book  '. 

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Ibenty  Series, 

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8  BY  SHEER  PLUCK,  * 

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9  CAT  OF   BLBASTES, 

of  Ancient  Egypt. 

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II     CAPTAIN  BAYLEY'S  HEIR, 

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*4     FRIENDS,  THOUGH  DIVIDED, 

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15  FOR  NAME  AND  FAHE,  or  Through  Afghan  Pasaee, 

16  FOR  THE  TEriPLE, 

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•<>ry  of  Wallace  and  Bruce. 

18  IN  TinES  OP  PERIL, 

A  tale  of  ludia. 

19  IN  THE  REIGN  OF  TERROR, 

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ao    JACK  ARCHER, 

A  tale  of  the  Crimea. 

21  LION  OF  THE  NORTH, 

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22  LION  OF  ST.  MARK, 

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27  ST.  GEORGF.  FOR  ENGLAND, 

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28  THROUGH  THE  FRAY, 

A  story  of  the  Luddite  Riots. 

39    TRUE  TO  THE  OLD  FLAG, 

A  tale  of  the  American  War  of  Independence. 

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3  St.  Winifred's,  or  The  World  of  School. 

Bi  THOMAS  HUGHES, 

4  Tom  Brown's  School  Days  at  Rugby. 

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•These  stories  uf  school  life  by  the  famous  author  of  the  "Life  of 
Christ"  are  not  surpassed  in  interest  and  high  moral  tone  by  any  boys' 
Itories  written.  They  picture  in  an  eloquent  and  exceedingly  fascinating 
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